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NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

NATO FORCE DEFICIENCIES AND IMPROVEMENTS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; and Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, John J. Hamre, Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, Norman G. Mosher, Frederick F.Y. Pang, and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Debra A. Rice and Mickie Jan Wise, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The hearing will come to order.

The committee meets this morning to continue hearings on the defense of NATO and the INF Treaty. This series of hearings is an extension, but a more focused review of U.S. national security strategy that the Armed Services Committee began last year. The INF Treaty must be considered in the context of NATO's military strategy.

Our witnesses this morning are the chiefs of the armed services, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Admiral Crowe as Chairman reported on the collective views of the Joint Chiefs when he appeared before us last week in our opening hearing.

Today we want to hear first-hand from these distinguished officers, primarily in their roles as head of the services that provide

the resources and support for our military strategy in NATO, but also from the broader perspective as they are members of the Joint Chiefs.

And so we want to hear their views on NATO force deficiencies and improvements. Each of our military services has a major operational commander. They know it takes more than words and wishes to implement a strategy.

So General Vuono, Admiral Trost, General Gray, and General Welch, we welcome you and look forward to your testimony.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have clearly stated the framework in which we will receive this important testimony.

I would simply add that the central thrust of these hearings is to determine if this treaty is in the security interest, near-term and long-term, of the United States and its allies. I am certain that you will address that central question as you proceed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I too welcome the chiefs this morning. Their testimony on the NATO deficiencies and needed improvements, particularly post-INF, will be valuable.

But as Senator Warner said, the chief thrust of these hearings is to examine the INF Treaty and to determine whether it is in our national security interest to ratify that agreement or not.

And I complain once again, Mr. Chairman, that this committee has yet to hear from a single witness who opposes ratification of the treaty.

Senator WARNER. General Rogers.

Senator HUMPHREY. No, General Rogers supports ratification. He says it is a lousy treaty, but for political reasons we should support ratification. And I complain once again about the stacking of witnesses for these hearings to exclude so far entirely a single witness who opposes ratification.

And we know the chiefs are well qualified to advise us on military matters, but let us face the fact. The Commander in Chief has made his decision about this treaty. They are bound to uphold the view of the commander or to resign. That is the choice.

And so their testimony this morning in support of the treaty really is not as persuasive as the testimony of those who are free to speak their minds freely. And I urge once again, out of fairness and out of the responsibility we have to examine both sides of the argument, that we have some witnesses before the close of these hearings who oppose the treaty and who can give us the other side of the argument.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Humphrey. Senator Humphrey, I think you gave us five names of people to be invited. We have four of those people who have been invited.

The problem is some of the people that you have on your list are for the treaty. They start off being opposed and have written things negative about it and they come up and testify, and the final analysis is that they are for the treaty.

Now, we are not inviting witnesses on the basis of whether they are for or against the treaty. We are inviting witnesses on the basis of their credentials in the national security field.

Now, I suppose we could parade 150 people up here any day against the treaty, but we have to look at the credentials and the authority with which they speak. I think it would be a sad commentary on the Senate Armed Services Committee if we did not hear from the head of the U.S. Army, the head of the U.S. Navy, the head of the U.S. Marine Corps, and the head of the U.S. Air Force as to whether they are for or against the treaty.

Whether they flip a coin or whether they come out with no answer, they are the leaders of our military. So I think it is entirely appropriate that we hear from these witnesses. We will continue to consider any of your requests and, frankly, we will consider them on the basis of the credentials, the general reputation, abilities, reputation in the national security field of the people that are testifying before us.

We are not here to try to hold a hearing to see how many people we can get on one side or the other or to march witnesses up here where we have 10 people for it and 10 people against it and say we have had a balanced hearing. It depends on the credentials of the witnesses.

And so we are listening, Senator Humphrey, to you very carefully, and we will continue to. We will continue to look at any witnesses you submit. Four of the five witnesses you have requested have either testified or are on our list scheduled to testify.

Senator WARNER. I think it is important that we clarify for the Senator those that he has asked to come before the committee and those that the chairman has acceded to invite. Could we have that clarification?

Chairman NUNN. The list I have, Senator Humphrey—and this to me, is a private communication. I do not really want to get into this in public. If Senator Humphrey would like to say who he has requested to be invited, then I would be glad to respond on each one of them.

But I do not really think that I should do that without his permission. But I can list the ones that he has requested to be invited and tell you what we have done with each one of them. If you would like to do this in a public forum, it is fine with me.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed that the chairman thinks it is necessary for another member to submit a list. The chairman is the chairman, and I should think the chairman would feel a responsibility to invite at least a few people he knows oppose the treaty, that the members of the committee and the public might get a more balanced presentation.

I am not calling for equal time. I do not care about that. But I do think we ought to have a few expert witnesses who are not bound, as the chiefs are and other members of the administration are, whether in uniform or not, to uphold the decision of the Commander in Chief and the President.

We welcome, as I said, and respect the chiefs, but we all know the dilemma that any uniformed man is in, whether one stripe or one star or five stars or four stars, when he disagrees with the

Commander in Chief. He has got to support the Commander in Chief and that is it, either that or resign.

And so I am not looking to get into any games here. Let us get some witnesses who oppose the treaty. Let us have a little balance, because we should examine both sides of the arguments, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I think we have heard a whole lot on the other side of the argument. General Rogers went through every conceivable reason that a military man might be opposed to the treaty, and then he balanced it out and decided he felt that he would not counsel us unequivocally to vote against the treaty.

I do not know that you could get a more articulate, experienced witness to point out the down side or the dangers of a treaty.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick also pointed out the overall political dangers and ramifications in a very articulate way, and I do not know how anyone could be more expressive of that perspective than she was.

Senator Humphrey, if I have your permission, I will refer to your letter and the witnesses you have requested and tell you what we have done with each one of them. Do I have your permission?

Senator HUMPHREY. You have. I do not see that it is going to do much good, Mr. Chairman. All I am seeking is a commitment on the part of the chairman to secure a few expert witnesses who are both against the treaty and against ratification.

I think if we have that, then we can say that we have heard, truly heard both sides of the argument before we make up our minds.

Chairman NUNN. Well, would the Senator suggest the chairman have an advance deposition to see how they are going to come down before they appear? Because there were some of them on the list that I thought were going to come down against the treaty and they came up and they decided after, I am sure, their own reflection that they were not opposed to the treaty.

I do not plan to depose the witnesses or have people tell me in advance how they are going to testify as a condition precedent for appearance before this committee. I never have done that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, if the chairman is not willing to do that, I am certainly willing for my part to do that. If the chairman will commit to, say, having at least three witnesses who are opposed to ratification, I will supply him the names of three.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I am not going to commit to any individual just because of a view they might hold unless they have some credentials in the field.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to waste the chiefs' time or the Senators' time any further. My point is valid, self-evidently valid, and I stand on my request.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I thank the Senator and I assure him I will continue to deliberate with Senator Warner, to take into account his views, to try to have a set of hearings that provides us with the expert information we need in order to make our judgment.

I will refer to a letter of December 17, 1987, from Senator Humphrey to me as chairman:

Dear Sam: As our committee begins planning for a series of hearings on the intermediate range nuclear forces, INF Treaty, I would appreciate the following distinguished individuals be called to testify:

Ambassador Evan Galbraith, Ambassador Edward Rowny, Frank Gaffney, Jr., Richard Perle, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers.

Senator Humphrey, we have four of those five on our list. General Rogers, of course, has already testified. So we will continue to work with you, Senator, in every way possible. We will try to make this as balanced as possible. We will take into account your views, and if you have any other witnesses you would like to appear, we will be pleased to take that into account.

We have gone over each one of these with the minority. It has been a joint effort in terms of the witness list.

We are up against a deadline in terms of instructions from the Senate as to reporting to them our views by the 1st of March. We have to take that into account. But I can assure the Senator that I am very aware that he wants to hear from people who are opposed to the treaty, and I can assure him that we will give that every consideration as we proceed.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee would like to speak.

Chairman NUNN. I would be glad to yield to Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. I am going to have to leave. The Kennedy nomination is coming up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Warner.

Gentlemen, we are glad to have you here. The Kennedy nomination to the Supreme Court is coming up in a few minutes and I have got to leave to go over for that, and I will not have time to propound any detailed questions at this time. I may submit some for the record, if you would kindly answer those.

Just let me ask you one question right now, and that is all I will have time for. I will start with General Vuono here and go right down the line. In your opinion, is the treaty signed by Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan in the best interests of our country?

General VUONO. Yes, it is, Senator.

Admiral TORST. I would agree, it is.

General GRAY. I believe it is, Senator. And I believe that we can maintain the global military balance with this treaty in the post-INF world.

General WELCH. It is clearly in the best interests of this country and of NATO.

Senator THURMOND. Speak louder. I cannot hear you.

General WELCH. I said it is clearly in the best interests of both the United States and NATO.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. We have Senator Dixon's statement which will be submitted for the record.

[The opening statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, the committee today is very pleased to have testifying before us the distinguished members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I join with the chairman in welcoming Gen. Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Adm. Carlisle Trost, Chief of

Naval Operations; Gen. Alfred Gray, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, and; Gen. Larry Welch, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

We have heard testimony from a number of distinguished present and former members of this and previous administrations. They have addressed the military and political implications to the NATO alliance of the INF Treaty. The NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance, and the military deficiencies and strengths of NATO. I'm sure that today's witnesses can contribute significantly to what we have already heard and provide expert military judgment on these very serious issues.

I am deeply concerned about the imbalance of conventional and chemical weapons in Europe. With all due respect to Senator Levin's fine report, the numbers very clearly evidence the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces. Testimony before this committee and the subcommittee I chair on Readiness, Sustainability and Support have raised disturbing questions about the capabilities of the United States and the allied forces to meet the Soviet threat. I am particularly concerned about the readiness of our support units that provide the crucial back up to our front line troops.

I hope to address the issues of the military implications of the treaty, and the readiness, maintainability, and support capabilities of our United States and European forces with you today. I welcome this opportunity to get first hand information from the Chiefs of our military services.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. We will hear from our witnesses, General Vuono first, then we will hear from Admiral Trost, General Gray, and General Welch. General Vuono.

STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL E. VUONO, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General VUONO. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today, and I hope I will be able to explain the reasons for my support for ratification of the INF Treaty. I will also address the implications of the treaty for the military capabilities needed to ensure that the alliance can continue to execute its strategy and achieve its security objectives.

I want to stress some points contained in my prepared opening remarks which I have submitted for the record. Military requirements and priorities ultimately derive from national interests. The conviction that our national security interests demand that no hostile state dominate Europe was cemented by our experience in two World Wars, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the commitment to protect collective security with conventional, nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear deterrent forces.

NATO's enduring strategy of flexible response demands robust alliance conventional capabilities, with the nuclear legs of the triad being the ultimate guarantee of NATO's security.

Deterrence depends not only on force capabilities, but also on the maintenance of a strong and healthy trans-Atlantic bond. The presence of substantial U.S. combat forces on the continent I believe is a major contributor to alliance cohesion.

The deterrent value of American divisions, tactical air wings, and the NATO-committed maritime forces is a product not only of their very substantial war-fighting capabilities, but is multiplied, I believe, many fold by the fact that they are American.

Forward deployed forces provide a disproportionate return on investment by linking U.S. and European security in a way other forces can never duplicate.

The INF Treaty does not change the strategy of the alliance. The requirements for deterrence and defense can still be met. Therefore, I support the ratification of the INF Treaty.

I believe the treaty enhances western security by reducing the threat to NATO forces, territory, and installations, as well as the threat to U.S. friends and allies in Asia. The treaty establishes a precedent for asymmetrical reductions.

Moreover, it includes the strictest verification regime in the history of our arms control negotiations. The utility of this treaty in our continuing search for security is determined by what we do in its wake certainly more than by the treaty's own considerable merits.

NATO can maintain its strategy without INF missiles, but we must ensure that the military forces required to execute our strategy continue to be adequate when compared with the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. While the Soviet Union has advantages in chemical and some short range nuclear systems, it is in the realm of conventional forces that disparities in force ratios are most evident.

NATO has made substantial improvement in conventional capabilities during the past several years, but much remains to be done. Modernization programs that support the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe (SACEUR), such as improvements in close combat and follow-on forces attack, improved air defense, enhanced sustaining capabilities, improved command and control, and improved theater reinforcement have the highest priorities within the Army programs.

On the nuclear side, NATO strategy requires continuing the nuclear modernization efforts initiated in 1983 by the Montebello decision of NATO's nuclear planning group. The Army part in this modernization centers around the follow-on to Lance missile and the Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles, and I believe that we should lift the legislative restrictions that currently hamstring these two programs.

The requirement to provide SACEUR 10 modern U.S. Army divisions within 10 days of mobilization is a cornerstone of the U.S. conventional contribution to NATO. Mobility enhancement programs, such as improved POMCUS, increases to inter-theater airlift, and the fast sealift initiative are vital to the credibility of our national promise.

Now, if the Soviets mean what they say about accepting deep cuts in conventional forces, then conventional arms control may become an increasingly important parallel path to enhancing security.

Conventional arms control must be viewed as a complement to, but not a substitute for, our commitment to modernize our conventional forces. Our alliance's key military objective in any conventional agreement should be an improvement of NATO's capabilities to defend itself and deter war.

If the Soviets do not change their offensive objectives and force postures, the likelihood of satisfactory, comprehensive conventional arms control outcomes is small. If, on the other hand, they recognize that their prospects for entering the 21st century as a prosperous nation will increase by reducing the threat they pose to their neighbors, they will have to reconstruct their military forces.

Until that time, I believe that we must be confident, strong, and patient. We can and should adjust to a changing threat, but to changing capabilities, not merely to stated intentions.

The INF Treaty in and of itself is a good treaty, but treaties are not an end in themselves. The INF Treaty is but one step in the process of securing peace with freedom. I believe there are many reasons to be optimistic about the future.

We also know that the pathway to maintaining collective security will always be marked with challenges. What we need most at this point in history to ensure our future security is a steadfast resolve, focused on the objectives and requirements of our national and alliance strategies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Vuono follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL E. VUONO, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TODAY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU OUR NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY NATIONS. I WILL EXPLAIN WITHIN THAT STRATEGIC CONTEXT THE REASONS FOR MY SUPPORT FOR RATIFICATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY. I WILL ALSO ADDRESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY FOR THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO INSURE THAT THE ALLIANCE CAN CONTINUE TO EXECUTE ITS STRATEGY AND ACHIEVE ITS SECURITY OBJECTIVES.

THE ARMY AND THE OTHER SERVICES HAVE THE MISSION OF MAINTAINING THE COMBAT READY FORCES NECESSARY TO FULFILL OUR SECURITY OBJECTIVES. IN ACCOMPLISHING THAT MISSION IN THE CASE OF NATO, THE ARMY'S PROGRAMS AND FORCES AIM TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GENERAL GALVIN. AS THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE AND COMMANDER OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, HE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS, HAS THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXECUTING OUR ALLIANCE MILITARY STRATEGY.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES ARE ULTIMATELY DERIVED FROM NATIONAL INTERESTS, NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE SECURITY OBJECTIVES, AND THE THREAT TO THOSE INTERESTS.

FOR OVER FOUR DECADES, THE MOST DANGEROUS CHALLENGE TO THOSE INTERESTS HAS BEEN THE MILITARY POWER OF THE SOVIET UNION. ALTHOUGH THE USSR HAS BECOME A GLOBAL POWER SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, IT CONTINUES TO ACCORD ITS HIGHEST EXTERNAL MILITARY

PRIORITY TO CENTRAL EUROPE.

A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY THROUGHOUT THIS CENTURY REMAINS THE CONVICTION THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS DEMAND THAT NO HOSTILE STATE DOMINATE REGIONS OR GROUPS OF STATES VITAL TO OUR INTERESTS. THIS CONVICTION WAS CEMENTED BY THE EXPERIENCES OF TWO WORLD WARS, THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, AND THE COMMITMENT TO PROTECT COLLECTIVE SECURITY WITH CONVENTIONAL, NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES.

ALSO ENDURING IS NATO'S STRATEGY, THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WHICH ARE WELL KNOWN. DETERRENCE DEMANDS ROBUST ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, WITH THE NUCLEAR LEGS OF THE TRIAD BEING THE ULTIMATE GUARANTEE OF NATO SECURITY. WHILE A CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE IS THE PREFERRED OPTION IN THE EVENT THAT DETERRENCE FAILS, NATO'S STRATEGY ALSO REQUIRES THE MAINTENANCE OF CAPABILITIES TO EXECUTE A RANGE OF NUCLEAR OPTIONS TO DEFEAT AN ATTACK OR CAUSE AN ENEMY TO CEASE HIS AGGRESSION.

DETERRENCE DEPENDS NOT ONLY ON FORCE CAPABILITIES, BUT ALSO ON WARSAW PACT PERCEPTIONS OF NATO'S WILL TO EXECUTE THE STRATEGY, WHICH IN TURN REQUIRES MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG AND HEALTHY TRANSATLANTIC BOND. ALLIANCE COHESION IS SUSTAINED BY MANY FACTORS, BUT THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL U.S. COMBAT FORCES ON THE CONTINENT IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR. WE SHOULD NOT OVERESTIMATE THE BURDEN WE BEAR RELATIVE TO OUR ALLIES IN TERMS OF OUR IN-THEATER FORWARD DEFENSE FORCES, NOR SHOULD WE UNDERESTIMATE THE CONTRIBUTION OF THOSE U.S. FORCES. THE DETERRENT VALUE OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS, TACTICAL AIR WINGS, AND NATO-COMMITTED MARITIME FORCES IS A PRODUCT NOT ONLY OF THEIR VERY SUBSTANTIAL WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES, BUT IS MULTIPLIED MANY FOLD BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE AMERICAN. ALTHOUGH OUR REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY IS

VITAL, FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES PROVIDE A DISPROPORTIONATE RETURN ON INVESTMENT BY LINKING U.S. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A WAY OTHER FORCES CAN NEVER DUPLICATE. THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES CANNOT BE CAPTURED BY NUMERICAL ASSESSMENTS ALONE. IN BOTH FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS, WE MUST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT; CERTAINLY, THE SOVIETS DO.

THE INF TREATY

THE INF TREATY DOES NOT CHANGE THE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE. WHILE I REMAIN UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE RELATIVE NATO AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY CAPABILITIES, EVEN WITH THE ADVANTAGES THE TREATY BRINGS, THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE CAN STILL BE MET. THEREFORE, I SUPPORT THE RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY. THE TREATY HAS THREE SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT:

FIRST, IT ENHANCES WESTERN SECURITY BY REDUCING THE THREAT TO NATO FORCES, TERRITORY, AND INSTALLATIONS, WHILE ALSO REDUCING THE LONG-RANGE THREAT TO U.S. FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ASIA. THE TREATY ELIMINATES, IN PARTICULAR, A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO MANY NATO AIRFIELDS, PORTS, POMCUS SITES, AND LOGISTICS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES. THE TREATY DOES, OF COURSE, REQUIRE THE U.S. TO YIELD THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE AND THE PERSHING II, THE LATTER OF WHICH HAS A CAPABILITY TO STRIKE QUICKLY INTO THE SOVIET UNION. ON BALANCE, I BELIEVE THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO FIGHT AND SUSTAIN THE FIGHT IS ENHANCED.

SECOND, THE TREATY ESTABLISHES A PRECEDENT FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS THAT CAN BE APPLIED IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE UPCOMING ATLANTIC-TO-THE URALS CONVENTIONAL ARMS

CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. UNDER THE INF TREATY, THE SOVIET UNION WILL GIVE UP THE DEPLOYED CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH FOUR TIMES THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENTS OF OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES. WE, OF COURSE, WILL CONTINUE TO SHARE THE DETERRENT BENEFITS WHICH THOSE SYSTEMS BRING TO THE WEST.

THIRD, THE TREATY INCLUDES THE STRICTEST VERIFICATION REGIME IN THE HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE INCLUSION OF AN ON-SITE VERIFICATION PROGRAM IS AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT PRECEDENT, IF CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL OUTCOMES.

OVERALL, THE INF TREATY IS A VICTORY FOR ALLIANCE RESOLVE AND SOLIDARITY. WE MET THE THREAT OF THE SS-20 AND CARRIED OUT THE DIFFICULT "DUAL TRACK" DECISION, WHICH REQUIRED US TO MODERNIZE AND NEGOTIATE SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE WERE FIRST SUCCESSFUL AT IMPROVING OUR SECURITY THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILE SYSTEMS. THEN BY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETING NEGOTIATIONS, OUR ADVERSARY HAS BEEN LED TO MAKE DISPROPORTIONATE SACRIFICES TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES. IT IS NO WONDER THAT EVERY NATO GOVERNMENT HAS COME OUT IN FAVOR OF THIS TREATY, WHICH IS A MONUMENT TO THE HEALTH AND VITALITY OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE INF TREATY IS EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE. IT SHOULD BE RATIFIED, BUT WITH AN EYE TO THE FUTURE. THE UTILITY OF THIS TREATY IN OUR CONTINUING SEARCH FOR SECURITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY WHAT WE DO IN ITS WAKE, MORE THAN IT WILL BE BY THE TREATY'S OWN CONSIDERABLE MERITS.

THE POST-INF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

NATO CAN AND WILL MAINTAIN ITS STRATEGY WITHOUT INF MISSILES,

BUT IT WILL ALSO HAVE TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AND ADAPT ITS OTHER FORCES. MORE OF THE BURDEN OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE WILL FALL ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE REMAINING NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THE TREATY WILL NOT SAVE MONEY, NOR WILL IT SOLVE OR DIMINISH NATO'S OTHER DEFENSE PROBLEMS. INDEED, WHILE THE TREATY STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS, IT REMINDS US OF THE ALREADY EXISTING NEED TO MODERNIZE NATO'S CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL, AND REMAINING NUCLEAR FORCES.

WE MUST INSURE THAT THE MILITARY FORCES REQUIRED TO EXECUTE OUR STRATEGY CONTINUE TO BE ADEQUATE WHEN COMPARED TO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT. IN THE EARLY 1970s THE USSR GAINED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY. THE USSR ALSO BEGAN TO PLACE MORE EMPHASIS IN ITS DOCTRINE ON CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS. THIS DOCTRINE, EXEMPLIFIED BY THE THEATER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE, GUIDED THE CONVENTIONAL BUILDUP WHICH CONTINUES UP TO THE PRESENT, EVEN AS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PROFESSES THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND A NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY." STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF NATO COUNTRIES ARE THE ULTIMATE DETERRENT. HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF DETERRING WARS OF ALL TYPES IS AND HAS BEEN SHIFTING MORE TOWARD CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

WHILE THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS CLEAR ADVANTAGES IN CHEMICAL AND SOME SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, IT IS IN THE REALM OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES THAT THE DISPARITIES ARE MOST EVIDENT. THE MILITARY NET ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED LAST SPRING POINTED OUT THE FOLLOWING ALLIANCE-WIDE FORCE RATIOS, ASSUMING FULL REINFORCEMENT: NEARLY A 3:1 PACT ADVANTAGE IN TANKS, MORE THAN A 3:1 PACT ADVANTAGE IN ARTILLERY, AND NEARLY A 2:1 ADVANTAGE IN DIVISION EQUIVALENTS. EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION TRENDS SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THESE ADVANTAGES. THE PACT, IN GENERAL, AND SOVIET FORCES IN PARTICULAR, HAVE MATCHED THESE EQUIPMENT GAINS WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE, OPERATIONAL

TECHNIQUES, AND SUSTAINMENT THAT FURTHER SUPPORT THEIR DOCTRINE.

OMINOUSLY, RECENT STUDIES ALSO INDICATE THAT THE USSR HAS IMPROVED THE QUALITY OF ITS GROUND SYSTEMS AND THAT THEY ARE MATCHING US IN MANY QUALITATIVE ASPECTS. OUR ALLIANCE'S BASIC TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN TURNED INTO A DISTINCT ADVANTAGE IN DEPLOYED GROUND SYSTEMS.

ALL IS NOT BLEAK, HOWEVER. NATO HAS A MORE COHESIVE ALLIANCE; HIGHER QUALITY, BETTER TRAINED UNITS AND SOLDIERS; AND, GIVEN ENOUGH TIME, THE ADVANTAGES INHERENT TO DEFENSE. AFTER YEARS OF BUILDING UP, IF PLANNED MODERNIZATIONS TAKE PLACE, WE CAN BEGIN TO MATCH THE PACT'S MODERNIZATION RATE AND ULTIMATELY CLOSE THE GAP CAUSED BY TWO DECADES OF INTENSIVE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES MODERNIZATION.

WITH OR WITHOUT THE INF TREATY, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE MODERNIZATION OF BOTH ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. IN AN ERA OF SCARCE RESOURCES, THIS MUST BE DONE WITH CARE, CHOOSING THE APPROACHES AND SYSTEMS THAT WILL GIVE US THE MAXIMUM WARFIGHTING "VALUE ADDED."

ON THE NUCLEAR SIDE, NATO WILL RETAIN AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INF TREATY. HOWEVER, THAT ADEQUACY PRESUPPOSES CONTINUING THE NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION EFFORTS INITIATED IN 1983 BY THE MONTEBELLO DECISION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. BRIEFLY, THE ARMY'S PART IN THIS MODERNIZATION CENTERS ON A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE MISSILE AND ARTILLERY-FIRED ATOMIC PROJECTILES. LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS THAT CURRENTLY HAMSTRING THESE TWO PROGRAMS MUST BE LIFTED IN LIGHT OF NATO'S ENDURING NEED FOR VIABLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT SYSTEMS TO IMPLEMENT THE MONTEBELLO DECISION.

A FAILURE TO MODERNIZE WILL EVENTUALLY REDUCE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF OUR FORCES AND INCREASE THE RISK THAT THE FORCE STRUCTURE BACKING OUR STRATEGY ALREADY ENTAILS. SACEUR HAS DESCRIBED THE NEED, AND IT HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED ANNUALLY BY THE ALLIANCE'S DEFENSE MINISTERS SINCE MONTEBELLO. IT IS NOW TIME TO MOVE FORWARD, SHOW OUR RESOLVE, AND FIELD THE MODERN CAPABILITIES.

THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY NATO HAS NEVER HAD CONVENTIONAL FORCES SUFFICIENT FOR STAND-ALONE DETERRENCE OR DEFENSE. INSTEAD, THE ALLIANCE HAS RELIED UPON THE COMBINED CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF ITS MEMBERS TO ENSURE ITS SECURITY. THE RECOGNITION OF ROUGH STRATEGIC PARITY AND THE ALL-TOO-EVIDENT GROWTH IN WARSAW PACT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES HAVE DRIVEN NATO TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS EFFORT IS DESIGNED TO REDRESS SOME TROUBLING DISPARITIES IN THE NON-NUCLEAR EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS THAT SUPPORT SACEUR --SUCH AS, IMPROVEMENTS IN CLOSE COMBAT CAPABILITIES, FOLLOW-ON FORCES ATTACK (FOFA) SYSTEMS, IMPROVED AIR DEFENSE, ENHANCED SUSTAINING CAPABILITIES, IMPROVED COMMAND AND CONTROL SUITES, AND IMPROVED THEATER REINFORCEMENT -- HAVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY WITHIN THE ARMY'S PROGRAM. MODERNIZATION PRIORITIES IDENTIFIED BY THE ON-GOING DOD COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES STUDY REINFORCE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED BY NATO, INCLUDING DEEP ATTACK AND AIR DEFENSE. OUR AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE CAPITALIZES ON OUR TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTHS TO EXPLOIT KEY PACT VULNERABILITIES AND NEGATE PACT STRENGTHS.

THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SACEUR TEN MODERN U.S. ARMY DIVISIONS

IN EUROPE WITHIN TEN DAYS OF MOBILIZATION IS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE ARMY'S NATO-ORIENTED PRIORITIES AND THE CORNERSTONE OF THE U.S. CONVENTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. MOBILITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMS, SUCH AS POMCUS, INCREASES IN INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT, AND THE FAST SEALIFT INITIATIVE, ARE VITAL TO THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR NATIONAL PROMISE TO HAVE TEN DIVISIONS IN EUROPE WITHIN TEN DAYS.

LASTLY, AS OUR NATO ALLIES AND OUR NATION PLACE A GREATER RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT DECISION. VISIBLE, EFFECTIVE, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT FORCES ARE ESSENTIAL BUT EXPENSIVE INVESTMENTS, AS THIS CONGRESS WELL KNOWS. THE NATO ALLIANCE CANNOT AFFORD TO SPEND LESS ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE UNTIL THERE IS A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE THREAT THAT MUST BE DETERRED.

SECURITY IN EUROPE CAN THEORETICALLY BE ENHANCED BY NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT. IF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MEANS WHAT HE SAYS ABOUT ACCEPTING DEEP ASYMMETRICAL CUTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO REACH EQUALITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT, THEN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MAY BECOME AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT PARALLEL PATH TO ENHANCING SECURITY. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MUST BE VIEWED AS A COMPLEMENT TO, BUT NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR, OUR COMMITMENT TO MODERNIZE OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

OUR ALLIANCE'S KEY MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN ANY CONVENTIONAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT OF NATO'S CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND ITSELF AND DETER WAR. SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR THEATER-WIDE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND IN SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE; PROVISIONS TO INCREASE WARNING TIME; AND VARIOUS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES MAY ALL BE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. IN JUDGING ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS, WE MUST APPLY

CRITERIA SIMILAR TO THOSE WE USE IN DECIDING ON THE FORCES NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WE SHOULD KEEP OUR ATTENTION NOT ON THOSE FORCES WHICH MIGHT BE REDUCED, REDEPLOYED, OR CONSTRAINED, BUT RATHER ON OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND AND DETER WITH WHAT IS LEFT AFTER AN AGREEMENT.

THE ISSUES ARE MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN SOME NOW REALIZE. MOREOVER, THE PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL DO NOT DETRACT FROM THE IMPORTANCE OF MODERNIZATION; RATHER THEY ADD TO IT. UNLESS NATO CONTINUES TO MODERNIZE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE NO MILITARY INCENTIVE TO SURRENDER ITS ADVANTAGES.

WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO DEMAND MAJOR CHANGES IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES. NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE, AND ITS FORCES ARE STRUCTURED TO MEET ITS OBJECTIVES. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS BUILD THEIR FORCES TO FULFILL THEIR DOCTRINE AND TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THOSE FORCES HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY SIZED, STRUCTURED, AND DEPLOYED FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT CHANGE THEIR OBJECTIVES, THE LIKELIHOOD OF SATISFACTORY COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL OUTCOMES IS SMALL. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PROSPECTS FOR ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY AS A GREAT AND PROSPEROUS NATION WILL INCREASE BY REDUCING THE THREAT THEY POSE TO THEIR NEIGHBORS, THEY WILL HAVE TO RECONSTRUCT THEIR MILITARY FORCES. UNTIL THAT TIME WE MUST BE CONFIDENT, STRONG, AND PATIENT. WE CAN AND SHOULD ADJUST TO A CHANGING THREAT, BUT TO CHANGING CAPABILITIES NOT MERELY TO STATED INTENTIONS.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

THE INF TREATY, IN AND OF ITSELF, IS A GOOD TREATY. BUT TREATIES

ARE NOT ENDS IN THEMSELVES. THE INF TREATY IS BUT ONE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SECURING PEACE WITH FREEDOM. SUBSEQUENT STEPS MUST MAKE SENSE IN LIGHT OF OUR SECURITY NEEDS.

I INTEND, WITH YOUR HELP, TO CONTINUE TO BASE ARMY DECISIONS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, REGIONAL PRIORITIES, CINC NEEDS, AND U.S. AND ALLIANCE STRATEGIES WHICH HAVE PROVEN SUCCESSFUL THROUGH SOME DANGEROUS TIMES.

I HOPE MY TESTIMONY MAKES CLEAR MY SUPPORT FOR RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY, AS WELL AS THE RATIONALE FOR ESSENTIAL FORCE MODERNIZATION AND THE NEED TO APPROACH FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH PATIENCE, UNITY, AND SELF-CONFIDENCE.

THERE ARE MANY REASONS TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE, BUT WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE PATHWAY TO MAINTAINING COLLECTIVE SECURITY WILL ALWAYS BE MARKED WITH CHALLENGES. AS A NATION AND AN ALLIANCE, WE MUST BUILD ON WHAT HAS WORKED, CORRECT KNOWN DEFICIENCIES, AND BE WARY OF RADICAL PROPOSALS. WHAT WE NEED MOST AT THIS POINT IN HISTORY TO INSURE OUR FUTURE SECURITY IS A STEADFAST RESOLVE, FOCUSED ON THE OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS OF OUR NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE STRATEGIES.

STATEMENT OF ADM. C.A.H. TROST, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral TROST. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a very, very brief statement that focuses primarily on the maritime aspects of the impact of this treaty and address specifically some of the questions that have been raised in prior hearings. Since most of the background material incident to the treaty and its implications have been brought out before the committee, I would begin simply by stating at the outset that I do support the INF Treaty now before the Senate for ratification.

And I should add that that is not a directed finding or a directed conclusion. It is based on my own studies and evaluation over a

period of quite a few months and my consultation with my fellow chiefs.

I am satisfied that on balance the treaty is militarily sound, and I believe its ratification is in the best interests of the United States. Most importantly, with enactment into force of the INF Treaty, NATO will still retain reliable nuclear and conventional forces that possess capabilities to deter or, if required, to respond to Soviet aggression.

The role of NATO's maritime forces and the contributions of those forces to NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrent posture will be critical in the post-INF threat environment. Carrier-based dual capable tactical aircraft, ballistic missile submarines, and sea-launched cruise missile capable surface combatants and submarines, all of which are unaffected by the treaty, remain available for employment in NATO's strategy of flexible response.

As Admiral Crowe noted in his earlier testimony, the Soviets have demonstrated an emerging concern about NATO maritime strength. That concern is reflected in a growing number of Soviet proposals to curtail naval activity under the guise of military detente in Northern European waters. General Secretary Gorbachev's call for an Arctic zone of peace encompassing the Baltic, North, Norwegian, and Greenland Seas, and Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov's call for a ban on anti-submarine activities in areas of the north and west Atlantic are specifically directed at NATO naval forces. Similarly, the General Secretary's warning that any U.S. deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles jeopardize negotiations between superpowers on a 50 percent cut in strategic nuclear weapons is directed at Soviet concern over U.S. sea power.

NATO's wartime success is critically dependent upon sea lines of communications in the Atlantic for rapid reinforcement and resupply, as well as those in the Pacific for sustained support. The Soviets know that and they understand that western maritime strength is the guarantor of those sea lanes and thus is the principal barrier to the global strategic objectives essential to their preferred strategy.

In the post-INF era, naval forces will also retain their inherent mobility and flexibility and their ability to apply discriminate force where necessary. Essentially remaining under national control, not tied to garrison ashore or subject to host government approval to operate from overseas bases, naval forces are highly leveraged for alliance support, while remaining free to respond quickly and unilaterally to crises that threaten U.S. national interests.

There will still be major imbalances between Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional and nuclear forces after the provisions of the INF Treaty are effected. Those imbalances should be redressed in my view primarily by deep and asymmetrical cuts, through the demobilization of preponderant Soviet forces that can be brought to bear on the central front or elsewhere on the Soviet periphery within militarily significant time lines. In that regard, one of the most salient aspects of the INF Treaty for the future is its affirmation of the principle of asymmetrical reductions reflected on the requirement for the Soviet Union to eliminate a greater number of weapons to achieve parity with the United States under the provisions of this treaty.

I appreciate the opportunity to briefly share my views on this important treaty and on the increasing value of NATO maritime power to the alliance. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Trost follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. C.A.H. TROST

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee:

Let me state at the onset that I support the INF Treaty now before the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. I am satisfied that, on balance, the Treaty is militarily sound, and I believe that its ratification is in the best interests of the United States. Most importantly, with entry into force of the INF Treaty, NATO will still retain reliable nuclear and conventional forces that possess capabilities to effectively deter or, if required, to respond to Soviet aggression.

The role of NATO's maritime forces and the contributions of those forces to NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrent posture will be critical in a post-INF threat environment. Carrier based dual-capable tactical aircraft, ballistic missile submarines, and sea-launched cruise missile capable surface combatants and submarines, all unaffected by the Treaty, remain available for employment in NATO's strategy of "flexible response."

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Thank you for the opportunity to briefly share my views on this important Treaty and the increasing value of NATO maritime power to the Alliance.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Admiral Trost.

General Gray.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ALFRED M. GRAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

General GRAY. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee:

Your Marine Corps has submitted their statement on the INF Treaty, and you will find that it, after paying due respect to the enormous responsibility you have with respect to the verification

process of this treaty, states that any arms control treaty must have two benchmarks: one, we must not permit it to disturb the global balance of power with respect to the United States and the free world as we know it today; and second, that it must be verifiable.

It points out that in order to maintain deterrence and continue the quest for peace, we must remain strong, we must continue to pursue our modernization efforts, not just in support of the aggregate NATO requirements, but indeed in the more macro sense, on the global scene.

We must do what we can to deter the Soviets, not only in Europe, but deter their adventurism throughout the globe.

It also points out that there are important areas on the flanks of NATO which must remain strong and we must indeed improve our capabilities to be operative. And it concludes that the treaty in our view and in my view as your Commandant is a good first step toward the lessening of tensions between the United States and our NATO allies and the Soviet Union and her allies, and therefore I recommend that the Senate approve this treaty.

I would add that from my study of this process, not just since I have been here in Washington but over the past several years, having been very much involved with the NATO command structure and been an operational commander with them, I believe that this treaty is representative of what both the NATO leadership and our military leadership desire.

As recently as last week, I attended a conference in Copenhagen with 10 NATO nations, to include military leadership and ambassadors, headed up by the Secretary General of NATO.

It was my opinion, after many geopolitical discussions and listening as well as making some comments, it was my judgment that the NATO alliance and the countries in it are supportive of the INF Treaty. They recognize, as we do, that there are risks.

But I believe that we can accept these risks, with the proviso that we continue under the support and leadership of this Congress to improve our aggregate capabilities and to continue both in the political and economic and the military areas to demonstrate our resolve.

And it is this cohesion and this resolve which I believe really makes NATO the deterrent and the great organization that it is.

Carl has mentioned some about the maritime aspects, and of course, as you know, this is where your marines are employed on the northern and southern flanks of NATO. It is crucial that we continue our efforts to strengthen our maritime power in this area and our aggregate capabilities, and not home in solely on the central front of NATO when we talk about aggregate military capabilities and usefulness.

In the high north, we must do everything we can to deter the idea of a nuclear-free zone, not just in the three northern NATO countries, but in the countries, to include Sweden and Finland, that make up the Nordic balance. This would be crucial to our aggregate capabilities to protect and use the sea lines of communications.

So there is some military instability in the north that we must shore up, as there is political instability in the southern region, with the Greek-Turkish question and the like.

But given all of this and given the direction which I understand we are moving in terms of improvements and keeping the global balance in mind, I as your Commandant support the treaty.

[The prepared statement of General Gray follows:]

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY, USMC

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

I am privileged to appear before you today to offer my views on the implications of the INF Treaty signed by the President on December 8th, 1987. The Constitution gives the Senate an extremely important role in the ratification of treaties. Given the unique nature of this treaty, a treaty which eliminates an entire category of weapons, your task is all that more important. Before consenting in this important matter, you are entitled to the most candid and insightful counsel you can obtain. I hope to so assist the Senate as it carries out its constitutional role regarding the INF Treaty.

I speak to you, of course, in two capacities. First, I wear the hat of a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the body responsible for providing military advice to the President of the United States. In my second role, I appear before you as the Commandant of the Marine Corps -- Chief of my Service -- responsible for training, equipping, and providing Marines to the Unified Commanders, who in turn are tasked to fight should our Nation's deterrent fail. While both these roles are important, it is the second one in particular that should assure you that I do not take lightly my duty to provide to you my best possible counsel. For should deterrence fail, there is no doubt that the young Marines entrusted to my care will be called upon to be the "First To Fight."

These thoughts considered, I say to you that an arms control agreement which does not meet at least two measures of merit is not in the interest of our Nation and may well serve to undermine our strategy of deterrence. In my mind, we must ensure that any arms control agreement meets the following two criteria: First, an arms control agreement must not result in a shift of the

military balance against the United States. More specifically, this means that a viable U.S. capability to deter hostilities across the spectrum of conflict from terrorism to high intensity conflict must be maintained. This is especially true in the light of the Soviet Union's considerable conventional capabilities. The lowering of tensions in Europe through arms control must not be allowed to encourage Soviet, or Soviet sponsored, adventurism and coercion elsewhere.

Secondly, an arms control agreement must be verifiable. This requirement ensures that our partner in such an agreement cannot surreptitiously undermine my first criterion. However, I offer a note of caution concerning verification. It is not a cure-all for ensuring that a stable military balance is maintained. More pointedly, we should not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security by overly optimistic hopes concerning verification. True military balance will ultimately rest on the readiness and warfighting capability of our country's armed forces -- not on our monitoring capability.

As the members of this committee well know, the INF Treaty is said by some to violate one or both of the conditions I have framed.

Nevertheless, it is my professional military judgment that we, as a nation, can preserve the global power balance, maintain deterrence and make verification work -- but certain force modernization programs continue to be necessary, whether there is an INF Treaty or not. The force modernization programs are aimed at ensuring deterrence by maintaining the credibility of US military power in the eyes of the world; a credibility rooted in this Nation's ability to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict, when and where required.

Unfortunately, this need for modernization comes at a time when all Services face substantial budget reductions. Yet if budgetary considerations prevail over military requirements, the

results, without continuing the modernization process, could well be to increase global instability and the risks to U.S. interests. Allow me to briefly outline how I arrive at this conclusion and suggest a solution to the dilemma.

It is widely perceived that nuclear weapons have deterred war, particularly in Europe, by altering the correlation of forces in such a manner that the risks of aggression outweighed any possible gain. NATO's strategy of flexible response -- the ability to selectively respond with conventional forces and tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces -- has provided a credible deterrent at all levels of conflict for nearly 20 years. Throughout these years, as circumstances changed, theater nuclear weapons have played a pivotal role in maintaining our strategy of flexible response. Indeed, it is the flexibility of strong, modernized INF weapons -- Pershing IIs and GLCMs -- that is so intolerable to the Soviets that they are now willing to forego forces capable of delivering four times as many warheads to rid themselves of this facet of NATO's deterrent.

However, if flexible response is to continue to be a viable strategy in the absence of INF weapons, the forces remaining must be seen as a credible deterrent in their own right. For as we know, the Soviet Union's conventional might, and its proximity to Western Europe, is not altered by this treaty. Thus, measures must be taken to sustain deterrence following the removal of INF.

Consequently, the JCS, in endorsing the INF Treaty, have endorsed a number of measures which minimize the risks associated with the removal of INF missiles. These measures, in the main, consist of previously identified modernization programs and force adjustments that provide a mix of both short- and long-range weapons systems, capable of selective employment against the full spectrum of the potential enemy's capabilities. In short, for deterrence to work in the absence of INF, the remaining conventional and theater nuclear forces must be capable of holding at

risk massed troops on the battlefield and be able to strike militarily significant targets throughout the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union.

However, it must be recognized that any measures we take to maintain our deterrence will be neither free nor cheap. In a fiscally constrained environment, it is likely that the Services may be called upon to make force adjustments. Those Services affected by these force adjustments may be required to restructure internally -- absorbing associated costs. Such restructuring will have a rippling effect on the overall defense establishment -- exerting a considerable impact on our ability to meet global responsibilities across the spectrum of conflict from counter-terrorism to high intensity conflict.

I raise this latter point to emphasize again that the impact of the proposed INF Treaty extends well beyond the issues of arms control and force structure in Europe. The INF Treaty cannot be examined in isolation. If history tells us one thing, it is that the enemies of peace and freedom take many forms -- the turmoil in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Philippines are only the most recent examples. As the leader of the free world, the United States must be ever vigilant and always capable of defending its interests when threatened. Global security must not be sacrificed in the process of adjusting to the post-INF environment in Europe.

Given our traditional NATO focus, the United States must continue to deter high intensity conflict in Europe -- and failing this, conclude any conflict there on terms favorable to the alliance. However, we must also maintain our ability to deter conflict on a global basis and prevail. If the Services -- forced to divert assets to deter a massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe in order to adjust for the removal of INF in Europe -- are degraded in their ability to provide, train, and adequately equip the forces necessary to fight elsewhere in the world; then the

result of the INF agreement will be to increase the risks to United States global interests. Should this occur, the military balance of power will shift to the disadvantage of our nation and global security will decline. Such a climate may well embolden those nations inclined toward adventurism and the promotion of instability in the world. This advice considered, I believe that it is essential, in a post-INF environment, to maintain a proper balance within our national force structure between forces focused on high intensity conflict and those oriented towards the mid to low level of the spectrum of conflict.

We should not forget that the INF agreement in question was made possible by the determination of the United States and its NATO Allies. This determination was evidenced by the decision to develop and deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs. These INF weapons were perceived by the Soviets not only as a credible military capability, but as a statement of will. As such they were an effective deterrent and ultimately motivated Soviet concessions. The lesson for us is that national determination and credible military capability are the keys to maintaining deterrence, protecting our national interests, and, ultimately, making peace. Many predict that this INF agreement is a precursor of a new era of superpower relations and global stability -- a situation we would all applaud. However, until that day comes the United States must remain strong and steadfast in its role as leader of the free world.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I offer the following:

First, in the larger scheme of things, certain upgrades to our defensive posture in Europe, identified by the JCS, should be accomplished in order to forestall any shifting in the balance of military power in a post-INF NATO/WTO relationship. The period of INF withdrawal from Europe, and the years immediately following, will be critical. At no time during this period should the NATO

alliance project an image of lessening its military capability or wavering in its resolve. Thus, the recommended force adjustments will be a must. Secondly, these force adjustments -- if accomplished without proper funding and only through internal Service restructuring -- will most certainly have an adverse impact on the capability of the United States Armed Forces to respond to crises outside of NATO. This treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot ensure worldwide security throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. Thus, the INF Treaty must necessarily be accompanied by our pledge to ourselves to maintain our global military capabilities.

Finally, I say that as an initiative to reduce the level of tension between the superpowers and the alliances of which they are a part, the INF Treaty is a sound first step. It is in this context that I recommend that the Senate give its consent to the INF agreement achieved by our President.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Gray.
General Welch.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have submitted a statement for the record and, with your permission, I will forego reading that statement and instead just comment briefly on some areas that I think warrant some special emphasis.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, all the statements will be submitted and entered into the record.

General WELCH. Thank you.

Of the range of subjects that you invited us to address, I think it would be most useful for me to comment on the NATO strategy and its relationship to the U.S. national military strategy and our ability to underwrite those strategies. I also have some brief comments about the INF Treaty and its impact on our ability to underwrite those strategies.

I believe very strongly that continued success in the overall national military strategy of deterrence requires an adequate balance of capabilities at the strategic nuclear level and the theater nuclear level and in conventional capabilities.

At the strategic nuclear level, within the constraints of resources available we are pursuing the right balance of capabilities to ensure that the Soviets could never believe that they could gain from attacking the United States or our allies with strategic nuclear weapons.

In addition, those strategic nuclear forces play their intended role, and a very important role, of deterring conflict at lower levels of conflict.

At the conventional level, I would simply echo the comments that you have heard from other witnesses that we have long been dissatisfied with the balance of conventional forces in the European theater and that substantial improvements are still needed in NATO forces, with or without an INF Treaty.

It is also widely recognized that improving the conventional balance will reduce the risk of Soviet-led conventional aggression that could and probably would escalate to theater nuclear weapons. However, improving the conventional balance could not compensate for inadequate theater nuclear forces, and the Joint Chiefs evaluated the INF Treaty on that basis, that is, the basis that the theater nuclear forces must stand on their own merits.

At the theater nuclear level, we have the right set of Air Force programs under way to underwrite this strategy, both in NATO and in the Pacific theater, and I very strongly support the programs recommended to strengthen the theater nuclear forces in the other services.

Those programs are clearly not constrained by the INF Treaty, and again they are needed with or without an INF Treaty.

The specific needed improvements in both theater nuclear weapons and conventional forces are contained in the service programs submitted to the Congress, and they support the strategy of forward defense and rapid reinforcement and flexible response, and I think I need not discuss specific programs.

As to the INF Treaty, I regard it as a successful culmination of the dual-track approach initiated with the 1979 NATO decision on the approach to address the intermediate nuclear weapons forces problem. And I would also point out that the Joint Chiefs had ample opportunity during the course of these negotiations to advise the President and to make our views known, and that this treaty reflects our views, and that I have no difficulty now or before the signing of the treaty in expressing my personal views, nor have I ever had any such difficulty.

And it is my personal view that the treaty does address the Joint Chiefs' concerns and it does embody those provisions that we thought were essential in order to have a treaty that serves the best interests of the country.

On balance, if successfully implemented, the treaty should bring about an improvement in the overall balance in Europe and in the Pacific. And further, with the improvements in theater nuclear forces that are already programmed or identified and that were programmed and identified well before the treaty was negotiated, I am confident we can maintain an adequate theater nuclear deterrent force.

Given the Soviets' past record, I agree there are legitimate concerns about the possibility of Soviet cheating. However, the verifi-

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cation provisions are extensive, and they will make it difficult, expensive, and probably not profitable for the Soviets to cheat on any level that would have any military significance.

I would point out, however, that it takes both the ability to detect cheating and the will to respond to cheating to make it unprofitable for the Soviets to attempt such cheating. And that is true of the INF Treaty, and it is true of every other treaty we have ever negotiated or contemplated negotiating.

But in short, the INF Treaty provisions require the Soviets to destroy the capability to deliver some 3,000 warheads, while NATO will give up the potential to deliver about 900. That asymmetrical drawdown will by itself reduce the current asymmetry in theater nuclear forces in Europe and the Pacific theater which have long been a concern to the Joint Chiefs.

However, the overall adequacy of forces to underwrite the NATO and the U.S. military strategies will be determined by the level of program and budget support provided, not by the provisions of the INF Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and look forward to questions and discussion on these subjects.

[The prepared statement of General Welch follows:]

STATEMENT OF: GENERAL LARRY D. WELCH
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE INF TREATY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO NATO MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCES.

I AM WELL AWARE THAT THIS COMMITTEE DOES NOT NEED A DETAILED DISSERTATION ON NATO'S OBJECTIVE OF DETERRENCE, NOR ON THE STRATEGY BY WHICH NATO ACHIEVES THAT END -- FORWARD DEFENSE, RAPID REINFORCEMENT AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT WE VIEW THE NATO SITUATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO UNDERWRITE THAT OVERALL STRATEGY.

WHATEVER WE MAY ACHIEVE IN ARMS REDUCTIONS AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL, THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEVEL OR IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS, DETERRENCE WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND, AS IT HAS FOR OVER 40 YEARS, ON A BALANCE OF CAPABILITIES AT EACH OF THOSE LEVELS AND ON THE LINKAGES AMONG THOSE CAPABILITIES.

THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF THE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE REQUIRES THAT WE ENSURE THE SOVIETS COULD NOT BELIEVE THEY COULD ACHIEVE THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH ANY COMBINATION OF SURPRISE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ATTACK, CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, OR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK FOLLOWED BY ESCALATION TO THEATER OR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR APPROACHES TO ARMS REDUCTIONS AND OUR PROGRAMS TO

BUILD AND MAINTAIN MILITARY FORCES MUST BE CAREFULLY STRUCTURED TO ENSURE THE BALANCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND TO REINFORCE SOVIET PERCEPTIONS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE. ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THE INF AGREEMENT MUST NECESSARILY CONSIDER THE BALANCE OF FORCES AT EACH LEVEL AND THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE COST VERSUS GAIN FROM AGGRESSION AT ANY OF THOSE LEVELS.

AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL, WE ARE BUILDING THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO; MAINTAIN HIGH CONFIDENCE DETERRENCE OF A SURPRISE NUCLEAR ATTACK; TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN CRISIS AND; TO CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE OF LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT.

CONCERNING THAT LAST POINT -- THAT IS, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN NUCLEAR FORCES AND DETERRING LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT -- NUCLEAR FORCES CAN COMPENSATE TO SOME DEGREE FOR NATO'S CONVENTIONAL WEAKNESS. BUT, THE REVERSE HAS NEVER BEEN POSSIBLE. THAT IS, CONVENTIONAL FORCES CANNOT COMPENSATE FOR INADEQUATE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES NOR COULD THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES COMPENSATE IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL WAY FOR AN INADEQUATE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. HOWEVER, ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES DETER CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN CRISIS, AND PROVIDE VITAL WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES. THEY ARE THEREFORE VITAL TO AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE. FURTHER, THE JOINT CHIEFS HAVE LONG BEEN CONCERNED WITH BOTH THE CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

HOWEVER, THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE CAPABILITIES MUST STAND ON THEIR OWN MERIT. IF DETERRENCE FAILS AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL THERE WILL BE GREAT PRESSURES FOR RAPID ESCALATION TO THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MORE ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, BUT THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES REMAINS. THE WARSAW PACT MUST CLEARLY PERCEIVE A SUCCESSFUL CONVENTIONAL ATTACK COULD FORCE NATO TO ESCALATE AND THE COST, TO THE WARSAW PACT, OF THAT ESCALATION MUST BE TOO HIGH FOR THE POSSIBLE GAINS FROM THE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. AT THE SAME TIME, IF A CONVENTIONAL WARSAW PACT ATTACK FAILS TO PRODUCE A QUICK VICTORY, THERE WILL BE PRESSURES FOR THE SOVIETS TO ESCALATE TO THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE POINT IS THAT WHILE THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE IS IMPORTANT, IN FACT, VITAL TO DETERRENCE AND STABILITY, THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES MUST BE EVALUATED ON THEIR OWN MERITS AND THAT HAS BEEN THE APPROACH IN ASSESSING THE MILITARY SUFFICIENCY OF POST-INF AGREEMENT THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

U.S. AND NATO CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN SYSTEMS ADDRESSED BY THE INF TREATY IS LONG STANDING. THE TREATY HAD ITS BEGINNINGS IN NATO'S 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY OBJECTIVE OF THAT DECISION WAS TO COUNTERBALANCE THE DISTURBING EFFECT OF SOVIET SS-20 MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS ON WESTERN SECURITY. THE DUAL TRACK WAS TO DEPLOY U.S. INF IN EUROPE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT THAT REDUCED INF MISSILE SYSTEMS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. WE HAVE TRAVELED DOWN BOTH TRACKS OVER THE PAST EIGHT YEARS. THAT IS, WE HAVE COUNTERBALANCED, TO SOME

DEGREE, SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AND HAVE NEGOTIATED THE ELIMINATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE THREAT. HOWEVER, THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID OF THE OTHER CLASS OF FORCES ADDRESSED BY THE TREATY. WE DID NOT COUNTERBALANCE SOVIET SHORTER RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WITH NATO DEPLOYMENTS, BUT THIS TREATY WOULD ALSO ELIMINATE THAT CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

A DUAL APPROACH WAS ALSO USED TO ASSESS THE ADEQUACY OF NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY ON THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BALANCE IS A STRAIGHTFORWARD MATTER. THE TREATY WOULD CLEARLY IMPROVE THE BALANCE AND THERE IS HIGH CONFIDENCE IN VERIFYING THE CHANGE IN THE BALANCE. THE SOVIETS WILL DESTROY DEPLOYED SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING JUST OVER 1600 WARHEADS COMPARED TO ABOUT 400 FOR THE U.S. HOWEVER, ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY IMPACTS ADDRESSES MORE THAN SIMPLE CHANGES IN THE BALANCE.

THE MORE COMPLEX QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE REMAINING NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES COULD ENSURE: 1) THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PERCEIVE THAT THE THREAT OF NATO ESCALATION AND THE COST TO THE WARSAW PACT OF SUCH AN ESCALATION MAKES THE POSSIBLE GAINS FROM A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK NOT WORTH THE RISK AND, 2) IF DETERRENCE FAILS AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL, THE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS BALANCE CAN SERVE SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

IN MY OPINION, THERE ARE AFFORDABLE IMPROVEMENTS AVAILABLE, MANY ALREADY UNDERWAY, UNQUESTIONABLY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE TREATY, FOR NATO TO MAINTAIN AN

ADEQUATE THEATER NUCLEAR DETERRENT. THOSE IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED WITH OR WITHOUT THE TREATY. FURTHER, THOSE IMPROVEMENTS CAN PROVIDE A POST-TREATY BALANCE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN THE CURRENT BALANCE. HENCE, I BELIEVE THE TREATY PROVIDES FOR AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN DETERRENCE.

HOWEVER, THE TREATY ALONE CANNOT ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES. ADEQUATE FORCES ARE NOT THE AUTOMATIC PRODUCT OF ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES. THERE MUST BE A CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT TO BUILDING AND SUSTAINING FORCES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF SUCH TREATIES. HENCE, MY CONCERN IS NOT WHETHER THE INF TREATY ALLOWS FOR ADEQUATE FORCES. IT CLEARLY DOES. MY CONCERN IS FOR ADEQUATE ONGOING SUPPORT TO PROVIDE THOSE FORCES. THE BUDGET REDUCTIONS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS AND THE DRASTIC REDUCTIONS WE FACE IN 1989 AND PROBABLY BEYOND DO NOT PROVIDE FOR FORCES THAT WARRANT HIGH CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ADEQUACY.

HOWEVER, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THAT BUDGET, WE ARE FOCUSING ON FORCES THAT ARE CAREFULLY STRUCTURED TO UNDERWRITE THE MOST VITAL NEEDS OF THE STRATEGY. AT THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEVEL, THE AIR FORCE PROGRAMS REQUIRED ARE FUNDED AND WERE UNDERWAY WELL BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY. THE F-15E, UPGRADING THE F-111 FORCE, NIGHT AND ADVERSE WEATHER CAPABILITY FOR THE F-16 FLEET, AND A STANDOFF NUCLEAR WEAPON FOR OUR DUAL CAPABLE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ARE SOME EXAMPLES.

AS FOR IMPROVING CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OUR CHOICES WITHIN BUDGET LIMITATIONS ARE, AGAIN, CAREFULLY AIMED AT UNDERWRITING THE STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE, RAPID

REINFORCEMENT AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. HOWEVER, ANY DISCUSSION OF PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE THOSE CAPABILITIES IS CLEARLY BEYOND THE INTENDED SCOPE OF THIS HEARING, SO LET ME CLOSE WITH SOME COMMENTS ON VERIFICATION.

I WOULD AGREE WITH THOSE WHO POINT TO THE LONG HISTORY OF SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENT VIOLATIONS. THOSE VIOLATIONS ARE WELL DOCUMENTED. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO CHEAT AGAIN WHEN IT SERVES THEIR INTERESTS TO DO SO. OUR APPROACH HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE TO INSIST ON A VERIFICATION REGIME THAT WILL REVEAL CHEATING THAT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT OUR DETERRENT POSTURE AND THAT LEAVES US WITH OPTIONS TO RESPOND TO SUCH CHEATING. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE SECOND POINT IS AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT AS THE FIRST. THERE IS NO VALUE TO VERIFICATION IF THE SOVIETS BELIEVE WE WOULD FOLLOW A "NO RESPONSE" POLICY.

TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT INF VERIFICATION, WE KNOW WE CAN VERIFY THAT THE SOVIETS DESTROY OVER 1800 DELIVERY SYSTEMS IDENTIFIED BY THE SOVIETS. AS SUGGESTED EARLIER, THAT ALONE BRINGS ABOUT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE BALANCE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. WE WILL ALSO WITNESS AND CAN VERIFY THE ELIMINATION OF THE EXISTING COMPLEXES OF EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES THAT SUPPORT THOSE SYSTEMS. FURTHER, FLIGHT TESTING OF THOSE SYSTEMS WILL BE PROHIBITED AND WE HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THAT PROVISION THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY AREAS OF SOME UNCERTAINTY. WE CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT SMALL NUMBERS OF MISSILES

WILL NOT BE CONCEALED. WE CAN OVER TIME MONITOR DEPLOYED SYSTEMS MAINTAINED IN ANY MILITARILY USEFUL POSTURE, AND THE SOVIET DECLARATION OF NUMBERS OF DEPLOYED SYSTEMS FALLS WITHIN THE RANGE OF U.S. ESTIMATES BUILT UP OVER YEARS OF SUCH MONITORING.

IN ANY CASE, FOR THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN A MILITARILY USEFUL FORCE OF COVERT MISSILES, THEY WOULD NEED AN ELABORATE HIDDEN INFRASTRUCTURE TO HIDE THE MISSILES, PERIODICALLY TEST THEM AND PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF EMPLOYING THEM IN A CRISIS. THEY WOULD RUN A HIGH RISK OF DETECTION OVER TIME.

APART FROM THESE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE MILITARY UTILITY OF SUCH A CHEATER FORCE WOULD BE LOW COMPARED TO THE RISK.

AND SO IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE INF TREATY AND ITS VERIFICATION PROTOCOL ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN, AND, IN FACT, TO ENHANCE, U.S. AND NATO STRATEGIES SUPPORTING DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. BUT THE RESOLVE WE DEMONSTRATED IN THIS SUCCESSFUL DUAL TRACK STRATEGY MUST NOW BE APPLIED TO MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF FORCES REQUIRED TO DETER AT THE CONVENTIONAL, THEATER NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC LEVELS OF CONFLICT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS, AND TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN MORE DETAIL.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, General Welch.

I am going to yield to Senator Warner. Senator Warner will be called to the floor for discussion on the Kennedy nomination. So Senator Warner, I will start, with you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, my questions will seek to bring out the procedure by which the chiefs individually and collectively reached the views that they have provided us this morning. I wonder if I might start with Admiral Trost.

Admiral Trost, could you briefly sketch the procedures that you as a member of the Joint Chiefs used in reaching your conclusions, up to and including consultations with the President.

Admiral TROST. Well, Senator Warner, the general topic of arms control has occupied a rather considerable amount of time on the part of the chiefs ever since I have been a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have had an opportunity through personal readings, personal briefings, to examine very closely not only the proposed contents of treaties, but to provide our own views of what should be in those treaties in order to protect the interests of this country and of our NATO allies.

We have had an opportunity to be briefed by experts on arms control, by those who have an interest in preserving the interests of our NATO allies, and by our own staffs, who have examined the subject in rather exhaustive detail.

I think I speak for all of us when I say we have all read rather extensively on the topic. We have examined prior negotiating history. We have discussed the implications of each aspect of these treaties on a considerable basis among ourselves.

And we reached a conclusion which I think I can say was a unanimous conclusion that the treaty, with the recommendations which we proposed, would serve the best interests of this country and our allies. As General Welch said, the treaty does incorporate our recommendations, and that leads to our conclusion that it is not only supportable, but it is in the best interests of the country.

Senator WARNER. Admiral, I have had the privilege of working with you now for some 18 years, and I have always known you to be a very independent thinking individual. At any time did you feel that the fact that the President had determined this treaty was in the best interests of the United States, that that determination in any way bound you to a comparable conclusion or in any way deterred you from speaking out on any aspect of this treaty which you felt might not be in the best interests of the United States?

Admiral TROST. I did not feel that I was bound not to speak my mind, but in this particular instance the President's recommendation and the treaty he signed are fully supported by the recommendations.

Senator WARNER. So your conclusion which you have expressed today is an independent one and is in no way, as we say, one of salute and march off behind the commander in chief?

Admiral TROST. That is correct, sir.

Senator WARNER. Did you feel at all times that you were free to speak to the President on this?

We in our most recent piece of legislation on reorganization specifically allowed for chiefs to seek an audience with the President of the United States if at any time they differed from other members of the Joint Chiefs, and particularly the Chairman.

Admiral TROST. I should note that I found no reason to request a separate audience. But I would note that our inputs were requested throughout the process of the formulation of the treaty and its contents, and we did have an opportunity to discuss the implications and our recommendations personally with the President. And I feel our views were fully considered.

Senator WARNER. So in conclusion, would you say, in characterizing the process by which the chiefs provided their input to this treaty, it was completely fair, open, objective, and at all times every member of the Joint Chiefs had the opportunity to express any view that they had for or against any provision of the treaty?

Admiral TROST. That is my view, yes.

Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, I would ask if anyone would like to further comment on the procedure with respect to themselves. General Vuono?

General VUONO. No, Senator. I would concur with what Admiral Trost said. I reviewed just recently the discussions that we have had, both as members of the Joint Chiefs as a collective body, but also discussions I have had inside the Army in terms of the implications of the treaty. It has been extensive and exhaustive.

Our positions were very clear. They were taken with objectivity and with what is in the best interests of this Nation, and I am completely satisfied that my views were forcefully——

Senator WARNER. Could you speak into the mike please?

General VUONO. And I am convinced that not only my views, but the views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs were laid out and expressed directly and forcefully, and I am satisfied that the treaty reflects not only the best interests of our military, but of our country.

Senator WARNER. Would you say that the views you have expressed here today coincide with those of the senior colleagues that you serve with in the U.S. Army?

General VUONO. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Do you know of any major dissent among your senior colleagues in the U.S. Army?

General VUONO. Absolutely none.

Senator WARNER. Do you know, Admiral Trost, of any major dissent within your senior colleagues now in uniform in the U.S. Navy?

Admiral TROST. I know of none.

Senator WARNER. General Gray, would you care to comment on your participation along the lines of Admiral Trost, and to the extent that your senior colleagues concur in your views?

General GRAY. Well, I would support what has already been said on this topic, and I also had a great many discussions, not just with marine leaders but, as I have indicated in my opening statement, with NATO military and political leaders as well.

And I have yet to find anyone that objected to the INF Treaty per se in the military or the political sense, and the reason is because the intermediate range nuclear ballistic missiles are a very

destabilizing capability in Europe and they permit coercion on the part of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

And removing them and removing that class of weapons forces the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the military sense to move to a whole new kind of capability with respect to the use of intimidation and the like. And I think that military people resist—or military people clearly understand that the concerns are more in the ambiguous area: Does this mean that our great Nation of America is going to abandon Europe, and does this mean that you would not trade Chicago for Bonn, and that kind of thing?

And that is really—that is the kind of thing that pops up from time to time, what we call Europessimism. But again, I believe that the——

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but could General Welch respond to my question?

Chairman NUNN. Yes, we will finish the answer to the question.

General WELCH. Thank you.

I think it is important to be aware that both SACEUR and the Joint Chiefs were seriously concerned with the serious imbalances in theater nuclear capabilities before the treaty was negotiated, and that, in response to those concerns, the service chiefs have vigorously pursued improvements in theater nuclear forces because of that imbalance.

This treaty clearly improves that imbalance problem. It would be irresponsible for any of the Joint Chiefs at this point in time to disavow responsibility for what is in this treaty.

This treaty not only contains those provisions that we insisted be in the treaty; it does not contain provisions that we were concerned should not be in the treaty. We were continuously involved in instructions to the negotiators, along with a great many other people. And the military implications and the military sufficiency was addressed by the Joint Chiefs at each step.

We met frequently with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, and on occasion with the President. So clearly, our advice was sought after and our advice is embodied in the treaty.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. General Gray did not quite get through.

General GRAY. Well, I would just say that I would reinforce what has been said, and the military people that I have talked to on this, they are supportive of this effort. It has been pointed out, we did not look at this in isolation.

That is all I would add, sir.

Chairman NUNN. I would like to get your views, particularly General Vuono, your view, relating to the conventional trends in Europe over the last 20 years. Yesterday, General Galvin was asked whether the conventional force trends in Europe have improved or grown worse since 1980, and he said they have grown worse.

Do you agree with that? I am talking about relative balance now, not simply improvement, but relative, NATO to the Warsaw Pact.

General VUONO. I would agree with that, Mr. Chairman, although we have made, I think, some great strides within our own conventional capabilities. They have not been as significant as I would like to have seen them in comparison to the Soviet Union.

I think that the positions that we have taken in terms of trying to continue the improvements of our conventional capabilities reflect that. As I said in my opening remarks, the areas that we feel we need to improve upon are reflected in our programs in terms of the systems that we think are needed to improve the conventional imbalance in Europe.

Chairman NUNN. General Welch, I would pose the same question to you.

And General Vuono, were you answering for the overall conventional balance or the Army ground forces?

General VUONO. I was speaking specifically about Army ground conventional.

Chairman NUNN. Let me pose the question to General Welch on the air. Let me say, how would you rate what has happened in NATO versus Warsaw Pact in terms of the air balance, let us say since 1980?

General WELCH. Well, clearly one of the great strengths in NATO are the tactical air forces embodied there. But I think that the question of the overall balance is a bit more complex from the deterrent standpoint.

That is, from the standpoint of the Soviets' confidence that they could quickly succeed in a Warsaw Pact attack, which I think their strategy and doctrine must produce quick victory or they will not attempt an attack. From that viewpoint, I think the Soviets have greater uncertainty than they did 5 or 6 years ago, because of the improvements in the forces that we have made.

Chairman NUNN. Now, is that related to air power or are you speaking overall?

General WELCH. Well, I think that in tactical nuclear forces or tactical air forces, both United States and NATO, and I believe that General Vuono would also agree, that the Soviets must have the great concern about their ability to make breakthroughs on the ground.

But from a balance standpoint, should deterrence fail, then no one has any reason to be comfortable about the outcome once deterrence fails.

Chairman NUNN. Do you think NATO still has a tactical air advantage over the Warsaw Pact?

General WELCH. I think NATO has the tactical air forces required to create great uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets. There is no way to say that the overall balance of tactical air favors NATO.

What I would say instead is that the Warsaw Pact certainly does not have the balance that they would require to be confident of a quick victory. We have the quality edge. They have the quantity edge.

Chairman NUNN. We have always looked at our tactical air over the years as compensating for some of our disadvantages on the grounds. So a NATO advantage in tactical air has always been deemed to be, as long as I have traced NATO, an essential element of trying to have the overall deterrent effect.

Are you saying that since we now have a parity, a rough parity in the air, that we no longer have that advantage? Or are you saying we still have a slight advantage? I am not talking about a

bean count. I am talking about your professional assessment of what I would call a more dynamic balance.

General WELCH. I understand, and that is what raises the complexity. Clearly, we have the qualitative edge. Clearly we have the edge in quality of training, quality of people, quality of equipment.

And I think it is very clear that NATO has the air forces required to deter Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional attack. However, on the other side of the coin and the reason why this balance becomes more difficult to assess, on the other side of the coin, the Soviets retain their quantitative advantage, and they have in recent years been significantly increasing the quality of their air forces.

So the qualitative edge is narrower than it was 6 or 7 years ago. The quantitative balance remains about the same.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral Trost, there has been a lot of discussion about the role of sea-launched cruise missiles, and particularly in relationship to the INF Treaty, as to whether we are going to negotiate some limit on sea-launched cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional, or whether we will have a nuclear limit, or whether we will have any restriction on conventional.

If you looked at the future of sea-launched cruise missiles, which has the highest priority in your view, the nuclear mission of the sea-launched cruise missile or the conventional?

Admiral TROST. Senator, I am going to hedge on your question because I do not want to answer that specific question in this forum. I would simply note that the role of sea-launched cruise missiles is clearly one that gives us tremendous flexibility and support of NATO's role of flexible response.

It again is inherent in those naval forces which can support NATO that they bring both capabilities to bear. As you know, there is a lot of discussion and a lot of pressure on the part of the Soviet Union to either constrain or eliminate our capability currently inherent in sea-launched cruise missiles, a capability that is building.

That tells me that they are clearly concerned about that capability or they would not be trying to negotiate away an area in which they see us having an advantage. The sticky point in our discussions to date has been the inability, despite the claims of Secretary General Gorbachev, of either side to find a way to properly verify what is in fact inside those missile launchers.

And that point I suspect will keep us from coming to a near-term conclusion or agreement on any kind of constraints or limitations on missiles.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would start with General Vuono and ask the same question of each of you in succession. Are you basing your support for this treaty on any assumptions about follow-on programs or follow-on treaties?

General VUONO. No, Senator. The programs that we need to improve our capabilities in Europe have been programs that we have been asking for for some time, both in terms of conventional capability improvement and in terms of the non-strategic nuclear capability.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are not basing your support on any programs that are not yet under way?

General VUONO. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Admiral Trost.

Admiral TROST. I am not basing my support on assumptions of programs not under way, but I am basing my support on the assumption that the national leadership and the Congress will recognize the need for a continued strong conventional posture on the part of our military, and that the NATO countries will similarly see that need.

I am convinced that it is our current posture which has brought the Soviet Union to the bargaining table on the INF Treaty, and I am also convinced that only if we maintain that strong conventional capability and an overall proper deterrent posture will we be able to make any further advances in other areas of disarmament.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Gray, you said something to the effect that there are risks in the treaty, if I understood you correctly, but the risks are acceptable, with the proviso that we demonstrate our resolve in military and political spheres.

What did you mean by that? What do you see as necessary to demonstrate our resolve in military and political spheres?

General GRAY. Well, I believe that we have to clearly underscore the point that it is through strength that we get deterrence and we get the hope for peace. And I believe that we must guard against people looking at the INF Treaty or any other arms control arrangement as one where all of a sudden we can take a quantum step forward to a utopian view that we can not reduce our guard and everything is fine and the like.

In my own conceptual framework for the future, I see a major difference between the Soviet Union and our great Nation and what we stand for, and I do not see that going away in this century and as we embark on the next.

And so I would hope that the plans and the programs that your military chiefs have presented through the normal programming and budgeting process would get careful consideration in that light. I believe that the Soviet Union is becoming quite good at playing the administration against the Congress in some of these views, and I think we have to be careful here.

I can remember scribbling on my pad after our session with Marshall Akhromeyev, "buyers beware." So I think we have to proceed on the course that we are on. I again look at it in more of a global sense. Vital interests are threatened in many places around the globe. We have to present to you programs that we believe will deter in the entire spectrum, from terrorism through high intensity conflict.

I think that we have to underscore that strategic nuclear capability is still the capstone and the linchpin for the defense of NATO, and that we must try wherever possible to go forward together in this entire arrangement.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Permit me to interrupt you because my time is so limited. Are you basing your support for the treaty on any assumptions about future weapons systems or future negotiations?

General GRAY. No, absolutely not.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Welch.

General WELCH. The treaty in itself does not create any new needs for programs. However, neither does the treaty obviate the need for those programs that we have already requested to modernize conventional and theater nuclear forces.

If there is a risk, it is a psychological risk that there will be a euphoria, that some people will assume that we need not make those already requested improvements because of this treaty.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I think you are going to see that as a fact of life.

Admiral Trost, do you have any concern about—in your statement, in the second paragraph, you note that carrier-based dual capable aircraft, ballistic missile submarines, sea-launched cruise missiles, and so on, all unaffected by the treaty, remain available for employment in the strategy of flexible response.

With respect to the ballistic missile submarines, do you have any concern about now substituting or, should I say, relying more heavily on what are perceived and usually are strategic platforms, launch platforms, to fill the gap created by the removal of the INF weapons? Do you have any concern?

I mean, some of our witnesses have said that, for example, the reliance on those SLBMs, or indeed reliance upon what are often strategic platforms, is to some degree more provocative and will be seen as more provocative in the eyes of Soviet planners than weapons that are obviously theater.

Do you have any concern on that point?

Admiral TROST. My statement was broader than the implication that we were now going to rely on ballistic missiles carried aboard strategic missile submarines for use in a NATO land environment. They are part of our national strategic deterrent and they remain so.

The SLBMs to which you refer committed to SACEUR remain there for use, as I stated before. The capability is one that is both a deterrent capability and a flexible one in terms of the tactical missiles.

The strategic—not strategic, but sea-launched cruise missiles which remain available to support NATO, I see no problem in the reduction of those missiles which are reduced under the treaty, since we still maintain our overall deterrent capability and the capability to respond that we have right now.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not sure you responded to my question, however. Do you have any concern about using strategic platforms to fill the gap created by the INF?

Admiral TROST. No, I do not, because I do not see any change in their deployment or their role.

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to add my voice to the overwhelming majority of the committee who appreciates the very careful and thoughtful way in which you have conducted these hearings and established the witnesses.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being with us today. We really appreciate your being here. General Vuono, in particular I

want to thank you and the Army for your great help on my recent trip during which I spent 2 weeks in Europe, hosted largely by the Army. They just did a wonderful job of setting it all up.

And there are some remarkably impressive people in your units, and I just wanted to say that publicly and to thank you, and to say I look forward to sitting down with you and sharing with you some of my thoughts and having a further exchange with you.

In the time that we have this morning, which is, as ever, limited, I would like to pursue some questions related to confidence building measures and the potential of discussions with the Soviets.

If in fact one of the primary purposes, if not the primary purpose, of the NATO alliance is to develop a program of deterrence and to assure ourselves that the Soviets would not be successful in any kind of a surprise attack, much less an attack in general, it seems to me that we are better off if we have more information about what they are doing, rather than less information; and that the agreements reached at Stockholm get us started and on a process of better understanding what the Soviets are doing, how they are deployed, how they are trained, and so on.

I was struck by the enthusiasm with which the Stockholm agreements were met by our Army and Air Force Commanders in Europe.

Could you comment, General Vuono and General Welch, one, on your evaluation of the Stockholm agreements, what we have learned so far from the observer teams and the challenge teams, one; and two, if you think that there are further steps that we ought to take in building upon what we have learned so far from Stockholm?

General VUONO. Yes. I think, Senator, that the Stockholm agreement has been a step in the right direction for us. I have also talked to our commanders in Europe and some of those who have been on these trips. To have the opportunity to look at the Soviets in some detail on their various exercises and training opportunities, it just cannot help but be beneficial to us. We have gotten, I think, some very good feedback on those visits in terms of tactics, leadership and training and so forth. They have been very valuable to us, and I would hope that we could continue that effort. I would also hope that in the future we could expand some of our military to military discussions at various levels, so that we could discuss doctrine, training, education, leadership, and other concepts.

I think it is very valuable to us, and I would hope we are able to do that.

Senator WIRTH. General Welch, do you have any comment?

General WELCH. I would agree with that. I think that we found the Soviets somewhat more open than we expected to. And obviously, anything that reduces the element of surprise contributes to stability.

I really do not see any drawbacks to that process.

Senator WIRTH. Have you all discussed or do you know of any analysis going on as to what further measures might be taken?

I am thinking in particular of discussions that we had with a number of senior officers in the Army, General Vuono, who thought it might be useful for us to be able to have similar kinds of observers, maybe on a continuing basis, at various bottlenecks in

the transportation network of the Warsaw Pact to see what was going through and how it was going through.

And that in turn would give us information if they were mobilizing or if there were changes in behavior, we would see them.

The ability to look at where they have significant concentrations of supplies might be another area. Some of the Air Force people, General Welch, were talking to us about being able to watch airports and see the potential of observing different configurations of transport planes coming in and out.

That would give us a lot of information.

Do you know of any efforts going on to look at what next steps might be taken on the current observation and inspection groups?

General VUONO. Yes. I think we are looking at a number of areas, some of which you just described. And I think there are any number that we can consider that would assist us in a more responsible way of looking at surprise and warning.

And I think those are ongoing, and I would hope that in the future we are able to see the results of that effort.

Senator WIRTH. General Welch, do you have any comment?

Senator WELCH. We are looking at some measures. The utility of those measures will depend upon what they add to what we can already do. And of course, that has to do with other methods that we have that we cannot discuss in this open hearing.

But the short answer is there are additional measures that we think look promising.

Senator WIRTH. And are these, the so-called visibility measures coming out of Stockholm, as much or more to our advantage than they are to the Warsaw Pact forces, who in turn can watch our major exercises and can challenge us, just as we can challenge them?

General VUONO. Well, I think you are going to see some of both coming out of Stockholm. I think we are seeing their interest in observing our forces, just as we want to look at them.

As you know, we already have certain organizations in place to do that right now. As we look at more detailed opportunities to do that, I think the benefits are certainly worth the efforts to do so.

Senator WIRTH. Finally, General Welch, do you have any comment on the suggestion that General Vuono made about increased exchanges or discussions between senior officers of the United States or NATO with senior officers of the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact?

General WELCH. Well, as you know, ever since Marshall Akhromeyev's visit that there has been some increased interest in that kind of activity. And I think that if we can determine in advance what we hope to accomplish by that, so that we can have as reasonable assurance of a successful outcome, that that can be very useful.

However, I think just willy-nilly exchange of visits, in hopes that we will learn to like each other, is probably not too useful. But there can be useful discussion on specific subjects with specific objectives.

Senator WIRTH. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your being here. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Next is Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the witnesses for their very important testimony. I thank them for being here. I have asked, I believe, every witness before this committee as to whether the conventional imbalance trends were favorable or unfavorable as far as NATO versus Warsaw Pact is concerned. And General Vuono, I believe, just indicated that he felt that situation was worsening.

Admiral Trost, do you share that view?

Admiral TROST. Well, looking at conventional trends, we need to assess several different areas. Clearly, the Soviet naval capability and their maritime power overall has expanded rather considerably over the last two decades and is a very, very major factor.

Ours in addition, as you are well aware, has expanded rather markedly likewise in this decade, and I feel rather comfortable with the balance that we enjoy right now. Having said that, I also recognize that we face a very considerable challenge in ensuring sufficient maritime power both to support the sea lines of communications and support of other forces in Europe, while also using our maritime forces to support the NATO flanks.

Our biggest threat is in the area of anti-submarine warfare, where we have seen the greatest near-term advances on the part of the Soviet Union. That is an area we are emphasizing very heavily and, with continued support for modernization of the forces involved in those areas, I think we can maintain a satisfactory balance.

Senator MCCAIN. Admiral, I appreciate the exposition. My question was are the trends favorable or unfavorable as far as NATO versus Warsaw Pact is concerned.

Admiral TROST. And I cannot give you a black and white answer on that.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I deeply regret that you cannot, since every other witness before this committee has been able to. And I would appreciate such an answer. I think it is very important because it will have an impact as to the congressional deliberations on the budget.

General Gray, can you state whether you feel that conventional trends have been favorable or unfavorable?

General GRAY. Within the context that I would like to confine my area geographically to where the marines operate, and that is on the northern flank and in the southern region, in my judgment we are much stronger today and much more prepared and capable to make major contributions on the flanks of NATO than we were, say, a decade ago.

And of course, as you know, with respect to the Marine Corps alone, the decade of the seventies was a very disastrous time financially. And so your Marine Corps has been fully modernized in this decade.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

General Welch, in your statement on page 6 you said:

My concern is for adequate ongoing support to provide those forces. The budget reductions over the past three years and the drastic reductions we face in 1989 and

probably beyond do not provide for forces that warrant high confidence in their adequacies.

And then, in response to a question from Senator Nunn, you said that the qualitative edge of NATO versus Warsaw Pact has narrowed and the quantity has remained the same.

What conclusions can we draw from your statement and your response to Senator Nunn's question?

General WELCH. I think the right way to look at that is that at this moment NATO air forces are more ready and more capable by a fairly wide margin than they have ever been. We have to figure out where we are on that cycle. We have been fielding large numbers of new F-18s, new F-16s, and new F-15s.

Those are designs that are essentially more than 10 years old. The Soviets are now beginning to field Flankers and Fulcrums that are essentially as good as those airplanes I just mentioned.

We will begin to field the ATA and the ATF and the French Rafale and the EFA and our next generation of tactical aircraft perhaps 7 or 8 years from now. So where we are at this point in time is that we are the beneficiaries of a tremendous modernization cycle in U.S. forces and NATO forces.

The Soviets are now beginning to become the beneficiaries of fielding that same kind of technology in greater numbers. And now we will have this period of time while we develop our next cycle of technology, which it will take the Soviets some years to match.

So my concern in the statement is that we cannot stop at this point being the beneficiaries of those past investments and that past development, because the Soviets are going to very quickly catch up in technology. And we see them fielding those kinds of systems today, but not yet in the numbers that would give them—that would allow them to close that qualitative gap.

Senator MCCAIN. How confident are you that we will actually fund and deploy the air-launched standoff missile during the current 5-year defense plan?

General WELCH. I am not sure which weapon you have in mind. I am quite confident that we will field and fund the joint tactical missile, the standoff missile. We have the ongoing combined international program with NATO in the MSAP. I am quite confident that we will fund that.

As to the standoff nuclear weapon that we have been seeking, the TASM, I am less confident that we will get the kind of support we need on this side of the river to field that.

No question in my mind that you will get the support from the Department of Defense, and we very much need that. So those are three standoff air to surface missile programs. There are two others that are compartmented in which I have high confidence.

So I guess I would say that in four out of five, they seem to be going well.

Senator MCCAIN. I would request that each of the witnesses provide for the record, since my time has expired, the cuts that each of the services had to make in the planned modernization of its forces for NATO as a result of the budget cuts for the last 3 years.

I think that might provide us with some very important information. And if those cuts are as significant as I believe they are and we still have confidence that, as General Gray does and Admiral

Trost is unable to determine, as to whether the force trend of imbalances is not significant, then perhaps there have been some requests that were not necessary and expenditures of the taxpayers' dollars.

[The information referred to follows:]

ARMY

General VUONO. Requested data cannot be released until February 18, 1988 budget release. Army will respond to Senator McCain and others who have requested similar information in separate correspondence.

NAVY

Admiral TROST. Budget cuts sustained by the Navy in the planned modernization of its forces over the past three years are summarized in the table below. The Navy is a mobile force with any given unit deployable anywhere in the world. Modernization of particular ships, aircraft and systems is therefore independent of current or narrowly specified potential theaters of operation. Furthermore, naval operations worldwide may be in support of a particular theater (ensuring access to sea lines of communication to South West Asia and Japan in support of a NATO conflict, for example). Therefore, the data provided are force wide, for all theaters including NATO.

NAVY MODERNIZATION

[Then year, billions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—		
	1988	1987	1986
President's budget submission	16.1	17.0	18.6
Appropriated	15.4	15.6	17.5
Total decrement	.7	1.4	1.1

Modernization resources are targeted at improving military capabilities of existing forces. The above data are total allocations for fleet modernization; aircraft modifications; weapon systems, equipment and component improvement; and research and development. On average, research and development represents about 60 percent of the total. Data for fiscal year 1988 are correct as of February 3, 1988; minor adjustments are being coordinated within the Department of Defense as a result of recent Congressional action.

MARINE CORPS

General GRAY. In the face of recent budget reductions the Marine Corps has protected combat readiness; however, it has been necessary to slow sustainability improvements and modernization. Procurement of some new weapons systems such as the AV8B and F/A-18 have been slowed. In the amended fiscal year 1989 budget submission the initial buy of M1 tanks for the Marine Corps has been reduced from 66 to 14. The Copperhead and 5" SAL-GP precision munitions are also considered unaffordable at current budget levels.

AIR FORCE

General WELCH. The U.S. Air Force, though impacted by specific modernization reductions during the fiscal year 1986, fiscal year 1987 and fiscal year 1988 budget cycles, continues to field more capable and combat ready forces for NATO. Fiscal constraints have slowed certain modernization programs; however, total procurement objectives for programs such as the F-15E, C-17, and the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) remain the same. The result is program completion dates move farther into the outyears. Five areas generally affect NATO capability: tactical fighters, airlift, air refueling, reconnaissance, and munitions.

Between fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1988, F-16 and F-15E new aircraft procurement decreased. The rate of Tactical Air Force (TAF) modernization, however, remained generally the same because fighter force size decreased from 40 TFWs

(fiscal year 1986 FYDP) to 37 TFWs (fiscal year 1988 FYDP). Throughout the last three budget cycles, money has been allocated to ensure that the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), the TAF's next generation modernization program, is fielded by the mid-1990s. [Deleted.]

In the airlift arena between fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1988, congressional reductions in C-17 RDT&E caused a slip in IOC for that aircraft from fiscal year 1992/2 to fiscal year 1992/4. Total C-17 procurement objective remains 210 aircraft. [Deleted.]

In air refueling, the Air Force takes delivery of the last of 60 KC-10 aircraft in fiscal year 1989/1, and through congressional action modernizes with the KC-135R at 50 aircraft per year. [Deleted.]

Planned modernization for Air Force reconnaissance assets continued in the fiscal year 1986 through fiscal year 1988 budgets. Existing strategic and tactical reconnaissance aircraft were identified for new systems and sensors, and investment continued on the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS), looking for an operational capability in the early 1990s.

Budget cuts over the last three years have forced smaller armament investments and slowed preferred weapon modernization. Significant for NATO will be a slower build rate for the AMRAAM, and smaller inventories of weapons such as the AGM-65 Maverick, AGM-88 HARM, and CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition.

Senator McCain. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Senator Shelby.

Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Vuono and General Welch, I would like to address this basically to you two first since I believe that the removal of the INF weapons will have the greatest impact on the Army and the Air Force.

Looking at the post-INF situation in Europe, what are your highest priorities? First, General Vuono?

General Vuono. Well, Senator, I think in the Army programs that we have submitted we have laid that out fairly specifically, both in terms of conventional improvements we need and also the improvements we need in our short-range nuclear forces.

And so I would say regarding short-range nuclear forces in the tactical nuclear business, two high priorities we have are to have the restrictions lifted so that we can go forward with the follow-on to Lance missile and to get the restrictions lifted on the artillery fired atomic projectile.

In the conventional arena, we have a suite of improvements that we need. And by the way, we needed those before the INF Treaty, as we did with the short-range nuclear weapons. Such things as improving our deep attack capability, improving our close combat capability, air defense, artillery, command and control, those would be the priorities that I would assign.

They would be the same priorities that I would have given you before the INF Treaty.

Senator Shelby. Let's look at the political climate in Germany, at least the trends there, possibly toward the third option, the third zero option, which I believe is real there. That is going to be the next push, the removal of all the battlefield nuclear weapons from Germany, is it not?

Is that not on the agenda there, the political agenda of some people anyway?

General Vuono. Well, in my view the short-range weapons are part of the triad we need over there. Those weapons are necessary.

Senator SHELBY. If they were removed, where would we be then?

General VUONO. I would say it is speculation in terms of where you would be. But if we would remove one important aspect of the triad—and I would not be happy with that at all—it would cause us difficulties. I feel very strongly that we should make every effort possible to keep those short-range nuclear weapons.

Senator SHELBY. How important is it, General Vuono, that some breakthrough be made regarding the reduction in the imbalance of the conventional forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

General VUONO. Well, I think that the asymmetrical nature of the imbalance is such that it would be very important that we reach some breakthrough in terms of the Soviets, the reduction of their conventional forces.

Senator SHELBY. And if there is no breakthrough—and there has not been. If there is not any, then what? Would you want, would you need and would you have to have not only the modernization of nuclear weapons, battlefield-oriented nuclear weapons for NATO, but would you need tremendous beefing up of the conventional forces, both United States and the Germans?

General VUONO. Well, I think that the programs that we have talked about for conventional improvements are based on the balance that we have there right now. So we would continue to push, as we have, for those conventional improvements.

Senator SHELBY. General Welch.

General WELCH. Sir, on the theater nuclear side, the programs that we think are essential are ongoing with one exception. The F-15E program, the F-111 upgrade, the F-16 with the LANTIRN system which gives it night capability and what weapons upgrades are ongoing insofar as I can determine are reasonably well supported.

We have just finished the definition of our approach to the TASM requirement, which has been a longstanding SACEUR requirement. There is not yet before the Congress our TASM program. That will be coming over when we finish the definition phase.

There is no question of the requirement. We just have not finished the technical work required to do that.

On the conventional side, it is the ability to help control the flow of forces to the battlefield, and that is the surveillance and the delivery systems and the munitions to deal with the deep battle. Both the Air Force and the Army are in very solid agreement that that is a very high priority and that we do have the programs currently before the Congress that are required to support that.

I unequivocally do not support a third zero until we have addressed the conventional imbalance.

Senator SHELBY. To all of you, do you, any of you, the four of you, recommend the linkage of reduction in the imbalance on conventional weapons to any possible START reductions of 50 percent? Admiral.

Admiral TROST. I would not recommend any linkage. These negotiations are very difficult of themselves, and when we start tying together two or more important areas in an attempt to negotiate, I think we are doomed to failure from the outset. And so I would not recommend the linkage, despite the importance of those reductions.

Senator SHELBY. But you are still looking at an overall nation's or allies' ability to respond. And there is linkage that way in the strategy. Why is there not linkage politically?

Admiral TROST. There is without question linkage on the strategy and linkage in the capability. If we are short in any area and fail to deter any capability, be it conventional or nuclear, we are asking for trouble. And so we do have to watch the overall balance without question.

My comments concern to the linkage of one type of negotiation with another. I think we should be mindful of what the posture is in these other areas as we negotiate, to make sure we do not do ourselves in, but not try to tie them together and create a more difficult situation.

Senator SHELBY. What about linkage of SDI to START?

Admiral TROST. Well, that has been proposed by the Soviets, and I oppose that.

Senator SHELBY. Anybody else?

General WELCH. I would just point out that the treaties have to stand on their own merits, and I think it would be a serious mistake to accept a treaty that you have questions about on the basis that it might lead to another treaty which you would consider to be beneficial.

Each treaty stands on its own merits, or we should not pursue it. And this one clearly does stand on its own merits.

Senator SHELBY. General, do you have any comment?

General GRAY. I would simply reinforce that. I would hope that the INF Treaty is looked at on its own merits and bounded as such by the treaty. I think, too, that the defense in space treaties and that type of thing should be decoupled from this type of process.

And I would only add, too, that I think that the short-range nuclear weapons—and they of course are obviously required to deter use of that Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional power, should be decoupled from INF as well.

General VUONO. I agree with that, Senator. I just believe that this treaty is a good treaty and we should move on this one, and not link it to the other negotiations.

General GRAY. To say that another way, my priority would be to reduce the conventional power on the other side before you trade off short-range nuclear weapons.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, I realize my time is up. Thank you for your indulgence.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Generals, welcome this morning. I want to ask General Vuono one question. In your statement you talked about the importance of the buildup of the conventional forces, and I just wanted to ask the question, should the congressional restrictions be removed that interfere with the development of the ATACMS and the artillery-fired weapons?

General VUONO. I absolutely believe they should, Senator, for both the follow-on to Lance and the artillery-fired atomic projectiles. We would like to see that restriction lifted so we could get on with it.

Senator SYMMS. You would say that is critical?

General VUONO. It is critical.

Senator SYMMS. Generals, just a more general question. I think you all may be a little bit more optimistic than I am about what this Congress is apt to do in the future and what our allies in Europe are apt to do with respect to future military budgets now that we have made the Evil Empire our partners in peace.

I am glad to see your optimism, but I am somewhat pessimistic. And I think if we do not demonstrate to the American people what the threat is, that it will be difficult to actually get the conventional buildup.

I asked this question of General Galvin yesterday and I want to ask it to each of you, just your personal opinion. But he made the statement in his testimony that, on the plus side, that he had more room to maneuver by getting the SS-20s out of Europe, so that was a plus. On the negative side, he hated to give up the cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs, which were very accurate weapons and which did pose a real deterrent to any proposed Warsaw Pact attack.

Then he went on to say that he agreed that all the targets that are not targeted by SS-20s will be targeted by SS-25s the day that the SS-20s go out. And so I would like to hear your military explanation of why we are better off by getting rid of a weapons system that is a real threat to our adversaries when they will retarget our forces with other weapons which also will have fast strike capability, the SS-25s?

And I just do not see—I cannot see how we can justify that we are better off with this treaty militarily. What is the answer to that? I need someone to be able to tell me why we are better off.

No one has made that case to me yet.

General WELCH. Well, I will be glad to respond to that, Senator. I think it is important to put into perspective the balance existing before the INF agreement. The one weapons system that you referred to obviously is the Pershing II, and it is our ballistic missile with absolutely assured penetration capability, accurate, rapid response, et cetera, et cetera, and that is all very desirable.

We have the capability to deliver 120 warheads with that system. The Soviets have on alert today a system of that same type that delivers 1,215 warheads. So we have a 10 to 1 ratio between systems of that type.

So while it is true that we must now cover those targets that were to be covered by those 120 warheads with a system that is somewhat less responsive, but no less certain, and that is the dual capable aircraft—as to the ground-launched cruise missile, what we gave up with the ground-launched cruise missile was that number of warheads. On the other hand, we can clearly cover those targets with dual capable aircraft with about the same responsiveness.

What we got for that obviously is that the Soviets gave up the overall capability to deliver some 3,000 warheads. And we stopped the deployment of the Soviet SSC-X-4 which was their ground-launched cruise missile. So I cannot tell you what future opportunities they have given up.

Those SS-25s that they can retarget if they choose to do so exist today. So this is not a new capability.

Senator SYMMS. What leads us to think they will not build some more SS-25s to offset the SS-20s that they are going to remove? What would their motivation be?

General WELCH. I think there is nothing——

Senator SYMMS. I mean, they are pushing into Central America, they are pushing in Afghanistan, they are pushing in Angola. I do not see any change in their operation. They are running a terrorist operation in Pakistan against civilians.

The Soviets I am speaking about are doing this, state-supported terrorism, which caused us to get quite exercised against Libya for doing it. But yet, our new partners in peace are doing it right in Pakistan today.

General WELCH. I certainly do not intend to sit here and defend the Soviets. On the other hand, if they have given up the most efficient way to cover those targets when they give up the three warhead SS-20, if they replace that capability with SS-25, they do it at considerably more expense. So they are destroying something that they have already paid for and must now replace it with something that they will have to develop and field.

Now, if economics is of no concern to the Soviets then that would not be a factor. But perhaps it is also of concern to the Soviets.

But my point is, whatever they do, they do with 3,000 fewer warheads than they have to do that with today, and that is why I think that it is militarily desirable to sign a treaty that causes the Soviets to give up 3,000, the capability to deliver 3,000 warheads.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, General.

I want to just ask one, and maybe you have answered the question satisfactorily, for General Gray. General Gray says on page 2 of his testimony:

> It is my professional military judgment that we as a nation can preserve the global power balance, maintain deterrence, and make verification work. But certain force modernization programs continue to be necessary whether there is an INF Treaty or not.

And that comes back to the politics that we face here with respect to defense budgets and what our alliance is going to do in Europe. And I hear what you are saying, General Gray, but does the treaty contribute to this or does it weaken this, or does it have any impact on your view?

General GRAY. Well, in my view, the treaty does not impact on that, provided of course, that everybody clearly understands what it is and what it is not. My colleagues in the Army and the Air Force would be more appropriate responders in terms of the current programs that are planned for modernizing the air forces as it applies to NATO.

My view is in the broader context with respect to our contributions to NATO as part of the maritime power and this same kind of flexible force contributing to stability throughout the globe.

So you can translate that to say that the programs, at least the marine programs, to include those aviation programs that are primarily to support the landing forces, those programs are very much needed to help defend this great Nation and our friends, with or without the INF Treaty.

When I made the comment that in my view we are stronger on the flanks of NATO today, that is in the context of our ability to

operate better with our allies there, to create more of an uncertainty in terms of environment with respect to the Soviet Union, and we have greatly improved our flexibility.

But those programs, by continuing the preposition in central Norway—and that is one of the most successful programs of our relationships there—they should continue.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of your testimony this morning.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Our next questioner is Senator Levin.

I am informed this is a 30-minute vote. It is on the Kennedy nomination. It is a very important matter, of course.

But I would suggest that we continue. We perhaps could complete the questioning in 30 minutes and then could save all of the service chiefs the time. Carl is up next and, Senator Glenn, you would be recognized after that. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me add my welcome to the chiefs this morning, and express my gratitude for their testimony and their balanced and fair assessment.

Admiral, you talked specifically about linkage of conventional force reductions to a START agreement, and I think the others commented on linkage in other aspects. So let me go down the line and ask you all specifically whether we should link a START agreement to conventional force reductions.

I think, General Welch, you touched a bit on that, too. But let me just ask the same question of all of you to make sure that we have a clear answer.

General Vuono, let's start with you. Do you favor linking a START agreement to conventional force reductions?

General VUONO. I do not.

Senator LEVIN. Could you tell us briefly why?

General VUONO. I think that the complexities and the efforts that are required for going into the conventional arms control are such that we should not hold any of the negotiations to conventional arms control or to START or to INF.

I just am opposed to linkage of any kind with any of the negotiations.

Senator LEVIN. Admiral, did you want to add anything to what you previously said? I think you covered it.

Admiral TROST. Only to ensure that you understand that I do not support linkage. I do not support linkage.

Senator LEVIN. General Gray, on the specific issue of linkage of START to conventional arms reductions or conventional arms control, what are your feelings on that?

General GRAY. Well, it is my own view that they should not be linked or coupled.

Senator LEVIN. Could you tell us why?

General GRAY. We have conventional war power capability and the ability to use that to deter and to keep peace in my view is because we have global responsibilities, and we must be flexible.

It is the aggregate usefulness of these forces that I think contributes the most to the national security and to the meaning of our

objectives throughout the globe. And so I oppose the kind of potential linkage, if you will, that says, well, if we get rid of so many nuclear weapons here or there or some other kind of agreement, that we would automatically have to reduce our conventional power.

I believe that we are a global power, whether perhaps some may like that or not, and I think that we continue to be, and I think that there are just too many people around the world that need that.

Senator LEVIN. Do you oppose linkage in either direction?

General GRAY. I think that when you talk about reducing Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional power, which has grown over time all out of proportion to be offensive in nature, then that is a topic, of course, which has been pursued for some time.

And I think that that has to stand on its merit.

Senator LEVIN. General Welch, do you want to add anything to what you said before as to whether you would support or oppose linking a START agreement to reductions in conventional forces?

General WELCH. I would just like to add one more comment to why I think linkage is not a good idea. It has nothing to do with the desirability of a conventional agreement. I think that is highly desirable.

On the other hand, the START agreement that we are pursuing and the only kind of START agreement that we should agree to is an agreement that on its own merit improves the strategic nuclear balance. That being the case, there is no need to link it, since it will benefit this country on its own merit.

If it does not, we should not agree to it. And second, the conventional agreement would just be an order of magnitude more difficult to deal with. We have been struggling with that for 14 years. The START agreement will be very, very difficult, and it will look easy in comparison to the complexity of a conventional arms agreement that gives us the true kind of balance that we are seeking.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, General.

Yesterday, General Galvin testified that the readiness of NATO forces is generally higher than that of the Warsaw Pact. And I am wondering if you would comment on that. Do you agree with that, General Vuono?

General VUONO. I do, Senator. The indicators that I see, both within our own forces, and NATO forces, would point out that our readiness is higher.

I think we have made great strides in the readiness of NATO's, through a combination of factors—the quality of people and the leaders, the interoperability efforts that have been ongoing for a number of years, and the various training exercises and so forth.

So I would agree with that.

Senator LEVIN. Admiral, do you agree that our readiness is higher than that of the Warsaw Pact?

Admiral TROST. I feel it is across the board. Specifically with respect to the Navy, I feel that our operational tempo and all of the various factors that we use to measure readiness are higher than those we observe in the Soviet Navy.

I think the key factor for the Navy, as well as for the other military services, is probably personnel readiness. We are all enjoying

an unprecedented high personnel readiness factor at the present time, thanks to support we have had in recent years.

We are not faced with the problem that their leadership are faced with, where they have high turnover every few years of large numbers; where the bulk of their military forces has no real intermediate petty officer or intermediate enlisted leadership cadre, as we have built up over the years, and where their officers in many cases are forced to undertake those cuties which we would assign to senior well-qualified enlisted personnel.

I think that this readiness factor in itself makes the biggest difference between our forces. It is also the biggest unknown in our ability to measure them.

Senator LEVIN. General Gray, do you have a comment on our force readiness for the marines? It is a little hard to compare here, perhaps, but do you have a comment to make on that?

General GRAY. Well, I think from the standpoint of our forces and your marine forces and those that operate almost on a daily basis throughout NATO, our aggregate preparedness to do what must be done has been considerably enhanced in the past several years.

And I think we are probably more prepared than ever. We have a good preposition program in the northern region. We have increased our ability to sustain combat in all the areas of sustainability with respect to the regions where we are required to be fully prepared to operate. And we have seen improvements in the air and the ground and the naval counterparts in some of the countries.

And there has been corresponding decreases. For example, Denmark in my judgment has decreased somewhat in the last decade, where other elements have improved. But I think on balance with respect to the entire strategic and conventional capability, we are prepared to do what has to be done.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Did you want General Welch to address that, to finish the question?

Senator LEVIN. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General WELCH. I think on balance across NATO that our readiness is higher than the Soviets. I think the Soviets' tactical air force's sustainability is better than NATO's, and they of course have the reinforcement advantage. So it is much more difficult for us to bring our ready forces to bear than it is the Soviets.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin.

General Glenn, if you would yield to me for one question, then I am going to run and vote.

General Welch, we had mentioned the other day a possible limitation in this treaty on air-launched cruise missiles. It is my understanding there is no such limitation in the treaty. Have you heard any explicit provision of a treaty or implicit understanding or any insinuation that there is a limit on air-launched cruise missiles of any range, particularly the range that is covered in this treaty for ground-launched systems?

General WELCH. Absolutely not. And in fact, it was a specific point insisted on by the Joint Chiefs and agreed to at every step in the negotiations that air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles would not be captured in this treaty, either conventional or nuclear.

Chairman NUNN. Do any of the others have any views to the contrary expressed by General Welch on air-launched cruise missiles?

General VUONO. No, Mr. Chairman.

General GRAY. I just want to underscore that particularly from the conventional side of these dual capable weapons. They are very important in all of our planning for the future.

Chairman NUNN. If I could ask one more question for the record, General Welch. In your statement you mention that the Soviet Union will destroy missiles able to carry 3,136 warheads. That is a different number than I have seen before, a higher number.

Could you furnish for the record how you arrived at that number?

General WELCH. Sure.

[The information follows:]

NATO STRATEGY/INF

General WELCH. The aggregate number of Soviet deployed and nondeployed IRMs and SRMs declared in the data MOU is 1,752. All of the missiles, with the exception of the SS-20, are capable of delivering only one warhead. The SS-20 carries three warheads. The number "over 3,000" is therefore derived as follows:

Missile	Deployed	Nondeployed	Total	Total warheads
SS-20	405	245	650	1,950
SS-4	65	105	170	170
SS-5	0	6	6	6
SS-12	220	506	726	726
SS-23	167	33	200	200
Total	857	895	1,752	3,052

Not included are 84 Soviet SSC-X-4 which have been tested, but not yet deployed.

Chairman NUNN. And also the 859 on our side.

General WELCH. I can furnish that for the record. That is the total count, deployed, non-deployed, training, et cetera. But I can provide that to you.

[The information follows:]

NATO STRATEGY/INF

General WELCH. The aggregate number of U.S. deployed and nondeployed IRMs and SRMs declared in the data MOU is 867. Since all these missiles are capable of carrying only one warhead, the cited testimony of "some 900" warheads is derived as follows:

Missile	Deployed	Nondeployed	Total	Total warheads
PII	120	127	247	247
GLCM	309	133	442	442
PIA	0	178	178	178

Missile	Deployed	Nondeployed	Total	Total warheads
Total	429	438	867	867

It should be noted that this is a representation of warheads "capable of being carried" by declared missiles—not necessarily a warhead inventory.

Chairman NUNN. I just want to be able to compare that to other numbers, to be sure that we are comparing apples with apples and so forth.

Senator Glenn, I will leave the questioning in your hands. And also, when you complete your questioning, if anyone else comes back for a second round, we can start there. If no one else comes back—the vote usually throws us off. I think everyone has had one round. Then I would ask you to recess the hearing, if you would.

And I thank all of the chiefs for being here today very much. It has been very helpful. We appreciate it.

Senator GLENN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From my look at the INF agreement so far, I think other weapons can cover what is being uncovered, whether you are talking about sub-launched cruise missiles or whatever.

I do not think the number of missiles involved with the INF Treaty are so significant that they upset our balance. We are talking about a fairly small number of delivery systems compared to the overall total, and even the reductions are in our favor.

We want to look at the fine print before we give our final stamp of approval on the treaty. We want to see the negotiating record, which has been requested, so we do not get caught up in a treaty reinterpretation controversy down the line. I do not have much doubt the INF Treaty will be approved.

I have been thinking, though, about whether the INF Treaty is the basis on which we can negotiate future arms control agreements. We already are embarked on START, basically using the same basis for negotiation as we used in INF. And when you talk about going down to 50 percent reductions, that is a little different.

And we even had people talking at Reykjavik, of course, about zeroing everything in 10 years. And so I have been wondering, while we get ready to approve INF, that we are not setting up a situation where we expect too much on the basis of INF. We are not dealing with the conventional balance, and we are not dealing with other nations that could and perhaps should be brought into this process.

If we had gone with the Reykjavik formula, we would have basically made the People's Republic of China the dominant nuclear power in the world, unless we brought them into this negotiating process.

I would like to have your views on whether we go to 50 percent reductions under START. Do we have to bring the conventional balance into this?

Do we have to bring other nations into the negotiations? Somewhere down this negotiating track, I think we have to return to what the United States has proposed in arms control negotiations for the last 40 years, and that is some control over the fissile materials.

I would be interested in your judgment on when we have to bring these other factors into consideration.

At what level of missile reductions must we consider these other factors—at 40 percent, 10 percent, 5 percent? Somewhere we have to deal with these other issues.

I do not think we can use the INF Treaty as the basis for future arms control negotiations. That is what bothers me. Does anyone want to comment on that?

General WELCH. I would be glad to begin. I think that your concerns are well founded, and the Joint Chiefs agreed to double zero in INF; we did not agree to triple zero, for exactly the reasons you described. And that is that the outcome of each of these negotiations must leave us both with a balance at that level and it must also leave us with the deterrent impact that that level has on the level below it.

It was suggested earlier that we have difficulty speaking our personal opinions. I will prove that I do not, and that is I think a zero nuclear balance in strategic nuclear weapons would be a disaster and I would never support such an agreement.

The 50 percent was not arrived at as haphazardly as it might sound, and that is at the so-called 50 percent reduction level we still retain—in fact, we improve—the balance between our strategic nuclear forces and we still retain an unquestionably capable force, that is, unquestionably capable of deterring conflict at lower levels, as well as maintaining the strategic nuclear balance.

So the 50-percent reduction is a level that we are comfortable with. Now, would we be comfortable with 30 percent? I think that would take a lot more study than has been done.

We suggested earlier that there should not—we cannot—link those negotiations together, both because of the complexity, but also because of the great temptation to believe that we can compensate for a bad agreement on one level with a great agreement on another level. We do not believe that to be the case.

What I would say about the current INF level is that was very deliberately and carefully arrived at, and it satisfies the twin criteria of improving the balance while leaving us with sufficient theater nuclear forces to serve the purpose, deterrent purpose, that needs to serve at the conventional level.

And 50 percent has the same qualities and the same attributes at the strategic nuclear level. Zero is a completely different world. It is not possible to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. You cannot negotiate away scientific knowledge, and I think we are very serious about that.

Senator GLENN. Do you think we would go to a START agreement with a 50-percent level reduction without making some agreement on the conventional balance?

General WELCH. I think the START agreement that we are currently proposing and currently negotiating will substantially improve the strategic nuclear balance and improve stability on its own merits. And therefore I think it is highly desirable, with or without a conventional agreement.

A conventional agreement would be highly desirable, but the START agreement that we are currently trying to negotiate will stand on its own merits and will be good for the country on its own

merit if we succeed in obtaining the kinds of provisions that we are currently negotiating.

Senator GLENN. Have the chiefs signed off on the START limitations that are being proposed now?

General WELCH. I would say so.

Admiral TROST. Yes, we have had our input into the limitations which are part of our negotiating position. We cannot, of course, testify at this point to what specifically we have suggested, since that would undermine our negotiating positions in some cases.

But yes, we have.

General VUONO. And I would only add to that, Senator, just as in the INF negotiations, there is a continual dialogue that goes on during the START negotiations, we are very much a part of that discussion.

Senator GLENN. You have a representative as part of that team over there, I believe on a continuing basis, do you not?

General VUONO. Yes, we do.

Senator GLENN. Well, does anyone else care to comment on how far we go in the START process before we must bring in the conventional balance, and where do we have to bring in the other nuclear nations?

Several years ago I was in China and met with Deng Xiao Ping. I said we are trying to get negotiations started with the Soviets on overall nuclear weapons reductions. I asked, "If we are successful in that, would you be willing to join in that effort?"

And he gave the obvious answer. He said: "When you and the Soviets get your stockpiles down to where they approach our levels, then we might be willing to talk."

Well, we now have a process started, and we cannot ignore other nuclear nations and I do not think we can ignore the conventional balance. I think the further you go from INF down toward the 50 percent START reduction level, you are going to have an increasing number of people around here jumping ship as far as support for such an agreement.

I do not know whether a 50-percent reduction would pass in the Senate without some conventional force agreement and without bringing other nations in the process.

We have looked at nuclear weapons as being the big equalizer all these years. We have put money into weapons systems to deliver these 12,000 warheads, saying it was necessary for our national security. And now we are saying it is not really necessary, all we are going to have is 6,000 warheads.

It is going to be a little hard for people to swallow?

Admiral Trost.

Admiral TROST. That is an interesting comment and I agree with your philosophy and your concerns. I would emphasize General Welch's point that at each stage we have to take a look at what it gains us and what is left.

In the case of START, I am not concerned about the reduction to the 50 percent because we still have enough to bomb out each other's mushroom clouds. That level in my view remains adequate to ensure deterrence, a very effective deterrence.

I do not feel that it needs to be tied, for example, to conventional force reduction, even though we strongly seek a reduction in the

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imbalance of conventional forces in the NATO area. It is very, very important to us in the long run.

What is important, however, is to keep in mind that whatever level we negotiate, absent a conventional force reduction agreement, has to be adequate to maintain that level of deterrence that we feel is militarily substantiated and politically sustainable, keeping in mind what the other countries have.

We would certainly not want to get down to a level or below a level that some third party might have and somebody say, I am king of the hill and I am going to tell you what to do.

Senator GLENN. The administration is still talking about having a START agreement completed by summer, so that means we must shortly be in final negotiations on this agreement.

That bothers me, because we may be rushing to get an agreement. I get very jumpy when I think of them rushing to get an agreement on reductions down to 50 percent without giving serious attention to these other factors.

Admiral TROST. I would be reluctant to prejudge how rapidly we may or may not be able to achieve success. I think it is fair to say, and I think my colleagues would support my statement, that we would not support a treaty that did not have the necessary guarantees or did not have the necessary content to ensure that capability which I was discussing earlier.

Senator GLENN. Do you think it is possible to have a START agreement without the elimination of classes of weapons? For example, can we cut half of the SS-18s, which is more difficult to verify?

Admiral TROST. I think it is impossible to have a START agreement without reaching that balance we are seeking in the inputs we have provided for negotiating position.

Senator GLENN. Do any of you have a comment on that? General Gray, you have been very quiet here. Do you have a comment on that?

Go ahead, General Welch.

General WELCH. You put your finger, of course, on the most complex part of START, and that is verification. Clearly, START verification is considerably more complex than INF verification, because there will probably not be an elimination of classes of missiles. There will be reductions in numbers.

And if you would have questions about the possibilities of negotiating that quickly, I think the issue will be verification agreements.

Senator GLENN. You all deal with the conventional balance in Europe. Our former Ambassador to NATO, David Abshire, testified the other day.

He says our NATO forces are maldeployed, and our readiness is down, and our sustainability is way down.

Do you agree with his charges, and if so, what are we doing about it? General Vuono.

General VUONO. Well, first of all, I do not agree that our readiness is way down. As a matter of fact, I think our readiness is in excellent shape. I think on sustainability there is much work being done trying to build up sustainability stocks, both for the United States and for NATO over there.

That is an expensive item, and we have got to look at that in the context of all of our other programs.

In terms of being mal-assigned, I am not sure in what context he made that comment, whether he is talking about any particular geographical location in Europe or what. There has been some efforts——

Senator GLENN. Well, he is talking about deployment particularly in the northern area, where other nations have, in effect, hollow forces, and the Soviets and the Pact nations are building up on the other side. The reason I bring it up this morning, is because, if there really was a crisis situation and we are maldeployed, then it means we have to make the decision on whether we are going to exercise the nuclear option sooner rather than later.

That is exactly what the conventional alignments are supposed to prevent. We are supposed to delay that decision point as long as possible.

General VUONO. We have made, I think, some real improvements in the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). One, we positioned a forward element, a U.S.-forward element, up there.

Two, we have improved our POMCUS positions in the NORTHAG area.

And three, one of our deployed corps from CONUS is earmarked in that area, and we exercise that capability fairly extensively.

So I think we are making corrections to that, to what he described in the NORTHAG area.

Senator GLENN. Your views obviously were not sought by the administration—I presume they were not—before they went off proposing to eliminate everything at Reykjavik, were they? Were your observations requested before that proposal was put forward at Reykjavik?

General VUONO. Well, I was not a member of the Joint Chiefs at that time and so I cannot address that.

Admiral TROST. They were not.

General WELCH. That was not the Joint Chiefs' advice.

Senator GLENN. I did not figure it was.

I am sorry I was going over. I did not realize Senator Quayle had come back in. Go ahead.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am just arriving.

I have not, unfortunately, had a chance to read your testimony and digest all of the pearls of wisdom on what we need to do now and in the future for the preservation of western security.

But let me just share with you a concern that I have, that I see is developing. The concern I have is the environment in which the defense spending for our national security and the investment we will be making in the future is debated in this Congress and in this country and around the world.

There appears to be a growing perception and perhaps some changes of ideas, whether it be Senators or administration officials, or former administration officials, that since we how have one arms control agreement and we have got another that is apparently in the works, that the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union are going to be greatly diminished, somehow that having arms control agreements do reduce tensions, notwithstand-

ing there has been no change in political statements and political doctrines and the statement of objectives, but that somehow the arms control environment will lead to less tensions.

There has also been some rather happy talk by some, that things in Europe really are not as bad as we thought they were. That is despite the statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, and others that the gap in conventional forces since 1967 has actually gotten worse rather than better. Even though we have done a lot, they have done a lot more.

What it seems to me is that we are going to convince ourselves that we really can in fact do less in defense and our security is really going to be better off.

We heard the SACEUR, General Galvin, yesterday in response to my question, and a couple of others picked up on it, on what kind of leverage we would have with the Soviet Union to enter into a conventional arms control agreement, and he said that the leverage in his judgment was the deterioration of the Soviet economy, that the economic conditions in the Soviet Union are getting worse and therefore there would be strong incentives for them to negotiate because they need some breathing room.

So you add all of these things together and you have got arms control agreements, less tensions, you have this perception of a very sick Soviet economy, you have statements that the Soviet Union really would like to do less in military spending.

You have some discussion that perhaps things really are not as bad in Europe as they appear to be. If in fact we are going to operate under this environment from a political point of view, I wonder if you might just share with this committee where you as individual service chiefs are prepared to do less, since that seems to be the momentum that is developing here, that we are going to do less, that we need to do less, that we do not need to do more.

Could you share with us a list of programs and priorities of where we can actually do less and still provide for our national security? I would be interested in a discussion of where we can in fact do less if this is the general drift of where we are going to be going.

Admiral TROST. Can I answer your question?

Senator QUAYLE. Sure, Admiral.

Admiral TROST. Can I answer your question without answering your question. I agree with your comments about the euphoria that can accompany any arms control agreement. I am well aware of the attitude in the country that we have come so far that we can afford to coast for a while on expenditures for national security.

I agree that the Soviet Union may well be driven by economic necessity to for a time forego certain defense expenditures, because they are in pretty good shape right now.

I do not think we, I specifically as a responsible military leader, can sit here in good conscience and say, and here is where we are going to do less to accommodate all of this. We must maintain the leverage we have had and will have in the future since any efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to be agreeable to a reduction of conventional forces or what have you is based entirely on the fact that we have rebuilt our national security posture to a point where

we do have a recognized deterrent capability and a far better conventional capability than we had a decade ago.

Those factors alone have brought about today's situation. And so, if we sit here today and say publicly, "and here is where we are willing to do less," what we are really saying is we do not believe all of what I have just said, we do not believe we have to negotiate from a position of strength. And I think that would be an error.

Senator QUAYLE. If you are telling me from your position as being the chief of your service that in fact for the security of this country we cannot afford to do less, and that is clearly the direction that a lot of people would like to go, is to do less, and in the name of national security saying we would still have a deterrence and security and we really do not have to worry about the Soviet Union as much as we have had in the past, you know, happy days are back with us and the threat is not as much as we thought. If in fact you are saying that we are not going to do less, then you better either say, let us just do the same that we have done in the past or we are going to do more.

But what I am telling you is that you are going to be asked—and I am starting that process right now—that in this environment we are creating and in the perceptions that we have, and many are developing on the Soviet Union, that there is this drive to do less.

You are going to get that question time and time again. That is why I would just like to explore with you where you want to do less. If you are telling me that you cannot do less, then you better come back and say, we need to do more and here is where we have got to do more.

Which way are we going to have this? We cannot have it both ways. We are going to have to make up our minds whether we are going to do less or whether we are going to do more.

Where are we going to go, or are we not going to go anywhere? General Welch, what do you think about this?

General WELCH. Well, I guess I could respond to that. We have been telling this Congress ever since I have been in any position to tell this Congress anything that we are not doing enough.

We have not changed that message one iota. The fact is that we do not set the national priorities, that we respond to the national priorities. And we see the national priorities in the most convincing way in the budgets provided us by the U.S. Congress.

And we are currently responding to those budget levels in the best way we know how to respond, and we are telling you every step of the way, it is not enough. We are telling you every step of the way, the risk is higher than I believe the country ought to put up with.

But the priorities are represented to us in that budget. It is not our choice.

Senator QUAYLE. My time is up. The only thing I can say is, if you have not been successful in the past, you ain't seen nothing yet, because if you are going to have the same message that we have had in the past, look at where you have gotten.

I am telling you it is going to get worse. And from your viewpoint, I do not think you want that. So we probably better figure out a way to change the message.

General VUONO. Let me just make one point, Senator. I would agree with what you just heard by both Admiral Trost and General Welch. And I think our responsibility is to lay out for you, based on the national security requirements, what our requirements are and then what the risks are associated with meeting those requirements.

And we are certainly not going to sit here and tell you that we can do what is required for us to do with less resources. We cannot do that. It is up to us to lay that case out.

Then we must then look at that against the risk associated with the resources that are being provided us. But as I said earlier before you came in, the conventional imbalances that we see in the NATO arenas we are talking about today, recognizing they are part of the triad of strategic nuclear, non-strategic theater nuclear, and conventional, leads me to say that we are not going to be able to tell you that we can do what we have to do with less resources.

Senator GLENN. Go ahead. We have plenty of time if you want to continue.

Senator QUAYLE. Let me just pursue that. Just looking at NATO for a moment, and let us assume that we are not going to do less, that we really need to do more and we need to perhaps look at some new technology that is coming on, that we need to get with our European allies and say, well, here is a NATO defense initiative that we are willing to pursue, not because INF has changed the parameters; it is just that we have got to do this for our own basic security, that we need to think of some new ideas and some new initiatives.

We are going to have to figure out a way to get our European allies to go along with it, because of the resource limitations, the budget problems, the political problems that you have on Capitol Hill.

We are not going to be a one-man show out there. It is going to be a cooperative, collective arrangement. Some of the things beyond the implementation of Montebello and the nuclear modernization, some of the conventional modernization.

I would be interested in seeing what, Admiral Trost or General Welch, what you think about some of the capabilities of augmenting our conventional forces and looking at conventional cruise missiles from the sea and from the planes.

We basically ban them from the ground, anything between the 500 and 5,500 kilometers. I wonder if we might want to look at some of the increased accuracies that we could have to extend the range on a conventional basis, how this could help our ground forces and how this would augment some of the capabilities and some of the laboratory advantages that we have right now.

It seems we always have the laboratory advantage with the Soviet Union, but not a field advantage on a qualitative basis. How do we go about exploring this and looking specifically at the conventional cruise missile? Does this offer some hope, and should we be pursuing this, which may prove out to be a rather cost effective measure?

Admiral TROST. I think it does offer hope, and both Air Force and Navy are embarked on a continuing program to enhance the

capability of the cruise missiles we already have in inventory and, of course are still buying up to our inventory objective levels.

We are pursuing both extended range and, more specifically, improved accuracy as means of improving the capability of our conventional forces at modest expense. It offers a marked opportunity.

Senator QUAYLE. General Welch, do you see any opportunity for the conventional cruise missile in the Air Force giving you more standoff capability and flexibility in the missions that you have?

General WELCH. Well, I clearly do. As you know, we are embarked on a number of standoff weapons programs, to include the cruise missile, the standoff cruise missile, the JTACMS. And those seem to be proceeding well.

I think there is some danger, and I would not want any of this interpreted as not being in support of high technology, accurate standoff weapons. I am. There is some danger, though, of this, what I call the "silver bullet" mentality. That is, the thought that somehow, if we build a few very highly accurate weapons that can be very precisely targeted against a limited number of points on the surface, that we can make a decisive difference.

The fact is that we have to have large numbers of those kinds of weapons in order to have any decisive influence. And that brings up the cost issue, and so affordability is an issue that we are pursuing, what we regard as affordable, sensible ways to explicit technology to increase our standoff capability and the accuracy of our weapons.

Senator QUAYLE. From an affordability point of view, General, which would be more affordable strictly on a cost basis, a lot of cruise missiles or a lot of aircraft?

General WELCH. It depends entirely what you want to do with them.

Senator QUAYLE. I want to hit targets. Just on an affordability basis?

General WELCH. Well, generally speaking, in terms of overall flexibility and the whole range of targets that you have to address, the best combination is for the entire front in NATO—the best combination is the air carrier with some standoff capability.

Now, if we could persuade everyone to provide the same kind of firepower that we are willing to provide, then it is clear that surface to surface missiles are affordable, cost effective, but of course must be concentrated in a smaller area.

Senator QUAYLE. Surface to surface missiles, do you mean like ground-launched cruise missile?

General WELCH. Well, no, nothing that meets that range category.

Senator GLENN. I am going to have to toot the whistle here since Senator Symms has come back.

Senator QUAYLE. Could I just ask what range category would you be talking about on surface to surface? Are you talking about over the 5,500 kilometers?

General WELCH. No, I am talking about less than 500, which is what we are pursuing.

Senator QUAYLE. Conventional?

General WELCH. Yes.

Senator GLENN. Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And generals, I am sorry I was out of the room during that vote. But there are two points that I want to ask you about, and I will try to keep the questions simple and hope that I can get a simple answer.

But it is my understanding that 30 days after this treaty is ratified we have to accept the Soviets' numbers on how many SS-20s there are, and there are some discrepancies on that.

Do you have anything that we should be concerned about. I have a concern—do we believe we know how many SS-20s the Soviets actually have manufactured?

General WELCH. I think the right way to answer that is that there is a range of uncertainty as to how many weapons systems the Soviets have on any count, whether it be SS-20s or any other, tanks or any other kind of weapons system.

The reported Soviet numbers, that is those numbers reported as of this moment, are within the range of uncertainty provided us by the U.S. intelligence community. The 30 days, of course—they have until 30 days after the treaty goes into force to give us their final number, whatever that number might be.

That is updated every 6 months thereafter based upon the destruction schedule. But the number that has been provided to us at this time is within that range of uncertainty that we can live with.

Senator SYMMS. How many missiles are in the range of uncertainty?

General WELCH. Well, the declared number is 650 SS-20s, I believe.

Senator SYMMS. Is there any estimate of how many they might be——

General WELCH. I think we cannot discuss that in an open hearing.

Senator SYMMS. Well, I think in a general sense—last week I was in Europe and talked to some of our commanders in the field. They think that there may not be an incentive for the Soviets to cheat on the INF, but that there will be a big incentive for them to cheat in the START Treaties.

Would you agree with that, General, that they will have an incentive to cheat on START where they may not have an incentive to cheat on this?

General WELCH. I presume we are talking about incentive truly and not opportunity. The verification process when we eliminate classes of missiles is somewhat easier. But if we talk purely about incentive, the START agreement that is currently under negotiation I do not believe provides the Soviets with any great incentives to cheat, and that if I were a Soviet assessing what kind of capabilities they need to do to carry out their strategy, I would judge that the numbers that we are talking about are adequate to serve that purpose for the Soviets.

And so I really do not know what would be the source of the incentive to cheat on START.

Senator SYMMS. Well, the way I understood it in a general sense is if we reduce our number of strategic weapons, then they would need fewer weapons to target our weapons for their first strike

strategy, that then there would be an incentive—to target with uncounted, say SS–18s on the limited few that we had.

I mean, in this country the news media and so forth would not let us cheat anyway. And so I do not think there is any question, the United States will not cheat in an open society that we have.

But I think there is a question of whether given a closed society and the dictatorship, they probably will cheat if it is in their best interest. I mean, I do not think there is any question in my mind that they will cheat when they think it will provide them with a leg up on us.

But coming to that with the verification process, do you as commanders of our forces feel any discomfort with the number of Soviet intelligence agents that will be roaming around in this country inspecting sensitive information?

I think the INF is one thing, but when you start talking about START—I had a meeting with the FBI yesterday, and the scope of what will be required is going to be enormous in terms of tracking all of these people in this country, and particularly in some of the sensitive areas where we have nuclear laboratories and facilities.

Do you have any feeling of discomfort just about having all of those people in this country nosing around, looking at things, General Vuono?

General VUONO. Well, I think you have to separate the two. I think, with START, one of the areas that will have to be worked out in the negotiations is the verification regime. That will be complicated and require much work.

I think on INF that I am satisfied we will have the necessary controls so that we will be able to keep a good handle on the Soviet personnel who will be here in terms of those specifically part of the verification regime for INF. And so I am not unduly concerned about our ability to ensure that within the verification regime, that we have a handle on the personnel here.

START is another subject, and it is one that is complicated.

Senator SYMMS. Well, back to the INF, and my first question, not talking about having the Soviets in this country, but if there is a discrepancy, and some have said, that it may be as high as 300 to 400 SS–20 missiles, would not that be a substantial—that would be more than what you were talking about, would it not, General Welch?

And General Vuono, you may want to comment on that. But would not 300 to 400 be substantial, if in fact there is that much of a discrepancy on how many they have admitted that they have?

General VUONO. I am not certain of that discrepancy, so it would be difficult to make any judgments.

Senator SYMMS. Let us say hypothetically if there were 300 more SS–20s than they have admitted to. Would that number be a significant problem in the European theater?

Admiral TROST. I think that would depend upon several things. One, have they an incentive to use them, and do we lack the capability to detect them?

In the case of the INF Treaty, I think we would detect them. If we did not, we would have to ask ourselves whether they had the capability to maintain them as a credible weapons system, with the necessary training, proof firings, et cetera, without our detection.

And I think the answer again would be no. And then I would go back to a statement of General Welch's earlier: They do not need them. They do not need the numbers to maintain the capability to carry out the mission they have at hand.

That goes back to the incentive issue, do they have an incentive to cheat. I am inclined to think that there is less incentive than we attribute to them.

Senator SYMMS. For the INF. But you do discriminate that from the START?

Admiral TROST. START is a different situation. There the verification will be very, very difficult by comparison, and could permit the opportunity, if there were such an incentive and if they were willing to take the chance that, having cheated, we would take no counteraction on our part.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you.

I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Senator Wilson is recognized. Senator Wilson, we had promised the chiefs that they would be out of here by 11:30. So if you could make your questions as brief as possible.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just first apologize for having to be delayed and arriving late. And if I am covering some ground that has been covered before, why, simply say so.

The Joint Chiefs I think have indicated that they were particularly strong for suspect site inspection, and this was dropped in the last week of negotiations, as I understand it. We have been arguing for that position.

How badly in your judgment, gentlemen, does the treaty suffer without the ability for the United States to conduct demand inspections of suspect sites? How much heartburn does the loss of that provision cause you?

General WELCH. I am a little surprised by the question, I guess, because we were not in favor of suspect site inspections.

Senator WILSON. Was that falsely attributed to you?

General WELCH. Yes, sir, because we were greatly concerned with the security compromise and the technology problems that would be associated with unlimited suspect site inspections.

Senator WILSON. Well, if that is not your position then all you need to do is say so and we will move on to something else.

Let me ask you whether or not you are concerned about what seems to be the vagueness of article XIV. There has been a great deal of discussion by prior witnesses and a great deal of interest on the members of the committee with respect to whether or not the so-called non-circumvention provisions of the treaty will pose some problem to us in terms of modernization, both nuclear and conventional, of our NATO forces, some problems with respect to transfer of technology to our NATO allies.

General WELCH. At the time that article XIV was written and when we first examined it, I would say the answer was no, there was no concern. But we did not see ambiguities in that article.

It was our assumption that that article applied to exactly what the treaty applies to, and that is ground-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Since that time, there have obviously been

questions about it and that is being re-examined to determine whether or not there are legal difficulties with the language in that article.

That concern does not come from the Joint Chiefs. We thought we understood what it meant. But if other people have questions about what it says, then it is obviously a matter of concern.

Admiral TROST. I think my concern would be that there are those who would interpret that article XIV much more restrictively than we see it intended. In that case, we would have a problem.

Senator WILSON. Well, that is precisely the concern that I think many of us have, and it would seem that there is in that provision, and I think it is one of the most important, some lack of common understanding.

It seems that it is a little vague, and for that reason it would appear that a resort to the negotiating record will be necessary. Let me ask you, then, Admiral Trost, what is the feeling of the Joint Chiefs that article XIV is supposed to mean?

Admiral TROST. I think we see it as confirming our understanding that we do have the flexibility to modernize those forces not covered by the treaty, that we do feel bound not to introduce forces which are covered by this treaty, and that it permits the necessary flexibility on our part to ensure that we maintain a necessary national security posture.

Senator WILSON. Was there consultation of the chiefs before the negotiation with respect to this particular provision?

Admiral TROST. I cannot speak to that particular one. We saw the entire treaty. I recall reading those words and not being concerned about it because we had discussed it in the context of offering the necessary flexibility.

Senator WILSON. General Welch, I wonder if you would comment on Spain's rejection of the dual capable F-16s and our ability to find them a new home. Does this suggest to you that NATO is growing more neutralist and that we are going to be really unable to have the kind of alliance in the future that has given us reasonable optimism in the past?

General WELCH. Well, certainly we are troubled by the adjustments that we are going to have to make based upon the sovereign decision of Spain. We have weathered worse situations than that in the past, as you know, such as when France withdrew.

And there are promising proposals to bed those forces down elsewhere in the southern region. But having said that, no, I do not see this—and in fact, I would say that the NATO response to this would give you confidence, that NATO nations other than the United States were disturbed or more disturbed about it than we are.

But I would not minimize our dislike for this development and the fact that there is going to be some temporary degradation involved with adjusting to it. But I think that today the NATO response has been the proper kind of response.

Senator WILSON. It is, I think, of considerable importance, obviously, because I assume that that is going to be where you place major reliance as a substitute for the covered missiles that will be eliminated.

General WELCH. Certainly that is an important dual capability aircraft. We can cover it with other approaches. But those aircraft are in theater. We think they are important in theater. We think they should stay in the theater.

Senator WILSON. My time has expired, but maybe I can just inquire. Has there been a discussion this morning with the chiefs about their view on how we secure conventional arms reduction?

Senator GLENN. I discussed that some. I do not know whether other members discussed it.

The staff director says yes, we have had a discussion of that subject this morning.

Senator SYMMS. About where we get the leverage.

Senator GLENN. We are going to have to end very shortly. We promised the chiefs.

Senator WILSON. I would be happy to desist at this point. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, though, that I would like to examine the record, and if it is not adequately covered I think it is imperative that we get from the Joint Chiefs their views as to how we achieve the leverage necessary to bring about conventional arms reduction in NATO with the Warsaw Pact.

Senator GLENN. Gentlemen, we would ask that you respond to any questions. Staff members, you can also submit your questions in writing to us, and we will submit those to the chiefs for their response also.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied, follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ALAN DIXON

NATO VERSUS WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY

Senator DIXON. Gentlemen, we have heard a number of opinions expressed before this committee on the relative military strength of the NATO forces vis-a-vis Warsaw Pact. Admiral Crowe has indicated his belief that we must move ahead expeditiously to modernize the NATO strategic and conventional capability. Philip Karber, of BDM, believes that the Soviets have more nuclear and conventional capability in Europe than we do. Senator Levin has eloquently expressed his concern that we are allowing numbers to overshadow a more positive picture.

What are your expert opinions on the NATO conventional capability versus the Warsaw Pact at this time?

ARMY

General VUONO. While we have enough to deter, I am concerned about quantitative disparities and the improved quality of Soviet and Pact systems. With or without INF, the need for Alliance-wide conventional modernization is great.

Overall, most indicators of the balance favor the Pact, but not enough to give current Soviet leaders high confidence in their ability to conduct a successful theater offensive. However, we cannot afford to be complacent, especially since our conventional forces are bearing more of the burden of deterrence.

NAVY

Admiral TROST. As my fellow service chiefs have stated, the conventional military imbalance on land between NATO and the Soviet Warsaw Pact is of concern and certainly deserves our attention. Although NATO holds the upper hand at sea, Soviet gains in ASW capability continue to pose a threat to our naval forces and is fast becoming a force to be reckoned with.

MARINE CORPS

General GRAY. The Warsaw Pact has an advantage in number of forces and weapons systems, which the United States and NATO have chosen not to match. The qualitative advantage enjoyed by the West erodes daily because of technology trans-

fer and the Soviet desire to close the gap. However, as a result of past and planned improvements in NATO conventional and nuclear forces, the United States and her NATO partners will have the capability to meet the requirements of flexible response, providing the Soviet Union with a strong uncertainty as to whether a Warsaw Pact attack would ultimately succeed.

AIR FORCE

General WELCH. The NATO air forces, including the U.S. air forces committed to NATO, cause the Soviets uncertainty about their capability for a quick conventional victory in NATO's central region. However, we shouldn't feel comfortable about the outcome of a war in NATO. An all-out conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact would severely stress NATO's capability to maintain alliance integrity. Adverse force ratios in the central region and inadequate stocks of sustainability items (such as air-to-air missiles, anti-tank weapons, guided munitions and runway denial munitions) would make forward defense a tenuous operation, particularly if the attack should come before NATO had been able to mobilize theater forces and move them to general defense positions, and more importantly, before reinforcements began to arrive from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Portugal. The overall numbers in tactical airpower do not favor NATO even though we have the edge in quality (of people, training and equipment). However, numbers do count. The Soviets have the quantitative advantage and are narrowing the qualitative gap significantly. Our capability to successfully counter a Soviet attack in Europe has provided a credible deterrent force on the European continent. Our existing efforts in force modernization, including the near term achievement of fielding an all-weather, look-down shootdown fighter force, the introduction of LANTIRN and improved airfield attack and anti-armor weapons, coupled with improvements in surveillance, targeting, and command and control systems will improve our capability to maintain the integrity of NATO's airspace, allowing reinforcement and positioning of ground forces to counter the threat. NATO airpower will also take the battle to the enemy, denying freedom of maneuver, the initiative and interrupting carefully orchestrated battle plan necessary for a successful offensive operation against NATO. Without the fielding of these capabilities the Soviet's ongoing modernization efforts will narrow the qualitative gap and increase their potential to defeat NATO through conventional means.

PERSONNEL MANPOWER REDUCTIONS

Senator DIXON. The Secretary of Defense has recently directed that the Army reduce its personnel end strength by 10,000. This will be the lowest Army manpower level since 1979. General Vuono, what impact do you believe this manpower reduction will have on the readiness and sustainability of Army units deployed in Europe? Will forward deployed units in Europe have to accept a proportionate share of this reduction?

General VUONO. The locus of our end strength cut has not been finally determined, but we will make no reduction in the European theater based upon the continued priority which must be attached to this vital region. We seek sufficient force structure to support the national military strategy while remaining strong in the defense pillars of readiness and sustainability. This is difficult during periods of fiscal fluctuation and is a problem shared by each of the services. The Army requires sustained and trained combat forces, forward deployed, and ready to defend in Europe as part of our deterrent efforts. NATO will continue to improve in readiness and sustainability if support for force modernization and improvement programs already identified by NATO and the U.S. is obtained. We are looking hard elsewhere to meet the Deputy Secretary of Defense's directive.

REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE RESOURCES IN EUROPE

Senator DIXON. Through the 1980's the Army has been introducing a broad new range of new equipment to its units in Europe: M1 Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Apache Helicopters, Multiple Launch Rocket System. At the same time, it has retained older systems: M60A3, M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers, A-1 Cobra Helicopters.

Has the mix of models and types of equipment in the field placed an unacceptable burden upon the repair and maintenance of the Army units in Europe?

General VUONO. There is no unacceptable burden resulting from a mix. Phased deployment schedules combined with the total package fielding concept ensure the supportability of each item.

SUPPLIES OF AMMUNITION

Senator DIXON. Have adequate supplies of munitions for these weapons accompanied their deployment?

General VUONO. The Department of the Army's goal is [deleted].

COORDINATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS/MUNITIONS/SPARE PARTS

Senator DIXON. We are soon to have the fiscal year 1989 budget presented to the Congress. We have authorized the acquisition of a number of new weapon systems in the past few years, and will be asked to continue support for these and possibly new systems in the future.

To what extent is the acquisition of new weapon systems coordinated with acquisition of the munitions and spare parts used by these systems? What proportion of defense outlays were allocated to the support of these systems in the past 5 years?

ARMY

General VUONO. The planning for new acquisition support items is part of the integrated logistics support planning process which begins during concept development for the weapon system. The job of the system integrators on the Army staff is to plan and staff supervise the coordinated acquisition of the systems into the Army.

Defining the proportion of defense outlays allocated to the support of the four systems in discussion is difficult for the Army to do. However, estimated historical figures for all prior operations and maintenance costs for the systems total $1.89 billion. An additional $3.7 billion was spent on munitions unique to these systems over the last 5 years.

AIR FORCE

General WELCH. The acquisition of munitions is coordinated with the acquisition of new weapons systems to the extent that weapons developers certify that the munitions can be delivered safely and accurately from the new weapons system platform. Also, requirements analyses are conducted at the Major Command and the Air Staff level to ensure that the munitions being acquired fit the mission role of the aircraft. These analyses take into account such variables as the target base and its characteristics, sortie generation rates, Defense Guidance objectives, and doctrine. Additionally, there is coordination regarding the composition of the munitions inventory and whether that inventory is adequate to support the weapon system's mission with preferred or substitute munitions.

Air Force Systems Command's System Program Office (SPO) structure is the integrating mechanism to ensure all facets of new weapons system are properly considered and in balance; e.g., research and engineering, production, procurement, integrated logistics support. Within each SPO a Deputy Program Manager for Logistics (DPML) function ensures a proper support structure exists when the weapon system is fielded. One specific task of the DPML office is to orchestrate the process of acquiring the necessary spare parts for the new system. This involves forecasting the requirements and ensuring those items are placed on contract and delivered when needed to the proper locations. The key players in this include the SPO, the weapon system contractors, HQ AFSC, HQ AFLC and AFLC's air logistics centers (ALC's). Once the DPML establishes and coordinates the spares requirements, the Air Staff Program Element Monitor (PEM) for each weapon system works with the Chief of Aircraft Initial Spares on the Air Staff to communicate and advocate funding these requirements during the PPBS process. This initial provisioning for spare parts covers the initial support for each end item (approximately two years). Requirements for follow-on spares (replenishment spares) are computed by AFLC.

Over the time period of FY 83-87, the Air Force spent over $21 billion on aircraft and missile spares which represents just under five percent of Air Force TOA. As a percentage of aircraft and missile procurement, spares are almost 16 percent.

SUSTAINABILITY/REPLACEMENT BY ALLIES

Senator DIXON. I have introduced legislation to improve the defense industrial base on this nation in peacetime and times of national emergency.

Given the past history, do you think that the U.S. can depend on its allies to be able to sustain or replace key components of our conventional armaments when called upon?

ARMY

General VUONO. I have no doubt that each of our NATO allies will meet their defense commitments. Both the U.S. and our allies need to do more to strengthen conventional defense. The relative contribution of nations to the common defense is hard to calculate, and it should not be viewed as a NATO problem. Our allies in the Pacific also must evaluate their contribution to the common defense.

We are making significant progress in standardizing equipment among NATO allies which in the past has made it difficult to rely on mutual support. However we should not consider either standardization, which may never be achieved in total, or burdensharing as reasons not to provide needed capabilities. Leaders must lead. While we certainly must continue to challenge our Allies to commit more to collective defense—and many are doing so—this must be done through leadership. We should not reduce our national capabilities or threaten to withdraw commitments vital to our own security interests.

AIR FORCE

General WELCH. The United States domestic and allied industrial bases are capable of supplying and replacing critical items needed in war and peace. The problem, however, is that both bases need time to make the transition from producing at peacetime production rates to those rates needed to sustain conflict. This transition time impacts our ability to successfully execute Operational Plans.

The Air Force is working hard with all DOD components and national agencies to better understand industrial base capability, and where appropriate, use DOD acquisition policy and budgets to influence the industrial base in positive ways. War reserves and other industrial preparedness measures are key to providing the required items to our forces during war.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, it has been argued that long range INF missiles, especially the Pershing II, filled a unique place in our flexible response strategy. Would you comment on the role of long range INF missiles in our strategy, and how this role will be accomplished post-INF?

General VUONO. While the technical characteristics of the Pershing II were unique, their contribution to the strategy of flexible response was not unique. Indeed, a key strength of the strategy of flexible response is that it is not based upon one system or any unique capability, but on the entire spectrum of NATO's capabilities to defend its territory. The withdrawal of INF forces will not eliminate NATO's capabilities to deter or defend at any level of the strategy. While the requirements of flexible response can still be met through the continued use of other capabilities not affected by the Treaty such as NATO's longer-range, dual-capable aircraft, sufficient investment is required to maintain the means to respond.

FURTHER LIMITS ON NATO NUCLEAR FORCES

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, what is your view of the potential for and the wisdom of further limitations on shorter range nuclear systems in Europe?

General VUONO. The short-range nuclear forces (SNF) that NATO will continue to maintain in Europe are essential components of the force capabilities that are required by NATO strategy. The United States is not in favor of negotiating on these SNF until the conventional imbalances have been eliminated. While the INF Treaty may be followed by other arms control agreements, it is not the objective of either the United States or of its NATO allies to remove all nuclear weapons and forces from our arsenals because deterrence continues to depend on them.

VIOLATIONS

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, can you amplify for the committee what you would consider to be military significant violations of the INF Treaty?

General VUONO. The significance of cheating would not be a simple matter of numbers or systems, but of the wider question of how cheating affected the military balance. There is no simple formula or clear boundary to define when cheating would be militarily significant but, instead, the determination would involve a combination of military and political judgments.

The greater issue, in my mind, is whether we are comfortable with the risks involved—they are high with or without the INF Treaty. We believe that eliminating the INF missiles improves the situation and if the Soviets were to cheat, we believe that militarily significant cheating would be detected and in sufficient time to react appropriately.

SOVIET STRATEGY

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, do you view the INF Treaty as part of a Soviet strategy that plays to Soviet strengths in conventional weapons? What changes should we anticipate in Soviet military strategy in the short and long term?

General VUONO. No. Just as the INF Treaty will require no change in NATO strategy, I would anticipate no changes in Soviet military strategy as a result of the treaty.

NATO possesses significant military resources and as a result of past efforts, has improved its prospects for conventional defense. The alliance can inflict massive damage upon the Warsaw Pact with a triad of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear systems. Consequently, the Soviet Union is faced with great uncertainty as to whether an attack would ultimately succeed. As a result of past and planned improvements in the alliance's conventional and nuclear forces, NATO will have the capabilities to meet the requirements of flexible response, provided the alliance continues to commit itself to the goal of a strong defense posture in which the risks and burdens are shared.

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

Senator WARNER. Admiral Trost, does the importance of the sea-launched cruise missile modernization program change as a result of the INF Treaty?

Admiral TROST. The INF Treaty serves to reaffirm the growing importance of the sea-launched cruise missile as an integral component of our maritime strategy which contributes to the ladder of flexible response. Planned improvements such as the rocket motor upgrade and Global Positioning System (GPS) linkage will result in an even more capable and credible weapon system.

CONVENTIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, in order for NATO's strategy of flexible response to remain effective, we must have a balanced mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Such forces must be modern, effective, and survivable. Would you assess the extent to which NATO's conventional forces currently meet these requirements and to what extent they don't?

General VUONO. NATO continues successfully to deter war in Europe, with its combined conventional, nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear capabilities. Those total alliance capabilities continue to be linked together in NATO's deterrent strategy of flexible response. In terms of NATO's conventional capabilities, the Joint Chiefs consistently have held the view that there is an unacceptable level of risk associated with NATO's conventional capabilities *alone* to defend forward successfully for a prolonged period of time.

While there is no direct effect of the INF Treaty on our conventional capabilities because the systems to be eliminated are not dual-capable, there continues to be a relationship between the three elements of NATO's TRIAD—strategic nuclear, nonstrategic nuclear, and conventional—in that we must remain a proper capability mix among all three. The elimination of INF does not reduce but instead it highlights the importance of retaining highly capable forces, including requisite enhancements and modernization, to execute the NATO strategy of flexible response.

POST-INF PRIORITIES

Senator WARNER. A question for all of you, would you prioritize the initiatives we should take in a Post-INF era in both theater nuclear and conventional forces?

ARMY

General VUONO. Post INF era initiatives must maintain deterrence by preserving the viability of the NATO Triad and the linkage among its elements. As one of several contributing initiatives, conventional arms control could claim high priority, if able to achieve a stable balance between conventional forces, and eliminate the capability for launching a surprise attack or sudden gain in ability to initiate large-scale offensive action. NATO modernization and improvement programs embodied in the 1983 Montebello and 1985 Conventional Defense Improvements initiatives are

equally valuable and high priority efforts. The existence of these initiatives signal unity of effort, recognition of significant defense needs, and a commitment to common defense.

These initiatives, importantly, directly address NATO military capability in two of the three areas of the NATO Triad—conventional and non strategic nuclear force modernization—and strengthen the linkage among the Triad's elements. The Army's part in this is to continue to press for needed modernization in close and deep operations, improved air defense and command and control. These, along with enhanced sustainment and improved theater reinforcement, have the highest priority within the Army's investment program.

NAVY

Admiral TROST. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has furnished to the President the prioritized listing of modernization for all Services with or without an INF Treaty. If support is needed in NATO's flexible response ladder as a result of the INF Treaty, the Navy can provide carrier-based dual-capable aircraft, ballistic missile submarines, and sea-launched cruise missiles as "no cost" options.

MARINE CORPS

General GRAY. NATO modernization and improvement programs, including the Montebello Decision and Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI), should proceed as planned, in full accord with the treaty.

The main elements of the NATO theater nuclear force modernization program are the following: [deleted].

Important conventional force adjustments would include [deleted]. I emphasize that any force modernization or force adjustment in a post-INF environment should be considered in the light of our total global responsibilities, possible budget constraints, and the cooperative actions of our Allies.

Additionally, I would like to emphasize the aggregate usefulness of Marine Corps forces in a post-INF era. As a force in readiness committed to global, out-of-area missions or on the flanks of NATO, Marine air-ground task forces are key to deterrence and security. As such, high priority should be given to maintaining the Marine Corps' readiness and operational capability for the future. In this light, such programs as [deleted] come to mind as those deserving special attention.

AIR FORCE

General WELCH. The USAF remains committed to modernization initiatives identified prior to signature of the INF Treaty. This includes those NATO priorities identified in the 1983 Montebello decision and the recently adopted NATO Conventional Defense Improvement Program.

The USAF fiscal year 1988/89 Amended Budget Request balances our need for quality people, quality equipment, and sustainability of a fully capable force. In the conventional arena, we continue to emphasize dual capable aircraft, smart munitions, and a fully capable force structure. This fiscal year 1989 program will be delivered for your review in the near future.

Without the stability in our programming and budgeting that only Congress can give, we cannot deliver programmed forces in sufficient quality and quantity at acceptable costs to meet the threat.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION-RESTRICTIONS

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, you noted that the Chiefs will be proposing a relaxation of legislative restrictions on the number of artillery-fired atomic projectiles. To what extent are these restrictions and the restriction on the use of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) impeding modernization that is necessary in your view?

General VUONO. NATO has stated firm requirements for modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SNF) in the Montebello decision in 1983 and confirmed in Monterey in 1987. NATO and JCS worldwide 1995 requirements for modernized Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles (AFAPs) cannot be met within the current Congressional restriction. Therefore, to meet SACEUR/CINC AFAP requirements, indefinite retention of older AFAPs by the Army and Marine Corps is required. Over time, failure to replace older AFAPs because of continued restriction is equivalent to unilateral reduction in SNF capability by its significant impact on warfighting and deterrence. Modern AFAPs provide advantages over the older weapons of increased range, shorter response times, better target effect, increased accuracy, modern safety features, improved command and control, advanced security and in-

creased survivability. The modernized 8-inch/155mm AFAP mix is not in consonance with U.S./NATO 8-inch/155mm howitzer mix.

Current Congressional restriction on development, testing, production or integration of a nuclear warhead to ATACMS applies until lifted by legislation. This requires certification by the SecDef to House & Senate Committees on Armed Services that ATACMS has achieved its conventional IOC with U.S. Army units permanently assigned in FRG. If ATACMS was selected as the Follow-On To Lance (FOTL), Congressional restrictions must be immediately lifted to achieve SACEUR's requirement. The INF Treaty testimony has highlighted the urgency of proceeding with a FOTL program in time to replace the aging Lance and meet SACEUR's requirement.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, what increased role, if any, will chemical weapons have in Soviet military planning after the INF Treaty?

General VUONO. The INF Treaty will not change the role of chemical weapons in Soviet military planning. The USSR will maintain its' overwhelming CW superiority against NATO. Chemical warfare has been and will continue to be a Soviet/Warsaw Pact warfighting option. This will continue to be true especially until we have a modern chemical retaliatory capability.

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

Senator WARNER. General Vuono, what impact will the elimination of SS-12 and SS-23 missiles have on Soviet military operations? What systems will they use to compensate for their removal?

General VUONO. Elimination of Soviet INF will mean, essentially, that other nuclear systems, sea-, land-, and air-based, will be depended upon to retain the same target coverage achievable by Soviet INF forces in NATO Europe. Among these, dual-capable land-based and naval aircraft, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles could be expected to provide a mix of capabilities against targets ranged by both the LRINF (IRM) and SRINF (SRM) missiles.

1979 DECISION TO DEPLOY PII AND GLCM

Senator WARNER. The 1979 NATO decision to deploy the PII and GLCM was justified on two grounds: (1) To respond to Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and (2) To complete the alliance's continuum of deterrence and defense, and strengthen the linkage of U.S. strategic forces to the defense in Europe. Now that these systems are being removed, is deterrence and the linkage of U.S. strategic forces to NATO defense weakened in any serious way?

ARMY

General VUONO. No, neither deterrence nor the U.S. commitment to NATO defense is weakened by the INF Treaty. The foundation of NATO is a long standing political commitment among the allies, including the United States. The U.S. commitment remains undiminished and is reflected in our force structure and deployment: we will maintain over 4,000 nuclear warheads and 325,000 uniformed troops in Europe. The INF Treaty has overwhelming public support in Europe and has the strong support of the allied governments.

AIR FORCE

General WELCH. The 1979 NATO "Dual Track Decision" was a direct response to the Soviet SS-20 deployments. From the outset of the negotiations in November 1981, the U.S. signaled its readiness to defer PII and GLCM deployments in return for Soviet elimination of its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 force. This "Zero option" was fully supported by NATO. The adoption of a "Double Zero Option" will neither weaken deterrence nor reduce the strategic linkage between ourselves and our NATO allies. The INF Treaty serves to improve the theater nuclear balance by requiring the Soviets to eliminate USSR delivery vehicles for appropriately four times the number of warheads of eliminated U.S. systems. NATO will retain sufficient theater nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression.

CONSULTATION WITH SERVICE CHIEFS

Senator WARNER. To what extent were the service chiefs consulted about the military implications of the treaty on deterrence and military operations during war if deterrence failed?

ARMY

General VUONO. The service chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted extensively on all aspects of the INF Treaty. Included in the numerous briefings and consultations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were specific actions to obtain formal certification of the treaty's military sufficiency in May 1987 prior its being tabled, and again in the fall 1987 prior to the summit meeting which culminated in the signing of the INF agreement.

NAVY

Admiral TROST. The service chiefs were consulted extensively throughout the negotiating process and addressed deterrence and warfighting issues formally in May and October 1987. Additionally, a JCS response to NSDD-284 was provided assessing U.S. military capabilities in support of NATO in a Global Double-Zero INF agreement.

MARINE CORPS

General GRAY. The service chiefs have been involved in the development of the INF Treaty from the very beginning. Input from the service chiefs and the JCS was sought and incorporated into the treaty language. The chiefs have discussed INF Treaty issues, on many occasions, among themselves and with the Secretary of Defense. On other occasions, the chiefs have consulted with the Secretary of State.

AIR FORCE

General WELCH. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were fully involved in the development of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We offered options and advice during the lengthy negotiation, and our views were sought by the President prior to signing of the agreement. The JCS certified the military sufficiency of the final agreement and have clearly stated our belief that the national security interests of the United States are served by the INF agreement.

Senator GLENN. Gentlemen, we appreciate you being with us this morning. You have been very informative. I am sorry I could not be here for all of your presentation, but as always your testimony is very valuable to us.

Thank you all very much.

The hearing will stand in recess subject to the call of the chairman.

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON NATO'S SECURITY POSTURE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; and Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, Michael J. McCord, and T. Kirk McConnell, professional staff members; Lucia M. Chavez, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Robert K. Griffith, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR TIMOTHY WIRTH, PRESIDING

Senator WIRTH [presiding]. The committee will come to order.

Senator Nunn will be here very shortly. He has to wait at the National Prayer Breakfast until the President leaves, and then the hall can empty.

The committee convenes this morning to receive testimony on NATO and the INF Treaty from Mr. Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Mr. Perle is, as we know, particularly well qualified to present views on this subject to the committee. He was present at the creation as the administration formulated its initial negotiating strategy for INF, and is widely regarded as the father of the zero option. Until his departure from office last summer, Mr. Perle participated in every major debate within the administration on the twists and

turns of this negotiation, even if that meant phoning in from some distant capital.

Mr. Perle, during your Senate staff career, you put in long hours assisting Senator Jackson as this committee carefully reviewed the SALT I accords and the SALT II Treaty.

We will not keep you very long this morning, but we hope that you will again make an important contribution to the committee's review of a major arms control treaty, albeit this time from the other side of the dais.

We will, of course, include whatever statement and additional material you would like to have included in full in the record, and why do you not proceed in whatever way you feel would be appropriate and most helpful for the committee and the record.

Thank you very much for being here.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. PERLE. Thank you very much, Senator, for inviting me to join with the committee today.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity that you have given me to testify on the treaty.

The general outline of the rights and obligations of the parties is by now well known to the committee and requires no further comment. Some specific provisions, however, deserve close consideration either because they are ambiguous, because they invite differing interpretations, because they create loopholes whose exploitation by the Soviets would alter substantially the military consequences of the treaty, or because they have important implications for future negotiations or the evolution of our military forces. It is with respect to some of these provisions that I wish to comment this morning.

But before doing that, I would like to say something about this treaty broadly conceived It is, as the committee knows, the product of 6 years of negotiation, from November 1981 to December 1987. It is a treaty that few thought attainable when the President first proposed it. It is a treaty that was categorically rejected by General Secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and, for more than a year, Gorbachev. The policy proposal to eliminate all INF missiles was denounced repeatedly by the Soviets as a subterfuge aimed at establishing American military superiority.

Most of the community of arms control experts believed that the Soviets would never accept the zero option, as the proposal came to be known. They regarded the President's proposal, but not Soviet rejection of it, with deep suspicion. The idea became quickly and widely accepted among them, that the offer to eliminate the entire class of medium-range missiles was a disingenuous maneuver intended to frustrate any serious negotiation. Indeed, the Washington bureau chief of Time Magazine wrote a full length book that sounded this theme, in which I was portrayed as the villain, and my State Department colleagues as heroes who would rescue an INF Treaty from the overly demanding zero option.

But having become persuaded that the elimination of all intermediate-range missiles was in the western security interest, the President refused to take no for an answer. He was patient and determined. He had reviewed our past experience with arms control and concluded that a failure of staying power had too often led to unreciprocated concess@ions, and ultimately such flawed treaties as SALT I and SALT II. He believed that in the past our eagerness for agreement had enabled the Soviets to avoid the necessity for compromise. We had typically offered the Soviets a succession of proposals, each more accommodating than the one before it, and they had simply waited until our proposals enabled them to realize their objectives.

He was convinced that we would never learn how tractable the Soviets were until we put forward proposals that would test their willingness to compromise. So he was comfortable advancing a proposal that many people considered unacceptable. Nonnegotiable is the term that is usually used, unacceptable to the Soviets. And he was equally comfortable waiting for a change in the Soviets' negative reaction.

Waiting meant remaining steady through 2 years of stalemate and through the year-long absence from Geneva after the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November 1983. When it later became clear to the Soviets that their strategy of terminating the talks to intimidate our European allies had failed, they returned to the negotiations, negotiations to which they had pledged never to return until all American missiles deployed in Europe had been removed.

The President's eventual success in gaining adoption of the zero option required, of course, that our allies in Britain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands, carry out the deployment that NATO had decided on in December 1979, and they did, with fits and starts, through a period of bitter controversy during which the Soviets hoped that opposition to the deployment of American missiles would relieve Moscow of the need to compromise and remove their intermediate missiles.

Looking back, it is clear that the opponents of deployment in Europe, the unilateralists in the United Kingdom, Germany, and The Netherlands in particular, would have destroyed any change of a successful negotiation if they had succeeded in halting the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles. The lesson of the INF negotiations should end once and for all the unilateralists' fantasy that their policies support serious arms control.

Perhaps equally important was the President's decision in 1983 to initiate a program of research, development and testing of strategic defenses, a program the Soviets vehemently opposed and hoped to scuttle through the arms control process. To accomplish this, they had to keep the process alive. This explains in part Gorbachev's decision to return to the Geneva negotiations in 1985, and his reversal later of the position he took at the Iceland summit of holding an INF agreement hostage to the United States abandoning SDI.

However, one regards the INF Treaty, it is the treaty that Ronald Reagan set out to get in 1981. His will and resolve, and that of our allies, has vindicated the judgment that the Soviets could be

pressed to abandon their intermediate missiles i@n exchange for ours.

I know that there are those who believe that the elimination of intermediate missiles will weaken rather than strengthen western security. I disagree. The removal of SS-20 intermediate missiles will impair the Soviets' ability to attack and destroy critical NATO installations on which the conventional as well as the nuclear defense of Europe depends. It is true that many of these installations will remain vulnerable to other Soviet missiles, including their ICBMs. But just as the use of an American ICBM is thought by some to entail greater risk than the use of an intermediate missile, the same, generally speaking, should hold true with the Soviets.

For my part, I believe that the decision to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet homeland in response to a Soviet conventional attack on Europe would be of such momentous consequence as to dwarf the issue of whether the chosen weapon was of intermediate or intercontinental range.

In any case, the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles have turned out to be far more vulnerable to attack than those who made the decision to deploy them anticipated. This is due in part to the difficulty of dispersing them in a timely fashion. At their operational bases they are vulnerable even to conventional attack. It is reasonable to assume that they would be the first Soviet targets in any war begun by them, and that they would not last more than a few minutes unless dispersed to field locations.

Indeed, the first Pershing II site in Europe was built not in Germany but in the Soviet Union where a full scale mock-up was constructed so that Soviet troops could train to attack and destroy it.

Timely dispersal is problematic because of the operational constraints placed on the peacetime movement of nuclear missiles. A timely decision to disperse in a crisis is almost certain to be rejected by NATO as an aggravation of an already dangerous situation. This unhappy state of affairs applies to the movement of weapons other than intermediate missiles, and it has profound implications for the ability of NATO to deter, implications that the alliance has so far failed to comprehend, let alone take action to deal with.

Even after the removal of American INF missiles from Europe, we will have some 4,000 nuclear weapons deployed there, many of which are carried by delivery systems that can reach, in some few cases, deeply into the Soviet Union. It is crucial for the defense of the alliance that these weapons be retained in the western arsenal, and consistent with the decision taken at Montebello by ministers of defense of the alliance in 1983, improved so as to make them more effective.

The Lance missile is approaching obsolescence and needs to be replaced, ideally with a @missile capable of the full range permitted by the treaty, 500 kilometers. The range and effectiveness of the other nuclear weapons deployed in defense of the alliance should be improved as well, and air-to-surface missiles should replace certain gravity bombs in order to improve target coverage and effectiveness. Finally, the F-111 aircraft should be modernized and eventually replaced with an aircraft that has the range and payload necessary to strike deep in Soviet territory.

These measures can, in my judgment, ensure that NATO will be able to deter attack in the future just as it has in the past. I cannot accept the argument of those who believe that the absence of American intermediate missiles in Europe will diminish significantly our ability to deter Soviet attack, provided that we continue to maintain a significant nuclear capability there.

But I would be deeply troubled about the defense of Europe if we were to eliminate our remaining nuclear weapons there. Without them we can neither deter nor defend. The presence of nuclear weapons among the western armies causes the Soviets to disperse their forces, and that in turn, by precluding the massing of vastly superior Soviet armor, increases greatly NATO's capability to defend Europe with conventional weapons. The removal of NATO's remaining nuclear weapons would increase the vulnerability of our forces there to the point where we could not in good conscience ask them to remain.

In any case, an agreement to eliminate or even more to reduce battlefield and air-delivered nuclear weapons would be impossible to verify, not difficult, but impossible to verify. Thus, it is puzzling that some Europeans believe that we ought to enter negotiations aimed at reducing those weapons. I can understand why Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has proposed such negotiations, but I cannot understand why Foreign Minister Genscher finds it so difficult to say no.

This committee has heard and will doubtless hear again that the removal of American INF missiles will leave Europe more vulnerable to superior Soviet conventional forces. I do not agree. This is not to say that Europe is not vulnerable to conventional attack. It clearly is. But I do not believe that it is any less vulnerable, or that the western deterrent is any more persuasive if the United States deploys intermediate missiles that are themselves vulnerable. The answer to the conventional imbalance lies now, as it always has, in western hands and treasuries. Easy reliance on nuclear threats cannot substitute for a robust conventional capability reinforced by NATO's nuclear weapons and by the American strategic deterrent.

Conventional arms control, which ought to be at the top of the western arms control agenda, is unlikely to lead the Soviets to abandon the superiority that they have endured great sacrifice to achieve.

I said at the outset that some provisions of the treaty deserve close scrutiny and careful Senate consideration. For despite the admirable professionalism, heroic at times, and I think in particular of the closing days and hours of this negotiation, with which the INF Treaty was negotiated, there are provisions in it that could benefit from greater precision and clarity. There are ambiguities that should be cleared up and loopholes that ought to be closed. There are also provisions that would establish dangerous precedents if they were believed to have application wider than this treaty. Much of the verification regime falls into this category. Had more time been available to negotiate those treaty issues that were resolved late in the negotiation, in some cases in the final days and hours, and even perhaps on the aircraft that brought the negotiators to Washington, it is likely that some of the more troublesome provisions would have been handled differently.

Yesterday the American Enterprise Institute released a careful article-by-article review of the treaty. It is the product of a working group that includes both supporters and opponents of the treaty. But all who participated in it believe that where the treaty can be improved so as to accomplish its essential purpose better, it is in the national interest to do so.

I am happy to make a copy of the AEI report available to the committee for whatever use it wishes to make of it. And if the committee agrees that it would be useful, Mr. Chairman, it is available for insertion in the record of the hearings.

Senator WIRTH. Without objection, it will be included in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Studies in National Security Policy

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE REVIEW

OF THE INF TREATY

by the AEI Working Group

on the INF Treaty

February 3, 1988

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THE INF TREATY: ANALYSIS AND COMMENT

Introduction

This analysis of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, entered into December 8, 1987 between the United States and the Soviet Union and currently being reviewed by the U.S. Senate, was prepared by a working group convened at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and chaired by AEI visiting fellow Frank Gaffney. The members of the working group are listed on the following page.

The purpose of the working group's analysis is not to support or oppose ratification of the INF Treaty; indeed the group includes individuals on both sides of the ultimate issue before the Senate. The aim here is rather to examine rigorously and in detail the effectiveness of the Treaty's provisions and protocols in achieving the Treaty's own goal: to eliminate all intermediate-range and all shorter-range nuclear missiles. Regardless of the wisdom of this goal it is clearly in the interest of the United States that the Treaty's requirements should be as transparent as possible and that its verification provisions should protect against undetected violations. Mindful of the Soviet Union's exploitation of ambiguities and loopholes in past treaties, and concerned that differing interpretations could lead to an unequal exchange of rights and obligations in the future, the authors have sought clarity, precision, and the timely assessment of ambiguities in the Treaty's text.

The members of the working group believe that a number of the INF Treaty's deficiencies discussed in this analysis could be exacerbated if an agreement limiting strategic arms were concluded and if certain of this Treaty's provisions were regarded as a precedent for the later agreement. They have thus identified problems which may strike some readers as minor details -- but which could become critically important in the context of the more ambitious agreements currently being negotiated.

This analysis is offered in a constructive spirit on the premise that the Senate will wish to understand the Treaty in detail before deciding whether to ratify it unreservedly or to amend or adopt reservations to it. Where there are ambiguities the Senate may wish to clarify them by eliciting an indication from the Soviets of how they interpret those provisions. In all events the sort of close scrutiny offered here should assist in placing the final disposition of the Treaty on a firmer basis than if the issues identified were not squarely addressed.

Christopher C. DeMuth
President
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research

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AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

WORKING GROUP

ON THE INF TREATY

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Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE REVIEW OF THE INF TREATY

INTRODUCTION

This paper reviews provisions of the INF Treaty, its two Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding. Comments are offered regarding a number of key issues. Where it is not yet possible to ascertain satisfactorily the meaning or implications of a given provision, we have highlighted the need for clarification by setting forth the relevant questions.

ARTICLE I - PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

Comment:

The primary obligation of the Treaty parties is, according to this article, the complete elimination of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and other specified items. This is the standard against which the Treaty's provisions must be judged. If, for example, as a result of the cumulative effect of allowed production, inadequate inspection and permitted R&D, the Soviets can retain or produce prohibited missiles and other systems, the Treaty would fail to achieve its purpose.

ARTICLE II - DEFINITIONS

Analysis of the Article II definitions should take into account not only their suitability in the context of this INF Treaty, but also the implications of their use as precedents for a START Treaty. It should be noted that the provisions of Articles VI and VII significantly add to and in some cases alter the definitions of terms dealt with in Article II.

The Treaty does not define "elimination" as such, though it does specify procedures for eliminating specific items. The problem is that the specified procedures will not in every case result in the actual elimination of these items. In fact, in some cases items "eliminated" according to the specified procedures may even be able to continue to perform their prohibited functions. See comments on Article IV.1.

Article II, Paragraphs 1 and 2

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile

(GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

Comment:

Taken together, the definitions of ballistic and cruise missiles in Paragraphs 1 and 2 do not capture every possible type of missile. For example, a hyper-velocity glide vehicle appears not to be within the definitions. This should be confirmed, as some work is being done in the United States on that technology. What other missile technologies are similarly excluded by these definitions? Were all such exclusions intended by us? What uses can the Soviets make of such exclusions?

This provision permanently prohibits conventionally-armed ground-launched missile options that could contribute substantially to the non-nuclear defense of Western Europe. (See Report of Commission on Long-Term Integrated Strategy.) The INF Treaty makes such contributions more important than before. The breadth of the definitions -- that is, the fact that they cover conventionally-armed as well as nuclear-armed ground-launched missiles -- is said to be justified by the verification difficulties that would be created if conventionally-armed missiles were not prohibited. This verification benefit, however, has largely been negated by the fact that the definitions do not cover drones (remotely piloted vehicles) or any other ground-launched missiles that do not carry weapons.

The operative assumption evidently is that the Article VII counting rule, which specifies that such systems may not be flight-tested for weapon-delivery, will prevent prohibited missiles from being developed in the guise of drones. Is this assumption valid? In other words, is it possible to flight-test a weapon-delivery system in a manner that would not be distinguishable from the flight-test of a drone?

Given that major verification problems still inhere in these definitions, the wisdom of permanently banning conventionally-armed missiles should be reassessed.

Article II, Paragraph 3

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

Comment:

A key issue of the Treaty is its application to Soviet GLBM launchers. See comments on Article IV, Paragraph 1.

Article II, Paragraphs 5 & 6

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

Comment:

These definitions refer to "range capability," but that phrase is misleading. In the case of ballistic missiles, as Article VII, Paragraph 4 makes clear, the range is considered to be not the maximum range of which the missile is capable, but only the maximum range to which it has been tested. As for the case of cruise missiles, see comments on Article VII.4.

Article II, Paragraph 8

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

Comment:

"Normally operate" is not defined in the Treaty. Its use here implies that missiles and launchers may legally operate outside the missile operating bases. This may mean that missiles that qualify under the Treaty as "non-deployed" may nevertheless be operational, though it is clearly the intention of the Treaty that all operational missiles be deemed "deployed." Is there an agreed meaning for this term? What if anything do we know about the meaning the Soviets attribute to "normally" here?

Ambiguous or unclear terms of this kind may or may not have great significance in the context of the INF Treaty. But we can expect many such terms to be transplanted into the START Treaty, where their significance might increase greatly. It is elementary but bears emphasis that it is very bad practice to allow terms of an arms control Treaty to remain ambiguous or undefined.

ARTICLE III - Treaty-LIMITED SYSTEMS

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

Comment:

On the assumption that the SSC-X-4 was at more or less the same early stage of development as the U.S. Pershing IB, the U.S. consented to have the Treaty treat these two missiles in the same fashion, different from the treatment of the "existing" items. The information about the SSC-X-4 in the Memorandum of Understanding -- that 84 SSC-X-4 missiles and six launchers have been produced and are located at a storage facility -- suggests that that assumption was erroneous.

This evident intelligence error raises questions about our ability to monitor the subject matter of the Treaty. How do we know that the 84 SSC-X-4 missiles that the Soviets have acknowledged are all the SSC-X-4 missiles that they possess? For that matter, what confidence do we have about the accuracy and completeness of the other data supplied by the Soviets? See comments on the Memorandum of Understanding.

Is there any significance to the difference between those inspection provisions applicable to the systems "never deployed" (i.e., Pershing IB and SSC-X-4) and those applicable to "existing" (i.e., deployed) items? See Article X.6.

ARTICLE IV - ELIMINATION SCHEDULE (Intermediate-Range Systems)
Article IV, Paragraph 1

Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

Comment:

The Treaty says that all Treaty-limited systems are to be "eliminated," and no such systems are to be "possessed" by either Party after three years. The actual obligation of the Parties, however, is to follow certain "elimination" procedures, custom designed for each banned item, and such procedures amount only to alteration rather than elimination of several Soviet launchers.

Whereas the "elimination" procedures for all Treaty-limited U.S. systems will ensure that such systems are reduced to scrap,

the procedures for several Treaty-limited Soviet launchers have been designed to allow the "eliminated" launchers to be used for other purposes. Given that these "eliminated" Soviet launchers will be permitted to operate throughout the Soviet Union, the question is whether, even if we observe them through overhead reconnaissance, we have the capability of ascertaining whether the alterations have been reversed so as to allow the item to perform a prohibited function.

It may be that the Soviets would find it easier to produce a new launcher from "scratch" than to undo the elimination procedures on an old launcher. This raises the question: Do we have any confidence that we would detect clandestine production of Treaty-limited launchers? See comments on Article VI, Paragraph 1.

Some of the Treaty's language implies a greater comprehensiveness of its scope than is, in fact, the case. In drafting the Memorandum of Understanding, the Parties excluded from the list of items to be eliminated certain elements of an INF capability -- certain facilities and equipment -- that can be used for other purposes, too. With respect to the U.S. facilities and equipment being so spared, this seems a sensible, financially responsible measure. The United States can be expected to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty not to retain an INF capability, and will not put such items to prohibited uses. The exclusion, however, may on the Soviets' side facilitate the concealment of Treaty violations or may enhance their ability to effect a rapid "break-out." For example, the Treaty allows the Soviets to retain without alteration SS-20-related multiple-bay garages and support structures for shorter-range missiles.

Each exclusion from the elimination schedule, gerrymandered definition, and exception to the non-production rule may seem minor in itself, but taken together such provisions mean that the Soviets, even without violating the Treaty, can remain rather close to a militarily significant INF capability. And the violations that would be required to maintain an INF capability are less extensive (and thus easier to conceal) than the Treaty's comprehensive language leads one to believe.

ARTICLE V - ELIMINATION SCHEDULE (SRMs)

Article V, Paragraph 1

> **Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.**

Comment:

Regarding the possible significance of this Article's failure to mention the elimination of support structures for shorter-range missiles, see comments on Article IV, Paragraph 1.

ARTICLE VI - COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS

Article VI, Paragraph 1

> **Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:**

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

Comment:

The ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor Soviet performance under the terms of this provision and the Treaty in general is a major issue. In this connection, the following questions, among others, must be addressed:

Can the IC accurately represent that it knows the location of all the facilities that have been used to produce the Soviets' Treaty-limited systems? Would it know if the Soviets actually began production of banned items at other facilities? Would it know if the Soviets created the capability at other facilities to begin production of banned items?

To what extent could permitted SS-25 production and testing mask or substitute for SS-20 production/testing?

It has been argued that this Article's prohibition of flight-testing serves to guarantee against covert deployment of the SS-20. The contention is that without flight-testing the Soviets would have no confidence in the reliability of their missiles and therefore would not deploy them. But our experience with the SS-16 missile, deployment and flight-testing of which were banned under SALT II, argues to the contrary. According to the Administration, the SS-16 was probably deployed over a long period of time even though we detected no flight tests.

It is also presumably the case that the Soviets will be a ble to obtain useful reliability information from the permitted launches to destruction and static fire burns prescribed by the Treaty's elimination provisions.

Furthermore, flight tests of the SS-25 will provide the Soviets some data relevant to the SS-20 because the first stages of those two missiles are essentially identical. Indeed, the Soviet Union's ability to use their unregulated SS-25 program as a vehicle for getting around the prohibitions of the INF Treaty or concealing violations of the Treaty is an intractable problem which arises repeatedly throughout this agreement. Some have sought to minimize the gravity of this issue by contending that the Soviets have little incentive to maintain a prohibited, concealed SS-20 capability because the SS-25s themselves, which are not prohibited, can perform the same military function as the SS-20 does.

This argument ignores, however, the possibility that the Soviets may value highly the specialized characteristics of the SS-20 -- in particular, its multiple warheads, high accuracy, and short time of flight. Such considerations may constitute ample incentive for the Soviets to exploit opportunities to maintain an SS-20 capability despite the Treaty. Also, if a START agreement is concluded, limiting or banning SS-25s and other strategic systems, the Soviets' incentives to violate the INF Treaty would increase substantially.

Article VI, Paragraph 2

Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each

Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

Comment:

This provision attempts to address the problem caused by the fact that the Treaty-limited SS-20 and the unlimited SS-25 ICBMs have first stages that are so similar that no practical inspection regime would be able to distinguish them. As a result of this provision, the Soviet Union will be allowed to produce first stages that are "outwardly similar to" the SS-20 first stage, thereby vitiating somewhat the general prohibition on production of any intermediate-range missile stage in paragraph 1. Although the Soviets say such stages are "not interchangeable with" SS-20 first stages, the absence of any definition of that phrase makes it meaningless.

Furthermore, it is unclear how -- if at all -- this Article would affect a future intermediate-range missile that might be developed using the first two stages of the SS-25 (just as the first two stages of the SS-16 gave rise to the SS-20). Could the development, testing and production of such a system be concealed using the SS-25 program as "cover"? In any event, it will be difficult for the U.S. to determine whether anomalous activities within the SS-25 program indicated a surreptitious intermediate-range missile development program.

This paragraph contains a noteworthy drafting error. Read literally, it permits the production of an "SS-25" second stage that is "outwardly similar to, and interchangeable with" the second stage of an SS-20. This problem arises because the paragraph begins with a "notwithstanding" clause that overrides the general prohibition on intermediate-range missile stage production of paragraph 1. This point should be clarified with the Soviets. What the last clause of the Paragraph meant to say (and should be revised to reflect) is: "... provided that that Party does not produce any other stage which is either outwardly similar to, or interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM."

ARTICLE VII - COUNTING RULES

As was pointed out in the comments on Article II, the Article VII counting rules have an important bearing on the definitions of key Treaty terms, and analysis of these rules should take into account both their suitability in the context of this INF Treaty and also the implications of their use as precedents for a START Treaty.

Article VII, Paragraphs 1 & 2

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

Comment:

The Treaty does not define the word "type." This suggests that the Parties were unable to arrive at a common understanding of the term. In light of the controversy relating to whether the SS-25 is a new type of ICBM, and thus a violation of SALT II, it is important that the sides not hold to inconsistent definitions of so critical a term.

In the absence of such a definition it is impossible to know how different a new missile must be from a Treaty-limited missile in order for that new missile to be excluded from the Treaty's prohibitions (i.e., in order for the new missile to be considered either (1) not a weapon-delivery vehicle, or (2) not a vehicle of intermediate- or shorter-range).

Article VII, Paragraph 3

If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

Comment:

The following questions arise from this provision:

With what effectiveness could a missile now designed for ABM, ATBM, or anti-air purposes be used in a ground-to-ground, weapon-delivery mode?

Could the Soviets develop a new intermediate-range or shorter-range missile in the guise of an ABM, ATBM, or anti-air missile?

Article VII, Paragraph 4

The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

Comment:

The counting rule for GLBM range capability provides a significant loophole: a new GLBM could be tested to 490 km in a non-minimum-energy trajectory and thus would have much greater actual range. The U.S. would have no grounds to object to such a system, even though it would unquestionably have the ability to strike targets over 500 km away.

The counting rule for GLCM range is taken from the SALT II Treaty (Article II.8, 2nd Agreed Statement). As Secretary Vance's published analysis of SALT II (Document 12B, p.19) makes clear, the U.S. interpretation of this definition was not confirmed by the Soviets. Was there, in the course of the INF negotiations, any agreement on the meaning of "flying to fuel exhaustion"?

In any event, this provision is not verifiable. If we observed a new Soviet GLCM flying 490 km in a test, how would we be able to know how much fuel it had on board when the flight was terminated? Replacing a large conventional warhead on such a GLCM with a small nuclear warhead would allow it to fly INF ranges -- even if the fuel would have been exhausted carrying the first payload to only 490 km.

Article VII, Paragraphs 7 & 8

> **7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.**
>
> **8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.**

Comment:

Is there any engineering or mechanical reason why the launcher for the SS-25 could not be used to launch an SS-20? Do we know whether any such launcher has ever been used for this purpose -- including during development of the SS-25?

If an SS-25 launcher during development testing carried an SS-20 canister, it would be captured by the counting rule in Paragraph 8. Can we be certain no such launcher ever did?

Article VII, Paragraph 10

> **Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:**
>
> **(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;**
>
> **(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and**

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

Comment:

Because the first stage of an SS-25 is externally indistinguishable from that of an SS-20, the counting rules for U.S. missiles differ from those for Soviet missiles. They impose a more rigorous standard on the U.S. side (the largest stage of the Pershing II missile alone counts as a full-up missile) than on the Soviet side (only a full-up Soviet missile -- or its canister -- counts as a missile).

The difference between the counting rules for U.S. missiles and those for Soviet missiles affects the relative values of U.S. and Soviet inspection rights under the Treaty. Because of these counting rules, the U.S. side's rights to conduct continuous monitoring of a Soviet production facility apply only to a Soviet final assembly plant. The corresponding rights of the Soviets, however, apply to a U.S. plant that actually manufactures missile stages. (For further discussion of this point, see Article XI, Paragraph 6.) This means that the Soviet facilities that now manufacture SS-20 second stages (or first stages for that matter) are not subject to monitoring by the United States under the Treaty.

Given that the Treaty effectively permits the Soviets to continue manufacturing first stages of the two-stage SS-20 (see Article VI, Paragraph 2), it is not a minor matter that we have no inspection rights at all at whatever facilities manufacture SS-20 stages.

ARTICLE VIII - SITING LIMITATIONS

Article VIII, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment

Comment:

If the Soviets have continued after November 1, 1987 to maintain SS-20s or support equipment at any missile support facility previously associated with these missiles but not listed in the MOU, they would be in violation of this provision. Is there evidence that any such items continued to be present at any such facility after November 1, 1987?

Article VIII, Paragraph 6

Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Comment:

The word "locate" in this provision seems to mean "to allow something to be at a location." On the other hand, it could be read to mean "to move something to a location." This point

should be clarified by the Parties especially if consideration is being given to creating a parallel provision in START.

Article VIII, Paragraph 8

> A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

Comment:

This provision seems altogether unmonitorable. And, in any event, even if we were to detect an apparent violation, the loophole (viz., "except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities ... ") would make it impossible to establish the point. Is it clear that, for purposes of this provision, a missile can be placed on its launcher only at a repair facility?

Article VIII, Paragraph 9

> Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article. areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.
>
> 2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.
>
> 3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating baser, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

Comment:

This Article describes where intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers shall be located during the period between entry into force and the end of the elimination period. These requirements raise the following questions:

Will we be able to tell that Treaty-limited items are not located elsewhere? For example, could they be stored without risk of detection in warehouses or other installations? Do we know that all areas in the Soviet Union where operational missiles exist have been identified by the Soviets as "deployment areas?"

How many intermediate-range missiles have the Soviets produced? How confident are we in our estimate?

Article VIII, Paragraph 5

> All deployment areas, missile operating bases and

missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

Comment:

This provision contains the Treaty's first reference to "training" missiles and launchers. No definition or clarification of such terms is provided in Article II, Article VII, or elsewhere. Have the Parties agreed that training missiles must be inert -- i.e., without propellant? If all missiles must be either deployed or non-deployed, where do training assets fit in? How will we be able to tell the difference between such missiles and "real" ones. This point is particularly important in light of last-minute Soviet reallocation of a number of deployed SS-20s into the training category.

ARTICLE IX - DATA AND RELATED NOTIFICATIONS

Article IX, Paragraph 1

The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations unde-taken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Comment:

The quality of the data contained in the MOU is fundamental to the viability of this Treaty. If such data represent only a portion of the actual Soviet force then the remainder of that force will not be subject to any of the inspection provisions. Issues that need to be explored include: the quality of our intelligence; the likelihood that actual Soviet capabilities are higher; the significance of apparently wide discrepancies in the number of refire missiles associated with each of the several Soviet systems limited by the Treaty; and the extent to which our estimates are being altered on the basis of Soviet-supplied information (despite the fact that the factors which gave rise to these estimates in the first place do not appear to have changed).

Article IX, Paragraph 3

No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Comment:

The United States insisted on reviewing before Treaty signature -- and retaining the right to reject -- the data provided for in the MOU. The data in the MOU, however, are not the data that form the basis of the Parties' obligations under the Treaty. The data that really count are those to be exchanged by the Parties 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force; the Treaty does not afford us the right to reject Soviet data supplied at that time. In fact, if the United States is unsatisfied with the information provided in the data update -- e.g., if we judge the Soviets to be understating their INF force -- and the Soviets fail to convince us of the accuracy of their new data, then the United States would have no effective recourse. As a practical matter, we would feel compelled to continue to fulfill our obligations under the Treaty.

Under Article X.8, the Soviets will be allowed to remove missile support facilities and operating bases from this data base if they claim to have accomplished certain elimination procedures by the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Since there is no prohibition against eliminating Treaty-limited items during this period, the Soviets may choose to remove missiles and launchers from the updated data base contending that they have been eliminated. However, we will not have any inspection rights with regard to such missiles and hence will not be certain that they have, in fact, been eliminated. It is, moreover, unclear whether the Soviets would be obligated to follow the procedures in the Protocol on Elimination with respect to systems eliminated during this period.

Two of the advertised verification strengths of the Treaty are the agreement on data before Treaty signature (as reflected in the MOU) and the inspection rights applicable to the elimination of Treaty-prohibited items. In light of the foregoing paragraph, one cannot reach a judgment on the contribution these "strengths" make to the Treaty's verification regime until we have received the updated data from the Soviets 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force. In order to minimize the problem, the United States could insist upon a commitment from the Soviets either that, should they eliminate Treaty-limited systems prior to entry into force, they will follow the provisions of the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection or that they will refrain from such eliminations until the Treaty enters into force.

Article IX, Paragraph 5

Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

****

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;
(ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

Comment:

It should be noted that the provision on notification of transit is not as valuable as it might have been, since it does not require that notification be given until 48 hours after the transit is completed.

ARTICLE X - ELIMINATION PROVISIONS

Article X, Paragraph 1

Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

Comment:

Unlike Article VI (production) and Article VIII (location of Treaty-limited items), this paragraph does not specifically apply its terms to the stages of Treaty-limited missiles. Section I.3 of the Protocol on Elimination does state that "all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination." It might be argued, however, that this Protocol language applies only to the stages of full-up missiles that are listed in the updated data base and whose elimination is observable pursuant to the Treaty's inspection provisions. That reading would allow the Soviets to separate, before the Treaty's entry into force, the two stages of the SS-20 and retain the separated stages indefinitely. This would greatly facilitate the reconstitution of a Soviet INF capability.

To fix this problem, the Parties could agree to add to Paragraph 1 the words "and stages of such missiles" after the phrase "intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles."

Article X, Paragraph 5

Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

Comment:

This provision was included because the Soviets insisted that they would otherwise be unable to eliminate all their intermediate-range missiles within the allowed period. The Intelligence Community should assess whether any benefit might accrue to the Soviets in terms of establishing a useful data base on SS-20 reliability. (See comments on Article VI, Paragraph 1). Does the U.S. expect to destroy any of its intermediate-range missiles by launching them?

Article X, Paragraph 6

Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this

> Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:
>
> (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and
>
> (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

Comment:

The significance of this paragraph is discussed in the comments on Article III.

Article X, Paragraph 7

> Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

Comment:

This paragraph makes it clear that the term "elimination" in the Treaty does not mean elimination in the common sense of the term but rather fulfillment of the elimination procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. The adequacy of such procedures was called into question in the comments on Articles II and IV.1.

Article X, Paragraph 8

> Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:
>
> (a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;
>
> (b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and
>
> (c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or

deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

Comment:

This provision must be read in conjunction with Article XI.5(b), which deals with the inspection of former missile operating bases and support facilities. It opens the door to the possibility that facilities which currently have a role in Treaty-limited activities can be exempted from inspection if the Party claims to have fulfilled the three conditions listed and hence omits them from the data exchange which must be made 30 days after entry into force.

Are all the conditions listed in subparagraphs (a)-(c) discernible by national technical means of verification? If not, how will we have confidence that facilities known to be associated with Treaty-limited activities meet these conditions before entry into force? If so, what is the perceived need for close-out inspections at facilities eliminated after entry into force?

Article X, Paragraph 9

If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

Comment:

It seems intended, but is not made explicit, that a missile operating base must be "eliminated" before it can be converted for the use of a non-limited GLBM or GLCM. This possible ambiguity takes on special importance given that the Treaty allows the Soviets to retain such structures as multi-bay garages and other SS-20-related items at "eliminated" operating bases.

ARTICLE XI - VERIFICATION: INSPECTION PROVISIONS

The utility of this inspection regime is limited by the fact that it does not provide any right to conduct short-notice, on-site inspections at suspect sites, i.e., sites other than declared (or formerly declared) facilities. Thus, all of the effort described in this article is directed only at those places that the Soviets have in fact listed and thus chosen to make subject to inspection.

Article XI, Paragraph 3

> **Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.**

Comment:

If a facility is not included in the updated data base to be provided 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force (which Article X.8 says it need not be if it is "eliminated" prior to entry into force), do we still have the right to inspect it? On the one hand, this provision is said to apply to all facilities listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, but, on the other, the purpose of the inspections it authorizes is said to be the verification of the data in the updated data base. A related ambiguity is discussed under paragraph 5(b) of this Article.

Article XI, Paragraph 5

> **Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:**
>
> **(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and**
>
> **(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.**

Comment:

Subparagraph (b) provides the right to inspect former missile

operating bases and support facilities "eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X." This right constitutes a major element of the entire inspection regime. Its value, however, could be severely limited depending on how one interprets the ambiguous term "pursuant to." In particular, the question is: Is a site that has been "considered to be eliminated" under the last sentence of Article X.8 ipso facto deemed eliminated "pursuant to" that paragraph? If not, then the Soviets can severely limit the value of this inspection right by "eliminating" as many sites as possible prior to entry into force of the Treaty. This problem would be solved if the Parties agreed to add the following sentence to the end of subparagraph (b): "Any site considered to be eliminated under Article X, Paragraph 8 shall be deemed eliminated pursuant to Article X, Paragraph 8."

This section's negotiating history needs to be carefully reviewed. In particular, what is the rationale for the diminishing quota of inspections?

Article XI, Paragraph 6

> **Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:**
>
> **(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or**
>
> **(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.**
>
> **The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.**

Comment:

This provision establishes the asymmetrical monitoring rights

discussed in connection with Article VI.2 and VII.10.

ARTICLE XII - VERIFICATION: NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

Article XII, Paragraph 2

> Neither Party shall:
>
> (a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party ...; or
>
> (b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

Comment:

Given the fact that the Soviets have in the past not complied with the corresponding non-interference provisions of other treaties, there is reason to doubt the value of this provision.

Article XII, Paragraph 3

> To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:
>
> (a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and
>
> (b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.
>
> Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

Comment:

We can expect that this provision will be hailed as a major accomplishment in the field of cooperative verification measures. While it does represent a new approach -- one designed to obviate on-site inspection of certain suspect facilities -- it does not under the circumstances accomplish its purpose, namely to allow us to monitor SS-25 bases to check whether SS-20s have been deployed there in violation of the Treaty. But Subparagraph 3(a) in effect affords the Soviets six hours in which to remove from a challenged site any illegally deployed SS-20s. Given that the SS-20 is a mobile missile designed to be movable upon short notice, it is unreasonable to suppose that, if the Soviets decided to cheat in this manner, they would not be able to effect a timely removal of the SS-20s after a challenge.

Other issues that merit attention in this regard include:

What is the value of this provision relative to the value of the short-notice, on-site inspection regime the United States was proposing up till the final days of the Treaty negotiations? It is noteworthy that, although the United States in the INF negotiations dropped its insistence on on-site inspection of suspect facilities, the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit Statement commits the Soviets to agree to procedures for such inspections in the START agreement. With this commitment in hand, perhaps the United States can now find a way to use it to strengthen the verification regime in the INF Treaty.

Does the negotiating record reflect some understanding about what a fixed structure for a launcher is, and indicate what would happen in the event new fixed structures for launchers appeared which did not have openable roofs? Is it physically possible for the Soviets to open the roofs of all fixed structures at SS-25 bases which are capable of containing SS-20 launchers? What about maintenance facilities, other garages, etc. in which a launcher could be located?

Does the Soviet obligation to show us the "missiles" on SS-25 launchers mean simply that we will be allowed to observe the SS-25 canister which will be judged (applying the standard INF Treaty counting rules) to contain an SS-25 and not an SS-20, or does it constitute an obligation to display the missiles removed from their canisters? If not, what value would this provision have as an aid to verification?

ARTICLE XIII - RESOLUTION OF COMPLIANCE ISSUES

Article XIII, Paragraph 1

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

Comment:

Given the poor record of the Standing Consultative Commission established under SALT I in resolving serious concerns about Soviet violations of past treaties, it is unclear on what basis one should expect the Special Verification Commission established by this paragraph to do better.

It is also unclear what types of "measures ... to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty" are envisioned that the parties will agree upon puisuant to subparagraph 1(b). It should be ascertained whether this provision can be used to circumvent the amendment process (described in Article XVI), which properly requires that any proposed amendments to the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

ARTICLE XIV - NON-CIRCUMVENTION

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

Comment:

The fundamental question about this provision is: Does it create any obligations over and above those contained in other parts of the Treaty? If not, then it merely emphasizes the Parties' commitment to comply with the Treaty, and, from a legal point of view, is surplusage. We assume that the Administration takes the latter position. However, under international law, if there is a question regarding the interpretation of a Treaty provision, then a reading which entails the creation of an additional obligation of the Parties is presumed correct as opposed to one that regards it as redundant (or "surplusage"). Consequently, if the Administration regards this provision as surplusage, then it must be clearly established now that the parties deem it as such in order to defeat the legal presumption that would otherwise apply. If this is not accomplished, then the provision could be cited as barring various Western defense efforts that, while not prohibited by the Treaty's terms, are said to be somehow "in conflict with" them.

ARTICLE XV - DURATION

Article XV, Paragraph 1

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Comment:

Although the Treaty is of unlimited duration, the inspection rights it grants last for only 13 years (3 years in the case of the verification enhancement provisions relative to SS-25 bases, possibly less for portal monitoring at Votkinsk under certain circumstances). The working assumption seems to have been that a START Treaty would be signed within 3 years. Should a START Treaty not be signed in that period, should thought be given to ensuring that the verification regime for this Treaty will be extended?

ARTICLE XVI - Amendments

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in

accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Comment:

See the comment on Article XIII.1(b) concerning the potential uses of the Special Verification Commission to circumvent the requirement that all amendments be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

SIGNATURE SECTION

****

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Comment:

Given the haste with which the final texts were prepared, and in view of the significant difficulties we have had in the past with divergent translations being cited as a pretext for Soviet behavior we judged to be inconsistent with their commitments, a careful review of the consistency of the two texts is in order.

Postscript on THE PREAMBLE

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

****

Have agreed as follows:

Though preambular language is often dismissed as having little significance, it can have a bearing on public attitudes about the subject matter of the Treaty and on questions of Treaty interpretation. It is troubling that the preamble here focuses on the threat of nuclear war rather than the threat of war in general. Any major European war would have devastating consequences. The focus on the special threat from nuclear weapons lends itself to use as a criticism of NATO's flexible response policy, which entails reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent against aggression.

The preamble implies that the elimination of nuclear weapons as such enhances strategic stability. This could have dangerous effects on attitudes toward the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe and toward strategic arms, all of which are

critical to Alliance security -- indeed, more critical in the aftermath of the INF Treaty than before.

ELIMINATION PROTOCOL

INTRODUCTION

This protocol specifies the categories of items associated with Treaty-limited systems that the Parties agree to eliminate and the procedures that will be deemed to constitute "elimination." Two points merit particular attention: First, the Parties have agreed that not all the equipment or facilities associated with Treaty-limited missiles are to be eliminated. Second, they agreed that some of the items to be "eliminated" are not actually to be destroyed but simply modified or altered in designated ways so as to allow them to be used for other purposes.

SECTION I

Section I, Paragraph 4

For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination.

Comment:

Notwithstanding this provision, the Soviets are permitted by the Treaty (see Article VI.2) not only to retain but even to produce the first-stage of the intercontinental SS-25, which is virtually identical to that of the first stage of the SS-20. Article VI.2 of the Treaty vitiates this section of the Elimination Protocol as far as a key element of the most important Soviet INF system is concerned.

SECTION II

Section II, Paragraph 3

Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed.

Comment:

This provision spares from elimination the nuclear warheads of the Treaty-limited INF missile systems. Given the serious concerns on the U.S. side about whether there could be effective verification of nuclear warhead destruction and whether important net intelligence benefits would flow to the Soviets from measures to verify such destruction and, given the Parties' apparently mutual interest in recovering and recycling warhead materials, this provision seems on balance to be desirable.

Section II, Paragraph 4

Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection.

Comment:

What is involved in allowing the inspected party to "select the technological means necessary ... to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures"? Is it clear that this right cannot be used to hinder the ability of the inspecting party to conduct a useful inspection?

Section II, Paragraph 7

A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that such missile stages are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed.

Comment:

It is unclear whether we can have confidence that the Soviets are complying with this provision.

Section II, Paragraph 10

The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph:

For the Pershing II:

*** * ***

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

*** * ***

For the SS-20:

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Comment:

The procedures "eliminating" SS-20 and other Soviet launchers have been designed to leave them useful to a certain extent. They contrast with the elimination regime applicable to comparable U.S. systems (i.e., the Pershing I's and II's) which requires a cutting up of the systems into halves. The significance of this discriminatory arrangement is discussed in the comments on Article IV.1 of the Treaty.

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION

INTRODUCTION

This protocol details the rights and responsibilities of the Parties with respect to the inspections called for in the INF Treaty and its associated documents.

SECTION III

Section III, Paragraph 7

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. In the event the inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member of the other Party has violated the conditions governing inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, or has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspected Party making such a determination shall so notify the inspecting Party, which shall immediately strike the individual from

the lists of inspectors or the list of aircrew members. If, at that time, the individual is on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspecting Party shall immediately remove that individual from the country.

Comment:

There are two types of problems relating to this provision. First, the obligation of inspectors "to respect the laws and regulations of the [inspected] State" appears to offer the Soviets the opportunity to circumscribe narrowly the on-site activities of U.S. inspectors. Carrying out the legitimate functions of an inspection (e.g., demanding access to areas off-limits to individuals without necessary clearances) could be characterized as a failure to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party. Moreover, this paragraph permits the parties great latitude in deciding whether to expel an inspector.

Second, there is the larger question of ensuring that the inspectors will be able to operate in the Soviet Union in the intended manner and without personal risk. There have been problems in other contexts with Soviet treatment of U.S. (and other Western) inspectors (e.g., when Soviet troops in 1985 insisted on restricting the activity of -- and ultimately killing -- Major Nicholson, who was serving in East Germany as an inspector under the Four-Power Military Liaison Mission agreement which was concluded in the late 1940s). Have the Parties arrived at any understanding on how to resolve disputes about the proper bounds of the inspectors' activities so that incidents like the shooting of Major Nicholson will not occur?

SECTION IV

Section IV, Paragraph 5

Either Party may change the point or points of entry to the territories of the countries within which its deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities are located, by giving notice of such change to the other Party. A change in a point of entry shall become effective five months after receipt of such notification by the other Party.

Comment:

This paragraph appears to give the Soviets the right to make a unilateral change in the point of entry into the German Democratic Republic. This issue -- a highly sensitive matter dating back to the earliest days of the Four Power occupation of Germany -- gave rise to particularly difficult negotiating during the last days of the INF Treaty negotiations. The result was Soviet agreement to name an airport other than Berlin-Schoenefeld (which the United States regards as a part of Berlin and hence subject to Four Power control) as the point of entry into the GDR. If the Soviets have given private assurances that they will not use this paragraph to change the point of entry to Berlin-Schoenefeld, it would be desirable to make them part of the record, lest this subject cause needless friction in the future between the FRG and its friends in the West.

SECTION V

Several paragraphs under Sections V and VI of this Protocol give the inspected Party wide powers to influence the inspection

process, e.g., the right to appoint in-country escorts with wide powers; to control in-country transportation; to provide telephonic communications for the inspectors' use; to specify "safety regulations" that the inspectors must observe, etc.

Can the U.S. prevent the Soviets from exploiting these provisions to frustrate effective inspection? What lessons were learned about likely Soviet behavior in the course of such inspections from the visit to Gomel?

Section V, Paragraph 4

> **Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party brings into the country in which an inspection site is located shall be subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought into that country. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country where the inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within tamper-proof containers within a secure facility. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system requiring the presence of both Parties to gain access to the equipment and supplies.**

Comment:

Equipment and supplies brought in by inspection team may be examined by the "in-country escort" in order "to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that [they] cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established [query: by whom?] upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded...."

The Parties cannot intend that this language be taken literally. Any kind of inspection equipment can perform functions "unconnected" with the Treaty; e.g., a camera can take pictures of things other than limited missiles and launchers. Presumably what is meant is that equipment will not be cleared for use if it cannot perform any functions connected with the Treaty. This would be worth clarifying with the Soviets.

Section V, Paragraph 5

> **Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying**

out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of the inspected Party, including meals, services, lodging, work space, transportation and medical care shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

Comment:

This provision, as well as other provisions which envisage that the Soviets will supply services for U.S. inspectors and bill the United States for them, should be evaluated in the light of our experience with similar arrangements in connection with the construction of the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Use in-country of host aircraft for transport to inspection sites conflicts with policy statements made following agreement at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe that the precedent established in that accord for host-aircraft use would not be applied to further, "serious" arms control agreements. This has possibly still more unsatisfactory implications for the START negotiations.

SECTION VI

Section VI, Paragraph 3

In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with on-going activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or taking actions affecting its safe operation.

What is the implication of this "non-interference" provision for the "stand-downs" (pursuant to Section VII.1) needed to give the on-site inspectors an opportunity to assess what is at the site? Will inspectors be able to enforce the rules requiring that missiles, launchers, etc., not be moved during the pre-inspection period?

Section VI, Paragraph 6

Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken solely as a leisure activity.

Comment:

The intelligence by-products of this provision will not be the same for the two Parties. While it appears that nothing of importance lies within 50 kilometers of Votkinsk, Salt Lake City, an increasingly important commercial and defense center, lies well within the range of "off-duty" Soviet inspectors.

Section VI, Paragraph 7

Inspectors shall have the right throughout the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located within the territory of the country where the inspection is taking place using the telephone communications provided by the inspected Party.

Comment:

This provision, requiring the use of host-country communications systems, may allow the Soviets to hinder effective inspection by U.S. personnel. It gives the Soviets the opportunity to deny U.S. personnel secure communications (or any at all) with their government while in the USSR.

Section VI, Paragraph 9

The inspection team may bring onto the inspection site such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, as well as linear measurement devices; cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties. The characteristics and method of use of the equipment listed above, shall also be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may use any of the equipment listed above, except for cameras, which shall be for use only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements shall be made by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall take photographs of the inspected facilities using the inspecting Party's camera systems which are capable of producing duplicate, instant development photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one copy of every photograph.

Comment:

This provision requires agreement within 30 days of entry into force of the Treaty on the "characteristics and method of use of" equipment brought by inspection teams. Given that the "initial" inspections (pursuant to Article XI.3 of the Treaty) are to start 30 days after entry into force (and to be finished 60 days thereafter), it is necessary that such agreement be reached promptly; will the fact that these discussions will be going on under such great time pressure create a problem for us? Why were these matters not agreed to before Treaty signature?

Section VI, Paragraph 14

For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection procedures, including briefings and safety-related activities, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures. The period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours, except for inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of inspection may be extended, by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with

the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol, shall begin immediately upon completion of the inspection and shall be completed at the inspection site within four hours.

Comment:

The inspections under Treaty Article XI, Paragraphs 3-5 (i.e., the bulk of the inspections provided for in this Treaty, except for the permanent portal monitoring) are limited in duration to 24 hours. This creates an incentive for the Soviets to delay and quibble. What recourse will the United States have if its inspectors are subjected to dilatory maneuvers?

SECTION VII

Section VII, Paragraph 1

Within one hour after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team arrives at the inspection site. During the period that pre-inspection movement restrictions are in effect, missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be removed from the inspection site.

Comment:

Pre-inspection movement limitations are to be imposed within one hour of notification of the specific site to be inspected; will it be possible to verify that such a "stand-down" order has been issued on behalf of the inspecting Party by the inspected Party and that that order has been obeyed? See comments on Section VI.3 of this Protocol.

Section VII, Paragraph 8

A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher. A container that the inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile subject to the Treaty, and which is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a container to confirm that it cannot contain more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14 of this Section, a container that is sufficiently large to contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain a missile or stage of such a missile subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by means of weighing or visual

observation of the interior of the container, as necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact, contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

Comment:

The last sentence will allow the Soviets (except at Votkinsk) to declare any suspicious canister to be a canister for an SS-25 (or for some other non-limited missile) and, it appears, we will be unable to look inside it, weigh it or x-ray it. As a result of this provision, the Soviets could keep any number of undeclared SS-20s in SS-25 canisters.

Section VII, Paragraph 9

A structure or container that is not sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or container to confirm that it is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

Comment:

It is unclear how small a structure or container must be in order for this provision to exempt it from inspection other than by external visual observation. For instance, it is not clear whether the counting rules of Treaty Article VII.10 apply to this provision and, if so, how.

Section VII, Paragraph 10

Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, but which is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspection team not to be accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall not be subject to further inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection.

Comment:

The language of this provision is not clear. Does the

prohibition on further inspections apply only to the inspection then underway, or would it apply to subsequent inspections of the same facility, as well? In the latter case, would it be overridden by any evidence that a party had increased the dimensions of the space so that it could now contain a Treaty-limited item?

Section VII, Paragraph 14

> During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected object which is equal to or larger than the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. This may be accomplished by partial removal of the shroud or environmental protection cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies the inspection team by its demonstration that the object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection of that object. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

Comment:

Rules about inspecting containers, shrouded objects, etc. have the following anomaly: as noted in connection with paragraph 8 above, if the inspected Party declares that a given container is a launch container for an unlimited missile, then said container is subject to a less stringent inspection regime.

SECTION VIII

Section VIII, Paragraph 1

> Inspections of the process of elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.
>
> ***
>
> (c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the execution of the specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If any deviations from the agreed elimination procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance with the above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such

procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination.

Comment:

Exactly what does the "right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance" with the inspection protocols procedures mean?

Section VIII, Paragraph 2

Inspections of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

Comment:

The Protocol contains no inspection rules for inspections of elimination of training missiles and launchers.

SECTION IX

The precedents established in this Treaty for continuous monitoring will be important for START. They should be rigorously assessed in that light.

Section IX, Paragraph 1

The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line and one road which shall be within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall exit only through this portal.

Comment:

The last sentence of this paragraph, as well as other paragraphs of this Section, apparently incorporates the fundamental inequality caused by the counting rule (Article VII.10 of the Treaty) according to which a Pershing II first stage counts as a whole missile, while only a full-up missile or its canister counts as an SS-20 on the Soviet side. In other words, all U.S. vehicles and containers large enough to contain a Pershing II first stage (length 3.7 meters) will be subject to inspection at the Magna facility's portal while only those as large as (or larger than) an entire SS-20 (lenth 16.5 meters) will be subject to inspection at the Votkinsk gate.

Furthermore, it is not clear whether there is agreement as to what constitutes an "agreed perimeter." Is there an accord reflecting certain minimum Soviet security standards, or are we making assumptions about the character and quality of such standards based on past practice?

Section IX, Paragraph 13

Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party but that are declared not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

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(c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded objects are not and do not contain intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of such GLBMs of the inspected Party.

Comment:

What does "responsibility...to demonstrate" mean? To inspectors' satisfaction? What is the significance of this choice of words when elsewhere the requirement is spelled out with specificity?

Section IX, Paragraph 14

Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

***

(c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage and to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage; it shall have the right to view such missiles or missile stages contained in launch canisters or shipping containers eight times per calendar year. The in-country escort shall be present during all phases of such viewing. During such interior viewing:

(i) the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container shall be opened;
(ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be removed from its launch canister or shipping container; and

(iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the missile shall be measured in accordance with the

methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

Comment:

The last sentence suggests that the Parties now know of some non-intrusive and non-damaging way to discriminate between the largest stage of the SS-20 and that of the SS-25. Is this the case? What is this technology? Is it currently available? What is its assessed reliability?

By what mechanisms are the Parties to agree to the methods for measuring SS-20/25 stages at Votkinsk? Do they include the non-damaging image producing equipment mentioned in Section IX.6? If so, why not say so? If the Soviets have not yet agreed that the methods to be used include such equipment, this lack of agreement should be noted.

SECTION X

An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that prevents an inspection team performing an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure or delay, then the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

Comment:

This section foresees the possibility of a delay that prevents the inspecting Party from arriving at the inspection site within the 9 hour period specified in Section VII.2. The inspecting Party may cancel (and not have an aborted inspection count against its quota) or continue anyway (and presumably have it count against its quota). In either case, this section appears to be an all-purpose loophole; the inspecting Party has an incentive to cancel since the presumably less worthwhile, delayed inspection still counts against the quota; even if it does not, the inspected Party will have been able to hide anything it wishes before the delayed inspection occurs. (Note that "delay" is distinguished from a force majeure circumstance in which the inspection presumably cannot be carried out at all.)

SECTION XI

Section XI, Paragraph 1

For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection procedures, and no later than two hours after the inspection has been completed, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report in both the

English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers and items of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and any measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures, as well as.the inspection site diagram provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be attached to this report.

Comment:

The written inspection report is to be provided to the in-country escort within 2 hours of the completion of the inspection. This hardly allows for any serious analysis of observations. It seems to assume that the inspection report will simply verify the inspected Parties' information.

In any case, it should be made clear that failure to list an anomaly in the inspection report will not prevent the inspecting Party from raising the issue subsequently, either in the Special Verification Commission or elsewhere.

Section XI, Paragraph 2

For inspection activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days after the end of each month, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report both in the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party that left the inspection site through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include any measurements of launch canisters or shipping containers contained in these vehicles recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party, under the provisions of paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a launch canister or shipping container declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also include the measurements of the length and diameter of missile stages obtained during the inspection and recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures shall be attached to this report.

Comment:

In addition to the aforementioned shortcomings of this Section, a further mechanical one merits mention. The problem of having competent translation and conforming of report texts

performed under the time pressures stipulated here is not a trivial one. If these reports take on the importance one might expect, then having them done properly and consistently may prove to be as daunting a task as ensuring that they are technically sound.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING INF DATA

Serious questions can be -- and have been -- raised about the accuracy of the data provided by the Soviets in this MOU. This is a matter that can be explored usefully and properly only through an examination of classified estimates and analyses.

However, it should be noted that the State Department stated in the Spring of 1987 that:

> In addition to the approximately 400 SS-20 missiles now deployed, there may be as many as 200-400 (or more) such missiles in the USSR's inventory.

Thus, it would seem that our intelligence estimates on these matters fall within a wide range of uncertainty. It is also the case that our estimates have, for some time, been a matter of public record. Consequently, we should not take particular comfort from the contention that the Soviet-provided data fall within that range.

Mr. PERLE. You will find in it an analysis of the ambiguities, loopholes and definitional problems that we would do well to clarify, close and resolve.

There has been a great deal of talk about the possibility that this treaty may be destroyed by killer amendments. Unlike some who argue that if the INF Treaty is politically and conceptually flawed, I believe that it is sound in these respects and should be ratified. Indeed, a failure to ratify the treaty could do grave harm to our political and security interests. So I would oppose any amendment aimed at killing the treaty.

At the same time, I believe that the Senate role in the consideration of treaties should entail more than a selection between a rubber stamp that says yes and one that says no. To offer treaties for Senate consideration on a take-it-or-leave-it basis would do to the Senate what the President rightly claims the absence of a line-item veto on budget measures does to executive authority.

I take particular exception to the notion that any amendment or reservation that requires further negotiation or consultation with the Soviets is bound to kill the treaty. Some of the treaty's deficiencies were the product of haste, not the clash of American and Soviet differences. Others reflect our thinking at one time or another during the negotiating process or issues where second thoughts are now in order. And I see no reason why language that might be subject to differing interpretations should not be clarified now rather than later.

We have learned to our regret how difficult it is to resolve interpretive disputes when they emerge years after ratification. The notion that this treaty cannot be improved without killing it implies that every provision in it reflects the only formulation that

the Soviets would or could accept, and that each of those formulations is as effective as possible. Surely this is not the case; and no one familiar with the negotiations would contend that it is. Indeed, some possible clarifications might be as welcome to the Soviets as to us.

Some improvement might result from an exchange of correspondence between the parties as to the meaning and interpretation of specific provisions, not all of which are self-evident. In other cases, amendments or reservations might be helpful so long as they do not alter the fundamental exchange of rights and obligations and thus the structural integrity of the treaty.

Amendments that did alter the essential features of the treaty to eliminate nuclear missiles, say, by conferring unilateral advantages or imposing unilateral constraints, would indeed be killer amendments that the Senate would be wise to reject. Amendments or reservations of more modest scope, on the other hand, deserve careful deliberation by the Senate.

Consider article XIV, which deals with non-circumvention. Various administration witnesses have testified that article XIV imposes no obligations on the United States beyond those contained in the other articles of the treaty. Yet under international law, treaty provisions are generally held to have some non-redundant meaning on the not unreasonable principle that if they lacked independent meaning they would be superfluous. We know from experience that it is a Soviet objective to curtail our military cooperation with our allies. And they may be tempted to interpret article XIV so as to encumber that cooperation.

A reservation that states simply that article XIV entails no obligations not otherwise specified elsewhere in the treaty would settle the matter. And unless the Soviets interpret article XIV differently, such a reservation should be readily accepted by them.

One provision of the treaty, article II, paragraph 2, has the effect of banning ground-launched cruise missiles with a range over 500 kilometers, even if they are armed with non-nuclear weapons. I believe that this is the single most serious defect in the treaty, serious enough to warrant an amendment that would ban nuclear but permit non-nuclear cruise missiles.

The prohibition on conventionally armed ground-launched cruise missiles will prevent the United States from deploying weapons that could strengthen greatly our deterrent forces and our conventional capability. Non-nuclear cruise missiles with previously unimaginable accuracy, missiles capable of striking within 10 feet of their targets. In any weather, even a day like today, when fired from great distances, could enable the United States to replace nuclear with non-nuclear weapons for a class of important targets that can now be destroyed only with nuclear weapons. Such deployments would significantly raise the nuclear threshold and place even hardened targets at risk.

This would create a formidable deterrent to conventional attack and diminish the need to rely on nuclear strikes to halt a conventional offensive early in a major war. And it would create a variety of options in more limited conflicts where it is inadvisable to place in jeopardy the aircraft and ships and the men who fly and man

them that would otherwise bear the burden of launching cruise missiles, and in particular, in very heavily defended areas.

Ground-launched cruise missiles are likely to be far cheaper and less vulnerable to attack or attrition than those delivered from costly and vulnerable ships and aircraft. And because they would not carry nuclear weapons, a number of peacetime dispersal options would be available. The advantage of deploying hundreds or even some thousands of ground-launched cruise missiles over a wide geographic area is considerable compared to concentrating a cruise missile capability on aircraft based at a few tens of locations or on a small number of ships. This is an advantage that ought to be seized.

The only argument for banning conventional as well as nuclear cruise missiles is that it is necessary to ban both in order to verify compliance with a ban on nuclear cruise missiles because it is difficult to distinguish between them. Yet the treaty does allow unarmed cruise missiles. If the Soviets wished to disguise the deployment of nuclear-armed cruise missiles, they could simply claim that they were unarmed reconnaissance vehicles. We would be unable to verify this claim in peacetime, and during a war nuclear warheads could be easily added.

Moreover, there is no practicable way to verify the range of a cruise missile. The Soviets could deploy a conventionally armed cruise missile with, say, a 2,000 pound warhead and a range of 500 kilometers. That is permitted under the treaty. The substitution of a 150 pound nuclear warhead for the much heavier conventional one would enable that cruise missiles to operate at distances greatly exceeding 500 kilometers.

So it is simply wrong to assert that a ban on non-nuclear cruise missiles makes a ban on nuclear ones verifiable. The verification advantage of complicating one cheating scenario for nuclear cruise missiles when several others exist is illusory. And yet, ironically, I believe that the administration agreed to ban conventional cruise missiles not so much because the Soviets insisted on it, but because it feared criticism from Senators concerned about verification. It is in your hands to resolve that issue.

In cases where verification is nearly impossible, as it is with respect to article II, paragraph 2, the crucial issue becomes the protection of U.S. options. Where the option in question is particularly promising and beneficial to our security, it is foolish to abandon it for all time in the idle belief that we have thereby solved an important verification problem.

As I understand it, the United States offered to ban intermediate-range non-nuclear ground-launched cruise missiles when the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they had no requirement for one. I believe that it is short-sighted in the extreme to abandon forever a program option of great importance because the cumbersome process by which the JCS establishes requirements has thus far failed to recognize the enormous potential such a program possesses.

Moreover, I understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said that we must not follow the logic that led to abandoning ground-launched cruise missiles when it comes to air- and sea-launched ones, but if the administration argues that article II, paragraph 2 is necessary for verification, how will it argue otherwise when the

Soviets assert, as they surely will, that the same holds true for the others? How will we persuade the public opinion on which all American negotiating positions ultimately depend, that yesterday's logic no longer prevails?

I am aware that the joint statement issued at the Washington summit would seem to protect the option for conventionally armed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, but we know from experience that summit statements are easily recanted or ignored. Already the Soviets have charged the administration with ignoring a section of the summit statement dealing with SDI. It will not be long before they find a pretext for insisting that conventional cruise missiles of all types should be prohibited. Summit statements are simply not the same as treaty text, and one would be foolish to think otherwise.

While the Soviets are attempting to constrain sea-launched cruise missiles in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, I do not believe the issue of conventionally armed cruise missiles was or is central to the INF Treaty. Had we insisted on retaining them, which we did for most of the 6 years of the INF negotiations, the Soviets would surely have acquiesced. This provision, Senator Wirth, is rather more like a collateral constraint to assist verification, which as I have indicated, I believe does not work, than it is a core provision of the treaty, and in previous negotiations this would have been regarded as a collateral constraint, and its subsidiary status would have been clearly understood.

An amendment that simply adds the word "nuclear" at the appropriate place in article II, paragraph 2 would, after a suitable interval of plaintive propaganda, be accepted by the Soviets. This was not and is not now a make or break issue. The Soviets will not abandon the INF Treaty on this peripheral issue. There is no killer amendment here.

I urge the Senate to facilitate rapid movement toward the development and deployment of accurate conventionally armed cruise missiles by requiring an amendment to the treaty that would permit them. If we are to diminish the awesome reliance on nuclear weapons that now figures so importantly in NATO strategy, we had better keep our options open for effective and cost-effective conventional forces. And I see no reason why the Senate should not advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an initiative along these lines would be welcomed and funded.

The AEI report to which I referred earlier considers a number of difficulties with the treaty's verification regime. I believe that many of these are easily correctable. Some doubtless are not. But however these questions are eventually resolved, I hope that the Senate makes it plain that the INF Treaty verification provisions would not be acceptable in a START Treaty where the risks are far greater and the consequences of cheating vastly more dangerous.

The President deserves great credit for what he has accomplished in concluding a treaty of unusual scope in circumstances that were inauspicious enough to discourage all but a few. He has in the broadest sense set a new standard for arms control, taking it beyond marginal encroachments on Soviet programs, and eliminating an entire class of weapons. But the achievement of results in

arms control requires an appreciation of its limits together with patience and persistence that we may not soon see again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Perle, for your very thoughtful and analytical testimony which I think a lot of members will find fascinating and challenging.

Let me ask you right at the top, if I might, if I note a contradiction, or clarify for me if this is not so. At the top of page 8 you state that verification is nearly impossible, and yet toward the bottom of page 5 you say that the treaty should be ratified.

Are you suggesting, in effect, that we ratify a treaty that is not verifiable, is that right?

Mr. PERLE. I believe that at the top of page 8 I am referring to the impossibility of verifying the ban on cruise missiles, and I think we ought to face that fact and then make some judgment about how important it would be for our security if the Soviets, exploiting our inability to verify, were in fact to deploy cruise missiles illegally. And on balance, it seems to me a risk worth taking.

Senator WIRTH. Would another way of resolving that ambiguity in verification not be to simply ban unarmed cruise missiles?

Mr. PERLE. I think not. First of all, the unarmed cruise missile cheating scenario is only one of several. This problem is simply insurmountable in my view. Not only could the Soviets resort to a program of unarmed cruise missiles which could be made nuclear, but the treaty permits air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. It even permits those air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles to be tested from ground launchers. So there is nothing to inhibit the Soviets in any way from developing and testing and surreptitiously manufacturing and retaining a clandestine force of nuclear armed cruise missiles if they wished to do so.

As I indicated in my testimony, there are other cheating scenarios, and indeed, we could spend the morning on cheating scenarios with respect to this particular issue. The Soviets could legally, under the treaty, deploy large numbers of ground-launched cruise missiles with conventional warheads at a range of 500 kilometers. That is permitted. If you remove a heavy conventional warhead and replace it with a light nuclear one, the range would go from 500 kilometers to 1,000 or 1,500 or more.

The point of all of this is that there is simply no way, given the distinctive technologies involved in cruise missiles, to get a verifiable provision that affects them.

Now, when we have nevertheless restrictions of the kind that are now contained in this treaty, they have unilateral consequences because we are not going to, in the guise of a reconnaissance vehicle, secretly develop and deploy a nuclear cruise missile. So we are bound, and we are bound completely and totally by our constitutional system and the way we approach the implementation of treaties. The Soviets are not bound at all.

And so under the circumstances, it seems to me that the sensible, the logical thing to do is to amend this treaty so that we do not deprive ourselves unilaterally of an option that could be very important to us. It is an option that is likely to be less important to the Soviets, for several reasons, one of which is quite simply that we have, in my judgment, the technological potential to produce

cruise missiles that are a substitute for nuclear weapons, and for the foreseeable future the Soviets do not.

So it is an option that we could exploit far more effectively than they could.

I have thought about this a great deal and am convinced that this treaty would benefit significantly from this change. And if the Senate is persuaded that even a change of this dimension is more than the treaty can bear, then one can only question whether this treaty is not so fragile as to be a risky proposition all around.

Senator WIRTH. I am sure that the members are going to want to come back to that issue of cruise missiles and your recommendation.

But before my time expires, let me ask you just very briefly for your reaction to the Stockholm agreement, the confidence building measures that were agreed to there, whether those have been effective, if we have learned anything from them, and, if we have learned from them, if we ought to be building upon them with further measures.

Mr. PERLE. Well, frankly, I do not think they have been terribly important in the scheme of things. They permit the observation of exercises. I suppose that is a good thing. But it is really at the margin.

There are other confidence-building measures that ought to be pursued that would have much greater importance. But you get 35 nations together, you can spend a great deal of time to produce a very small result. This was a small result.

Senator WIRTH. It might be useful if I were to get together with you in the not-too-distant future to talk about the measures you think might be useful to build upon. I am struck by the fact that we are concerned about assuring that the Soviets are not successful in launching a surprise attack. One of the ways of assuring that is to have more information about what they are doing before they have a chance to mobilize or to take the steps necessary for a successful surprise attack.

So what those measures might be is something that perhaps we could pursue a little later.

Mr. PERLE. That is a potentially promising area.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you much, Mr. Perle. Again, you have my admiration for the clarity of your presentation, as ever.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We welcome you, Mr. Secretary. Your thoughts are always very provocative and constructive.

Returning to the article XIV clarification procedure, this is one that members of the committee, indeed a number of other Senators, and I have examined. In speaking with a former senior member of the Department of State as to how this should be approached, he said in his judgment it would best be left alone. It was constructed to remain in a very vague and inconclusive form. Indeed, it resembles in some respects what was put in other treaties with the exception of the insertion of one or two words.

If we were to get into a clarification procedure, might not we anticipate the Soviets coming in with their version of article XIV which, in my understanding, was extensive and detailed, almost to

the point of specific programs? If we were caught in this "program by program" type of clarification, and in the future we were to have a new program not envisioned at the present time, it could well be eclipsed because it was not on this list.

Could you give us your views on that?

Mr. PERLE. Surely. I think it is always a mistake, where there is a known ambiguity and a known difference of view, as there is with respect to the noncircumvention provision, to resort to obscurantism as a way of resolving the issue.

For one thing, you are buying a pig in a poke. You do not know what the Soviet interpretation is of article XIV. You know what American officials have said about what it means, but we also know that international law would not look kindly on that interpretation. And so you face the prospect that at some point in the future the Soviets will assert their interpretation with vigor, and we, acknowledging the international law on the matter, will be forced to concede that there is something more there than mere surplusage, as the lawyers call it.

I think one can settle this issue quite simply by saying what the administration has said, by taking it at its word that nothing in article XIV obliges the United States to do anything beyond the obligations contained in the other articies of the treaty. That would settle the issue of whether article XIV is entitled to an independent meaning by virtue of the fact that it is deemed under international law not to be surplusage.

I do not think this is a big deal, frankly. That is, I do not think the reservation would be a big deal. It is obviously an illegitimate purpose for the Soviets to try to use these negotiations in order to divide the United States from its allies, to encumber our cooperation with our allies. And frankly, I would have preferred it if we had said to the Soviets we are not going to agree to any noncircumvention language. This is an effort on your part to exploit the fact that we are trying to reach an agreement here in order to raise doubts about the future of our relationship with our allies, and we are just not going to sign such a provision, and if we cannot have a treaty, we will not have a treaty. And I think our allies would have rallied behind us.

You know, we can get results when we take that position, and when we turn it over to the diplomats to generate fog, you are asking for trouble down the line.

So I would settle this thing now with a simple reservation, and I would be very concerned indeed if the administration, which says that article XIV is redundant and adds nothing to the other provisions of the treaty, I would be very concerned if they mounted a campaign against a reservation that simply takes them at their word.

Senator WARNER. Let me move to a second question here in the brief remaining time.

In the judgment of many of us, there are a nu@mber of helpful precedents established in this proposed INF Treaty. You have publicly expressed concerns about weaknesses in these provisions.

Could you identify with more specificity the shortcomings, as you view them, in the treaty provisions and what negative precedents

may be established if we were to adopt these as we go into the START negotiations or continue the START negotiations?

Mr. PERLE. Let me take one which has a long history, and that is the question of the rights enjoyed by the parties to inspect facilities on the territory of the other side in the event that suspect activity leads to concern about compliance with the terms of the treaty.

For quite some time it was part of the American position that we should have that right, essentially unencumbered. Late in the negotiation we changed our position. We dropped insistance on on-site inspection of suspect sites, and we settled instead for a provision that gives us inspection rights with respect only to facilities that are specified in the agreement.

We do not even know what facilities those are going to be because owing to another defect in the drafting, in my judgment, we will not have the list of facilities until a month after the treaty has been ratified. And there may be facilities not on that list that we think ought to be there, but we will have no further recourse in that situation.

I think this is just careless drafting and can probably be worked out by an exchange of correspondence or conceivably by reference to the negotiations record. But in any case, our inspection rights on Soviet territory are limited to a very small number of facilities. I do not know whether it is 1/100th or 1/1000th of 1 percent of Soviet territory, but it is minuscule in relation to the places where illegal activity could take place.

Now, it is one thing to do that with respect to this treaty which, first of all, bans the whole category of weapons, and it is rather more difficult in the presence of a ban to maintain the infrastructure necessary for a clandestine force. And no START Treaty with which I am familiar, no proposal for a START Treaty will ban all strategic systems. And it is much more difficult to verify a ceiling than it is a ban.

But the weapons themselves are vastly more important. We can find other ways to strike the targets assigned to Pershings and ground-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets can find other ways to strike the targets assigned to SS–20s.

So we are not dealing with the core of our security interests or, for that matter, the security interests of our allies. But that is certainly not the case with respect to START.

So an inspection regime that so limits our rights to examine areas where there may be illegal activity as this one does I think would leave us much too vulnerable in the context of a START Treaty. There are many others, Senator.

Senator WARNER. You say there are many others.

Have you detailed them somewhere?

Mr. PERLE. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Could they be made part of the record?

Mr. PERLE. I think that was done earlier. It is a 48-page analysis, article-by-article, that is offered in a constructive spirit because, as I said, I think many of the problems could be clarified by a simple exchange of correspondence.

Senator WARNER. My time is up, and I do not want to impose on others.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, since I have to go to another meeting, where can we obtain that document he refers to, that 48-page document?

Senator GLENN [presiding]. It is the AEI report.

Mr. PERLE. Yesterday or the day before we sent copies to Senate offices, but I would be glad to provide another copy.

Senator WARNER. I understand it is in the possession of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator.

Copies are available.

Senator GLENN. These were sent to our offices.

Mr. PERLE. I was a little disappointed with the rapidity with which the administration, which I am quite sure had not had time to read it, declared it to be of little interest.

Senator WARNER. Under the early bird rule, I am advised that Senator Glenn is next in line?

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

I agree with you that there may be some areas that need not be changed or even renegotiated, as Frank Gaffney suggested might be necessary yesterday. I do look forward to reading this report, and we want to make sure that it is clarified. One of the points you make in your prepared statement was that the Soviets might welcome this kind of clarification. We might be able to do this with an exchange of letters.

But I wanted to confine my questioning here to a different area. INF to me is important only as a stepping stone to other issues. Obviously, it is only a first step. We have backed off on some of our long term negotiating stance over the last 40 years where we wanted to place controls on fissionable material. Every time we would propose that the Soviets demanded overall arms control.

We both have backed off that framework. Now we have INF as a first step. You were part of the group at Reykjavik that was proposing going to eliminating nuclear weapons within 10 years.

Now, somewhere down this path, we must have agreement on conventional weapons, and we would have had to have agreement with other nuclear nations. If we really had gone to zero with the Soviets, we would have made the PRC the dominant nuclear power. So we have to bring other nations into this process somewhere.

It is not going to be satisfactory as an end product, to say that we all have our nuclear warheads taken out of these missiles and put on the shelf for other use. All we are doing in time of crisis then is trying to figure out new ways to deliver these warheads now that we have destroyed the methods of delivery.

So it seems to me those three items have to be brought into future arms control negotiations. My question is, where along the line does this happen? Apparently we are hell bent for getting the START talks completed so we can have an agreement by this summer. You already mentioned in your statement here that we may have been too hasty in our rush to get something done, and that may have contributed to our difficulties.

I am concerned about whether we can even attain 50 percent strategic missile reductions without considering these other factors very seriously.

Mr. PERLE. Well, Senator Glenn, I think that it is vital that we make some significant progress with respect to conventional weap-

ons in the context of the continuing discussion of nuclear ones. We do not want to make the world safe for Soviet conventional superiority. We do not want to add significantly to the burden of defending conventionally, with all that entails for our budgets and the number of men under arms and our way of life. So I think some balance has to be achieved as long as we do depend to the degree we do on nuclear threats in order to deter aggression.

I think we depend to an undue degree on nuclear threats, which is why I am quite keen to see us exploit the technological potential of conventional cruise missiles.

But I frankly do not know how we could conclude an agreement that involved the destruction of nuclear material. There is no way to destroy nuclear material, of course, apart from detonating the weapons.

Senator GLENN. You can denature it. There are ways you could take care of that and take it out of the explosive category.

Mr. PERLE. You can alter it, but then you have pretty severe storage problems. I mean I do not know how many Senators would volunteer to have a storage site in their State for even denatured former nuclear warheads. And we would not be able to verify it, not least of all because the Soviets have commingled their—as you well know, and you are an expert on this—their power production and their production of nuclear material for weapons purposes, and virtually any Soviet nuclear power plant can and does contribute to the stockpile of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

So I do not think as a practical matter we could expect to verify that.

We can, we hope, with sufficient inspection rights and other measures, and with confidence developing over time, hope to inspect the delivery systems. So I think for the foreseeable future that is bound to be the focus of our efforts.

Senator GLENN. Would you be willing to move to START and the 50 percent reduction without some agreement on conventional arms and without including other nuclear nations in the equation of negotiation?

Mr. PERLE. I would not want to include other nuclear nations. It is not up to us to speak for them, and I am quite sure they would refuse to come to our party even if we invited them. At 50 percent levels, that is not so critical.

But I do believe that START and conventional arms control ought to proceed in parallel in any case as a practical matter. I do not believe that it is possible responsibly to negotiate a strategic arms treaty that reduces our strategic nuclear warheads by 50 percent in the short period of time remaining before a Moscow summit.

Moreover, I believe that an effort to compress the negotiating process into that period solely for the purpose of doing it on this watch——

Senator GLENN. I agree with that.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. Would weaken our position gravely, and I am convinced the Soviets would exploit that.

Senator GLENN. Do we have to have a conventional arms agreement, though, before we would go to 50 percent reductions on START?

Mr. PERLE. Not if we got the right START agreement with the right 50 percent and the right emphasis, but I think we should at least be under way. I think there should be a real negotiation, not a moribund sideshow like MBFR.

Senator GLENN. My time is up, but I have just one short question.

Where in this process, then, does this become important enough that we cannot go further without some sort of agreement? Is it 40 percent, 25, 10, 5?

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I would not go beyond the 50 percent, frankly, and I think it is a mistake to create a Utopian vision of a world with significantly fewer nuclear weapons than we need for stability.

As you get to very low levels, you have real stability problems.

Senator GLENN. What if they had accepted our zero/zero/zero at Reykjavik?

Mr. PERLE. I do not think we ever made that. We did propose the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, but we had no intention of abandoning the strategic air forces or cruise missiles or a variety of other weapons necessary for deterrence.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Perle. It is always a pleasure to be illuminated by your lucid and informed and sometimes entertaining testimony. I think you have provided an important input into our hearings.

I would like to begin by asking you your opinion as to the trends in the conventional balance, as to whether you feel it has been favoring the Warsaw Pact or NATO.

Mr. PERLE. Of course, it depends over the length of time, but because the trend has not yet been reversed I think we can safely say that it has been favoring the Warsaw Pact, which not only has superior quantities of forces in every relevant category but has, in recent years, been modernizing those forces and putting in the field an increasing percentage of advanced, sophisticated weapons.

Senator MCCAIN. Could you briefly describe to us in general terms what would be required to move toward correcting this imbalance?

Mr. PERLE. Well, the single most important element is money. There is no way to get tanks and aircraft and so forth without money.

I would put close behind that spending that money wisely. One of the ways in which we might spend it wisely in my view is with the development of very accurate cruise missiles, cruise missiles that can strike within a few feet of their targets.

I think this development has the potential to change the face of modern warfare and, at relatively low costs, could give an enormous equalizing push to American and NATO conventional forces, which is why I feel so strongly that it is a mistake to foreclose that option forever for the most foolish and fundamentally incorrect reasons.

But I would put a very high emphasis on doing what we do best, which is the application of advanced technology to difficult mili-

tary problems, and the most difficult of all military problems throughout history has been hitting the target you are aiming at.

Senator McCain. Do you believe that there is any conceivable chance that NATO will fund a robust conventional defense option over the next 5 years?

Mr. Perle. I think it is extremely unlikely in the absence of an external shock.

Senator McCain. Do you think that the United States will fund the equipment necessary?

You said the first requirement is money. Do you think the United States, given trends in our defense budget, will provide the necessary funding?

Mr. Perle. No, I do not, not nearly enough.

Senator McCain. One issue concerning this treaty that has been discussed during these hearings which I do not believe I saw addressed in your testimony was the issue of the United States reaction to Soviet violations.

Some of us are deeply concerned about the continued violation of treaties such as ABM and SALT I. They seem to go not only unpunished but to continue unabated and, at the same time, there are legislative mandates that the United States, on our part, observe to the letter those treaties, while they are, in the view of some of us, blatantly violated by the Soviet Union.

Do you believe it would be appropriate to include in this treaty some amendment or reservation requiring some response on the part of the United States in the event of serious Soviet violations of the INF Treaty?

Mr. Perle. I am, as you know, Senator, concerned about the pattern of violations. I am in some ways even more concerned with the appalling inability of the Government of the United States to do anything about it.

When I say the Government, I mean to include the legislative branch, which I believe is now principally responsible for our inaction. The President clearly desired to take action with respect to the violations. He announced his intention no longer to be bound by one of the treaties that the Soviets are violating.

The Congress imposed on him, over his objections, continued adherence to that treaty that was being violated. It is a dismal performance on the part of the Congress of the United States. It reflects a lack of seriousness.

I think if I were to say to you, yes, by all means, amend this treaty to provide for compliance, the fate of any such amendment in light of the unwillingness of the Congress, including the Senate, to take action previously is pretty clear. So I think such an amendment would fail.

I would much prefer the action the Senate has already recommended which would require the Senate reversing the position that it has previously taken together with the House.

I think it is quite beside the point to put brave words in documents when there is no follow-up, when there is no serious intention behind it.

What would the amendment say? That we will not withdraw the Pershings and ground launched cruise missiles unless and until the Soviets are in compliance?

As a practical matter, our allies would show us the door, I believe, not least of all because we have not been as persuasive as I think we can be in discussing these violations with them.

So I think one wants to be very careful here about doing something of a practical nature. The most useful thing we could do, in my judgment, is reverse the mistake the Senate made when it compelled the President to continue to respect a treaty that the Soviets are violating.

Senator MCCAIN. My time has expired. I thank you, Mr. Perle. I certainly agree with what you say, and I hope that perhaps we could find some practical method of at least forcing some United States action in case of Soviet violations.

I also would say I share your pessimism as to the practicality of it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Mr. Perle, I want to welcome you here today. I was at an earlier meeting and could not be here to start the hearing, and will be in and out throughout the hearing. I will do my best to catch up. I understand you have already offered very valuable insights to the committee, of which we are very appreciative.

I will be back and forth, and wish to ask some questions myself. In the meantime, I yield to Senator Levin.

Mr. PERLE. I just hope you were praying for both of us, Senator Nunn.

Chairman NUNN. The President was doing that.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my welcome to Mr. Perle. It is good to have you back again.

I am sorry I was not here when you presented your testimony orally, but I have tried to catch up by reading it. As I understand the gist of your testimony, you favor the ratification of this treaty. You also favor the adoption of a number of reservations, but would oppose so-called killer amendments.

Is that too simplistic a summary, or is that basically it?

Mr. PERLE. Well, to be precise, I do not think it would take much in the way of reservations or amendments. I have recommended one reservation and one amendment.

Senator LEVIN. On the cruise missile issue. In the absence of the adoption of that reservation and amendment, would you recommend that we consent to the ratification?

Mr. PERLE. I think it is a much weaker treaty, Senator, a weaker treaty because it would deprive us of an important option for strengthening our conventional forces.

Judgments as to whether it is wise to reject the treaty have a great deal to do with the practical consequences of doing so, which I think would be serious and damaging.

So I would strongly urge that the Senate do what it can to improve the treaty. That seems, to me, the really interesting issue and the issue worth debating.

Senator LEVIN. I am wondering, though, if you could answer my question, which is, in the absence of both the reservation and the amendment which you have identified, would you recommend that we reject this treaty?

Mr. PERLE. No, I would not recommend that you reject the treaty, but approval of the treaty under those circumstances would be in many ways a damage-limiting operation.

Senator LEVIN. Now, I presume that your feelings or beliefs on these issues have been brought to the attention of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs?

Mr. PERLE. Well, if you are referring to the document——

Senator LEVIN. Just your position on these issues.

Mr. PERLE. On some of them, yes; not on all of them.

Senator LEVIN. On the two key ones which you have identified here today?

Mr. PERLE. I think my view was certainly well known on the cruise missile issue. This is an issue that the President decided several times. He always decided it the way that I am recommending the Senate decide it until the last time, when he reversed his position for reasons that I do not understand and almost capriciously went the other way.

Senator LEVIN. Was this after you had left?

Mr. PERLE. It was after I had left.

Senator LEVIN. So that when you were there@, the President, as far as you know, had specifically decided the way you had urged him relative to the cruise missile issue?

Mr. PERLE. Several times.

Senator LEVIN. You have no insight as to why that final decision came down the other way?

Mr. PERLE. I think it was done in haste and on the basis of a mistaken belief that the Senate of the United States would criticize the treaty if it could be argued, as our negotiator feared the Senate would, that we could not verify this provision.

The only thing wrong with that is we still cannot verify this provision, and the Senate is more sophisticated than that, anyway.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether or not the Secretary of Defense recommended in favor of the final position taken on the cruise missile issue?

Mr. PERLE. He, of course, can speak for himself, but I believe that he took the view throughout most of the negotiations that the President supported them; that is, that conventionally-armed cruise missiles should not be a subject of this treaty.

Senator LEVIN. But at the end, do you know what his position was?

Mr. PERLE. I believe that was his position to the end.

Senator LEVIN. You have indicated here this morning that you do not believe that we should link our INF Treaty or our START Treaty to an agreement on conventional arms reductions.

Did I hear you correctly on that?

Mr. PERLE. Yes. I think that we would be unwise to conclude a START Treaty without a real negotiation in progress, but I believe it is going to take some years to conclude a conventional arms treaty, and I do not think that the train will wait with respect to START.

Senator LEVIN. Or should it.

In other words, you are saying if it is a good START Treaty, we ought to ratify it without linking it to an agreement on conventional arms?

Mr. PERLE. Yes. Clearly, if it improves our strategic posture, then we would be foolish to persist in a weaker strategic posture in order to try to get a stronger conventional one.

Senator LEVIN. Relative to the conventional balance, do you think that we are worse off, better off, or about the same as we were in 1980?

Mr. PERLE. I think we are significantly stronger than we were in 1980.

Senator LEVIN. In the conventional balance?

Mr. PERLE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Can you identify those components of the conventional balance where you think we are stronger?

Mr. PERLE. Yes, indeed. The most obvious and glaring deficiencies in 1980 were such that we were in far deeper trouble than I@ think the public realized then or now.

We had ammunition bunkers that were empty. We had ships that could not go to sea because overhauls had been delayed for so long and because weapons systems were off line owing to undone repairs.

In order to maintain the level of men and women in uniform, we were every year lowering the standards for entry, because the pay allowances were not sufficient to attract people with higher skill levels into the All Volunteer Army.

We were losing more conventional aircraft through normal attrition than we were building.

I could go on and on.

We were in a perilous state in 1980. A significant infusion of money, for which over most of this period this committee is to be commended, has helped to rectify many of those problems. So I think we are much stronger today.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Quayle, I believe you are next.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Perle. It is always a pleasure to have you before the committee and to listen to your words of wisdom.

Let me just say that I very much concur with your written statement which you have given to the committee. I think the members of this committee have heard me speak on the problems of article XIV that you have outlined also, my statements in the past that I felt one of the major mistakes in this treaty was the giving up of the conventional groundbase cruise missile. I still think that is a major mistake.

You have addressed a way that we can perhaps rectify that, and we will take that under serious consideration.

I listened to you answer the questions and read your statement about the concerns you have with the cruise missile, the suggested amendment, the problems you have with the circumvention/noncircumvention article XIV amendment, your concerns that we do not have the rights of inspection to suspect sites, that they have to be identified, and many of the other concerns in the area of verification.

I wonder if I might just put you down as a lukewarm supporter of the treaty that is pending before this Senate? I am trying to get

a gauge on how enthusiastic you are for this current treaty. I am sort of detecting that there is perhaps not a great deal of enthusiasm about some of the amendments and reservations that would be adopted.

Am I correct in perceiving that in the testimony and the responses that you have given thus far?

Mr. PERLE. Senator Quayle, my enthusiasm was sharply diminished when we sacrificed unnecessarily conventionally-armed cruise missiles. It was further diminished when we abandoned some important on-site inspection provisions.

My enthusiasm would rise significantly if we took the necessary steps to correct those deficiencies in the treaty. I hope we will.

Nothing would please me more than to be able to say at the end of the day that this treaty, which is and should be a collaborative product of the legislative and executive branches, is as good a treaty as we could make it under the circumstances we faced; and it is within the power of the Senate to do that if it chooses to do so.

I will answer that question after the final vote is taken.

Senator QUAYLE. But as it stands right now, to get your enthusiastic endorsement we really need to improve the treaty through some amendments and reservations, and that is clearly your position as you testify here today? How enthusiastic you may or may not become toward this treaty depends on what we do here?

Mr. PERLE. We need to fix the cruise missile provision. Most of the other fixes, I think, are relatively easy.

Of course, if the administration takes the view that this is a flawless work of art and no one should shift a comma and if the Senate is cowed into submission by that assertion, then we will miss the opportunity to make even the easy corrections.

Senator QUAYLE. What would be a couple of the easy corrections that should be noncontroversial?

The thrust of my question is how far can we go, in your judgment, having dealt with the Soviets a lot, in the reservations, amendments and understandings without them being put in the category of killer amendments?

I am sure that your amendment and reservation, if it has not already happened this morning, will be suggested by somebody to be a killer amendment, and that any amendment, any reservation, any understanding is a killer amendment.

How far can we go, in your judgment, in this area of reservations, understandings and amendments before they would become so-called killer amendments?

Mr. PERLE. I think amendments that correct deficiencies in the treaty, in some cases deficiencies that would trouble the Soviets as well, should pose no problem.

The correction of drafting errors should pose no problem.

The restatement of the administration's own interpretation of article XIV should pose no problem unless there is a greater difference there than the administration has acknowledged, and I hope that there is not.

Some of the problems that we have referred to in this study could be corrected outside the treaty, and I will give you an example of that in a moment.

But the term "killer amendment" must not be used as a label that stops all thinking. It is thinking that is being killed, not the treaty. Just declaring something a killer amendment, and thereby ending all debate about the merits of it or whether it indeed would so alter the structure of the treaty as to cause the Soviets not to carry this treaty forward, is not enough.

When administration officials or anyone else blandly asserts that virtually any change that requires that we talk again with the Russians is a killer amendment, I think that is an absurd assertion which should be laughed out of court. It is not a serious argument.

Now, obviously it is convenient to say that we must not have any amendments or any changes, and if the Senate wishes to become a rubber stamp, choosing either the yes or the no stamp, it has every opportunity to do that. I would regret that.

This is something on which I have been consistent for 20 years, as those of you who knew me when I was here trying to help work the will of the Senate with respect to executive branch decisions, including treaties, well know.

The Senate has a role to play. It is a second chance in our constitutional structure that most of the time is a damn nuisance because Presidents cannot make commitments until after those commitments have been ratified by the Senate.

Every once in a while, however, our creaky constitutional structure gives us an advantage. It gives us a second look. That is what the founding fathers had in mind. That is why they asked two-thirds of you to make this judgment. I would not throw it away. Senator QUAYLE. My time is up. I just wanted to make one final statement.

If there is a document where you can show us a past precedent where we have attached these reservations and understandings and potentially some amendments to other treaties to give us a framework of how we might be able to go.

Mr. PERLE. We have done it many times. Of course, we have tended not to do it in arms control treaties because administrations have intimidated the Senate with the argument that any change is going to be the end of the treaty and maybe the holocaust. But that is not, in my view, a respectable argument.

If I might, Mr. Chairman, I was going to give one example of a matter that could be easily cleared up and strengthen the treaty in the process.

The treaty provides that the United States will have the right to impact and observe the destruction of the weapons prohibited by the treaty. It is perfectly reasonable that we want to be there when they destroy SS-20s so that we can observe it.

The treaty also provides that the inventory of SS-20s to be destroyed will be provided to us 30 days after the treaty is ratified, after it enters into force.

When we receive that list, the number of SS-20s that it identifies is the number whose destruction we will be permitted to observe.

Now, nothing in the treaty precludes the Soviets from destroying those SS-20s before 30 days after entry into force. In principle, in theory, we could face a situation in which 30 days after entry into force the Soviets give us a list and it has half the number of SS-20s we expected it would have, and when we say this number looks a

little low to us the Soviets would say, well, we have already destroyed the other half.

We would have no recourse under the treaty. It would have been an entirely legal and proper procedure for the Soviets to have destroyed some of the weapons in the intervening period, but I think it would shake the confidence of many Americans, and I know it would shake mine, as to the risks that we would be taking because we could not be sure that those SS-20s had, indeed, been destroyed.

Now, you can argue that this analysis is the result of an unduly suspicious personality, but it is easily corrected. If the Soviets have no intention of exploiting what I think is a kind of silly loophole in the treaty, an exchange of correspondence to the effect that they have no intention of carrying out destruction in advance would settle the matter.

If they do intend to destroy SS-20s in advance, thereby negating our inspection rights with respect to those they do destroy, they may wish as a matter of comity and goodwill to permit us to make the inspections even before the treaty goes into force. I would be happy to permit them to make inspections if we were to do that.

You will find in 48 pages of analysis a number of problems like that which I believe can be corrected and, in some cases, readily corrected, in many cases outside the treaty itself, I do hope that the administration will not circle the wagons and take the view that it must reject all of these suggestions into which talented people put in a lot of time and hard work.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

Mr. Perle, do you believe that this treaty is militarily significant?

Mr. PERLE. I think that its principal significance is political, but it is not without some military significance.

In particular, the Soviets could, with their sizable force of SS-20s, attack and destroy virtually all of the critical military installations on which the defense of Europe depends: the nuclear weapons storage sites; the POMCUS facilities; and the rest. You know this better than I, Senator Nunn.

Without the SS-20s, a number of those targets will be beyond the range of the remaining Soviet missiles, and so they would be compelled to use intercontinental missiles for that purpose.

Chairman NUNN. That depends on the Soviets staying within the spirit of the agreement, as opposed to the letter of the agreements, does it not?

Mr. PERLE. Well, it certainly assumes that they will not cheat and retain the SS-20s that they are obliged to destroy.

Chairman NUNN. I don't think the Soviets have to cheat to do that. The way the treaty is structured the definition of "intermediate missile" means that you have not tested a new missile between the ranges of, say, 500 and 5,000 kilometers.

As I read the treaty, if you tested a new missile, let us say a replacement for the SS-20 missile, predominantly for the intermediate-range kind of capability, you can build a new missile and test it one time over the 5,000 kilometer range, and it thereby is no longer an intermediate missile. You could then spend the rest of your time testing the missile between 2,000 and 3,000 kilometers,

replace the whole SS–20 array, put them in the same places, and be compliant with the treaty.

Am I reading that wrong?

Mr. PERLE. I would like to confer. We may have missed that, but that is a very serious loophole, if you are reading it right. Knowing you, Senator, I am quite sure you are reading it right.

Chairman NUNN. I have not been searching for loopholes quite as diligently as you have, but I have looked at the treaty and I think the committee is going to have to take a closer look. However, this is the way I read the treaty. Intermediate missile as defined, and I do not remember the precise language, is one that has not been tested over the range as defined.

Mr. PERLE. It turns on the definition of range capability. Frankly, we did not catch this when we went through the treaty, which I suppose only reinforces my view that the closest scrutiny is necessary and desirable.

Chairman NUNN. Does your colleague see anything wrong? Am I wrong in my understanding of the definition? The committee will discuss this issue with the negotiators, but the way I read it it is not an intermediate-range missile if it has been tested above the top range.

Mr. PERLE. If that is correct, and let us assume for the moment that it is, then the important question to address, I think, is this question of the spirit of the treaty.

Senator, I would not go to the bank with the value of the spirit of the treaty. The Soviets barely observe the letter of treaties, and sometimes they do not do that, and they do not believe in the concept, in my view, of the spirit of the treaty.

Anyone who has negotiated with them, especially in the end game, will appreciate the excruciating legalism to which they resort, which is a clear indicator that they have no intention of being bound by anything that they are not explicitly bound to do.

I could give you a dozen examples from past treaties of Soviet interpretations that turned on flatly rejecting the concept of the spirit of the treaty and exploiting loopholes that only the Soviets could have dreamed up.

Chairman NUNN. As I read it, there is nothing in this treaty that would prevent the Soviets from testing their SS–25 missiles or their SS–19 missiles at intermediate ranges, is there?

Mr. PERLE. I believe that is right.

We have now found the relevant language, and you are indeed quite right about the other issue as well.

Chairman NUNN. What I am doing is combining the definition of intermediate-range missile, meaning a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers, and then you go to article VI, which is the article that basically bars.

It says, "Upon entry into force of this treaty and thereafter, neither party shall: (a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or (b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles" and so forth.

If you combine the two, what you are barring in article VI is what you have defined in article II, subparagraph 5. What you

have barred in that paragraph is a missile having a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers; thereby, if it does have a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers, meaning tested in that mode, it is no longer an intermediate-range missile; therefore, it is no longer barred either in the testing or the development stage.

I do not wish to diminish the political and psychological importance of what has been accomplished. Some of the precedents are very important; but from a military point of view, it seems to me that we are in a position if this reading is correct, of relying on the spirit rather than the treaty itself, the provisions . . .

I have not talked with the administration, and I want to hear their arguments.

Mr. PERLE. It is a great mistake. If one wanted to rely on the spirit, we could save a lot of time in these negotiations.

If you look at article VII, paragraph 4, "The range capability of the ground launch ballistic missile not listed in article III of this treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested."

So you are quite right. You test it to a maximum range. If that then classifies it as outside the scope of the treaty and you subsequently test it in other ranges, it is a loophole.

If these loopholes are the results of inadvertence or carelessness or the haste with which this treaty was concluded, and I believe in most cases those are the appropriate explanations, then there should not be much difficulty sorting this out.

If, on the other hand, the Soviets carefully guarded this language because they have in mind action that they are free to undertake as a result of the way in which the treaty was drafted, then I think we have a very serious problem.

I am delighted that you have taken on this burden of trying to unearth the facts and implications.

Chairman NUNN. In our last week of INF hearings we are going to try to get to each one of these points and try to pin down the precise explanation so that we know the exact meaning. You have pointed out several things that will be on our agenda. You have been very helpful this morning.

There is no need to get into a situation where you all of a sudden throw up your hands and the CIA comes over and says the Soviets have violated this agreement, and all of a sudden you get to looking at the treaty and it is not a violation at all.

In the old version, W.C. Fields was seen reading the bible as he was on his deathbed. They asked him what he was doing, and he said looking for loopholes. I read that in the George Will column, to give complete attribution in the spirit of the times.

It seems to me that we ought to have somebody in our delegation who is Mr. Loophole Searcher. I don't know why we do not have someone whose job it is to look for drafting loopholes.

I understand how these things happen. You try to define, and it is easy to see how they happen, but when you engage in negotiations for 6 years, it seems to me you ought to have somebody in that role.

My time has expired. I have a couple more questions, but I believe that Senator Symms has not had his first round.

Have you?

Senator SYMMS. No. I would like to ask some questions.

Mr. PERLE. Could I comment just very briefly?

Chairman NUNN. Certainly. Go ahead.

Mr. PERLE. That is what we have tried to do, and everyone who is involved in this activity was at one time an official involved in this.

Six years is a little misleading. For some of the period, the Russians had walked away from the table, and for much of it there was no serious drafting going on. In fact, most of the drafting took place in the last year and far too much of it in the closing weeks.

But we need to face the reality that some loopholes are the product of negotiation. That is a simple, clear, unambiguous and straightforward prohibition, was not acceptable to the other side or not acceptable to us and, therefore, we resorted to circumlocution.

Now, that means you have a problem down the road, and we ought to go into this with our eyes open and understand that where the Soviets have fought to preserve a right, they are likely to exploit that right at some point in the future.

Finally, this was a recurring theme of W.C. Fields, his thoughts as he faced death. There is a marvelous scene in one of his movies where he is about to be hanged. The hangman is there and says, do you have any last remarks. He says, yes, this is going to be a great lesson to me. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Perle.

I read with interest the article in the paper where the group that you work with criticized the treaty's provisions that might allow SS-20s to be hidden.

As you probably are aware, there have been accusations that, to my satisfaction, have not been repudiated, there may be as many as 300 SS-20s that we have not accounted for.

It has also been claimed that the crews can train on SS-25s and would then be able, because of their similarity, to fire SS-20s. So what the Soviets may be doing is finessing us into moving out the cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs while they still will have adequate coverage with SS-20s.

Would you want to comment on that? What could we do about that problem?

Mr. PERLE. There is a question as to the number of SS-20s that the Soviets have built over the years. They have given us data with respect to those numbers which would be more persuasive if they had not given us different sets of data that were inconsistent with one another.

The real data, the data that counts for purposes of this treaty, will not be received by us until 30 days after the treaty is entered into force, which is, among other things, after the Senate has acted on its ratification.

So there is some uncertainty as to whether the Soviets might not have produced more SS-20s than they have admitted to producing and, therefore, whether those missiles might not be hidden somewhere.

In my view, if the Soviets choose to hide SS-20s and leave them in a kind of cold storage, they could do that and we would not detect it.

This issue becomes more complicated, however, when you attempt to assess the military utility of weapons that cannot be moved for fear of detection, that cannot be tested, where exercises cannot take place as the training of troops and the like. Here judgments are going to vary.

I believe that what we should do, Senator, with respect to a number of the provisions that make it less verifiable, we ought to try to make some improvements in those provisions.

If we did so, if we adopted the kinds of corrections that are detailed in the report from the American Enterprise Institute that I have submitted, then I think the risks are manageable, but I would not apply this shaky verification regime to a START Treaty. That, I think, would be most dangerous and unwise.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much.

I think that short of these types of precautions, we may end up in the position that W.C. Fields was in, getting taught a real lesson. I would like to see us avoid that.

This is a question which I asked the chiefs and which you mentioned briefly, there are no SS-20s targets that new replacement SS-25s cannot target; is that not correct?

Mr. PERLE. That is correct. If the Soviets are prepared to use intercontinental ballistic missiles on a foreshortened trajectory, they can strike all the targets that might have been struck by SS-20s.

Senator SYMMS. If, as Senator Nunn points out, they can make adjustments with these missiles, we may end up getting the W.C. Fields lesson of the hanging.

This is another question I have asked several people, how would you classify on a scale of 1 to 10 or critical or not critical Congress lifting the restrictions on the ATACMs and the AFABs?

Mr. PERLE. I think it is very important that the remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is now down to around 4,000 and for which reduction I was responsible for a good part of when I was in the Department of Defense, a reduction that was made on the assumption that we would proceed to make the remaining weapons as safe, as secure and as survivable as possible.

These programs are important to accomplish that. In any event, some of the weapons that would be replaced by them are on the verge of obsolescence. So I think it is extremely important, a 10.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much. One last thing.

Everyone seems to come in here and say that this treaty somehow is good for politics, but as I see it we have now had this love-in with Mr. Gorbachev, and now we don't have the evil empire out there. We have made the Soviets our partners in peace, a perception that exists both in Europe and in the United States. All of the chiefs of the services talk about the necessity for us to make a further commitment to modernization, and all these things cost money.

Where will the political will to modernize come from in Europe and in the United States, in light of this continued lovefest with Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviets.

Mr. PERLE. Well, I do not see a great deal of political will in Europe, and that is reflected in the levels of defense spending of our principal allies, which hovers somewhere around half of our own.

I see a declining political will here, as evidenced by recent action with respect to our own defense budget.

Senator SYMMS. They just had a vote in the House last night.

Mr. PERLE. I think that adds to the impression.

I do not think we will see a change until there is some external shock, as I put it earlier, another invasion by Soviet military forces or some activity that sobers people.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your thoughtful testimony, Mr. Perle.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perle, if we get to a second round here, I would like to give you time to tell me what you think the Soviets' motivation was in agreeing to the zero/zero proposal, what their objectives were in this treaty, but in the first round let me get to some specifics.

Article XV of the treaty provides for a 6-month notice of withdrawal from the treaty when the national interest of either party is jeopardized.

Could you give us your judgment as to what that means? What kind of events would jeopardize our supreme national interests?

Do you think a 6-month withdrawal option is important and advisable?

Mr. PERLE. I frankly do not think that the withdrawal provisions are terribly important. I understand why they are there. If circumstances require us to withdraw, we would like to do so in accordance with international law, and so you have provisions of this sort.

But we should not kid ourselves into believing that it is an easy thing to withdraw from a treaty like this, especially a treaty that entails the removal of weapons from the territory of sovereign states who would be most unlikely to permit the return of weapons to their territory and, in any event, the weapons will have been destroyed in the interval.

So it seems to me, in connection with a treaty where you are actually destroying weapons, withdrawal presumably means that you could begin once again to build them. I am assuming now that this takes place after the destruction is complete.

I do not think it is a terribly useful provision as a practical matter. It would take us years after withdrawal to produce anything.

Senator WILSON. You say you do not think it is terribly useful. Let me ask you, then, to think of it in the context of forbearance from going forward with a weapons system, and let us look both at a 6-month period and a 10-year period.

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I am not sure I understand.

Senator WILSON. Let us assume that article XV provided that——

Mr. PERLE. We have to wait 10 years, notify 10 years in advance?

Senator WILSON. Yes.

Mr. PERLE. As a practical matter, even if it said 6 months, it would be some years before we could actually build and deploy a weapon of the type that we will be eliminating. There may be some other provisions of the treaty that we could utilize in a shorter period of time, but I rather doubt it.

Now, 10 years is sufficiently far into the future so that with respect to a program that could be accomplished in less than 10 years you would obviously be paying a price, and the price would turn on the difference between the speed at which you could take this action without that encumbrance and 10 years.

I have a hunch that what is lurking behind this is a concern about the 10-year limitation in the SDI Treaty. I am not sure. So let me address that directly if that, in fact, is where you are headed.

Senator WILSON. Go right ahead.

Mr. PERLE. It is a significant American concession aimed at accommodating the Soviets, to say to them that we would not exercise the right that we now enjoy to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of 10 years.

My own view is that we could live with that if it were clear and agreed that during the 10-year period we could avail ours@elves of all rights to do research, development and testing under the ABM Treaty as interpreted by the administration based on its reading of the treaty negotiating record.

The narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty is death for SDI, and there is no sense pretending otherwise. You do not have a program under that interpretation. You cannot test under that interpretation. If you cannot test, you might as well give it up.

So I would cheerfully exchange 10 years of adherence to the treaty, properly interpreted, for the right after 6 months to abandon the treaty if there were agreement all around that we could do the necessary research development and testing.

Senator WILSON. Let us move from the subject of legal safeguards to a little bit more pragmatic considerations.

Given the verification uncertainties, particularly those that attend the uncleared sites, suspect sites, do you support the idea and do you think that the Europeans would be comforted by a commitment to deploy safeguard antitactical ballistic missile systems defenses as a hedge both against Soviet cheating and, really, perhaps a very substantial disincentive to it?

Mr. PERLE. I think it makes a great deal of sense to have an antitactical missile system, not least of all because even after the elimination of these weapons, assuming the Soviets comply perfectly, they will still have a sizable number of short-range missiles, and short range can be up to 500 kilometers, which is not trivial if you can use the territory of your hapless allies from which to launch, which I think the Soviets intend to do.

Moreover, it is possible, although I have not looked at this technically, that if the Soviets were to adapt ICBMs to perform the intermediate range ballistic missile missing, they might adopt a flight profile such that they could be intercepted by an antitactical ballistic missile.

So my answer is an unequivocal yes. It would add greatly to NATO's security, which is vulnerable in large measure because it has so few important military bases, military locations. It would be greatly strengthened by such a program.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I do have additional questions. I do not know whether the Secretary is on a preannounced schedule of departure, but if there is not that problem I would like to have an additional round.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Would Mr. Perle clarify for the present Chair what his schedule is?

Mr. PERLE. I am at the disposal of the committee. I can stay as long as you can bear it.

Senator EXON. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You made reference in your testimony to your belief that our allies in Europe would not be increasing their support for conventional forces in the abse@nce of an external shock, I think that is the phrase that you used.

Could that shock come either from the East or from the partial withdrawal of American troops, or was this shock referring totally to one from the East?

Mr. PERLE. I had in mind a shock from the East, Senator Levin. I rather doubt that troop withdrawals would animate the Soviets as one likes to think they would. In order to have any hope at all of doing that, and it would be risky because there are other countercurrents in Europe, the cuts would have to be so deep as to adversely affect our own security.

Senator LEVIN. Do you have any specific suggestions as to how we can improve the burdensharing of our allies?

I know you have some strong feelings on this issue. At one point we were, indeed, trying to arrange to have you come up and testify on that subject.

Is there something that we can do that is very precise but we will not shoot ourselves in the foot in the process?

Mr. PERLE. I believe there is a great deal we can do and, as a matter of fact, I testified on this very subject the day before yesterday before the panel that the House Armed Services Committee has convened on burdensharing.

If you like, I would be glad to make that testimony available to you.

Senator LEVIN. That would be helpful.

Mr. PERLE. The main point I sought to make in that testimony is that you have to define the burden carefully, and it consists of more than just levels of investment and defense.

Some of our allies are assisting some of our enemies, for example. Now, they ought to at least not add to the burdens. When the EEC gives grants to the Sandinistas while we are struggling with the question of whether to give aid to the Contras, that troubles me.

Senator LEVIN. If you could supply that testimony, that would cover the question, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Prepared Statement by Richard Perle Before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Burden Sharing Panel

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before the Subcommittee to comment on the sharing of the defense burden between the United States and its allies. I can state my view simply: the United States has been bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of defending the alliances in which we participate. And while I believe it is wise for the United States to defend our interests as far forward as possible, our defense effort, from which our allies also derive protection, could be shared, and should be shared, more equitably.

Having said that much, an obvious point needs to be made. One must define the burden to be shared in order to judge whether it is being shared fairly. For the most part our allies have chosen to limit the nature of their commitment to the common defense to countering immediate threats to their security and territorial integrity. Thus they do not consider that they are under any obligation to join with us in the protection of western interests outside their immediate territory. When these interests are threatened elsewhere—for example in the Gulf—individual allies may or may not join with us, depending on decisions made individually and at the time. But in no case do they consider that the NATO alliance obliges them to do more than protect NATO territory. For this reason the burden of protecting western interests falls even more disproportionately on the United States than the figures might otherwise suggest.

I have listened on many occasions, as you have, to a recitation of statistics showing that our NATO allies provide a high percentage of the men and equipment that are deployed in defense of the Alliance. Without the troops, ships and aircraft that our allies contribute to NATO, an already adverse conventional force balance would be even more lopsided than it is now. But that fact in no way relieves our allies of the responsibility for making a defense effort more nearly comparable to our own. Indeed, to say that we benefit from the effort of our allies, and they from ours, is merely to underline the collective nature of our alliance.

When I speak, Mr. Chairman, of the United States assuming an unfair share of the defense burden, I have in mind more than financial and technical resources. I believe that we assume greater risks in the defense of our allies than they are prepared to assume in our defense or, in some cases, their own. I will return to this theme momentarily; but because the most frequent measure of the defense burden is defense investment, let me comment on the question of who is spending what on the collective defense.

There is no set of figures that adequately expresses the various ways in which each of us contributes to the security of the rest. Yet it is difficult to ignore the level of effort that is expressed by the percentage of gross domestic product that the member countries of the alliance allocate for defense. Using figures for 1985, in our case it is 6.9%. The figure for the Federal Republic of Germany is 3.2%, less than half of ours. Our Canadian ally invested 2.2% of their GDP in defense in 1985 less than one-third of what we were spending. And Japan, despite its large and growing wealth, spends barely 1%, a scant one-seventh of our budget. And while I do not accept the notion that the American budget deficit is caused by our defense expenditure, I must say that it is galling to be lectured, as we so frequently are, by those whom we defend about the need to control our budget deficit. Indeed, if we were to reduce our defense effort to, say, the level of the Federal Republic of Germany (expressed as a percentage of GDP) we could balance the American budget this year. Such a move would gravely imperil our security as well as the security of Germany and no one concerned about the security of this nation would recommend such a course. But it does help to place in perspective the mounting frustration with which many of us view the superfluity of advice fired in our direction by finance ministers who have reduced the defense ministers of Europe to hapless supplicants.

I will not presume to judge the social and political factors that might explain the reluctance of our allies to fund their defense adequately. Their ordering of priorities is rather like that of many in our own Congress who prefer soc@ial to military spending. Allied governments often rule with thin margins or coalition partners who impose their budgetary preferences on ministers who, were they free to do so, might give greater emphasis to defense. Denmark is but one example of a government that lacks an effective majority on the issue of defense so that the social democratic and left opposition parties dictate the size of the defense budget overriding the better judgment of the governing parties. And if you will permit me to draw an analogy, something rather like the Danish situation is emerging here as the Democratic controlled Congress continues to impose its budgetary will on the President's defense budget requests.

I have seen enough of the European leadership to believe that many prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, finance ministers and other political leaders are woefully ignorant of the nature of the military balance between East and West. Compared to their American counterparts they are poorly informed. I believe it is the case that the foreign and finance ministers in a number of allied nations have never had a comprehensive briefing on the status of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces of the sort that is routinely made available to members of the American Congress. I can't recall the last time that a NATO foreign ministers meeting was briefed in depth on these military matters. And while NATO defense ministers regularly receive such briefings, allied defense ministers often lack influence within their own governments. At meetings of NATO defense ministers one invariably hears a plaintive lament to the effect that things would be different if only more people could see the evidence that has been laid before them. I am quite sure that the defense ministers have their chancellors, presidents, foreign ministers and finance ministers in mind.

The point of all this is to disagree most emphatically with those who draw one of two wrong conclusions from the apparent indifference of some allied officials toward the Soviet military threat to Europe. One conclusion is that it is we Americans whose perception is impaired, with the result that we exaggerate the weight of Soviet military forces. Another is usually formulated like this: If the Europeans, who are closer to the Soviet Union than we are, don't seem concerned at the Soviet threat, why should we be so troubled? I believe that the answer in both cases is that if allied officials had the same access as their American colleagues to the steady stream of intelligence pointing to the unrelenting build-up of Soviet military power, they would react much as we do—with concern and apprehension and even money. So it remains an important task of American diplomacy—one at which we have largely failed—to get the facts before the community of allied officials whose knowledge and judgment are crucial to the development of sound policies.

Defending the community of democratic nations entails more than buying and deploying military forces. And inadequate as the performance of our allies is with respect to defense spending, the most glaring inequities lie elsewhere.

First, take the matter of sharing the risks of defense. No country allied to the United States has been prepared to take anything approaching the risk we assume in our commitment to use American nuclear weapons to defend other countries. (This may help to explain why there are doubts as to the credibility of that commitment.) Some NATO allies share the nuclear risk by having American nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. But others, like Denmark, Norway, Spain, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Canada refuse to accommodate nuclear weapons on their soil. And there is pressure in Germany, which now accepts American nuclear weapons, and among such opposition parties as the British Labor Party, to remove American nuclear weapons. Not even France and Britain, which maintain independent nuclear deterrent forces, have been prepared to extend a nuclear guarantee to other members of the alliance.

Second, consider the American policy of providing security assistance to its poorer allies. While we do not do nearly enough to support such allies as Portugal and Turkey, our allies do practically nothing. It is not as if they cannot afford to extend aid. Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Italy and the Netherlands—and outside NATO, Japan—could all afford to assist Turkey, for example, which urgently needs to equip its sizable army with modern military equipment. In any alliance in which all burdens were shared fairly there would be a significant flow of aid from the better to the less well off members. In this regard the Japanese case is scandalous. With its vast wealth, to say nothing of its immense trade and currency balances, Japan could, if it wished, comfortably aid Turkey, Portugal, and its friends in the Pacific with substantial funds, equipment and technology. The political and psychological excuses that Japan has told a succession of American administrations, including this one, for not sharing the defense burden equitably, are little more than a gloss on a policy of chronic freeloading.

Third, there is the matter of restraint in supplying advanced technologies and know-how to the Eastern bloc. Most of our allies would cheerfully sell to the Soviet bloc those advanced technologies that would enable the Soviets to strengthen greatly the effectiveness of their military forces. Indeed, many do so—or they at least countenance such transactions by companies under their jurisdiction by failing to put in place even a minimally effective system of export controls. We have seen recently the extensive damage that can result in the case of Japanese and Norwegian firms selling the Soviets the means by which to counter our anti-submarine warfare capabilities. And one could recite a long list of examples encompassing optical, radar, deep-submersible, advanced materials, microelectronic, manufacturing and

scientific technologies. At the Coordinating Committee in Paris, which is charged with coordinating the embargo on the sale of sensitive technology to the Warsaw Pact, our allies are an unrelenting source of pressure to relax the restrictions and increase the flow of sensitive technology to the Warsaw Pact. The Germans in particular have shown a remarkable indifference to the military consequences of some sensitive sales to the Soviet Union and they seem eager to do even more in the future.

Fourth, consider the nature of the financial relationship between many of our allies and the Soviet bloc. Western commercial banks have been lending money to the Soviet Union in prodigious amounts. The average monthly lending by European and Japanese banks to the Soviet bloc in 1986 was $2 billion of which $1.6 billion took the form of untied, general purpose loans, available to the Soviets to finance their military build-up and their subversion abroad. Our Japanese ally currently holds 27% of Cuba's $3.7 billion external debt, and Japan, together with other American allies, has been lending significant sums of money to Vietnam even as Vietnam continues to occupy Cambodia. Japan has emerged as the largest single source of Soviet Bloc credits over the last three years, supplying 40%, or nearly $10 billion, in 1986. The Germans, who cannot get their defense budget up to half of ours, are eager to expand their financial relationship with the Soviets with an inevitable expansion of untied lending.

Fifth, there is the problem of what one might call reciprocal sensitivity to the security concerns of other allies. Our allies expect us to share the burden of protecting their interests when they consider that those interests are threatened. We have, over the years, provided logistic support to a number of allies whose overseas interests were threatened. France, Belgium and the United Kingdom come immediately to mind, but there are others. And where are they when we need help—say, for example, in containing Cuban or Nicaraguan subversion? If they are to be found at all it is often on the side of our adversaries. The EEC collectively and a number of its members individually cannot manage to find much assistance for such allies as Turkey, but they have managed to send aid to the Sandinistas. I don't wish to overstate the point; the record here is mixed. But it is intolerable that allies of the United States, who have seldom found the resources to assist other allies of ours, should actually send aid to our adversaries. They have, as well, largely scorned our effort to contain Castro by limiting trade and financial transactions with his regime. Obviously on such issues as Cuba and Nicaragua there is room for allies to disagree. But I should have thought that in any cohesive alliance there would be a willingness to defer, whenever possible, to the views of the ally most immediately concerned.

Sixth, take the issue of access and overflight rights for American forces and base facilities for our overseas deployments. As the very fine report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, chaired by Fred Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter has pointed out, the reluctance of our allies to facilitate the movement of American forces could pose critical problems for the effectiveness with which we can project power in support of objectives that are largely shared, at least privately, by many of our allies. France's refusal to permit the overflight of French territory for U.S. forces engaged against Libya is a case in point. And, as the expulsion of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Spain makes clear, some of our allies are not prepared to accommodate even those minimal facilities necessary for the conventional defense of the alliance. Even where we are able to secure base facilities, the negotiation of the necessary agreements are becoming rather more like real estate transactions than collaboration among allies.

What should we do to bring about a more equitable sharing of the burdens of western security? Much of the answer is implied by the points made above. Actions that actually add to our burdens, like the sale of sensitive advanced technologies and the extension of untied loans, could be halted if our allies would cooperate. Increased assistance to Turkey and Portugal in Europe and the Philippines and others elsewhere are well within the means of our major allies. Our allies could act to strengthen the controls on the export of sensitive technology to the Soviet block and they could take steps to enforce those controls.

The European economy, like the Japanese, is flourishing. Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands could all do more to invest in defense, especially in conventional forces, without affecting the well-being of their economies or sacrificing social programs. The American policy of leading by example in the early years of the Reagan administration when we increased greatly our defense spending has clearly failed. And now we are reducing our own defense investment, which hardly commends a policy of "follow us."

Our allies cannot assume, but they can surely share more effectively, the risk associated with NATO's policy of deterring aggression through nuclear threats. They can participate in the plan to improve the nuclear weapons that will remain in Europe after intermediate missiles have been withdrawn, a plan agreed to at Montebello in 1983. And they can improve their conventional forces so as to diminish the extent to which we rely on the threat to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression carried out by conventional means.

It is well within the capability of our allies to permit greater access for U.S. forces to the bases and facilities on their territory—and to do so in a manner that gives us some confidence, on the basis of which we might plan, that they will be there when we need them.

In much of this Japan is a special case. Japan could easily afford to accelerate implementation of its commitment to defend itself out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese territory. It could consummate quickly its planned purchase of AWACS. And while doing so they might consider buying some for our Turkish allies. Turkey's wartime mission of holding the Turkish straits is vital to keeping open the sea lanes of communication through the Gulf and it is thus vital to Japanese security. If they don't understand that in Tokyo it is time they did. There is no reason why Japan could not devote an additional one per cent of GDP to security assistance to the western democracies who need help. If there are inhibitions on the growth of Japanese defense spending, then other ways must be found to enable Japan to share the defense burden more fairly. But the Japanse haven't been looking. And neither have we. We have permitted Japan to be defended largely by us and our allies without any serious effort to get the Japanese to find ways to share the defense burden.

We do not and should not coerce our allies. But we can place the issue of burden sharing on the agenda on every occasion—summits, ministerials, bilaterals, international conferences, and the like. Every conversation, whether it is about trade or politics or exchange rates or maritime or space issues should begin and end with a discussion of burden sharing. Let's at least insist that our allies share the burden of brooding about burden sharing.

Senator LEVIN. You have made reference, as have we all, to killer amendments. In your testimony you talked about an amendment aimed at killing the treaty.

Would you be willing to revise that somewhat to an amendment which has the effect of killing the treaty?

Mr. PERLE. Sure. I was not hiding behind that distinction, but I do think that, clearly, it is possible in good faith to offer an amendment that one does not think will but does, in fact, kill the treaty. I would not propose anything like that.

Senator LEVIN. Pursuing the killer amendment issue further, how would you define "killer amendment", and let me ask a subquestion to that.

You indicated, for instance, that we should not just simply take at face value the statement that an amendment is a killer amendment because it will result in the Soviets rejecting the entire treaty if it is adopted, the implication being that we really cannot tell what a killer amendment is until we adopt it and the negotiations with the Soviets over it are undertaken.

How would you answer the first question, what is a killer amendment, and how would you address that second implication that I raised, which I think is implied perhaps in what you said about killer amendments?

Mr. PERLE. I think that a killer amendment is an amendment that so fundamentally alters the structure of the exchange of rights and obligations as to raise fundamental questions about the validity of the treaty.

An amendment that says, well, we can keep a few of ours would obviously be a killer amendment.

One can imagine mischievous amendments that entail no real consequences but odious language that would be intended to make this treaty unacceptable to the Soviets.

Now, with respect to how the Soviets would react——

Senator LEVIN. How do we know that?

Mr. PERLE. We cannot be sure, but unless we are prepared to defer to the judgment of others on that I think we are as well able to make that assessment as others who are commenting on it.

Senator LEVIN. If we reach the conclusion that the adoption of an amendment would result in Soviet rejection of it and the treaty itself, is that then a killer amendment?

Mr. PERLE. It could become one if that prediction turned out to be true.

Now, I am not suggesting that we take extravagant risks with this. Obviously, we would only want to propose amendments with the reasonableness of which and the plausibility of which a significant number of people could be persuaded of.

Senator LEVIN. Should we be persuaded that there is a reasonable chance that the amendment would be adopted by the Soviets before we adopt it?

Mr. PERLE. I think the question one wants to ask is: Is this an issue on which the Soviets would abandon the treaty that they are barely interested in having.

Senator LEVIN. That is the same as saying that they would agree to it?

Mr. PERLE. I think they would agree to it, yes.

Senator LEVIN. The test for us should be is there a reasonably good chance that the Soviets would finally agree to this amendment?

Mr. PERLE. I think the test is: Is the improvement that the amendment would make to the treaty such that it is worth taking whatever risk there might be that the Soviets would refuse to ratify the treaty if it were so amended.

Senator LEVIN. You would recommend against any amendment that did not meet that test?

Mr. PERLE. I would.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. PERLE. Just to be clear, this does not mean an absolute certainty, because no one is in a position to supply an absolute certainty. Indeed, at the moment the only claim of certainty with which I am familiar is the ludicrous claim by some administration officials that any amendment, including ones they have never seen, would be a killer amendment.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Senator Quayle, I will recognize you. You have had your first round; is that right?

Senator QUAYLE. Right.

Senator EXON. Let me take my first round, and then I will recognize you.

Secretary Perle, thank you for coming before the committee. We value very much your expertise in this area as a long-time student of not only the Soviet Union, their desires, their intentions but also what they can be expected to do under certain circumstances. Your

testimony, therefore, and your taking the time to come here is very helpful to the committee.

From a realistic standpoint, I feel that this treaty is going to be ratified by the U.S. Senate without any significant amendments. Given the circumstances that are many and varied I think it is the best thing to do.

But let us take a worst case scenario, in your viewpoint. I am going to state a worst case scenario, and I want to get your viewpoint on what the result would be.

Let us assume that the treaty is ratified by the Senate, goes into effect, and turns out to be not in the best interest of the United States of America, and 2 years down the road we conclude that we should not have signed the treaty in the first instance and the Senate should not have ratified it in the second.

How damaging do you think that would be to our overall posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union? Would you rate the damage under this scenario minimal, serious or a disaster?

Mr. PERLE. It would depend very much on what it was that led us to revise our judgment of the advisability of the treaty.

If you have in mind Soviet cheating, for example, if we discovered that they in fact have retained SS-20s——

Senator EXON. That is a given. Either side can cheat on this treaty.

Mr. PERLE. We cannot as a practical matter.

Senator EXON. Why is that?

Mr. PERLE. I do not believe that we can.

Senator EXON. You do not think we can?

Mr. PERLE. No.

Senator EXON. Why not?

Mr. PERLE. Because for us to cheat on this treaty would require a large number of people consciously and deliberately to violate United States law, and we have a system in which people go to jail for that, and they would not do it. They simply would not do it.

In the Soviet Union, you can go to jail for not following instructions, even if they are——

Senator EXON. Yes, but when you bring up that caveat, do you not say, therefore, it is dangerous for us to enter into any kind of a treaty with the Soviet Union? That would be the end of the road, would it not?

Mr. PERLE. No. For a very long time I have believed that an awareness that that is a closed society in which violation of agreements is feasible, although it is not here, ought to have some bearing on how we negotiate and what we negotiate and the kinds of risks we take.

It does not mean that we should never negotiate or never conclude agreements.

Senator EXON. What I am trying to get at is that the Soviets have cheated to some extent, as near as I can tell, on every arrangement that we have ever made with them, and I think that we have to monitor this one very closely to make certain that they do not cheat on this treaty or make changes that would dramatically affect the balance.

But given the scenario of the cheating they have done in the past in previous arrangements and assume that they do no more than

that on this treaty, how much would overall security interest be affected?

Would you consider that the very nature of this treaty and the ratification of it and our living up to it if they do not totally and completely would minimally affect the overall balance, significantly affect it, or could it be a disaster?

Mr. PERLE. Let me say that if at the point at which the cheating took place we had also entered into a START Treaty that entailed significant reductions, then the consequences would be very much greater, because 1,000 warheads on SS-20s are a lot more important when the total universe of nuclear weapons is half of what it is today.

We did some studies in the Department of Defense early in 1981. I requested them. They had a great deal to do with the support that I gave to the zero option because they concluded that the Soviets, with 50 SS-20s and SS-20 launchers and some reload missiles, but not many, could attack and destroy virtually every critical military installation in Western Europe, and they could do it in a very few minutes at the outset of the war.

That was a serious military threat, and it seemed in 1981 to many of us that if we could bring them down below 50, there was a significant advantage in diminishing that Soviet capacity to attack preemptively and destroy the nuclear storage sites, the airfields, the POMCUS and so forth.

My own view at the time was if you had to go down to 10 or 15 you might just as well go down to zero and gain all the verification benefits of zero, which is the genesis of the zero option. It is not, as some people have suggested, some wicked ploy to prevent an agreement. It was based on a serious military analysis.

Now, logically I think I would have to say that 50 illegal SS-20s could restore that Soviet capability to attack and destroy critical installations, and if they were to cheat to even that degree, I think that would significantly improve their offensive potential. So I would be troubled by that.

It is not clear to me what we would do about it at the point at which we discovered the violation.

Senator EXON. So I guess what you are saying is——

Mr. PERLE. It could be serious.

Senator EXON [continuing]. If the scenario should go considerably sour, this treaty could be a major disadvantage to us in the out years?

Mr. PERLE. Yes.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perle, I would like to focus on the issue of verification for a moment. What I am going to try to do is extract a list of areas that we are going to have a very difficult time verifying and where our confidence in verification will be rather low.

First, the issue of whether a cruise missile is armed or unarmed. In your judgment, is that a difficult area for verification?

Mr. PERLE. It is impossible to verify, Senator Quayle, and I saw in the newspaper today someone making the assertion that the

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flight profile is different and we could verify it. That is just rubbish.

First of all, there is no definition in the treaty of what constitutes a flight test. The Soviets could flight test to their heart's content, and even if we were able to observe it, which I doubt that we could do if they were to try to conceal that test—we would never be able to prove that the test we had observed was the test of a weapon since there is no agreement as to what constitutes a weapon test as distinct from a test of a nonweapon. So whoever made that argument in response to the report we issued yesterday, is simply wrong.

But the short answer is there is no way to verify.

Senator QUAYLE. There is no way to verify even the flight tests. They say that the way that they would train or conduct any kind of an exercise would be different for an armed or unarmed vehicle.

You do not buy that argument?

Mr. PERLE. No, I do not buy that argument at all. Again, there is no definition of what constitutes—first of all, there is no prohibition on training. You can infer it logically from the prohibition on possessing the things that you would train to fire. So it simply is not verifiable.

Senator QUAYLE. Another area that goes to the concern of the chairman, Senator Nunn, has to do with testing. Let us take a reverse type of proposition. Let us say you test a cruise missile at 490 kilometers, which would be allowed.

How can we verify that they have put all the fuel in the missile? Would it not be possible that a cruise missile could have the range of, say, 1,000 kilometers or even more? Can we verify that even though they tested it at 490 when it is deployed and that that is all the distance it will go?

Mr. PERLE. No, we cannot verify that, and that is one of the reasons why it is ridiculous to believe that we have solved the verification problem by ruling out a very important conventional weapons program.

Senator QUAYLE. So we cannot really verify the range of cruise missiles or ballistic missiles other than to say, well, here is where it has been tested, but that does not necessarily mean that it might not fall in the category between 500 and 5,500 clicks?

Mr. PERLE. That is quite right. As a matter of fact, if the Soviets wish to test these clandestinely or in ways that deprive us of information, they can do it. There are places in the Soviet Union where you could fire a cruise missile and have it circle. It does not have to go to its full length, and it could circle for thousands of kilometers and we would never even observe the test.

Senator QUAYLE. How can we verify if a cruise missile is a new type of cruise missile? Can we verify that?

Mr. PERLE. I would want to look closely at all of the definitional material. I rather doubt it.

Senator QUAYLE. I do not believe that there is a definition of type. If there is no definition of type, how can you verify what a new type of cruise missile would be?

Can you?

Mr. PERLE. You cannot. The Soviets will say it is an old type, and we will say no, it is not, and we would be left exactly where we

have been on the new type versus old type of dispute with respect to SALT II; that is, nowhere.

Senator QUAYLE. What is our confidence in verification if they wanted to take some missiles now and just put them in storage facilities and cover them up?

Mr. PERLE. They would have no problem doing that.

Senator QUAYLE. We could not verify that?

Mr. PERLE. We could not verify it.

Senator QUAYLE. What other categories would come to mind that would be basically very difficult to verify or almost impossible to verify? Do you have any others that come to mind?

Mr. PERLE. The production limit on SS-20s or stages of SS-20s or other missiles in the prohibited range. We are not permitted to go to those production facilities. We are permitted to maintain a permanent presence at a final assembly plant.

Now, I think it is safe to assume that if the Soviets wish clandestinely and surreptitiously to produce missiles, they would not choose to assemble them at the one plant that we are permitted to observe. They would assemble them somewhere else. So I think that limitation is unverifiable.

One can argue that they would, of necessity, have to test the weapons they produced illegally, and we would be able to observe the tests. But this depends significantly on the relationship between an illegally-produced prohibited intermediate missile and a present or future intercontinental missile that might consist of the intermediate missile plus additional stages.

In principle, one could have a sort of modular approach to this so that every test of the ICBM in question also constituted a test of the included intermediate-range missile.

Senator QUAYLE. These categories that we have gone over are militarily significant, are they not?

Mr. PERLE. They all go to the question of whether the treaty does what it is intended to do; that is, whether it eliminates SS-20s or gives you some high expectation or medium expectation that they will eliminate SS-20s. I think they are important.

I might add one other. The Soviets, for reasons that I still find it difficult to understand, seemed reluctant to do the obvious thing to their SS-20 launchers, which is destroy them and sell them as scrap. Instead, they insisted, evidently, on the right to modify them.

These are enormously great weapons. I do not think you could park one in the length of this room. They are two stories tall, I believe; at least a couple of stories.

The Soviets evidently have some other use in mind for these dedicated launchers of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. I do not know that they have told us. I think they have hinted it is for moving pipe.

It is not hard to build a pipelaying machine, and machines designed to lay pipe are probably going to do a better job of laying pipe than machines designed to launch ballistic missiles. The costs involved in making these modifications could be considerable.

I guess I am naturally suspicious, but this leads me to wonder whether the modifications are of such a nature that the Soviets could not reverse them; that is, remodify these vehicles which will

be permitted once they have been modified and turn them into missile launchers once again.

So I would urge the committee to take a close look at that. It is entirely possible that our engineers could come in with blueprints and photographs and persuade you and me that the extent of the modification is such that there is no way that these could ever be restored to missile launchers.

If I were you, before voting on this treaty I would want to know that.

Senator QUAYLE. My time is up.

In just one sentence, could you tell us the confidence that you have in verification of this treaty?

Mr. PERLE. It is quite low.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you.

Senator EXON. We are in somewhat of a parliamentary snarl here on first round/second round. To be fair, I would certainly wish to recognize the Senator from South Carolina if he has questions at this time, since everyone else has at least had a first round.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might prevail on my friend and colleague for the courtesy of allowing me to read some questions and not take the answers. I, unfortunately, have to go, and I do have a second round of questions.

Would you mind? Thank you very much. I greatly appreciate that.

Secretary Perle, as I indicated earlier I would be grateful for your comments on what you think to be the Soviet objectives in this treaty and what prompted their agreement to the zero/zero proposal.

Second, pursuant to the discussions that you had this morning with Senator Quayle and others on verification difficulties, I would be grateful if you would comment on whether you see greater verification difficulties yet resulting were the United States to enter into the START agreement that has been described.

Assuming that you do, I would ask the question should the United States enter into a START agreement that does not permit us to make unannounced inspection visits to suspect sites.

Mr. PERLE. I will answer that in more detail, but let me give you an interim no.

Senator EXON. Are those your questions, Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. I have one other that I would appreciate, and that is I would like Secretary Perle's comments or advice as to how the United States may institute a compliance regime. I would solicit from him any ideas he has on how we can enforce the compliance of the Soviet Union by provisions that would be contained in the treaty or in some manner through the ratification process.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my friend, Senator Thurmond.

Senator EXON. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perle, we are glad to see you and glad to have you back here. You are held in high regard by a lot of people in this country.

Mr. Perle, General Rogers testified that he felt that the seabased systems assigned to NATO were not a credible deterrent in the

minds of the Soviets because it cannot be determined whether they represent a theater response or a general strategic response when employed.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I am always reluctant to disagree with General Rogers, but I am afraid on this issue I do disagree with him.

I think the decision to launch a nuclear weapon well into Soviet territory at critical targets in the Soviet Union is a decision of such importance and with such weighty consequences that the issue of whether the missile that is used to attack that target is based at sea or on land and is of long-range or intermediate range is a secondary issue. It is not a critical issue, in my view.

Ironically, I think it only exacerbates European concerns that we would be less willing to use a strategic range weapon than an intermediate one to argue the case as General Rogers has argued it. It seems to me not a military issue but a psychological and political one, and I simply disagree that we would be much readier to use the groundbase missile as opposed to the seabase missile.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, we have received testimony from Dr. Schlesinger that there is little incentive for the Soviets to violate INF unless a START agreement is signed also.

Do you agree? If so, how will this test of verification capabilities and the possibility of a reserve of SS-20s impact the security of NATO?

Mr. PERLE. I do agree that there is not great incentive to deploy SS-20s illegally as long as there is no START agreement. Incentives would increase greatly if there were a START agreement, and for that reason I believe the verification regime for a START agreement must be more effective than the verification regime for this agreement, first.

Second, if and when a START agreement is reached, the verification provisions of that agreement should be made to apply to the INF agreement; otherwise, you would create the anomalous situation in which our verification rights would be limited by virtue of the INF Treaty at precisely the time when you need those verification opportunities at their maximum.

But I feel I ought to add that the Soviets have in the past violated agreements where there was also very little incentive. The continuing deployment of SS-16s, for example, after the conclusion of the SALT Treaty gained them a trivial military advantage; nevertheless, they did it.

So the fact that the incentives are not great does not mean that it will not happen.

Senator THURMOND. In this morning's Washington Post and in your prepared statement, you recommended the administration essentially renegotiate certain provisions of the treaty; is that correct?

Mr. PERLE. What I am recommending is that the Senate amend the treaty. It would then go to the Soviets, and if the Soviets insisted on further negotiation because they did not like the amendment, that could be the result. But it is entirely possible that the Soviets would not react in that manner because the amendments might be of such a nature that they would not consider it worth going back to the negotiating table.

If necessary, I think that, Senator, it is so important for us not to foreclose for all future time the right to deploy conventionally-armed cruise missiles which I think can make an enormous contribution to our security that we would be well advised to amend the treaty to permit that, even if it means that we then have to sit down with the Russians and negotiate about it.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, did you have concern that a renegotiation maybe should be done, and it could be done without unraveling the treaty?

Mr. PERLE. Oh, of course, of course. I mean, a renegotiation sounds like a pretty formidable undertaking. What we are talking about is convening the representatives of the two sides in a room and discussing the amendment that the United States may have enacted.

It is not a big deal. No one is suggesting that we should renegotiate whether it should be zero or some number other than zero. The kinds of issues and, in particular, the principal issue that I think should be the subject of the Senate amendment would not, in my view, necessitate more than a very brief consultation with the Soviets, and it might even be worked out before the Soviet acted.

If you said to the administration go talk to the Soviets because we do not like this provision and before we vote on ratification we would like to see you make some effort to get this changed, I think there is a very good chance that that could be accomplished.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, during testimony by Secretary Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, he expressed a willingness to work with the Congress to fashion legislation separate from the treaty that would establish a commitment to support specific actions in the event the Soviets are found to be in significant noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. PERLE. I wish him good luck, Senator. I think getting a consensus within this or, dare I say it, any other administration as to the measures to which we would resort if the Soviets were to violate the treaty and getting the Congress of the United States to go along with that, I think if you can do that, you can renegotiate this agreement between breakfast and lunch on Sunday.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have just a couple more.

Senator EXON. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, do you think we should consider entering into a negotiation with the Soviet Union on eliminating the third zero of groundbased theater nuclear forces?

Mr. PERLE. Absolutely not. In fact, I feel so strongly that the elimination of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would leave us incapable of defending our forces there that, if it were up to me, I would make it very plain, and I would do it now, that if those weapons go, so do the troops who are protected by those weapons.

I would not leave American troops in Europe without nuclear weapons, knowing that the Soviets have nuclear weapons, knowing that an agreement that eliminated these weapons would be totally and utterly unverifiable, and knowing that without nuclear weapons among our forces, the Soviets can mass their armor and roll over us in a blitzkrieg attack that we could not withstand.

So I would not leave American troops in Europe unprotected by nuclear weapons, period.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, should NATO employ any other tactical nuclear weapons beyond those identified for modernization in the 1983 Montebello decision, and should we also consider increasing the range of some of those forces identified in the Montebello modernization program?

Mr. PERLE. I think we should increase range to the maximum permitted by the treaty. You can always choose not to use that range, but if you have not built it in it is not available when you need it.

I think we did a pretty good job, if I may say so, in the Montebello report. It was the product of 15 countries, and it reads in some respects like the product of 15 countries, but it did identify the major requirements to improve the remaining nuclear forces.

I think if we were to implement Montebello and the alliance is committed to doing so, that would be satisfactory for the foreseeable future.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Perle, the administration is active in negotiating, I understand, a START agreement before the President's next summit with General Secretary Gorbachev, say in late spring.

If a treaty cannot be completed before the two leaders meet, should an interim agreement or Vladivostok-type accord be considered? If so, in light of the impact of past interim agreements on U.S. force modernization, do you think this is a prudent approach?

Mr. PERLE. First, Senator, I do not believe that it is possible responsibly and carefully to conclude a START Treaty that protects our interests before a summit in Moscow. There just is not time, and an effort to do a year's work in 3 months would put such pressure on our negotiators that we would be bound to make unwarranted concessions. There is no other way it can be accomplished. So I would be very much against that.

I do not see any particular value in an interim measure or a Vladivostok-type framework agreement. They work to our disadvantage, so they are of a general nature, and the problems really are quite specific problems between us.

The Soviets simply reject the parts they do not like. We find it very difficult to reject the parts that we did not like, thus reflecting the nature of our two societies.

So I believe that we are placed at a disadvantage when we conclude Vladivostok-type framework agreements. We should not do it, and it adds nothing anyway. If this administration cannot carry the ball forward, the next administration I am sure will.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perle, as I understand this treaty, it would not cover cruise missiles that are not ground launched. Is that correct?

Mr. PERLE. That is correct.

Senator LEVIN. It does not cover cruise missiles of a range over 5,500 kilometers?

Mr. PERLE. That is also correct.

Senator LEVIN. So that we could have or develop a conventional or, for that matter, nuclear-armed cruise missile with a range longer than 5,500 miles?

Mr. PERLE. Kilometers, yes, and we could develop a ground-launched cruise missile in the prohibited range in the guise of a sea-launched or air-launched cruise missile, and we could test it from a ground launcher because the treaty permits that.

Senator LEVIN. So that it is not all conventional cruise missiles that are prohibited; it is just one class of conventional cruise missiles which would be prohibited under the treaty?

Mr. PERLE. Ground-launched cruise missiles of intermediate range.

Senator LEVIN. What would the Air Force's reaction be to a longer-range cruise missile of 5,500 kilometers, do you know? Have they taken a position?

Mr. PERLE. I do not know that they have taken a position. I would not recommend it, because you would use so much of the aircraft's carrying capability. This would be a very large and heavy cruise missile.

Senator LEVIN. How about ground launched?

Mr. PERLE. Now, ground launched, you could do it more readily. You do not have the problems of weight. You would have, I would think, a considerable problem of flight time. At that sort of distance, you would be talking about delivering a weapon 8 or 9 hours after you launched it.

I would want to take a hard look at that. It would be an unusual, rather casual way to fight a war.

Senator LEVIN. Your testimony on page 3 criticized the INF basing mode in Europe. One of your criticisms was that we would almost certainly be inhibited from giving the order to disburse the missiles in a crisis, fearing that this action would be seen as an aggravation of an already-dangerous situation.

Do you think that same criticism could be applied to the rail mobile MX basing proposal?

Mr. PERLE. I think with less weight for several reasons. One is there is a single decisionmaker here, and part of the problem in NATO is the collaborative process. You have to get everyone to agree.

Senator LEVIN. You were talking about the aggravation, though. You were not talking about the difficulty of the decision.

Mr. PERLE. Yes. I think there would be reluctance on the part of our allies, who would argue as we sat around the table.

But here you have a single decisionmaker, and it is a lot easier for one man to make the decision than for 15.

That is one reason, Senator Levin, why I am very dubious in general about having so much of our strategic capability depend on warning, because warning is only useful if you utilize the time, and utilizing the time carries significant costs, one of which we are talking about now.

That is why I think we ought to put the emphasis on active rather than passive defenses.

Senator LEVIN. Can you tell us what the German reaction is likely to be to replacement of the nuclear Lance on German soil?

Mr. PERLE. Well, the Germans participated in the Montebello decision actively. Indeed, no country contributed more to the discussion of those issues, including the issue of a successor to Lance than the German Government. Some of that discussion was even under a German socialist administration. Nevertheless, there is sufficient angst in Germany to attach itself to any issue of importance, including this one, and so I expect there will be a great deal of handwringing about what is a perfectly humdrum decision to take a missile that is becoming obsolete and replace it with a missile that is not obsolete?

Senator LEVIN. What do you think is the likelihood of success of that replacement program?

Mr. PERLE. I think it will depend most importantly on our position with respect to it, and if we say what I have urged that we say, which is that those weapons are vital for the defense of our forces, and you cannot have the forces without permitting them to defend themselves, I think the Germans will permit what after all is a pretty unglamorous exchange, a swap-out of an older missile for a replacement.

Senator LEVIN. Do you think we would actually have to threaten to pull out the forces in order for us to succeed in overcoming the political opposition in Germany?

Mr. PERLE. I do not think there is much political opposition at the moment, but I think if we do not make it clear that a refusal to keep those weapons in Europe would have profound consequences, you might find people airily advocating all sorts of crazy things.

Senator LEVIN. You have said that you have low degree of confidence in the verification provisions, the verifiability of this treaty. You have also said, though, that you would not recommend rejecting this treaty, despite your qualms about some of the provisions, including verification.

If you have such a low degree of confidence in the verifiability of this treaty, why is it that you would still not recommend rejection of it?

Mr. PERLE. Well, there are two issues here. One is could the Soviets cheat, and are they likely to cheat? I think they could cheat in the sense that there are many ways, many things they could do in violation of this treaty that we would be unable to observe, certainly unable to observe conclusively and persuasively.

On the other hand, the benefits of that cheating I think are really quite limited, especially in light of the fact that there are many other weapons that can substitute for the ones that are prohibited that they are free to build in whatever quantity they like. So it is in the context of these circumstances that I am not unduly concerned that the Soviets will avail themselves of opportunities to cheat, although they might. You cannot rule that out.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Mr. Secretary, let's go into this verification matter a little bit more. I guess for as long as I can remember we have talked about, they have talked about, everyone has talked about that would it not be wonderful if we had on-site inspection. Boy, that certainly would solve an awful lot of problems.

I am not sure that on-site inspections, the way they are envisioned by either the Soviets or our negotiators at the present juncture, are very feasible. As I understand this treaty, while there will be some on-site inspections, and that was highlighted early when the announcement was made that this treaty had been agreed to, it is that while sites A, B, and C would have on-site inspections, if sites D, E, and F are suspected by either side as a possible violation of the treaty, there is no guarantee that either we or they could go into sites, would have no rights to go into sites D, E, and F under this treaty.

That is correct, is it not?

Mr. PERLE. That is correct, although A, B, and C on the one hand, and D, E, and F suggests that there is—I know you do not mean to—an equal distribution of sites we can go into and sites we cannot go into. It is rather more like this. The sites that we can go into constitute a tiny fraction of the sites we cannot go into, a minuscule fraction. If you took all of the offices in the three buildings that make up the Senate office buildings, in relation to the facilities that might be used to accommodate a violation, it would be the equivalent of having access to Senator Levin's office and no access to any other.

Senator EXON. Of course, it is true, is it not, that we are as touchy about unlimited demands for the right to go in everywhere because we are concerned about security.

I am looking forward now to the so-called START Treaty which might be here much sooner than some of us would like to see. While I have announced that I support INF, I have some grave concerns about going ahead with START until at least there has been a beginning of discussions on the imbalance of the conventional forces in NATO.

And also in that regard, if you were doing the negotiations, what premise would you work from as to some kind of an arrangement that could be accepted by all sides for on-site inspections with the right to cover D, E, and F that I referred to in my previous questions.

It seems to me that is going to be an extremely knotty problem, is it not?

Mr. PERLE. I believe that it is a soluble problem, Senator.

Senator EXON. You think it is a solvable problem.

Mr. PERLE. Yes. And I think the reaction, on this side, the reaction of many who took the view that they would not wish to be inspected was a visceral reaction, unsupported by any serious analysis because when you stop and think about it, the right to inspect a facility in order to determine the presence of an illegal intermediate-range ballistic missile by a term of designated inspectors, escorted by American escorts, a team that is permitted to walk through a facility long enough to satisfy themselves that there is no violation there but not so long as to collect sensitive data and so forth, is not such an onerous burden.

But I think there was what I found to be a disappointing visceral reaction to this and no serious analytical work, to the best of my knowledge.

So I believe as people look at this issue they will find that there is really not so much at risk in permitting Soviet inspectors on our territory.

I worry a lot more about the Soviet inspectors that come here unannounced and unaccompanied and unescorted, and when one looks at what we know about the Soviet Union and what they know about us, we have much less to lose than the Soviets have by the possibility that the system of inspection might be abused. So I would not hesitate to enter into a much more comprehensive on-site inspection agreement. And I think we will move increasingly in that direction as people stop and think about the problem.

Senator EXON. My last question has to do with your impressions of the attitudes of Europeans if this treaty is ratified. My concern is in regard to the nuclear-free concept.

I just returned from the South Pacific, and I was struck that the nuclear-free zone concept is absolutely sweeping the South Pacific. Everybody thinks that is the answer to all their problems.

Do you think that the ratification of the treaty is going to have any significant impact upon the notion that it might be a good idea if Europe were nuclear free also?

How serious do you think that problem might be?

Mr. PERLE. That is a view that I do not expect to gain any currency among serious leaders, certainly not among officials of the alliance or defense or foreign affairs officials in any of the countries. Europe would be at the mercy of the Soviet Union if it lacked any nuclear capability. I think that is understood by a great many Europeans, although one does worry about quite emotional and unthinking attitudes on these issues in places like Germany and parts of Scandinavia.

Senator EXON. I am talking about the public now rather than the officials.

Mr. PERLE. It seems to me that this treaty should deal quite a decisive blow to these unilateralists. We have shown how to get results, but not on the basis of abandoning our systems. We could not verify the elimination of these battlefield weapons, not at all, no hope. Nor could we deter the Soviets from using theirs, and they are still going to have nuclear weapons. I mean, if you get rid of the short-range systems, so the Soviets hit you with a longer range system. What do we use, an ICBM on the battlefield? So it would be a disaster for European defense, and I think at the end of the day, the European public will understand that.

Senator EXON. Thank you. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Mr. Perle, I have a couple more questions. I do not know whether Senator Warner has more questions.

Senator WARNER. Just one.

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead, and then I will follow.

Senator WARNER. My question simply would be, while I was not available this morning when you addressed the pros and cons of the debate on linkage between START and conventional, it is my understanding, that you said we should first take a look at START and then determine the extent to which there should be some necessary linkage.

Is that a fair summary?

Mr. PERLE. Yes. It depends importantly on the content of the START agreement.

Senator WARNER. Yes, and I can understand that.

My great concern comes from procedure. As I understand the conventional, it is now tied up in the CSCE. We must get a mandate out of there. That mandate could be coupled with a lot of other human rights and other issues before the 23-nation conference gets started. I do not see how one can overlay, if the President's sort of anticipated schedule with START continues, any real constructive work on conventional because of this procedural byzantine trail.

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I could not agree more, and I fought and bled to keep these conventional arms talks out of the CSCE context because it was perfectly clear that it would slow down, delay and complicate the procedures. And when I left office, they were still not in the CSCE, and shortly thereafter, the State Department, which wanted them in CSCE from the beginning to accommodate the French, caved in on this issue, and I think they made a very big mistake.

Senator WARNER. Well, they are there now. So hypothetically, if the START agreement, in the judgment of certain persons, perhaps including yourself, would require some type of linkage—just using this in a very general sense—with conventional, I see a roadblock to achieving progress because of the procedures we are now on in the conventional.

Mr. PERLE. I agree with that.

Senator WARNER. I thank the witness. He certainly has made a valuable contribution as always, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Two or three questions, one on the question of verification, which you have brought up.

You have pointed out that you don't believe we go far enough in on-site inspections to be able to go anyplace, any time, particularly on suspect violations.

If you were drafting the treaty, and if you had the say-so on this, would you have held out for anywhere, any time challenge inspections, even if it meant giving the Soviets access rights to sensitive U.S. facilities?

Mr. PERLE. Well, Senator Nunn, I was not as concerned as some people were about Soviet access to sensitive U.S. facilities because I believed that the quality of the access coupled with defensive measures that one might take to protect certain things, quite properly given the modalities that would have to be negotiated, were such that we could live with that, and indeed, I rather doubted that the Soviets would abuse the privilege.

The worst case scenario is always the same, the Soviets say they want to go to a facility where there is a black program in the construction stages, a perfectly legal black program, but nevertheless, a black program; and if they are permitted to go to that facility, they are going to learn everything there is to learn about it. That is the worst case.

I think there is an inoculation against the worst case, which is to make it very clear to the Soviets that if they were to abuse the in-

spection regime, by concocting the spectre of a violation taking place at a facility that they know is producing a black product, that there is a rather long list of facilities in the Soviet Union that we would be most anxious to inspect, and I would actually give them the list.

You are familiar with some of these facilities. There are facilities in the Soviet Union that are engaged in military activity, and we have not the slightest idea what military activity. In a case like that, a walk-through would be highly revealing, whereas a walk-through, if the Soviets pressed their luck and nevertheless insisted on going through a plant producing a black program, a walk-though might yield little or no information, depending on whether you shrouded objects that, because they were not large enough to constitute a violation, you would be free to protect, and so forth.

I think we need some serious analysis of this problem, in short, and not just the top-of-the-head reaction which is what principally informed the thinking of the administration.

Chairman NUNN. You do not think we have had that kind of serious analysis yet?

Mr. PERLE. I am quite sure we have not.

Chairman NUNN. I would think that would be enormously important as we get into START. If we are going to have verification, it is going to be much more difficult. I think we would all agree with that.

Mr. PERLE. Very important, and at some other time I have an idea about this that I would rather not discuss in open session that I think holds a lot of promise for settling the dispute rather easily.

Chairman NUNN. During the famous "walk in the woods" talk in 1983, Ambassador Nitze reached a tentative understanding, or at least ad referendum understanding with his Soviet counterpart, on an agreement under which the United States would have been permitted 300 GLCMs but zero Pershings while the Soviet Union would have been allowed 75 SS-20s but no GLCMs.

This formula would greatly reduce the SS-20 threat while leaving NATO with a number of INF systems for the purpose of linking its battlefield nuclear systems to U.S. strategic forces.

I believe at the time that the "walk in the woods" talk occurred that you were not in favor of that formula. Now, looking back on it, where we have ended up with the zero option, how would you compare where we are now with where we would have been under that let's call it tentative understanding.

Mr. PERLE. Well, Senator, let me first try to correct the record on what happened.

I do not believe there was a tentative understanding worth talking about, and I am not sure Paul Nitze would say there was either.

Chairman NUNN. Use whatever term you please. I would strike that and use discussion.

Mr. PERLE. Well, the situation in 1983 is that we had an impending German election. You had Helmut Schmidt out on a very long limb defending the deployment of Pershing IIs, and you had an American proposal, unauthorized, to abandon the Pershing IIs but no agreement to consummate the entire deal in all of its 14 points. And in my view there was not a prayer that the Soviets were going

to accept that deal, and the evidence is that they did not because when Paul Nitze went back to the negotiations, he was told at the outset by Kvitsinskiy that he had been shot down in Moscow with the proposal.

In the meantime, we were out there having made an initiative that could have done serious political harm by indicating that we were prepared to abandon something not yet deployed and about which there was bitter controversy as to the necessity of deployment.

So my view was that this was politically ill-advised. As a military outcome, if the question is would this balance of forces be in our——

Chairman NUNN. Yes, that was the question I was going to ask next. If we had that choice now, other than zero-zero, how would you feel now at this stage rather than back then?

Mr. PERLE. Well, I thought even then that as a final outcome, that was not a bad outcome. But that is not the issue that was faced then. The issue that was faced was do you make this proposal without any reason to believe that it is a final outcome but that you have compromised some important principles and you have still got long negotiations ahead of you.

So there was a practical difference.

But let me say that had we agreed to this, had we agreed to permit the Soviets to retain 75 SS-20s, SS-20 launchers, which is rather more than they need to cover every critical NATO target, all the airfields, all the POMCUS sites, all the nuclear storage sites and so forth, we would have a serious verification problem because with 75 SS-20s dispersed around the Soviet Union, I would want to be awfully sure that they did not have reloads, that they did not have additional SS-20s, and frankly, I do not think the verification regime of this treaty would have supported a treaty that permitted some SS-20s as distinct from banning them and therefore encumbering the cheating scenarios.

Chairman NUNN. So the main obstacle other than timing and political consideration to that kind of agreement, as opposed to zero-zero, would be verification?

Mr. PERLE. Verification, and frankly, Senator, I became persuaded that the vulnerability of the Pershing II ground-launched cruise missiles was such that they would not achieve the deterrent effect that was intended, and that vulnerability is the product of restrictions on the movement of those missiles so that they are confined for practical purposes to their bases where they are vulnerable even to conventional attack.

Chairman NUNN. I know you mentioned in your statement—I do not have the exact quote, but you were stating that you felt, on the question of vulnerability, that if there was a building crisis or beginning of a mobilization, short of war, that moving those missiles, if they were not moved out of their locations, they would be vulnerable even to a conventional strike, both ground-launched and Pershings.

If they were moved out, you thought it would be very unlikely they would be moved out because of the provocative nature of that, is that correct? Have I got that correct?

Mr. PERLE. Because our allies would regard it as provocative.

Chairman NUNN. Right.

Do you think that the same thing would apply to the MX railmobile in this county?

Mr. PERLE. I think less because there is a single decisionmaker, and getting the allies to agree on anything can be difficult, and on something like that, the decision to start moving nuclear weapons in a crisis, getting a consensus would be very difficult.

Now, you could always say well, we are going to abandon the NATO rule of consensus and do it anyway, but that does not come easily. There is a big political price attached to that.

So I think it is much easier if one man is making the decision than if an alliance is making it. But it is not a trivial matter to start moving nuclear weapons, especially in a crisis, and if that is not the normal peacetime mode of operation, there is a real, a serious obstacle to doing the right thing.

This is one of the reasons why I think we need to look increasingly in the future to active defenses rather than struggling to make passive defenses more effective because you get into terrible problems with passive defenses, almost all of which depend on warning which we are unlikely to have. You will get ambiguous signals, but the kind of warning on which governments can act is extremely hard to come by.

I was delighted, by the way, to see the interest you have expressed in limited defenses. I have never believed that you have got to have a perfect defense in order to appreciate the importance of some limited defense, and one of the great virtues of a limited defense is that it can protect systems that are not going to achieve sufficient warning to be protected otherwise.

Chairman NUNN. I think we have to take a closer look at where we are in the post-START environment, if and when we reach a post-START environment, and see what kind of vulnerabilities we have, and particularly what kind of force posture we have then. Whether we have a system that requires strategic warning, and how many hours that is, and that would be more like the MX railmobile, or whether we have gone to a single warhead system that is much more dispersed, and the question of cost gets in there, and Midgetman costs and so forth.

But we have got to look closely at what kind of vulnerability problem we have as to the defense requirements in the future.

Also, my remarks were really aimed toward emphasizing the research on something you have pointed out from time to time, and that is that we have no defense against an accidental launch or an unauthorized launch of a small number of missiles.

I do not know what the odds are on relative scenarios, but I have always felt, and still do, that the odds against an accidental launch are not nearly as high as I would like.

Mr. PERLE. Given the gravity of the consequences.

Chairman NUNN. I do think we ought to look into that. I have not—some people have interpreted it as calling for the deployment of that. I have not seen that kind of system researched yet, and what it would entail and what it could cost, and it just really gets down to how much is the risk and how much is the premium.

But I surely believe it ought to be looked into very, very carefully, and I think it would be wise for part of our SDI efforts to be aimed in that respect.

Mr. PERLE. You would be amazed if you show any interest at all in defense, at how often you will be misunderstood. It happens to all of us.

Chairman NUNN. Well, that is true. This issue has polarized us.

Mr. PERLE. It is terrible, the emotionalism that attaches to what is a perfectly straightforward question.

Chairman NUNN. It is somewhat like the question of whether deterrence is immoral. The left and the right have almost joined in a circle on that question. I think that is part of our problem with the INF Treaty in Europe. It is not INF as such that is the big problem, it is the loose talk about the immorality of deterrence in this country, and also some of the consequences of Reykjavik that shook the Europeans.

But that is the subject of another day.

Let me ask you, what if we ratify this treaty, we give advice and consent to its ratification, the President actually submits the Articles of Ratification, and we engage in conventional arms control talks for 2 or 3 years, and then they just hopelessly bog down and we are left with a severe conventional imbalance. And let's say we are halfway through the withdrawal of these missiles.

Do you think there is any advantage to NATO serving notice in advance that we will take another look at where we are on the conventional balance relating to arms control before we complete the withdrawal, particularly reserving the rights under the supreme national interest clause, looking to the balance, or would that be too much linkage for you?

Mr. PERLE. I do not think it would serve a useful purpose because I do not believe that the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles that we are giving up under this treaty can compensate for an inadequate conventional balance. I have never thought they can, and indeed, the effort to create the sense that they do so forces you even more deeply into relying on nuclear threats to deter conventional attacks.

Chairman NUNN. So the conventional imbalance is something you think needs to be addressed in and of itself with NATO?

Mr. PERLE. Absolutely, and the thing that troubles me most about this treaty which I otherwise support enthusiastically, is that it is actually going to diminish our capability to carry out one of the most promising programs to improve our conventional forces, which is conventionally armed ground-launched cruise missiles.

If you had, for argument's sake, a couple thousand or 3,000 conventionally armed ground-launched cruise missiles with a range sufficient to reach those critical fixed facilities—set aside for the moment moving targets, which is a more difficult proposition—those critical fixed facilities, many of them hardened, on which Soviet support of an invasion depends, you would have—and these would have to be weapons of very great accuracy, on the order of 1 to 3 meters—you would have the capability without resort to nuclear weapons of stopping dead in its tracks a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Because you would have these conventional weapons widely dispersed, because their nonnuclear dispersal in peacetime

is not a problem, you would have, in my view, a terribly important and highly stabilizing capability which for the shallowest of reasons we are about to abandon in this treaty, unnecessarily in my view.

We can regain that freedom with a simple amendment to the treaty, and this treaty is not going to be rejected by the Soviets because a peripheral, collateral constraint, which is really what this was, is brought back in.

Chairman NUNN. If the loophole we discussed a few minutes ago works both ways, and if we do not get it corrected, would we not also be entitled to test a ground-launched cruise missile at over 5,500 kilometers and then go to an intermediate system?

Mr. PERLE. We cannot do it. In the real world you cannot come to the Congress and say here is our plan for circumventing the treaty, and I think the administration would oppose it in the first place.

Chairman NUNN. I agree, it should not be done because we should not have that loophole in there from the beginning. But it seems to me that if this indeed is a loophole, there would be some incentive for the Soviets to be willing to correct it because if they did abuse it, then I think it would change the atmosphere.

Mr. PERLE. Senator, they have done things like that in the past with hardly any effect on the atmosphere. For example, the deployment of the SS-19 exploited a loophole of no greater prominence than the one you are talking about.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I think this might be a little bit different because this would go to the very heart. If you were to go out and make that test of over 5,500 kilometers and then put in an intermediate-range missile system which really was aimed, that would just destroy the whole thing.

Mr. PERLE. A lot would depend on how clear it was, whether it was ambiguous. There would be dispute within the administration. No matter what one thinks about whether we are likely to catch them, we are not about to avail ourselves of loopholes fundamentally inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty, to do something prohibited by the treaty.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask you this. I know you have said you do not believe in linking, you just answered you do not believe in linking this INF withdrawal to progress on conventional arms control, right?

Mr. PERLE. Well, I think we ought to insist that the process is under way, and we ought to take some measure of whether we think it is leading anywhere, because if it is hopeless, I think we ought to know that before we conclude a START Treaty, but a START Treaty that improved our strategic posture would be worth concluding.

Chairman NUNN. So you would not link either INF, at this stage, or START to progress on conventional arms control?

Mr. PERLE. In principle I would not. If it turned out that for whatever reason the START Treaty we were prepared to sign was a generous one to the Soviets, that is, if we made a lot of concessions that I think and others might think we should not have made, then it seems to me we can say, well, look, if you want this treaty which is better for you than it is for us——

Chairman NUNN. In other words, if it is a marginal treaty and a very close question, you might change your mind on that?

Mr. PERLE. That is right, but if it is a treaty that is good for us and strengthens our position, I would not sacrifice it in order to try to get more.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. It would seem to me on that last question that if there were a treaty which was marginally better for the Soviets than for us, you would recommend against such a START Treaty in any event, would you not?

Mr. PERLE. Yes, I probably would recommend against such a START Treaty, although it would be a case for it if we could report that we had elicited some significant concessions on conventional forces.

Senator LEVIN. Even if those concessions were not concluded, and the talks were still in process?

Mr. PERLE. I am a great believer, and I know you are an attorney, in seeing the final document signed and notarized, especially when dealing with the Soviets.

Senator LEVIN. You would like to see a START agreement before you would want to link it to conventional reductions?

Mr. PERLE. In the process of negotiation in principle, you can get to a point where you can see the shape of it and then decide that this was not going to be a very good agreement for us, and it should have such appeal to the Soviets that they would be prepared to make some concession elsewhere in order to get it.

I would prefer that we not conclude agreements like that, but then, I am not in charge, so I have no way of knowing what——

Senator LEVIN. Well, you are giving us your advice, and I am a little confused.

I thought earlier today you made clear statements recommending against linkage to conventional arms reductions, and now I am wondering whether you are blurring that a bit or not.

Mr. PERLE. What I was saying earlier is that I would not make the conclusion of a good START Treaty contingent upon the Soviets doing something on conventional arms control.

Now, I am not in charge. If you ask me as an observer of a START Treaty that is emerging 6 months from now, would you link this START Treaty to Soviet movement on conventional forces, I would be inclined to say yes if I thought that the START Treaty had conceded too much to the Soviets. You might as well then try to get something for it.

Senator LEVIN. Are you willing to judge the START Treaty before you see it?

Mr. PERLE. Obviously there are some judgments that you cannot make until you have the treaty in its totality.

Senator LEVIN. Overall, are you willing to recommend against the START Treaty now on its own?

Mr. PERLE. I do not think we have come far enough yet.

Senator LEVIN. I have just a couple other questions, and one is a historical question relating to Ambassador Nitze's walk in the woods proposal.

Are you saying that when Nitze was informed that the walk in the woods formula had been shot down in Moscow, that at that time the formula was still actively and openly under debate here?

Mr. PERLE. At that time, Senator Levin, Paul Nitze not only had authority to continue those discussions, but a separate classified channel with its own code word had been established to communicate back with respect to those discussions, and to the best of my knowledge, the only message that came back through that channel established for that purpose was Paul's message that Kvitsinskiy had said at the outset of their meeting that he was shot down in Moscow.

Senator LEVIN. My question is slightly different.

Are you saying that the actual walk in the woods formula was still an open possibility here at the time that Nitze received the word it was no longer a possibility in Moscow?

Mr. PERLE. Nitze's instructions were to say to the Soviets that while Washington did not agree with everything in that 14 point formula, he was authorized to discuss it further.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin, I am going to have to leave, so I will leave you in charge. Before I leave, I want to thank Mr. Perle for his very helpful testimony.

I understand your associate has not been introduced. Perhaps for the record we could get his name.

Mr. PERLE. Yes. Doug Feith, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Defense Department and is now a partner at Feith & Zell, a law firm in Washington. He contributed importantly to the analysis that we have done on the treaty.

Chairman NUNN. We thank you, Mr. Feith, for being here this morning.

Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Just two other questions.

One, can you tell us your five biggest problems or reservations in priority order with this treaty now, if you have them on the top of your head. If not, for the record? But if you are able to do that today, can you just list them without giving us all the reasons for them?

Mr. PERLE. Number one, clearly, is the conventional cruise missile.

Number two is article XIV, which I think is easily corrected.

Then I would have to choose three from among the verification problems. I think there are a variety of those verification problems that are also quite readily soluble.

Senator LEVIN. Are you able to prioritize those verification problems for us, give us the three biggest ones that you have, or would you rather do that for the record?

Mr. PERLE. The problem created by the Soviets having given us different data at different times troubles me, and I would like to see that sorted out.

I am concerned about some of the loopholes that the Soviets could exploit, like the ones that Senator Nunn has been talking about. But I think those are cleared up by the Soviets telling us they are not going to do that unless they intend to do it, in which case we should know that.

And I think I am troubled by some of the limitations on our inspection rights. But I believe that reopening that issue would be very difficult now at this stage with the Soviets. And so I would feel a lot better about this treaty if there were a clear understanding that if and when there is a START Treaty which would make the incentives to cheat on this one more attractive, that any inspection rights that are agreed to in the START context would be retroactively applied to the INF Treaty so that we do not create an island of noninspection surrounding the INF Treaty.

Senator LEVIN. Would you try to put that into the INF ratification process?

Mr. PERLE. I think that could go comfortably in the resolution which would state the view of the Senate to the administration rather than as an amendment to the treaty itself, and ideally this is the kind of issue on which in collaboration, the Senate and the executive could agree.

Senator LEVIN. So that you would not recommend "anytime, anywhere" inspection as an amendment?

Mr. PERLE. No. I think that would be too difficult to negotiate a this time, and so I would recommend doing it the other way, which is to insist that the more effective verification regime associated with START—and I would oppose a START Treaty that did not have a more effective verification regime—should be imposed after the fact on the INF Treaty.

Senator LEVIN. I did have one more question.

Admiral Crowe indicated that Soviet attempts to conceal a small number of missiles would have little military consequences since there would be no way for the Soviet to test the missiles without being detected, and over time they would become obsolete.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. PERLE. Well, that depends very much on whether the tests could be concealed within the tests of the permitted system, an intercontinental ballistic missile system. But if the issue is could we detect an SS-22 test, just a straight up, instrumented SS-20 test, the answer is yes, we could do that, and over time, Soviet confidence in the SS-20, if they could not test it, would decline.

But if the first stage of the SS-20 is the same as the stage of the SS-25, and if the second stage turns out to be rather similar to something else, then you might in fact be able to test the SS-20 in the guise of testing something else. And this is frankly an issue on which I would want to look in greater detail than I have been able to do, but it is one that I would urge the committee staff at least to take a close look at so we know where we stand.

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Perle, we are all grateful for your appearance today, for your testimony, your answers to our questions.

It is good to see you again.

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee recessed.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

ALLIED PERSPECTIVES ON NATO'S SECURITY POSTURE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Warner, Thurmond, Quayle, Wilson and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; and Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, John J. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, and T. Kirk McConnell, professional staff members; Barbara B. Brown, Mary J. Kampo, and Richelle M. Turner, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

This morning, the committee continues its hearings on "NATO Defense and the INF Treaty." The Senate returns after a week's recess. Several of us spent the time last week in Europe conferring with allied military and political figures on the health and the future of NATO. Senator Byrd headed the delegation. We had a number of conversations with the top leaders in Great Britain, in Germany and France as well as Turkey and Italy. The subject of our hearings today is most appropriate from the perspective of taking a look at the European views of the INF Treaty, and particularly the European views of the future of NATO in the post-INF period.

The political scene in Europe on both sides of the inter-German border today is a dynamic one. The committee must assess how various political developments may affect the future of the alliance in the broadest sense. Understanding the views of our allies and political constraints that may shape their policies is crucial to our evaluation.

Too often we attempt to formulate coalition policies solely from the American perspective. If NATO is to forcefully meet the challenges of this dynamic period, and to effectively manage its internal and external relations, the United States, as the alliance's leader, must help to chart a course that has solid prospects of being supported and sustained by the member nations of NATO.

This morning we shall hear from the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs, the Honorable Rozanne Ridgway; the U.S. Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms, Ambassador Ron Lehman; and the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters, Ambassador Edward Rowny. Ambassador Lehman has been nominated by the President to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, but he is appearing today in his capacity as the START negotiator. We hope that that confirmation will be completed—in fact, I thought the Senate would have acted on it right before we left, but our committee got it out right at the end; the paperwork came in that day.

Mr. Ambassador, we are glad to have you here wearing your first hat rather than the second hat that you will have shortly.

I will skip a recital of the long and distinguished government service of each of these witnesses. They are all well known here. But on behalf of the committee, I would like to extend a warm welcome to each of you.

Before turning to Senator Warner, who will be here in just a few minutes, I would like to remind the committee that Dr. Brzezinski is coming this afternoon to discuss the European perspectives. Tomorrow morning we have scheduled an important meeting in executive session with the Dutch Minister of Defense, Dr. van Eekelen, who is the Chairman of the Euro Group's Defense Ministers.

We will proceed this monring, I believe, first with Ms. Ridgway, and then Ambassador Lehman and Ambassador Rowny.

[Prepared statements of Senator Warner and Senator Dixon follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join the Chairman in welcoming these three distinguished Administration witnesses. Their testimony before the Committee is important. These witnesses were either directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations of the INF Treaty. We are fortunate to have them here this morning and I look forward to hearing their testimony.

I also want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing this Committee with a stimulating and informative series of hearings. The first half of these hearings, which we have just recently completed, has given the Committee an invaluable overview of the political and military implications of the INF Treaty for both U.S. and Allied national security. Specifically, over the course of two weeks of hearings we have examined issues relating to the strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, reviewed current and future trends in the European military balance, identified some future nuclear and conventional NATO force requirements (including chemi-

cal), and heard testimony on the Treaty's political impact particularly with respect to its effect on future Alliance relations.

What this Committee heard was at times both disturbing and reassuring. On the one hand, we heard from virtually every witness that many deficiencies exist in the NATO force posture. The overwhelming majority of witnesses pointed to the importance of following up the elimination of short and long range intermediate nuclear forces with conventional, chemical, and short-range nuclear modernization. Many of these witnesses warned that without a serious and comprehensive modernization program NATO's flexible response strategy and extended deterrence would be weakened—if not become destabilizing.

Many witnesses assured the Committee, however, that the Allied governments support the INF Treaty and are firmly behind the full implementation of the 1983 Montebello decision to include NATO's conventional modernization program. This same message was reaffirmed to me and other Senators by the leaders of five NATO countries with whom we visited over the recess.

It was particularly reassuring to hear administration witnesses and a majority of the outside experts agree that this treaty will not lead to the denuclearization of Europe and decoupling of the United States from the Alliance—two fundamental Soviet objectives. This point was also reaffirmed by NATO leaders. Nevertheless, while such assessments are welcomed, we must ensure that the Alliance fulfills its commitments and that the Soviets never achieve their objectives. An important way to protect against such a situation is for the United States to demonstrate leadership and political will. Political will and leadership exercised in the context of close and continuing consultations with our allies, are vital elements necessary for implementing our planned commitments, programs, and policies.

Today we begin the second half of these hearings on the INF Treaty. In addition to hearing further testimony on the political and military implications of the Treaty, we will focus a great deal of our attention on the negotiation and language of the INF Treaty. It is important for the Committee to understand how it was negotiated and to review the treaty language to guarantee that there are no loopholes, ambiguities, or misunderstandings. It is my hope that the witnesses before us today can help us in this objective.

Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for setting these hearing on a course that provides us the necessary information to fulfill our constitutional responsibilities and in the end provide the United States with an enduring treaty.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have before us distinguished members of this administration, the Honorable Roxanne L. Ridgway, Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman, II, and Ambassador Edward L. Rowny. I am sure their testimony will add to our increased understanding of the allied perspective of the INF Treaty and NATO's security posture.

We have heard varied perspectives on the NATO position on this treaty. Dr. Schlesinger and General Rogers have stated that they have heard reservations expressed privately. Others such as Secretary Carlucci and the joint chiefs of staff have stated that there is unanimity of support for this treaty among the political and military leaders of the alliance. I hope our witnesses today will help to clarify this divergence of opinion and add their own unique views to the debate.

The importance of the conventional forces of the United States and its allies has been continually stressed before this committee. I am committed to the strengthening of the readiness and sustainability of our forces in Europe and around the globe. We must not loss sight of the criticality of the balancing of our forces with the Warsaw Pact as we continue to strive for further arms reduction agreements.

I look forward to the testimony today.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Ms. Ridgway, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Ms. RIDGWAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement which I ask be submitted for the record. I will talk from that statement.

Chairman NUNN. Your statement will be part of the record.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Your own recent travels in Europe I think give you and the other members who were engaged in conversations with European leaders a——

Chairman NUNN. Secretary Ridgway, we have a problem with these microphones. If I could just get you to talk as directly into the microphones as you can, and I ask each of you to do that.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Let me try again. I was referring to the special background that you bring to this topic today, given your own recent conversations with European leaders.

I think I can assume from that that you bring back a sense of community that exists among the United States, Canada and those leaders, and perhaps a special appreciation that when we speak about the Atlantic alliance and its health, we are not speaking exclusively about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but rather, a range of institutions as well as the so-called CSCE process, the growing intra-European security cooperation, developments in the Western European Union, the Franco-German dialogue, and even another development with which now shapes our dialogue with Europe. That is, the coordination of foreign policy views of EC members through something called the European Political Cooperation.

NATO is perhaps the most outstanding of those institutions and has been successful over 40 years. But today we see in the alliance particularly vigorous examination of the fundamental principles of that alliance and their continuing validity. I believe that that is as it should be.

At the moment it has come about as the result of a number of factors; the completion of the INF Treaty has encouraged or sparked something called the examination of post-INF alliance or post-INF Europe. There are budget pressures on both sides of the Atlantic, political pressures. There are as well new and particularly difficult to analyze internal developments in the Soviet Union.

So as has so often been the case in the alliance, there comes a moment when a lot of things come together and the alliance engages in this vigorous examination of its principles.

But I like to think of this alliance partnership as one that evolves and matures inside of its own framework. It is not in the business, and we are not in the business, of looking at it to find novelty for the sake of novelty. We are trying today, as we have in the past, to develop an alliance consensus on the issues of defense, deterrence and arms control as they present themselves as we move through the agenda.

It is never wrong to say that the United States remains committed to the defense of Europe as an integral part of our own security and defense. I think it is also correct to say that that commitment has been vigorously reciprocated by European allies. And we have, among last year's events, the WEU platform of principles which gave a European voice to the statement of this set of principles.

The INF Treaty is a substantial achievement. It strengthens Western military security, it sets new standards for arms control, it is a political success for the alliance, and I think this common achievement, which includes a record of the most extensive consultation in which the alliance has ever engaged is one that has also given further strength to the Atlantic partnership.

What I would like to draw from that experience today is the fact that the INF Treaty, for all of these benefits, leaves us with many challenges still to meet, and we have to make sure as we go forward that we draw the right lessons from INF. I think that the principal lesson, starting with political courage as its foundation, is that NATO continue to field the forces necessary to carry out its commitment to flexible response. There are today substantial U.S. nuclear forces emplaced in Europe, including weapons on dual-capable aircraft that can reach deep into the Soviet Union, short-range nuclear missiles and artillery, SLBM warheads committed to NATO.

So together with the forces of the alliance, including U.S. ground forces in Europe, they constitute a convincing deterrent and a clear link to the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee.

One of the topics we hear a lot about today is the Montebello Decision. That was taken in 1983. It was to reduce and to modernize NATO nuclear systems, a decision taken when NATO agreed that this would be essential whether or not we reached the INF agreement. It is our view that we need to proceed with the Montebello agreement so that nuclear forces in Europe maintain their capability to fulfill the mission of deterrence.

The INF Treaty does not resolve the conventional imbalance in Europe. That was not its objective. In fact, the security criteria that guided the negotiations was that the treaty not have a negative impact on the existing conventional imbalance and that it not harm NATO's conventional capabilities in addressing that imbalance. It is our view that the treaty more than meets that standard.

There is agreement on the arms control priorities ahead of the alliance, the 50-percent reduction in strategic arms, an effective, comprehensive, global, verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and establishing a stable and secure conventional balance in Europe by eliminating disparities.

There are some important precedents set by INF in this area. There are some precedents that are not set by INF in this area, and I think it is important to not draw wrong lessons, just as it is important not to miss any of the right lessons.

We are looking forward to a NATO summit next month, and I think it is worth underlining again that this will be an occasion to express once again our continuing commitment to Europe, to the NATO strategy of flexible response and forward defense, to talk about East-West relations, to talk about developments in the Soviet Union, again, to look at the lessons from INF, to talk again about the modernization and effective arms control, to talk about defense resources. To use a phrase which certainly is not original with me but one I know we are going to hear a lot about, Mr. Chairman, the consequent need for thinking smarter if we cannot think richer. And of course, the leaders will want to talk about the conventional imbalance and how to give a new start to the negotiations that are taking shape.

I think I can say, although we have all been reluctant in the Department to try to speak for Europeans beyond the NATO communique of December, that the Europeans share our sense of satisfaction that the alliance has successfully seen through the 1979 decision. It does not mean that thoughtful Europeans do not have con-

cerns about the East-West strategic environment; they do. They may well have concerns about the specifics of the appropriate deterrent. We have our own views about that, and defense posture and arms control strategy for the future. There are a lot of false fears out there that I need not give more weight to by repeating here. But again, I think that we see an alliance that is able, with a lot of public discussion, nonetheless to end the day with a sense of where it is going.

And the Reykjavik Foreign Ministers communique on the arms control priorities continues to govern.

We will certainly in the future, in this so-called post-INF discussion, hear a lot about alliance burdensharing. It is not an easy one to address. It is not something you can just give a straight line calculation to. But I am confident that we all know how to put together in such a discussion the economic, social and political costs that join as well the budget costs that need measuring, when we start talking about the sharing of burden. And I would add, the sharing of risks.

It is not that all of us cannot do more for defense, we can, we should, we need to keep pushing on it. We need to use all available occasions to keep talking about burdensharing, but I do not think that it is the kind of a subject that needs to be drawn up as a notional problem or a particular bilateral problem. It is an alliance problem.

We are working on a number of subjects that you, Mr. Chairman, know better than anyone else because they represent in so many cases your own thinking and contribution in this whole area of staying strong, of keeping the nuclear threshold high, the conventional defense improvement program, the armaments cooperation initiatives, the new NATO conventional armaments planning system which will deal with the armaments requirements of the alliance rather than leaving this critical set of decisions to individual nations to resolve.

By the end of June we will be saying goodbye to Lord Peter Carrington, and I think that as we do, we must point to some very major accomplishments and contributions of his in this whole area of getting the alliance moving on these more detailed and less headline-earning topics, but they are the stuff of what is making the alliance credible.

My conclusion, then, Mr. Chairman, is that the alliance partnership is in good health. There are these vigorous, energized discussions going on. They have before. They will in the future. There are differences of view, but it is the kind of a partnership that can sustain a discussion of those differences on the way to finding a consensus. That alliance partnership, which is the broader definition of which I spoke at the beginning, which includes economic as well as political and security, continues to meet the national interests of the United States.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ridgway follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, you have been looking primarily at the military implications of the INF Treaty for the Western deterrent and for U.S. defense posture. I will address the Atlantic Alliance more broadly at this important juncture.

Nature of the Alliance

The Alliance is most fundamentally a community of nations with shared values. It comprises formal and informal commitments among friends and allies to secure and preserve the world of democratic institutions, pluralistic societies and free-market economies in which we all want to live.

It goes beyond NATO, the Treaty Organization, to encompass such diverse endeavors as: the 35 nation CSCE process; multilateral intra-European security cooperation through the Western European Union; Franco-German and other bilateral security arrangements; and coordination of the foreign policy views of EC members through the mechanisms of European Political Cooperation.

NATO itself has been successful over almost 40 years because it pursued a strategy of defense and dialogue through a series of specific goals and programs agreed in the security context of the time. It has stuck to its agenda and backed up its decisions with actions.

A number of factors -- among them the completion of an INF Treaty, budget pressures on both sides of the Atlantic, and internal developments in the Soviet Union -- have combined at this time to produce a particularly vigorous examination of the

fundamental principles of the Alliance and their continuing validity. That is as it should be.

The Alliance partnership evolves and matures inside its own framework. We are not in the business of novelty for novelty's sake. We are in the business of continuing to develop an Alliance consensus on issues of defense, deterrence and arms control as these present themselves today and for the future.

The U.S. remains committed to the defense of Europe as an integral part of our own security and defense. The U.S. commitment has been vigorously reciprocated by our European Allies. Europeans are actively consulting among themselves on security cooperation, and we welcome that.

Last October, foreign and defense ministers of the Western European Union countries, meeting in The Hague, unanimously approved a tough-minded "European Security Platform." The Platform, which we fully endorse, speaks of the "indivisibility" of the trans-Atlantic security partnership; the continuing need for a nuclear deterrent in Europe; and the "irreplaceable" role played by U.S. nuclear and conventional forces stationed there.

The WEU platform confirms the unacceptable human consequences of a divided Europe, and finds no lessening of the Soviet military buildup. One of its stated objectives is furthering European integration, specifically "a more cohesive European defense identity," in the spirit of solidarity of the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. Signatories assert "our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Alliance, to the benefit of Western security as a whole." They add that this will enhance the European role in the Alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic.

The INF Treaty

The INF Treaty is a substantial achievement. It strengthens Western military security. It sets new standards for arms control. It is a political success for the Alliance. Our common achievement, based on close consultations, further strengthens the trans-Atlantic partnership.

The INF Treaty is the result of our steady, patient approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, on the basis of realism, strength, and dialogue. We got this Treaty because we were persistent at the bargaining table, and because our allies went forward with INF deployments. The way we and our allies successfully met the Soviet INF challenge shows that tough-mindedness, clarity of purpose, and resolve pay off. The INF experience offers important lessons on how to proceed as we confront other challenges to our security.

The INF Treaty strengthens U.S. and allied security. It enhances international stability. It may be opening a new chapter in arms control -- the beginning of reductions. It reduces nuclear weapons systems, rather than setting guidelines for their future growth. It accomplishes the goals we and our allies set for ourselves eight years ago, when the deployment of the SS-20 led to the NATO dual-track decision. It eliminates the SS-20 threat.

The Treaty reaffirms the principle of equality. There can be no other basis for U.S./Soviet arms control. Because the Soviets had deployed more, the Treaty also establishes the principle of asymmetrical reductions. The Soviets will eliminate deployed missiles and launchers capable of carrying about four times as many warheads as those eliminated by the U.S. -- missiles capable of targeting, among other things, NATO's ports and airfields.

The Treaty strengthens deterrence by significantly complicating Soviet attack planning. From now on they are denied intermediate range weapons options that for nearly thirty years they have been able to rely on in any consideration of an attack on NATO. Now they would have to allocate more of their central strategic systems from intercontinental to NATO targets.

The Treaty keeps third-country systems and programs of cooperation with our allies completely out -- essential precedents for future negotiations. It does not limit dual-capable U.S. aircraft -- which make a critical contribution to NATO's defense. It does not rely on Soviet goodwill, but rather requires the most comprehensive verification regime ever, including on-site inspections.

INF and Future Deterrence

The INF Treaty, for all its benefits, leaves us with many challenges still to meet. As we and our allies move forward, we must draw the right lessons from INF. We succeeded in getting a good Treaty because we persisted in our approach. If we and our allies had not gone forward with deployments, or if we had not kept the courage of our convictions at the bargaining table, none of this could have been achieved.

The trans-Atlantic partnership, in the face of a continuing threat from the Soviet Union, requires that NATO continue to field the forces necessary to carry out its commitment to flexible response. There are substantial U.S. nuclear forces in place in Europe, including weapons on dual-capable aircraft that can reach deep into the Soviet Union, short range nuclear missiles and artillery, and SLBMs warheads committed to NATO. Together with the forces of the Alliance, including U.S. ground

forces in Europe, they constitute a convincing deterrent, and a clear link to the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee.

In 1983, NATO adopted the Montebello decision to reduce and modernize NATO nuclear systems, which NATO agreed was essential whether or not we reached an INF agreement. We must proceed with the Montebello program, so that our nuclear forces in Europe maintain their capability to fulfill their mission of deterrence.

The INF Treaty does not resolve the conventional imbalance in Europe. That was not its objective. The security criterion which we established was that, in improving the nuclear balance, the Treaty neither have a negative impact on the existing conventional imbalance, nor harm NATO's conventional capabilities in addressing it. The Treaty more than meets that standard.

NATO has agreed that the next priorities in arms control are fifty per cent START cuts, a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, and establishing a stable and secure conventional balance in Europe by eliminating disparities. In all these areas, the INF Treaty sets precedents that will serve us well, including asymmetrical reductions and effective verification. And the Treaty shows the importance of negotiating from strength, and of being patient, determined, and purposeful at the bargaining table.

Early next month there will be a NATO Summit. No doubt NATO's leaders will reaffirm existing NATO policy of East-West dialogue based on a strong defense. Among the other themes we expect will be prominent in Brussels are:

-- The continuing US commitment to Europe, to NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defense.

-- The persistent reality of the Soviet threat to peace and freedom in the West, and the corresponding need for a balanced, tough-minded approach to relations with Moscow.

-- The application of the lessons learned in INF -- particularly the importance of strength, unity, and persistence in the pursuit of our objectives -- to our future agenda.

-- The need to keep working to provide for our security through both modernization and effective arms control.

-- The pressures on defense resources on both sides of the Atlantic, and the consequent need for "thinking smarter, not richer."

-- The conventional imbalance, and the need to give a new start to negotiations as well as pursue NATO's Conventional Defense Initiative modernization program.

European Perspectives on the Strategic Environment

The Europeans share our sense of satisfaction that the Alliance has successfully seen through the dual-track decision.

That does not mean that thoughtful Europeans, like thoughtful Americans on this side of the ocean, don't have concerns about the East-West strategic environment and the specifics of an appropriate deterrent, defense posture and arms control strategy for the future.

Some concerns amount to false fears. We hear that some are concerned about de-nuclearization of Europe, some about "de-coupling" of the U.S. deterrent from Europe, and still others about "singularity," any exclusive concentration of nuclear weapons, and hence Warsaw Pact targets.

The US remains commited to the defense of Europe as an integral part of our own security and defense. As I have described, the Western deterrent will continue to contain a

credible nuclear component in and commited to Europe. And, in fact, all of Western Europe is vulnerable to Soviet nuclear forces. So of course are the United States and Canada. Turkey and Norway, like the FRG, are in range of Soviet SNF. No less than eight NATO nations, not counting France, operate nuclear delivery systems.

Burden Sharing

Burden sharing is a perennial and legitimate concern to all Members of this Committee, and indeed to all of us as taxpayers. Our concerns will certainly not lessen as pressures grow on available resources. Let me make just a few points on this critical issue.

Allied burdensharing is not easy or straightforward to calculate. It is much more than simply looking at a nation's percentage of GDP devoted to defense. In the case of a short-warning attack in Europe, for example, the vast majority of NATO forces involved would not be American: over 90 percent of the ground forces, 75 percent of the air forces, and more than 50 percent of the naval forces would be provided by our allies.

It is difficult, moreover, to quantify the economic, social, or political cost of having foreign troops on your soil, using conscription as a means of manning your forces, or absorbing the maneuver damage caused by over 5000 field exercises each year. You can't measure these factors in percentage of GDP, but they are significant collateral costs borne by our European allies.

That is not to say that all NATO nations, including the United States can't do more for defense. We, and other Allies as appropriate, continue to use all available occasions to

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discuss burdensharing in light of the economic realities facing the United States. However, continued fingerpointing at individual countries will become less and less effective. Burdensharing should be addressed as an Alliance problem and not just a national problem.

We believe we have made some definite strides forward in this area. The Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) program and the armaments cooperation initiatives, spearheaded by Senator Nunn, have enabled the Alliance to more effectively allocate scarce resources. The new NATO Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS) will deal with the armaments requirements of the Alliance rather than leaving this critical area to individual nations to resolve. The CAPS program is just one of the legacies of Peter Carrington's highly successful stewardship of the Alliance. We believe that through focused programs such as these we will achieve far greater results than by simply telling nations to do more for defense.

Last fall's WEU Platform undertook to: "see to it that the level of each country's contribution to the common defense adequately reflects its capabilities"; expand regional military cooperation; intensify armaments cooperation; and concert policies on crises outside Europe "insofar as they may affect our security interests."

There are no easy solutions to burdensharing. As the events in the stock market the last few months have indicated, the economies of the world are indisputably linked. Many of the economic problems facing the United States are shared equally, or more, by our NATO allies. You can be sure, however, that we will continue to explore all avenues for ways that we can all do better. And in a time when we are all under

resource pressure, better necessarily means smarter, and not necessarily richer.

Conclusion

The conclusion has to be that the Alliance partnership is good for us and for Europe. It meets our fundamental security and economic needs.

The Alliance tasks at hand, like nuclear force modernization and redressing the conventional imbalance, were there before the INF Treaty and need to be addressed in their own right, not because of the Treaty.

The same is the case for the Alliance's ongoing broader political requirements of strength, unity and persistence.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Secretary Ridgway. We appreciate that statement, and we will have several questions for you.

Ambassador Lehman, again let me urge you, if you will talk as directly into the microphone as possible.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II, CHIEF NEGOTIATOR ON STRATEGIC ARMS

Ambassador LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Once again, I am honored to be here before the committee.

Chairman NUNN. Would you excuse me for just a minute and let me see if Senator Warner has any opening remarks.

Senator Warner has just returned from the same trip I alluded to a few minutes ago.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I will not do other than to welcome these witnesses. They are probably three of the best informed witnesses that we will have before this committee. I believe the chairman might indicate to the witness that he is testifying in his capacity as Ambassador, and that shortly he should have another job, would tnat not be right, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman NUNN. He has at least 1½ hats now—one is about to be put on and the other one is about to come off. But he is testifying now in his capacity as Ambassador to the START talks.

Senator WARNER. We would hope this week, Mr. Chairman, that that name could be acted upon.

Chairman NUNN. I would hope it would be passed by the Senate this week, I agree.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. It came out of committee by a tie vote, and the chairman broke the tie.

Senator WARNER. In the last day of the session.

Chairman NUNN. An oral vote, though, not a recorded one.

Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the expeditious handling of my confirmation, and I understand the logistical and administrative difficulties that were not of the making of this committee.

I have a rather long statement which I would ask be entered into the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, it will be part of the record.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, both from the perspective of the job I am leaving as the Strategic Arms Negotiator and from the perspective of the new position that I will take with its broader responsibilities with respect to the alliance, and to our deterrence policy, I appreciate that the committee is looking at the INF Treaty in a broader context.

What the treaty itself and its provisions provide is very important, both the limitations that it places upon the Soviet Union and the limitations it places upon us. But obviously we must look at the treaty in a broader context. In that regard, however, I would like to express one caution. Just as we should not attribute to the treaty advantages or virtues that are not really contained within the treaty, so we should not hold the treaty responsible for disparities in the military balance and difficulties that are not of its making.

My own view is that the INF Treaty is in the military and political interests of the United States and its allies. I feel that way very strongly. I think that it is a major success for the NATO alliance. That is not to say that the negotiation did not involve two parties and that the Soviet Union did not seek to achieve its own objectives. In some areas, we are not talking about a so-called zero sum game. Clearly, what can be in the advantage of the Soviet Union can also be to the advantage of the United States.

But I do not think that we should be naive. The Soviet Union has had a number of negotiating objectives which are not designed to strengthen the alliance either militarily or politically. Quite the contrary. The Soviet Union has sought continuously to use the arms control process to decouple the North American allies, the United States and Canada, from their European allies. They have sought, for example, in the INF negotiations, to hold those talks hostage to START, to MBFR, to SDI, to dual-capable systems, to the British and French systems. This has required a very intense negotiation.

But the bottom line is that the alliance held firm to its principles, remained united, and the treaty that has resulted is in our military interest. It is true that the United States will give up certain nuclear systems that we had introduced into Europe for the purpose of strengthening our flexible response posture. But at the same time, the Soviet Union will give up more systems—more threatening systems—in numbers beyond what the United States and its allies had decided to deploy. In the process, the threat to NATO will be significantly reduced, not only in the nuclear area, but to some degree, in the conventional and chemical weapons areas, as well.

And it is not the case that we will denuclearize Western Europe. On the contrary, we will retain a full spectrum of nuclear capability, and I believe that our policy of flexible response will be enhanced by this treaty.

If that is the case, though, then why did the Soviet Union agree to this treaty? Well, as we know, they expressed a great deal of concern about our deployments of the ground-launched cruise missiles, and as you remember, they launched a very vigorous propaganda campaign, in particular, against the Pershing II missile. And I will be the first to admit that the Pershing II missile is a highly effective military system, although I think some of the Soviet propaganda was shrill and hysterical and designed more to frighten us than to reflect Soviet fear.

But if that was their view, then they have gotten something out of this, and I see that Mr. Yazov is testifying to that effect in the Soviet Union, that this was an accomplishment for them.

But is this what they really sought out of this treaty? Well, I am sure that they will justify the treaty on its military merits as well. But I think there is also an indirect implication of the treaty, and I think it is this that we ought to focus upon. It may well be that the Soviet Union hopes to create a soporific effect, a relaxation in the West that will cause us to ignore military threats that actually exist and to neglect our defenses.

Many people have said we should not support the INF Treaty because it will feed that effect. I do not share that view. On the contrary, whether or not we do what we must do is in our hands, not in the hands of the Soviet Union. We and our allies must simply maintain our defenses. If we maintain our defenses, then this treaty is not only an excellent treaty on its own merits, but through it we will have strengthened the overall regime.

If I could switch for a moment to the broader arms control situation, in part because of the position I am now leaving, I would like to make a point. You may remember that, in November 1981, the President laid out an arms control agenda that focused on four areas. On the INF Treaty, he proposed the so-called zero option. There we have met and, in many ways, exceeded our initial objectives. He announced the importance of a START agreement, and you will remember shortly thereafter we put forth a notion of an agreement that would distinguish between fast flying and slow flying systems, would have deep reductions and would limit ballistic missile warheads to 5,000.

As you know, in Geneva we now have a very extensive joint draft treaty text which has many key elements agreed already with the Soviet Union, including this principle of 50-percent reductions, this distinction between fast flying and slow flying systems, and a limit of not 5,000 but 4,900. We have come a long way in START, and I think that many people have focused on INF and on other issues, and have not realized that, at the same time, extensive progress was being made in START.

You may remember that, working with you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Warner, that this administration has taken a lot of initiatives in the area of confidence building measures. You may remember that we worked together on the four so-called Weinberger Ini-

tiatives. All four have resulted in agreements with the Soviet Union. This was the hotline upgrade. We did not get the joint military communications link, but working with you, we have achieved the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and several other measures.

And the fourth area was in the area of conventional forces. Now, there we all like to focus on the Stockholm agreement at [CDE] and the fact that exercises of certain sizes require notification and that we actually now have, within the alliance, the right to onsite inspection, and we have conducted that right within the Soviet Union for Soviet military exercises. Well, that is an achievement that we have made with our allies.

But what have we not achieved that was in that original outline of an agenda? We have not achieved deep reductions in conventional forces that would enhance safety and stability in Western Europe. Well, you all know the history of MBFR, which I will not repeat and you all are aware that we now have under way negotiations on a mandate for not one but two new negotiations: one involving conventional stability with forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the other involving follow-on confidence building measures along the lines of the Stockholm agreement.

But why is it that we have had these very extensive, lengthy negotiations in MBFR, on conventional forces, and we have thusfar not been able to achieve an arms control advance?

I would suggest that the reason is reflected in the geostrategic reality that the Soviet Union maintains large land forces in Eastern Europe, not only as forces of occupation, but also as a means of coercion against the West, and until we are prepared to guarantee that we unilaterally will negate that advantage, it is hard to see what incentive the Soviet Union has to negotiate reductions that would truly enhance our stability, not just reductions, but reductions in a way that truly enhance our stability.

Now, I do not need to tell this committee the difficulties involved in those negotiations. I only bring this up to say that all of these issues we have been discussing—the alliance, arms control, how the legislative and executive branches work together to try to enhance our overall security—all of these issues come together in the area of conventional forces. And there we hope to make advances in the arms control area, but we recognize that it will not be easy, and therefore we pledge to work with the committee to maintain and strengthen our conventional forces in Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lehman follows:]

TESTIMONY OF
RONALD F. LEHMAN, II

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, ladies and gentlemen:

I am honored to appear before this Committee today to participate in the Committee's important series of hearings on NATO Defense and the INF Treaty. Your subject holds a particular interest for me because, as you know, I have recently returned from an intensive involvement in US-Soviet arms reduction negotiations to take up new and broader responsibilities involving not only arms control, but also US defense policy in regard to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Thus, I share the Committee's deep interest not only in the INF Treaty per se -- what it requires the Soviets to give up and the US to give up -- but also in the question of where the Treaty will leave us: what the post-INF security situation will be, and what we and our allies should do about it. Your inquiry properly reflects an important proposition: that arms control is but one element of our overall national security policy and must never become an end in itself. As such, an arms control agreement must ultimately be judged by the contribution it makes in the larger context of our total security posture, that is, by bolstering deterrence, reducing risks, and strengthening our Alliances.

I therefore applaud the broad approach the Committee has adopted. You are indeed asking the right questions. I would add only one caution at this point. Just as we should take pains not to ascribe to the Treaty more advantages than are objectively warranted, so we should be equally careful not to impute to the Treaty deficiencies that are not of its making, nor really a consequence of its adoption. Beyond doubt, some aspects of our post-INF security posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact will give cause for concern and will need to be

corrected by vigorous Alliance action. But one must avoid the fallacy post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Post-INF does not equate necessarily to "because of INF." I believe that careful analysis will show that the Treaty enhances Alliance security, and that our post-INF security posture will not be made worse or exacerbated in relation to our adversaries, by the operation of the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I propose today to offer some comments on political developments in Europe, particularly as they relate to the INF Treaty; discuss principal features of the Treaty and their implications for Alliance security; review briefly the status of other arms reduction negotiations; and outline my view of how best the US and the Alliance can maintain and enhance their security in the years ahead.

The European political landscape provides a kaleidoscopic backdrop to consideration of the INF Treaty. A number of general trends in Western Europe are influencing the security policies of the NATO allies, including their attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union.

Allied leaders and the vast majority of West European publics welcome the INF Treaty as enhancing Alliance security and as a step toward relaxation of tensions in Europe. However, some West Europeans ask whether withdrawal of US INF missiles could weaken the coupling of the US to the defense of Europe and be a step toward the denuclearization of Western Europe. Some have asked whether the Treaty may even foreshadow an eventual US withdrawal from Europe.

Moreover, recognition of the magnitude of the Soviet military threat is declining. Many West Europeans, and North Americans as well, have been unduly influenced by General Secretary Gorbachev's public affairs skills. Some speak as if the military threat posed by the Soviet Union had suddenly disappeared. Yet, in other West European quarters there is a growing fear that this unwarranted euphoria will lead to

naive accommodation with Moscow and unsound arms cntrol. This development may increase the difficulty of obtaining the levels of defense spending that are necessary to counter the Soviet threat and could result in pressure to adopt unsound policies.

On the other hand, European Military Cooperation is increasing. Several allied governments are stepping up measures to bolster European defenses through increased multilateral and bilateral channels, as well as through NATO itself. One of these is the Western European Union. France and West Germany have also strengthened their military cooperation through such measures as joint exercises and a joint brigade.

Anti-NATO, anti-defense political rhetoric has not brought success at tne polls. Despite uneasiness about the nuclear debate and a reluctance to spend more on defense, West European voters have generally not been won over by sharply anti-defense political postures. Indeed, in most allied countries the continued staying power of governments preferring stronger support for NATO and defense programs has been remarkable, despite often shrill opposition.

Some of these developments are heartening, others obviously are not. But on balance, I believe there is no reason to be discouraged. We are passing through a period of great flux, and flux brings uncertainties and doubts. We did not expect a unanimous European vote of confidence just because we achieved the objective the Alliance had set for itself, any more than we expected unanimous support when we set out to implement the 1979 dual-track decision. What these various and conflicting European attitudes do underscore for me, however, is the importance of a firm, reasoned and consistent US policy voice as we deal with these issues. The US in recent years has compiled an impressive record of consultation with our allies, and the Alliance's ability to weather some

of the current political vicissitudes will depend heavily on our continuing the frank, exhaustive type of consultations that has been the practice of this Administration. High on the list of topics in this regard is the need emphatically to dispel concerns about the continued coupling of the US to the defense of Europe, and about denuclearization. There should be no question in anyone's mind that we remain firmly committed to NATO and to NATO's strategy of flexible response. And we will continue to make our full contribution to the maintenance of all legs of the NATO triad of strategic nuclear, nonstrategic nuclear and conventional forces.

Certainly, many of the questions and reservations raised about the Treaty both in Europe and in this country can be answered by an objective look at the Treaty's terms and effect. In this regard, I would repeat Secretary's Carlucci's words in his January 25 testimony before this Committee: that the INF Treaty is a remarkable achievement for freedom's most important alliance, and it promises to advance both NATO's military security and its political cohesion.

It has not been an easy road, nor a short one. Though the inseparability of American and European security has withstood the test of almost four decades, the Soviet Union has sought continually to use the arms control process to "decouple" us politically and militarily. When NATO decided in December, 1979 that, barring a concrete arms agreement making it unnecessary, 572 NATO longer-range INF missiles would be deployed in Europe, the Soviet Union launched a massive propaganda campaign designed to forestall the deployments and split the Alliance. British and French nuclear forces, US dual-capable aircraft in Europe, the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, research on the Strategic Defense Initiative, and scheduling of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks were all among the items the Soviets sought to link to the INF talks in Moscow's challenge to the cohesion of the

Alliance.

NATO stood firm and, as a result, the basic objectives set out for an INF Treaty in 1979 and in subsequent Alliance discussions have essentially been met or exceeded. We insisted on equal global warhead limits for deployed longer-range INF missiles, and we preferred equality at zero. The Soviet Union finally agreed to the US position. And we had long urged that the Soviets constrain shorter-range INF missiles, which they could substitute to some extent for longer-range INF missiles, as part of the INF Treaty. The Soviet Union, after denying the need for such constraints, in the end agreed to eliminating all land-based missiles of the US and USSR with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers, the so-called "double-global zero" solution. This agreement is, of course, recorded in the INF Treaty, together with the most far-reaching and stringent verification measures yet concluded with Moscow.

If the INF Treaty is a symbol of what can be achieved when the governments of NATO consult closely and remain united, and has been endorsed unanimously by NATO's political leaders, why are there concerns about the treaty among some of NATO's best friends? Quite simply, they wonder whether reductions in American nuclear forces without major reductions in superior Soviet conventional military power will expose Europe to greater danger. They recognize correctly that the deployment of NATO longer-range INF missiles reinforces NATO's deterrent which had been undermined by the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missiles. They remember also that the Soviet Union's across-the-board military buildup in the 1970s created imbalances throughout the spectrum of military power. The new NATO missiles were deployed in large part to reinforce NATO's deterrent policy of flexible response across that spectrum.

Why then are we prepared to give up the PERSHING IIs and GLCMs that we now have, they ask? The answer is not, as some would have

it, that we never meant zero and had no choice but to take yes for an answer. On the contrary, zero means that the Soviet Union will give up far more military capability than the United States, and that it will give up a numerical and qualitative superiority that NATO had not planned to match numerically either in longer-range INF or shorter-range INF missiles. Moreover, the missiles that the Soviet Union will be giving up are fast-flying nuclear weapons capable of preemptive attacks not only against our nuclear forces, but also against our conventional defenses as well -- our air bases, kasernes, prepositioned equipment facilities, our ports and depots, and the like. Under the provisions of the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union will eliminate deployed forces capable of delivering over 1600 nuclear warheads. Many of the Soviet missiles also have conventional or chemical warfare capabilities, which will also be eliminated. Elimination of INF missiles will reduce the Soviet Union's ability to execute rapid strikes throughout Western Europe without resorting to its strategic systems and thus will enhance NATO's ability to deter attacks.

At the same time, the elimination of longer-range and shorter-range INF missiles does not "denuclearize" our force in Europe. Nor does it create a dangerous gap in the spectrum of NATO's deterrent capability. NATO will retain its dual-capable aircraft, a capability in which the Alliance has qualitative advantages and less of a disparity in numbers, and whose bases will no longer be threatened by the Soviet missiles being eliminated. Aiso, we retain our existing short-range missiles and dual-capable artillery. Thus, a substantial number of US nuclear weapons will remain in Europe, contributing to the credibility of our deterrent. In addition, the strategic nuclear umbrella will remain strong and coupled to Europe and will continue to include a sizeable number of submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads specifically dedicated to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

If the INF Treaty is a military plus for the United States and for Western Europe, why would the Soviet Union agree to it? Undoubtedly, Moscow believes that an INF Treaty can create political and economic opportunities: perhaps to establish a neo-detente; perhaps to gain access to outside economies and advanced technologies presently denied to the Soviet Union; and perhaps to defuse criticism of Moscow's policies. But what of the military dimension? Is Moscow really willing to make a major military sacrifice solely in hopes that there might be political and economic benefits and those alone? Probably not.

The Soviet Union says that NATO LRINF missiles are particularly threatening. Moscow launched a major propaganda campaign focused on the PERSHING II missile, stressing the destabilizing nature of its short flight time. While efforts to increase stability through tight limits on fast-flying systems remain the centerpiece of US arms control proposals, such a stability theme is normally rejected by the Soviet Union, except in the case of the PERSHING II force. Perhaps the Soviet Union actually believes that its fears of the PERSHING II, which in fact was small in number and could only strike a small part of the Soviet Union, were quite justified. If so, the INF Treaty may be very attractive to Moscow.

Let us not forget another consideration, though. The "neutron bomb" debate and the anti-nuclear protests of 1982 and 1983 remind the Soviet Union that modernization of nuclear forces and improvements in conventional capabilities have never been politically easy in the West. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union hopes that a new arms control agreement will have a soporific effect on Western security concerns which will weaken NATO's defenses. Perhaps Moscow believes that differences already expressed within NATO over net benefits, burdens and risks will be exaggerated, or that the voices of unilateralism, neutralism and the denuclearization of Europe will now be heeded. Certainly, if

NATO countries decide to let down their defense as a result of our arms negotiations, then the critics will have been correct, but not because of the terms of the INF Treaty. In truth, most of the concern expressed about the INF Treaty is really driven by a certain pessimism about the future of the Alliance, a fear that arms control success will trigger a failure to meet our security responsibilities.

Before we accept this outcome as inevitable, however, let us stop and think about what really has happened. The Alliance did not fail to deploy the LRINF missiles; it deployed them. The Alliance did not fail to achieve its arms control objectives; it is in the process of achieving them. Nor has the Alliance become blind to its defense responsibilities, although much more needs to be done. Indeed, when responsible voices remind us that we must not lose sight of our real security and arms control objectives, we should heed them. To a negotiator, steady voices reminding the Soviet Union that the West will not sacrifice its security interests are more helpful than maudlin rhetoric implying that we will pay almost any price for an agreement. Some would say that the internal debate makes us weaker. I do not share that view. In the end, the market place of ideas makes us stronger. Once we have had a thorough debate, we have been able to rely upon the common sense of our citizens.

In 1983, elections were held in the three countries deploying LRINF missiles and since then in the other two deploying countries. In 1984, there was a Presidential election in the United States. In all of these elections, issues of arms control and defense were raised. NATO's December 1979 decision was not turned back in any country, and this has permitted us to negotiate with greater confidence. In the end, however, the ultimate contribution of the INF Treaty will be measured by how we manage our security in the period after the Treaty is signed. The immediate benefits of the INF Treaty are clear from its terms -- the Soviet Union will

eliminate a major threat to our security, far greater in scale than the numbers of systems the US will eliminate as its part of the agreement. However, the INF Treaty does not relieve us of the continuing responsibilities we all share to manage effectively the combination of viable defenses, sound negotiations, and convincing policy.

NATO's Defense Ministers have accordingly agreed that the Alliance must retain a balanced mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities to provide for deterrence. Nuclear weapons must continue to provide a counter to the Warsaw Pact's larger conventional forces, to offset the Soviet Union's remaining theater nuclear capabilities, and to hold Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory at risk, thereby deterring war. The United States and allied governments have agreed that negotiations to reduce any of NATO's remaining nuclear forces in Europe should await establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces there.

Some of the concern about NATO's nuclear future stems from the fact that NATO had already made sizeable unilateral nuclear reductions prior to signature of the INF Treaty, reductions which prompted no reciprocal Soviet drawdown. In 1980, 1,000 warheads were withdrawn from Europe without replacement. As a result of NATO's 1983 Montebello Decision, 1,400 more warheads were withdrawn and one additional warhead was withdrawn for each PERSHING II and GLCM warhead brought to Europe.

In making the Montebello Decision to reduce warheads to the lowest level consistent with a flexible response strategy, NATO's Defense Ministers agreed that NATO must take steps to ensure the responsiveness, survivability, and effectiveness of the forces that would be left after NATO's unilateral reductions. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was asked to develop recommendations on how best to structure these forces to attain the most deterrent value out of a minimum number. SACEUR's recommendations involved modernization of existing systems, correction of maldeployments of

nuclear forces within Europe, and improvements to their survivability and to their command, control and communications. A number of improvement measures have been or are currently being implemented by the United States and other nations concerned. NATO is continuing to work on improvement measures which still require implementation. These include developing a follow-on to LANCE, replacing a portion of our nuclear free-fall bombs with a tactical air-to-surface missile, and producing sufficient modern nuclear artillery rounds to allow retirement of older rounds. None of these programs are constrained by the INF Treaty, which does not limit dual-capable aircraft or nuclear forces with ranges below 500 kilometers.

In addition to pursuing the requirements established prior to the INF Agreement, the Alliance has under consideration additional adjustments to ensure that NATO retains a full spectrum of nuclear deterrent options at all ranges. Such adjustments would involve existing or planned systems and would be entirely consistent with the INF Treaty provisions.

The situation regarding conventional forces is similar. Despite the INF Treaty's important security benefits -- including reducing the conventional and chemical missile threat to ports, depots and airfields -- it did not eliminate existing imbalances in the conventional forces, and it could not be expected to. Nor will it prevent the Warsaw Pact from continuing to build upon its advantages in most conventional force categories. These advantages posed a threat to NATO and to overall stability between East and West before the INF Treaty, and they will continue to do so in its wake. It follows that ongoing programs to modernize and improve NATO's conventional forces must be vigorously pursued. NATO's 1985 Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) Program to redress key deficiencies in the conventional posture requires the full support of all NATO nations, including the United States. The CDI

effort is important regardless of the INF Treaty to enable NATO to reduce its reliance on the threat of early nuclear use to deter a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, certain adjustments in NATO's conventional force structure may also be desirable to enhance the Alliance's ability to implement its strategy of flexible response. In this regard, I would commend to you the Byrd-Quayle Report describing our NATO Defense Program.

Finally, we continue strongly to support NATO development of an anti-tactical missile (ATM) capability. Although the INF Treaty will eliminate intermediate-range missiles from the Soviet inventory, short-range systems will continue to pose a significant threat. In my view, therefore, NATO will continue to require an effective ATM capability, as a logical and necessary extension of existing air defenses.

As I suggested earlier, arms control can serve as a complement to efforts to ensure deterrence through maintenance of strong, credible defenses. The INF Treaty alone would be sufficient evidence of the important role arms reduction agreements can play, in appropriate circumstances, in promoting our security. There are, as the Committee knows, other noteworthy negotiations now in process or in prospect, and I would like to touch briefly on these.

Our first priority, in keeping with the general arms control framework adopted by the North Atlantic Council Ministers at Reykjavik last June, is an effectively verifiable and stabilizing treaty reducing strategic offensive arms. The ICBMs and SLBMs of the Soviet Union under negotiation in START exist in far greater numbers and are potentially far more destructive than longer-range and shorter-range INF missiles, and they can strike every inch of NATO soil in Europe and North America. Likewise, the US systems under negotiation in START play a vital role in NATO's policy of flexible response and provide the ultimate

extended deterrent of the US. We believe that a good START treaty could enhance NATO's security, and that a START treaty should be concluded as quickly as possible.

Few people realize how far we have come in START. In 1986, the basic outlines of a START agreement implementing the concept of 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive forces became clear. Early in 1987 in Geneva, we jointly drafted language recording a number of the key elements of a treaty, and on May 8 of last year, the US tabled a draft START treaty. We had to wait three months for the Soviet draft, but when it appeared, it paralleled to a large extent the US draft.

I do not wish to mislead you. The Soviet draft treaty contained major differences in substance and a number of ambiguities and possible loopholes. In Geneva today, however, both sides are now working from a single document, a START Joint Draft Text which has already enabled us to make further progress. It is our hope that a treaty will be ready for signing this year, perhaps even in time for the Moscow Summit. But, before this point can be reached, we must be satisfied that we have achieved a good agreement including detailed and effective verification provisions.

Our START position, as was the case with INF, is designed to enhance stability, strengthen deterrence, and retain the credibility of our flexible response strategy, not to impose a disproportionate burden on our conventional forces. We must maintain a balanced deterrent even as we seek better, safer ways to maintain the peace.

One of our most important efforts in that respect, of course, is the Strategic Defense Initiative. The SDI seeks to lay the foundation for a safer, more secure future for the United States and our Allies, based on increasingly defense-reliant deterrence. We have recently tabled a draft treaty at the Defense and Space

Talks in Geneva which would help to provide a jointly-managed, predictable and stable basis for developing, testing, and -- when proven feasible -- deploying effective defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will continue to insist on linking a START agreement to measures which would kill or cripple the SDI. Our position, however, is clear; we will not jeopardize our long-term security or that of our Allies by accepting any restrictions on the SDI beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty.

With regard to chemical weapons, the US is an active participant in CW negotiations under the auspices of the 40-member United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The US and the Soviet Union also discuss CW bilaterally in Geneva. Over the years, Soviet contributions were negligible, if not obstructive. Once Congress demonstrated its support for the modernization of the US chemical weapon stockpile, however, the Soviet side began to show interest. In 1986, the Administration fulfilled Congressional preconditions for funding of the binary program (which includes the 155mm artillery shell, the BIGEYE bomb, and the Multiple Launcher Rocket System). In the same year, NATO approved the program as a US Force Goal. Once the President certified to Congress that necessary actions had been taken, the Soviets made several overtures attempting to portray agreement not only as possible, but at hand. The major Soviet step has been acceptance in principle of the US proposal for mandatory on-site challenge inspections to insure compliance with a treaty. It has been nearly five months since that step, but the Soviets have yet to specify any details of their "in principle" agreement. We believe the Soviet activities are directly related to our binary program. As recently as January of this year, the Soviets reacted to the first production of binary weapons (December 17, 1987) by suggesting that such production

is designed to torpedo the negotiations. In truth, it is the binary program and our commitment to our security that have brought on the Soviets' interest in the negotiations.

Despite Soviet assertions that a treaty is at hand, there are numerous and complex issues that must be resolved. Verification of a CW convention is exponentially more difficult than verification of agreements about nuclear weapons, and a small quantity of CW stocks, under modern doctrine and delivery techniques, is militarily significant, potentially decisive in theater. We must address verification issues that we are not sure can be resolved. In addition, we and our allies are concerned about national security under the provisions of any agreement that provides for transition to the complete elimination of CW. There is also concern about CW possessor states that might not sign a CW convention. These and other problems will require careful deliberation and negotiation before any CW Pact can become a reality.

In the area of confidence-building measures, the United States has achieved considerable progress. All four Weinberger initiatives have led to agreements with the Soviet Union in one form or another. We have upgraded the hotline to include facsimile transmissions. We have reached agreement on a nuclear risk reduction center, although the Soviet Union would not agree to a joint military communications link. We have reached agreement on improved embassy-to-capital communications, and we have agreed on certain accident measures provisions. As a result of the CDE talks in Stockholm, we have negotiated a number of confidence-building measures related to military activities in Europe, and we have conducted actual on-site inspection within the Soviet Union.

In the area of conventional arms reductions, we are trying to reinvigorate what had become a moribund topic. After years of Soviet intransigence in the Mutual and Balanced Force

Reduction (MBFR) Talks, East and West are discussing a mandate for talks aimed at reducing conventional forces from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals. These Conventional Stability Talks (CST) will be a major step forward, because MBFR's focus on the limited area of Central Europe was always a major impediment to an equitable agreement. In the CST mandate talks in Vienna, we have agreed with the East that the objectives of the negotiation will be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels. We have agreed to pursue these objectives by eliminating the disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that are prejudicial to stability and security, especially the disparities that give one side the capability to launch a surprise attack and initiate large-scale offensive action.

Our mandate discussions for CST with the East have been conducted in parallel with Alliance discussions about an initial proposal, to be put forward when the CST begins. Although a number of issues remain to be worked out, there is broad agreement within the Alliance to drop MBFR's exclusive focus on manpower in favor of offensive equipment, especially tanks and artillery. In addition to being more verifiable, we think this also places the emphasis on a more relevant index of offensive capability. While we will address these forces in the entire Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, we will also focus on forward deployed Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. We are also determined to press for large asymmetrical cuts.

The question in all this, of course, is: Why would the Soviets agree? Frankly, we are not sure. The East may hope to get some Western concessions for Eastern conventional force reductions that are planned in any case. And they clearly hope to reduce our remaining nuclear deterrent forces in Europe by negotiating limits on our dual-capable systems. On the other hand, Soviet ground forces deployed in Eastern Europe are more

than forces of occupation, as tragic as that is -- they are a primary means through which the Soviet Union, anemic in political and economic terms, can influence and even attempt to coerce the West. This is a posture the Soviet Union will not give up easily. But they have stated that they are ready to eliminate disparities by reducing to the lower of NATO or Pact force levels. We hope to hold them to the offer.

The Soviet Union is unlikely to show real flexibility in conventional arms control until Moscow is persuaded that the US and its European allies are prepared to shoulder the burden necessary to counter the Soviet advantage. Hence, with or without INF and START, we must step up the programs under way to strengthen our conventional defenses. This will strengthen the hands of our negotiators in Vienna as well.

In their totality, these various arms control efforts constitute an enterprise of awesome complexity. I can assure the Committee that the Department of Defense will spare no effort to ensure harmony among these efforts, and to see that they are meshed carefully with our force planning and modernization in terms of objectives, timing and security benefits. We will be careful, too, to make proper allowances for the risk of failure, so that we do not engender the notion that an agreement must be concluded at almost any cost.

Finally, let me share with you my thoughts as to fundamental directions for NATO in the years ahead. I believe it will be apparent to you from what I have said so far that, by and large, I believe NATO is already on the right track. NATO does not need a sharp change of direction, although useful innovation is always welcome, but NATO does need to build momentum. For now, the Alliance is moving ahead steadily. The INF Treaty represents one of the greatest successes in NATO's history. NATO has the right strategy -- flexible response and forward defense. And we can maintain an effective triad of forces to implement

that strategy if we continue with essential modernization and other improvements, largely independent of the INF Treaty.

In my judgment, the essential challenge lies more in reinforcing and building on our current plans and initiatives than in a revolutionary new approach to NATO security. Nevertheless, we can and must step up our efforts on a number of fronts.

We must ensure the allocation of the necessary resources; that is the indispensable base, without which better use of available funds will still fall woefully short.

It will be important to have a clear appreciation of the nature and magnitude of the threat, and to make a special effort to remind our people of the reality of the continuing Soviet arms buildup.

While our NATO allies make a greater contribution to the common defense than they are usually given credit for, we believe that we can fairly ask them to assume a greater share of the defense burden. This does not mean larger defense budgets in all cases; but certain allies are clearly capable of greater effort. Moreover, we are pressing for exploration of other ways in which the allies can enhance the effectiveness and significance of the European contribution.

For our part, we must maintain our forward deployments in Europe at approximately current levels. As Secretary Carlucci told the Committee, holding our troop levels more or less constant is essential to maintaining and, if possible, improving the conventional balance in Europe, and to providing an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate real reductions.

There is a need for greater innovation in our approach to cooperative programs in the Alliance; in our pursuit of low-cost measures to enhance the conventional posture; and in the quest for greater efficiency in the way we procure and maintain our forces and equipment. In all this, the Alliance must do a better

job of capitalizing on its strengths, most notably our superior technology. In due course, we expect our current work on Competitive Strategies to help us and our allies align our strengths against persistent Soviet weaknesses, and channel the competition into areas less threatening to us.

These and other means of improving our posture are set forth in greater detail in the Report submitted to the Congress on January 25.

Lastly, and most importantly, we must have the political will to stay the course. For me, one of the most encouraging, indeed exciting, aspects of this particular conjuncture in Alliance affairs is the opportunity we may have to achieve further progress in bilateral and multilateral arms and defense cooperation.

Mr. Chairman, it is my hope and expectation that the NATO Summit which President Reagan will attend on March 2 and 3 in Brussels will serve to reinforce NATO's crucial role in the defense of Western freedom and values. The Summit should, I believe, reaffirm the continuing validity of NATO's strategy of flexible response, place arms control in its proper context as one aspect of our efforts to ensure security and stability, and promote public understanding of our defense programs and how they fit together to ensure the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent posture. On that basis, I am sure that the US and its allies can then move confidently ahead on our joint undertaking to secure peace and freedom.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Ambassador Lehman.

Next, Ambassador Rowny, we are delighted to have you this morning, and we welcome your statement. If you would like to put your entire statement in the record, we will do that by unanimous consent, and you can either summarize or give the statement, whatever you prefer.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD L. ROWNY, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL MATTERS

Ambassador ROWNY. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to put the statement in the record and draw from it in that fashion.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, the statement will be part of the record.

Ambassador ROWNY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, in 1979 after 6 years as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to SALT II, I resigned from the Army to testify against that treaty. Today, after a great deal of careful consideration, I appear before this committee to urge that the Senate ratify the INF Treaty. Unlike SALT II, the INF Treaty is sound, it can be effectively verified, and it serves our national security interests.

I will not review the entire history of the dual track decision or the course of the negotiations in detail. Rather, I will relate why I personally feel this agreement is worthy of your ratification. And here I will just tick off some of the points that are in my statement, Mr. Chairman.

In 1981, after lengthy consultations, we and our allies decided on five objectives for the INF negotiations.

First, we required equality of rights and limits. That was met.

Second, we insisted that the negotiations deal with U.S. and Soviet systems only, and that has been met.

Third, and here I want to elaborate a little further, the limits must be global, precluding transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia, or vice versa. At the President's request, I undertook almost 300,000 miles of travel in the last 4 years, to allied and friendly capitals, primarily in Asia. From my many trips to Asian capitals during the negotiations to consult with our allies and friends, it was clear that they strongly supported global zero. They opposed interim solutions that did not eliminate the SS-20 threat to Asia.

I related these concerns to the President and pressed for a global zero outcome. As a result of the President's firmness on this issue and strong pressure by the Asian governments on the Soviet Union, the INF Treaty calls for a global elimination of the INF missiles.

Fourth, the agreement must be effectively verifiable. This is the fourth of the objectives we set in 1981. Certainly no airtight verification regime in an arms control agreement is possible with so secretive a society as the Soviet Union. The INF provisions, however, satisfy reasonable criteria of effectiveness. I will not go into those except to stress the one that I think is most important, and that is that the treaty provides for a ban on flight tests of INF missiles. Without flight tests, the Soviets cannot remain confident of the

military efficiency, safety and reliability of any illicit missiles for more than a few years.

However, at this point, let me point out that the verification provisions for INF will not, repeat not suffice for START, which poses far more complex verification problems. It will be much harder to verify a 50-percent reduction in START which will permit continuing production, testing and deployment of a variety of systems than it will be to verify INF which reduces all United States and Soviet weapons systems in that class to zero.

Our final objective was that the INF Treaty cause no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability. The treaty before the Senate satisfies that requirement. To be sure, imbalances in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces exist today, and as both speakers before me have emphasized, they will continue to exist after the INF missiles are eliminated.

The INF Treaty, while not a panacea, does help NATO. It eliminates the shorter range Soviet SS-12's and SS-23's, both of which are capable of delivering not only nuclear warheads, but also conventional and chemical warheads on key NATO targets such as depots and airfields vital to our reinforcement capabilities. Furthermore, by excluding the Soviet demands to include dual-capable aircraft, the treaty ensures that this important element of NATO's capabilities will not be constrained.

Some have argued that this treaty is a step toward the denuclearization of Europe. I do not see this as the case. Nuclear weapons are and still will remain an essential component of NATO's deterrent for the foreseeable future. Flexible response will continue to be a viable NATO strategy, employing a mix of nuclear weapons, such as Lance missiles, artillery-fired atomic projectiles, and on aircraft capable of striking the Soviet homeland. In addition, a number of U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads remain committed to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Once all our INF missiles are removed, NATO will still retain in Europe about 4,000 nuclear weapons on a variety of delivery systems, and of course, our strategic nuclear systems are the ultimate guarantor of deterrence. They will be unaffected by this treaty, as are the systems of our British and French allies.

In addition, the 1983 Montebello decision which resulted in the unilateral reduction by NATO of 1,400 nuclear weapons in Europe also committed the alliance to a rigorous program of nuclear modernization. Modernization, Mr. Chairman, is the other side of the coin that permitted such a large reduction.

The commitment to modernize must be met, and the programs identified by SACEUR must be implemented. This includes development of the following-on Lance, a tactical standoff air-to-surface missile, modernized nuclear artillery, nuclear gravity bombs and dual-capable aircraft. Nuclear security and survivability must also continue to be improved.

In the end, we met the five objectives we established for ourselves in the INF negotiations. NATO must continue to take those steps needed to persuade the Soviets that the costs of any aggression would outweigh the gains.

Therefore, I would urge that this committee look at the future of NATO beyond the elimination of the intermediate and shorter

range missiles from Europe. In the final analysis, the INF treaty highlights our continuing need to redress the existing conventional imbalance while we maintain a viable nuclear deterrent in Europe.

Over the period of years I have negotiated with the Soviets, Soviet officials have frankly admitted to me that the cutting edge of their political and military power is their conventional forces. They may be attempting to mesmerize the West with nuclear reductions, while protecting the utility of their conventional superiority. The hard facts are that without a concerted NATO effort to strengthen its conventional capabilities, the Soviets lack a strong incentive to reduce the threat they pose to the alliance. Soviet leaders are, in my opinion, gambling that NATO will not rise to the occassion and will not redress the current conventional imbalance.

While this task will be politically and economically challenging, there is no objective reason why European NATO with the population and gross national product larger than the Soviet Union, together with the United States and Canada, cannot meet this challenge. We have heard this so often that we seem to tune it out. But we must face the facts squarely; the matter of redressing the conventional imbalance, in the ultimate analysis, is a matter of political will.

Much thought has already been devoted to how to redress the conventional imbalance and improve NATO's conventional force structure. NATO's conventional defense improvements initiative, the so-called CDI, is addressing those known deficiencies in the alliance force posture. It deals with such items as reinforcements, follow-on forces attack, sustainability and air defense. Admiral Crowe has already testified to this committee on the additional steps that the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel are needed.

Secretary of Defense Carlucci's report in support of NATO strategy in the 1990's provides a detailed analysis of what needs to be accomplished. In addition, Ambassador David Abshire has provided to this committee specific low-cost recommendations designed to redress the conventional imbalance.

I also must mention the report of the Independent Bi-partisan Federal Advisory Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, the so-called Wohlstetter-Ikle report. It also provides some useful ideas on broad, long term security issues that warrant the attention of this committee.

Meanwhile, of course, we should continue to seek to reduce the Soviet threat through negotiations. I will not repeat the negotiations that are in process mentioned by the other speakers. I do want to say that we have learned from experience in dealing with the Soviets that such negotiations have a chance of success only if we deal from strength.

I want to mention also the issue of chemical weapons. It is very important that our approach be similar, that is, modernize and negotiate. Continued congressional support for the modernization of chemical weapons is critical.

At the other end of the spectrum, we are actively negotiating on START. However, we must be careful. The Soviets, here too, are gambling that we are so eager to enter into an agreement on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive weapons that we will make unwise concessions or compromise our ability and our right

to conduct the research, development and testing necessary to establish the feasibility of our strategic defenses.

A START Treaty like the one proposed by the United States would provide for deep, stabilizing and verifiable reductions and would enhance the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Reducing the Soviet's capability to conduct a first strike would have a stabilizing effect. In addition, the complementary modernization efforts proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the remaining U.S. strategic forces should be carried out.

And here, modernization of conventional forces in Europe also will play a key role in addition to the modernization of the offensive and defensive strategic forces of the United States.

I cannot emphasize too strongly, Mr. Chairman, that a START agreement should stand on its own merits and not be linked, as the Soviet Union continues to demand, to crippling limits to our Strategic Defense Initiative. Under no circumstances should we allow a START agreement to become hostage to limits on our ability and right to conduct that research, testing and development which is needed to establish the feasibility of the defense that could protect us and our allies from a ballistic missile attack.

A year ago the Soviets dropped their tactic of linking INF with START and SDI. We must continue to insist that they also delink START from SDI.

Even as President Reagan expressed his greatest satisfaction with the INF agreement, he took pains to remind us that it is but a single step forward in arms reduction. Even more importantly, President Reagan reminded us that arms reductions are but one element in our relationship with the Soviet Union. Improvement in United States-Soviet relations is tied to significant changes in Soviet behavior in other key areas of our relationship such as human rights, bilateral affairs and regional issues. If we place most of our emphasis on arms control and neglect these other key areas, we will fall into the trap of dealing with the symptoms rather than the causes of East-West tension. As President Reagan has said on numerous occasions, we do not mistrust one another because we have arms; we have arms because we mistrust one another.

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me repeat, that I do support ratification of the INF Treaty. It is a product of years of congressional and allied consultations and cooperation, and I emphasize the importance that the Asian allies have also had in this treaty. It serves the security and political interests of the United States and our NATO allies, and is fully supported by our friends and allies in Asia. However, I urge that this committee not dwell too long on INF. Rather, I would like to see this committee move ahead and give serious attention to the long-term political and military objectives of the United States and NATO.

To this end, I urge the committee to continue support of President's Reagan's broad approach to East-West relations. I also strongly urge that this committee take the lead in Congress to strengthen NATO's conventional forces and to continue your support of NATO security assistance programs.

I am confident this committee will also continue to play a key role in providing us the wherewithal to successfully modernize the

strategic offensive forces and to move forward in strategic defense programs.

That is what I would like you to draw from my statement, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Rowny follows:]

Statement by

Ambassador Edward L. Rowny

Special Advisor to the President and

Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters

on the INF Treaty

Mr. Chairman:

In 1979, after six years as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the SALT II negotiations I resigned from the Army to testify against that fatally flawed treaty. Today, after a great deal of careful consideration, I appear before this Committee to urge that the Senate ratify the INF Treaty. Unlike SALT II, the INF Treaty is sound. It can be effectively verified. It serves our nation's security interests. Since President Reagan initiated the INF talks with the Soviets, this administration has practiced patience, consulted continually with our allies and Congress and negotiated from strength. This Treaty is a victory for our approach to the negotiations.

I will not review the history of the dual track decision or the course of the negotiations in detail. Rather, I will relate why I personally feel this is an agreement that is worthy of ratification and should not be saddled with conditions or amendments.

In 1981, after lengthy consultations, we and our NATO allies decided on five objectives for the INF negotiations.

First, we required equality of rights and limits. The INF Treaty is the first ever to provide for asymmetrical reductions of nuclear-armed missile arsenals to equal levels -- in this case zero -- rather than simply setting limits on their growth. This outcome should end the Soviet charade of insisting that "equality" means "equal reductions" - a principle that wrongly benefits the side that builds up, and punishes the side that shows restraint.

Second, we insisted that the negotiations deal with U.S. and Soviet systems only. This Treaty covers only the INF missiles of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, despite repeated Soviet attempts to obtain offsets for the systems of third parties.

Third, the limits must be global, precluding transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia or vice versa. At the President's request I have undertaken almost 300,000 miles of travel in the last four years to allied and friendly capitals, primarily in Asia. From my many trips to Asian capitals during the negotiations to consult with our allies and friends it was clear that they strongly supported "global zero." They opposed interim solutions that did not eliminate the SS-20 threat to Asia. I related their concerns to the President and pressed for a global zero outcome. As a result of the President's firmness on this issue and strong pressure by Asian governments on the Soviet Union, the INF Treaty calls for the global elimination of INF missiles.

Fourth, the agreement must be effectively verifiable. Certainly no "air-tight" verification regime in an arms control agreement is possible with so secretive a society as the Soviet Union. The INF verification provisions, however, satisfy reasonable criteria of effectiveness. Let me touch on some of its features:

* For the first time in a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement, each side will send on-site inspection teams to verify the data provided by the other.

* Inspectors from each side will observe the elimination of the missiles and related equipment throughout a three-year elimination period.

* Even after all the missiles have been eliminated, U.S. inspectors will remain for up to 10 more years at the Votkinsk final

assembly facility. The SS-20 first stage is outwardly similar to that of the long-range SS-25. To be certain the Soviets are not producing SS-20s, our inspectors will be permitted to measure, weigh and image all SS-25 canisters leaving Votkinsk.

* Each side will be permitted "short notice" inspections at present and former INF facilities during the entire 13 years of on-site monitoring.

* Perhaps most important, the treaty provides for a ban on the flight-testing of INF missiles. Without flight tests, the Soviets cannot remain confident of the military efficiency, safety, and reliability of any illicit missiles for more than a few years.

Since so many verification details of the INF Treaty are without precedent, the implementation of this accord will provide a test of verification procedures applicable to future agreements. However, verification provisions for INF will not suffice for START which poses far more complex verification problems. It will be much harder to verify a 50 percent reduction in START, which will permit continuing production, testing and deployment of a variety of systems than it will be to verify INF, which reduces all U.S. and Soviet weapons systems in that class to zero.

Our final objective was that the INF Treaty cause no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability. The Treaty before the Senate satisfies that requirement. To be sure, imbalances in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces exist today and will continue to exist after the INF missiles are eliminated. The INF Treaty, while not a panacea, does help NATO. It eliminates the shorter-range Soviet SS-12's and SS-23's, both of which are capable of delivering not only nuclear warheads but also conventional and chemical warheads on key NATO targets such as depots and airfields vital to our reinforcement capabilities.

Furthermore, by excluding the Soviet demand to include dual-capable aircraft, the Treaty ensures that this important element of NATO's capabilities will not be constrained.

Some argue that this Treaty is a step toward the "denuclearization" of Europe. This is not the case. Nuclear weapons are and will remain an essential component of NATO's deterrent for the foreseeable future. Flexible response will continue to be a viable NATO strategy, employing a mix of nuclear weapons on Lance missiles, artillery-fired atomic projectiles and on aircraft capable of striking the Soviet homeland. In addition, a number of U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads remain committed to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Once all our INF missiles are removed, NATO will still retain in Europe about 4000 nuclear warheads on a variety of delivery systems. Our strategic nuclear systems, the ultimate guarantor of deterrence, are unaffected by this Treaty, as are British and French nuclear systems.

In addition, the 1983 Montebello Decision, which resulted in the unilateral reduction by NATO of 1400 nuclear weapons in Europe, also committed the Alliance to a rigorous program of nuclear modernization. Modernization is the other side of the coin that permitted such a large reduction. The commitment to modernize must be met, and the programs identified by SACEUR must be implemented. This includes development of a follow-on Lance, a tactical stand-off air to surface missile (TASM), modernized nuclear artillery, nuclear gravity bombs and dual-capable aircraft. Nuclear security and survivability must also continue to be improved.

In the end we met the five objectives we established for ourselves in the INF negotiations. But NATO must continue take those steps needed to persuade the Soviets that the costs of any aggression would outweigh the gains. Therefore, I would urge that this Committee look at the future of NATO, beyond the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles from Europe. In the final

analysis the INF Treaty highlights our continuing need to redress the existing conventional imbalance while we maintain a viable nuclear deterrent in Europe. Soviet officials have frankly admitted to me that the cutting edge of their political and military power lies in their conventional forces. They may be attempting to mesmerize the West with nuclear reductions while protecting the utility of their conventional superiority.

The hard facts are that without a concerted NATO effort to strengthen its conventional capabilities, the Soviets lack a strong incentive to reduce the threat they pose to the Alliance. Soviet leaders are gambling that NATO will not rise to the occasion and redress the current conventional imbalance. While this task will be politically and economically challenging there is no objective reason why European NATO, with more population and larger total gross product than the Soviet Union, together with the U.S. and Canada, cannot meet the challenge. We have heard this so often that we tune it out. But let's face the issue squarely. It is a matter of political will.

Much thought has already been devoted to redressing the conventional imbalance and improving NATO's conventional force posture. NATO's Conventional Defense Improvements initiative (CDI) is addressing known deficiencies in the Alliance force posture. It deals with such items as reinforcements, follow-on forces attack, sustainability, and air-defense. Admiral Crowe has testified to this Committee on the additional steps the Joint Chiefs feel are needed. Secretary of Defense Carlucci's recent report, "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's," provides a detailed analysis on what needs to be accomplished. In addition, Ambassador David Abshire has provided to this Committee specific low-cost recommendations designed to redress the conventional imbalance. The report of the independent, bipartisan Federal Advisory Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy also provides

some useful ideas on broad, long-term security issues that warrant the attention of this Committee.

Meanwhile, we should continue to seek to reduce the Soviet threat through negotiations. However, we have learned from experience in dealing with the Soviets that such negotiations have a chance of success only if we deal from strength.

On the negotiations track both the United States and our NATO allies remain committed to achieving an equitable and verifiable agreement at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) in Vienna. In 1972 I was the first chairman of the MBFR Working Group. Unfortunately, during all the years since the MBFR Talks began, little progress has resulted because the Warsaw Pact has little incentive to reduce its superiority in conventional forces.

Today NATO is seeking to begin two distinct conventional security negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The first negotiation, among the 35 CSCE states, will carry forward the work of the Stockholm Conference. The second negotiation, referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST), would encompass the 16 members of NATO and the 7 member countries of the Warsaw Pact. The goal of this negotiation will be to eliminate the conventional imbalance by removing destabilizing military disparities and eliminating the capacity for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. The mandate for these talks is now under negotiation in Vienna.

On the issue of chemical weapons our approach is similar: modernize and negotiate. Continued Congressional support for the modernization of chemical weapons is critical. In the absence of a verifiable chemical treaty it is essential that the U.S. maintain a credible chemical weapons deterrent force. To this end, we have undertaken to replace certain existing weapons with modern, safer

binary chemical weapons. At the same time we continue to pursue the goal of a truly global and effectively verifiable ban on these weapons and have tabled a draft treaty to that effect.

At the other end of the spectrum, we are actively negotiating on START. However, we must be careful. The Soviets are gambling that we are so eager to enter into an agreement on 50% reductions of strategic offensive weapons that we will make unwise concessions or compromise our ability and our right, to conduct the research, development and testing necessary to establish the feasibility of advanced strategic defenses. A START Treaty, like the one proposed by the United States, would provide for deep, stabilizing, and verifiable reductions and would enhance the security of both the U.S. and the USSR. Reducing the Soviets' capability to conduct a first strike would have a stabilizing effect. In addition, the complementary modernization efforts proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the remaining U.S. strategic forces should be carried out. Here, as in the modernization of conventional forces in Europe, this Committee will play a key role.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that a START agreement should stand on its own merits and not be linked, as the Soviets continue to demand, to crippling limits on our Strategic Defense Initiative. Under no circumstances should we allow a START agreement to become hostage to limits on our ability and right to conduct research, testing and development needed to establish the feasibility of defenses that could protect us and our Allies from a ballistic missile attack. A year ago, the Soviets dropped their tactic of linking INF with START and SDI. We must continue to insist that they also delink START from SDI.

Even as President Reagan expressed his greatest satisfaction with the INF Agreement, he took pains to remind us that it is but a single step forward in arms reductions. More importantly, President

Reagan has also reminded us that arms reductions are but one element in our relationship with the Soviet Union. Improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is tied to significant changes in Soviet behavior in the other key areas of our relationship: human rights, bilateral affairs and regional issues. If we place most of our emphasis on arms control and neglect these other key areas, we will fall into the trap of dealing with the symptoms rather than the causes of East-West tensions. As President Reagan has said, "we don't mistrust one another because we have arms, we have arms because we mistrust one another."

In conclusion let me repeat that I support ratification of this Treaty. It is the product of years of Congressional and Alliance consultations and cooperation. It serves the security and political interests of the United States and our NATO allies and is fully supported by our friends and allies in Asia. However, I urge that this Committee not dwell too long on INF. Rather, it should move ahead and give serious attention to the longer term political and military objectives of the United States and NATO. To this end, I urge this Committee continue its support of President Reagan's broad approach to East-West relations. I also strongly urge that this Committee continue to take the lead in Congress to strengthen NATO's conventional forces and to continue your support of NATO security assistance programs. I am confident that this Committee will also continue to play a key role in providing us the wherewithal to successfully modernize our strategic offensive forces and to move forward in our strategic defense programs.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Ambassador Rowny.

I will start off the questioning, and we will rotate it on our normal 6 minute rule.

We talk a lot about the modernization of our remaining nuclear weapons in Europe, and of course there is a lot of discussion in Europe about that. There were two or three points that we came away with in the recent week that we spent in Europe—Senator Warner and myself, Senator Byrd, Senator Boren, and Senator Pell.

One point that I think we all ought to put in focus is that there is nobody in the alliance, in government in the alliance that is advocating a triple zero—that is, going to zero on the very short range weapons. There is no one in government in the alliance that we talked to, at least, that is advocating denuclearizing a segment of Central Europe. The disagreement comes on Montebello and in what timeframe that would be implemented, and really what Montebello means in the post-INF period. And the other disagreement among the allies comes on the question of when do we start negotiating downward, not to zero, but downward on the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe.

Of course, the German Government is very sensitive on that latter point and on the decision about modernization.

We here in this committee will be facing in the next several weeks the question about what we do with the requests from the administration on nuclear modernization. And we have got to take into account, of course, the budget situation and also the situation with our allies.

I would like to ask first of all, Secretary Ridgway and Ambassador Lehman, what is Montebello? What did Montebello pledge the alliance to, and how much has that changed just by the nature of the INF Treaty?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Mr. Chairman, I had hoped to bring with me some papers on that, and they were classified, and I would like to submit them later, if I might, but I took them out of my book.

[The information follows:]

1983 MONTEBELLO LANGUAGE ON NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION

Recognizing that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective, Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including a continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Montebello was a decision, in 1983, on the defense side of the alliance, the nuclear side of the alliance, that had two parts. First, there is this wonderful word of maldeployment, which I have come to hear so much about; it is sort of the wrong thing in the wrong amount in the wrong place with the wrong mission, and the review by the defense side of the alliance of its nuclear force structure in this range of weaponry produced a number of conclusions about systems that in fact could be done without or in smaller numbers.

It produced, as well, a set of decisions as to what appropriate systems should remain, given the tasks at hand, and among those systems which over time would require modernization. There was concern also with survivability and how one would upgrade for survivability.

The decision concerning reductions, that is, a net drop of 1,400 nuclear weapons in Europe, was agreed to, and those kinds of reductions have been taking place. At the same time, the alliance called upon the Soviets to match those reductions on a unilateral basis, but it never took place. And then the Montebello, what is now a Montebello process, because it is a continuing thing, placed before the defense leadership of the alliance a set of recommendations, not final decisions, but a set of recommendations with respect to the kinds of things that the defense ministers believed, and the high level group, and the Nuclear Planning Group, SACEUR, believed were the kinds of steps, that I would call force improvement, that would need to be taken over a period of time.

Specific decisions have not been made.

Chairman NUNN. Have not been made.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Have not been made. They are being made on a national basis by national authorities. We certainly believe that all of the recommendations, Lance follow-on, tactical air-to-surface missile, artillery modernization, that all of those things are good things and should move forward, but they were recommendations to ministers.

Chairman NUNN. But they have not been—we did not have a Montebello decision that absolutely bound the allies, for instance, to the Lance follow-on, is that right?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That is correct, that is correct. They were recommendations.

Chairman NUNN. The specific part of Montebello, as I understand it, was the withdrawal of the 1,400 outmoded weapons. The general pledge at Montebello was that we were going to modernize in accordance with the general military consensus, but that would be presented over the next several years, is that correct?

Ms. RIDGWAY. The general understanding was that in order for the reductions to take place, that there would be modernization. It was implicit if not explicit that those reductions could not take place if we were not going to improve, if you will, modernize, the remaining systems. And then the military authorities presented an improvement or modernization program, and it is implicit again that the alliance would go ahead with that.

Now, the decisions as to timing and things of that sort have not been made.

Chairman NUNN. We met with Chancellor Kohl, along with other European leaders, and after we had left that meeting, we had extensive discussions. There was a release that was made by his office that clarifies to some extent the speech he made at the Wehrkunde Conference, which I think some people attended or at least followed closely.

Part of that statement, says and I will quote from it,

At its meetings in Reykjavik in June and then in Brussels in December last year, the North Atlantic Council decided it would be necessary as part of this concept to bring about tangible and verifiable reductions of United States and Soviet land-

based short-range INF, that is, systems with ranges of less than 500 kilometers. This would be done in conjunction with the establishment of conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons.

I continue to quote,

In this situation, the Federal Government does not see any need for an isolated decision on modernization or nonmodernization of individual nuclear systems at the present time. It is felt that decisions of this kind can only be made on the basis of a comprehensive concept yet to be developed. In this process, the alliance will have to define the overall future structure of its nuclear potential, including nuclear systems with ranges of less than 500 kilometers.

So my question is, Chancellor Kohl is clearly saying that there is no overall concept that has now been agreed on in a post-INF framework.

First, do you agree with that, and second, if you do or do not agree with it, is this going to be a top item on the agenda for the summit coming up in March?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Mr. Chairman, let me say first of all, I think between what I am saying and what the Chancellor is saying, there is no difference concerning whether a decision to modernize was taken. A decision was made to modernize, and I recall at the same conference Defense Minister Woerner stated on behalf of the Federal Republic that that remains valid.

There is a discussion on systems, when and where. There is, as the Chancellor's statement suggests, a discussion on a comprehensive concept, some say of security, some say of arms control. Perhaps, indeed, the comprehensive concept that I find missing is that so many things have been set in motion in this increasingly complex world of negotiating reductions and staying strong and modernizing while not jeopardizing one's force posture, that people begin to feel the absence of a coherent pattern.

I do not share that view. It is true the alliance in Reykjavik in June 1987 laid out its arms control priorities. That would be part of any comprehensive concept. Those arms control priorities are agreed. We have mentioned them today, in START, chemical and conventional forces.

The alliance also agreed that, in conjunction with the achievement of a conventional balance and a global and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, reductions in tactical nuclear missiles, not systems but missiles, between the United States and the Soviet Union, to lower levels would be a part of that.

There are other so-called SNFs, short-range nuclear systems, besides missiles. I think the sense that somehow the alliance needs to get together and wrap this all up because no one has a sense of a roadmap is not one that I would share.

But it is true that the alliance on the political side from Reykjavik has been attempting to put all in one place this variety of activities. Now, whether that would come up at the NATO summit as the search for a comprehensive concept, I do not know.

I would expect it very much to be behind the discussion, to be the backdrop to the discussion. I do not see how one could avoid that. It is a very current topic.

Chairman NUNN. I guess the bottom line, if I could borrow a couple of minutes on my next round, the bottom line that this committee and the Congress is going to have to decide is, should Amer-

ica get out in front with a nuclear modernization program that has not been agreed to or signed off on by the alliance, particularly those countries that would be most affected.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Nunn, if I could address a couple of the questions you have raised, including this last question. I think it is not the case that the alliance does not have an overall concept.

I would note that Chancellor Kohl himself highlighted the elements of what has been a very consistent approach: the importance of flexible response, the importance of the NATO triad, the importance of recognizing that we cannot have the denuclearization of Europe, no third zero—the themes that you have mentioned.

I think that Ambassador Ridgway is correct, that these have been very exciting times for the alliance. You have had a major arms control success. You have seen some events in East-West relations that we have to evaluate.

And I think that in that context we have to explain once again the basic validity of our approach and also how we intend to fine tune it to take into account changing realities.

Let me address the Montebello decision in the context of flexible response. I think it is quite clear that modernization is not something where one goes out and suddenly says: "well, what do you think, shall we modernize?" We modernize all the time.

And indeed, with respect to our nuclear forces, if you did not modernize you would inevitably have the denuclearization of Europe and the third zero. So obviously, modernization is something that we must do and we do exercise all the time.

This committee votes funds continuously for modernization. And much of this is simply for our own national purposes, but also in support of NATO. And these efforts, both the national efforts and alliancewide efforts, are coordinated with the alliance, both through the military structure and through the political structure, including the NATO High Level Group and the Nuclear Planning Group, which involves defense ministers.

Now, with respect to Montebello, I think Ambassador Ridgway is correct that basically this was a package that was approved, that involved both reductions and the commitment to modernization. The defense ministers endorsed certain requirements.

Among those requirements were a follow-on to Lance and a tactical air to-surface missile, program which are in the process of evolution.

Now, with respect to what one might call final decisions, obviously there are final decisions that have to be made later on, down the road. I think that it would be unwise to force final decisions prematurely.

Likewise, I think that the executive branch and legislative branch should be working together to make sure that this is a balanced approach that we are taking, that we are looking at the right approaches, both in terms of hardware and also in terms of how it fits into NATO policy.

By the way, I should point out that, in addition to Montebello, the NATO High Level Group is looking at certain adjustments that one would take, not compensation but adjustments, in the context of the INF Treaty. This work is underway.

So the alliance has this process underway, and I think it's a very straightforward effort to continue our process.

Chairman NUNN. My time has long since ran out and I will waive the next round. I think that this ought to be on the agenda of the summit. I think there is not a clear consensus on it in NATO, and I believe that before we rush out and have a large package in our own defense budget on which NATO is somewhat in disagreement, which could provoke a nonproductive debate, a counterproductive debate, both here, in Germany, and other places, that we ought to address it at the highest level and decide what we really are going to do. Whether to emphasize those very short-range systems, 20, 30, 40, 50 miles, nuclear artillery, or whether to go for a longer range standoff, air-carried type munition that would not fall in INF, or whether to modernize Lance or whether to upgrade Lance and extend the range.

I think these decisions have got to be made at very high levels. I do not agree that there is consensus now on it. I think it is a manageable problem. I do not think it's a problem that's in any way out of control, and I think we have a broad consensus, a framework within which it fits.

But I do believe that if the United States gets very far out front in this atmosphere right now, without close consultation and general consensus, that we are going to be stirring up a debate on both sides of the Atlantic that will be counterproductive.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During the course of our trip we visited with five of the major nations in NATO. Each one of the leaders gave very high marks to President Reagan and his leadership in arms control, not just INF, but also the manner in which he is working on the START agreement.

Of course, we gave reassurances. There is no rush to get to a START agreement. We are working on it carefully, and only after an agreement in our judgment is verifiable and adequate and in the security interests of this country would the President consider affixing his signature, and then only after consultation with our allies.

I praise each of you on the subject of consultation. I specifically asked each of the leaders whether the consultative process was adequate and if they felt fully informed, most particularly with START ongoing? Almost without exception, each said that the consultative process was very adequate and that they felt that they were not only being listened to, but that their views were taken into consideration. I thank you for that.

As a follow-on to Senator Nunn's observation in particular about Germany, we now have with Chancellor Kohl one of the strongest leaderships in recent memory in that nation. During the course of the Wehrkunde Conference, Secretary of Defense Carlucci made this statement in his written text:

> Holding U.S. troop levels in Europe more or less constant is essential to both ensure NATO's security and to provide an incentive for Moscow to negotiate real reductions in the Warsaw Pact conventional threat.

The press, however, in the days following—and we followed this with considerable interest—made reports along these lines:

Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci warning in Munich last weekend that U.S. troops may leave West Germany if Bonn rejects tactical nuclear arms, has apparently set the scene for confrontation at the NATO summit next month.

Let us try to clarify that today. As Senator Nunn pointed out, there is some advantage from time to time that parliamentarians of Europe speak with congressional members here, because we understand the bottom line in our business and that is votes.

If you do not have them, you are out of office. There are many difficulties in Germany, in view of the fractured political structure and coalition they have over there and looking at the precariousness of these issues in light of the defense budget, which will be coming up here in a short time.

We now know that there are some 30,000 overall reductions in our end strength in the military. Will that reduction affect NATO and was that part of Secretary Carlucci's message?

If so, I think it must be done very carefully and with prior consultation, because of the fragility of the situation outlined by Senator Nunn.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Warner, we intend to maintain our troop levels in Europe. It is our belief, as you have mentioned, that for military reasons, because of the negotiations, and because of the broader geopolitical context, that is the right thing to do.

Indeed, we have been very reluctant, even in this very tight budget environment, to consider any kind of reductions in Europe.

Senator WARNER. In answer to my question, the forthcoming announcement that we will have reductions will not affect projected troop levels in Europe?

Ambassador LEHMAN. That is right.

Senator WARNER. Let us go to the second question, then. Time flies here.

Is there any linkage between the pace of the modernization program for nuclear systems under 500 kilometers and the maintaining of our troops in Europe, as pointed out in some of the press coverage?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Warner, you have to remember that statement was made at the Wehrkunde Conference. I was there and Ambassador Ridgway was there. It is a conference of a wide variety of very distinguished government officials, nongovernment officials, intellectuals, and opposition leaders. It is very diverse.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Ambassador, I was there. I know that.

The question is, is there a linkage between forthcoming troop levels of U.S. forces in Europe and the modernization program of nuclear systems with ranges under 500 kilometers?

Ambassador LEHMAN. No. The Secretary was making a very clear statement that as a Secretary of Defense, when you are committed to maintaining U.S. troops in an area, that the troops should be deployed and have at their disposal the weapons that are necessary, whatever those may be. And that was simply the point that he was making.

Senator WARNER. Let me proceed to another matter of the ships in the Black Sea and the confrontation between the Soviet and United States ships. Again I have a special interest in that since I

negotiated the Incidents At Sea Agreement, and signed it on behalf of the United States in 1972 in Moscow.

That agreement has worked well for 14 years. It has prevented any confrontation of any major type between United States and Soviet surface naval forces and aircraft.

In my own judgment, what occurred there was a carefully preconceived, calculated decision by the Soviet Union, knowing that we have basically followed this operational plan for some time.

There has been some speculation that that incident would affect in some way the work here in the Senate on the INF Treaty and its eventual ratification. In my judgment there should be no linkage between that incident and the work here in the Senate in terms of the INF ratification process.

Do you share that view?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Yes, Senator Warner, I do. I do not want to speculate on why the event occurred, but clearly it seems to me that the INF Treaty deserves the support of the Senate on its own merits.

Senator WARNER. I agree with that. It was a serious thing. I do not mean in any way to denigrate the fact that these ships did collide, that it was preconceived. It was a political decision, not a military one, political-diplomatic. It was not the fault of the sailors.

It seems to me that we have got to go on with our work and let that situation in the Black Sea be handled on its own, hopefully avoided in the future, and that it should not directly impact on the Senate's work on INF.

Do you agree with that, Secretary Ridgway?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Senator Warner, if I could pick up two things that you said. Go on with our work, that is of course very much the background to the Black Sea challenge. We have been saying, in the context of the consideration of the INF Treaty, that too much must not be drawn from this treaty. It does not represent a change in the purposes and international objectives of the Soviet Union.

It is not the basis for euphoria with respect to the relationship. The United States continues to have very significant, indeed vital, national interests that are wrapped up in some other programs. We have chosen not to abandon those, but to continue expressing them internationally.

I think you are quite right in saying that one must regret the way the Soviet Union chose to respond to this. But the challenge represented important legal principles for the United States and we continue to address those.

So we must, as you say, keep on with the business at hand.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Welcome to you all here this morning. Let me just ask you a general question.

Chairman NUNN. I have been informed there is no vote on now. We are missing one light on the clock. I will make sure that committee staff informs the Senators when there is a vote.

Senator EXON. I get the impression, it is more than an impression, I get a feeling from talking with various people who have been here from Europe, from listening to witnesses before this committee, on the INF proposition, that possibly we have not consulted

with our NATO allies as diligently and as thoroughly as we might on a whole series of matters going back to the Reykjavik conference when they were shocked on some of the things that came out of that.

It seems that they were given some of the information on various propositions with regard to the INF Treaty after the fact. And it seems to me that the present misunderstandings, if that is the right word, with regard to the Montebello agreement are part and parcel of possibly us not giving as much advanced notice or direct consultation with our NATO allies as would be wise. Is that a wrong impression that I get?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Senator, it is not entirely wrong, but one of the everlasting features of this trans-Atlantic dialogue is that there are perceptions on both sides on occasion which simply have no basis in fact.

I have often, with respect to Reykjavik, the summit meeting, for example, had Europeans say to me, we were not consulted. That simply is not true. The months ahead of Reykjavik were full of consultation.

But late in the evening if one asks a European, now really, what was the problem, the answer, is, we were not there. Now, that is a true fact. And among the topics of discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union are subjects which are very important to Europe and they are not there.

One of the very good things that come as a result of Reykjavik then was intensified intra-European consultation, so that there might be a more effective European voice on these subjects, which could express itself to us before we engaged.

The record of consultation, however, on these arms control topics with the alliance, I would submit to any kind of an assessment, confident that it would show that it was the most extensive consultation ever engaged in.

The numbers are quite staggering. I think in the years 1986, 1987 there are something like 56 consultations between the United States and its allies on these subjects. The trips taken by the negotiators, the stops by the President, by the Secretary of State before and after, all of these make a good record.

What they cannot do, and so it is natural that there be this sense of not knowing everything, what they cannot do is make a place for Europe at that table between the United States and the Soviet Union. And so there will always be a sense that perhaps not everything is known that should be known.

Senator EXON. Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Rowny, do you disagree with or care to add to the explanation that is given by the expert witness from the State Department?

I think you gave a very excellent answer to the question. And I assumed that was the right posture. But we do keep hearing these things. And probably more than anything else it is a wide diversion of opinion of hurt feelings, people with those diverse elements that make up those governments over there wanting to be more involved.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Exon, I would not only strongly endorse everything Ambassador Ridgway has said, but I would even emphasize further that all three witnesses you have today

have spent many, many, many hours consulting with our allies on our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Now, with respect to, for example, the Montebello decision, this was not a negotiation with the Soviet Union. Rather this was a collective alliance decision, and it was the result of many, many, many meetings, not only bilateral, but also multilateral within the NATO organization. So these are all decisions that have been made with the closest of consultations, because in essence it was agreement that we were talking about.

But back on consultations on the arms control negotiating process, let me say that it is clear to me that by 1983, as the alliance was coming under pressure from the Soviet Union over the deployment of the LRINF missiles, government-to-government relations reached what may well have been a peak of close consultation.

It was a challenge to the alliance, and the alliance stepped up to it. We learned a lot of lessons in that process. We learned, for example, not only that we would have close consultations with the alliance governments but that in fact we had to make more information available to other opinion leaders, to the people of Europe themselves, and to our own people.

So I would say that far from erratic behavior, what we have is a pattern of the closest consultations in the history of the alliance.

Senator EXON. Would you care to add anything, General Rowny? My time is up. I was afraid of that. I think they ought to let you answer. Go ahead.

Ambassador ROWNY. Thank you, Senator. I would agree fully that we have tried everything humanly possible. And sometimes after these long trips to Asia, I wonder if it goes a little beyond what is humanly possible.

I made nine trips in the last 18 months to Asian capitals, as well as European capitals. So we did consult. But if I can use that as a point to answer Senator Nunn's last question, I think, with all due respect, the committee here will have to get out in front and will have to show that the United States can continue to lead in this alliance.

Now, certainly at the next NATO summit, we should consult closely. And we must again repeat the absolute necessity for modernizing these remaining nuclear systems. Because if they are not modernized, and the conventional imbalance remains, then Europe cannot sustain itself defensively.

Chairman NUNN. General, I would say I completely agree with you on the necessity to modernize. The question is, which systems get priority?

Do we go for the short-range systems that cannot get beyond the West German border? Or do we go for longer-range systems that have some chance of reaching the territory of our adversary?

These are not trivial questions. And that is the reason I went into detail about what Montebello means. How specific was it? What sort of a timeframe do we have? The way people are describing Montebello now you would think we had every single weapon and when it was going to be modernized and the timeframe and all of that. That was not done.

I think we have to be careful about terms at this very sensitive point. We have to take into consideration what our allies think about various systems, particularly in a tight budget situation.

Because if you get down to about June or July of this year, and you have a whole lot of nuclear artillery in the budget, and we have an uproar in Europe about it, then somebody is going to go back and say, hey, why did we not talk to them first?

I think we better take that into account. If we do not, we are going to have a two-way debate around the Atlantic that is going to be nonproductive, and is going to cloud the positive results, very positive results, of INF. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could editorialize a bit, I certainly share the chairman's concern about what decisions need to be made.

I thought that in Chancellor Kohl's statement at Wehrkunde that his lack of addressing the issue of modernization was conspicuous in its absence from what otherwise was a very thoughtful and important speech.

At the same time, I share Ambassador Rowny's view that we cannot and never have set back and waited for our European allies to tell us what they think is best for Europe in a vacuum.

If I were a European parliamentarian, I would respond to Senator Nunn's statement by saying, I think that this would be an abdication to some degree of the partnership that we have, if we are going to wait entirely upon European decisions as to modernization.

I think that partnership has to take place, and I think the forum is there, starting in March at the meeting that is supposed to take place. And I hope that we can get some very important results from that.

But at the same time, for us to do nothing on this committee, and wait for the Europeans to act would, I think, have serious consequences.

So let us hope that there will be an atmosphere of consultation and decisionmaking which will give this committee time to orient its budget priorities accordingly. I do share the chairman's concern that that does not seem to be coming as quickly as we would hope.

Ambassador Rowny, in your statement on page 6 you say, "in the final analysis, the INF Treaty highlights our continuing need to redress the existing conventional imbalance. . . . Soviet officials have frankly admitted to me the cutting edge of their political and military power lies in their conventional forces." Are you deeply concerned about the conventional imbalance that exists today between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces?

Ambassador Rowny. Yes, Senator, I am concerned about the conventional imbalance that exists. And I wish that there was some way to put high priority on redressing this conventional imbalance.

What I was trying to say in those few words was that over a period of years the Soviets have confided, or at least mentioned and stated, that they believe that the conventional forces are the "more usable" type of forces, that people are afraid of nuclear war.

They admit that they are too. They do not know what the consequences are. They are more used to having their way with conven-

tional war. And in my opinion, they have shown very little evidence that they are going to redress that conventional imbalance.

So unless and until that conventional imbalance is redressed, the Soviets are going to win on their gamble, as I put it, that NATO, with United States and Canada's help, from this side of the Atlantic, is not going to redress that conventional imbalance.

So I would say that the long-range view of where we are going in United States-Soviet relations hinges greatly on this question of trying to redress the conventional imbalance.

Senator McCAIN. Ambassador Lehman, do you share Ambassador Rowny's view?

Ambassador LEHMAN. My assessment is that the INF Treaty does not transfer the burden from the nuclear to the conventional.

Rather, the deficiencies we have in the conventional area need to be addressed. We need to do more than we plan to do, because of the risks involved.

And I think that we need to work closely within the alliance to get, as they used to say, more bang for the buck, or to be smarter with the dollars that we have. We need to address those concerns.

Senator McCAIN. We have recently seen studies, some of them private and none that I have seen from the Department of Defense, that make a case that the conventional imbalance is either very small or, in the case of some studies, nonexistent. And yet we are unable to get a nonclassified view of the situation from the Department of Defense.

I wonder if you are going to do anything in your next job to produce such a document so that the American people can at least get the administration's view of this imbalance, if it indeed exists.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator McCain, I think that is an excellent suggestion. Let me take a look at that and see what we might do to help in this regard.

We have a large number of classified studies, of course, that deal with the problem of the balance from the point of view of the military men who would have to defend, for example, NATO Europe or other regions of the world.

And each of them, unfortunately, is very complex, very scenario-dependent. And how you translate all of these important planning documents and assessment documents into a kind of net assessment is a bit of a more complex step. But let me take a look at it and see what we can do to make something unclassified available.

Senator McCAIN. Well, let me say, if you share my view that there is not only a conventional imbalance today but that the trends are not in our favor, then we have to inform the American people of that situation. We cannot do that with classified documents. Senator Levin's study, for example, makes a very strong case to the opposite.

And unless we can, those of us who believe that there is a serious imbalance that needs redressing, we will be unable to win any national debate. And obviously we all agree that it is up to the American people to decide where their resources are allocated.

So I would suggest that we try to come up with some method as soon as possible, because I think it can have a serious impact on budget decisions that are made, unless we can declassify some of that information.

My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to each of you. By the way, I join Senator McCain in that request for unclassified assessments and analyses of the conventional balance.

It has been too long since we have had one from the DOD. As far as I am concerned, it would be very helpful, and I would surely hope it would be forthcoming as quickly as possible. We see classified assessments, but we also need unclassified assessments. SHAPE is working on one now. Maybe that will do the job.

Let us talk about the relationship between the conventional imbalance and the START agreement which you are working on. I think each of you have addressed the question of the START agreement in your testimony. At least, two of the three of you have.

Ambassador Lehman, let me start with you. There is a threatening concentration of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, which has created an imbalance which must be addressed somewhere, somehow.

Some of us feel that we ought to link or make some reference in advance of receiving a START agreement to the relative importance of that START agreement to the conventional issue.

And perhaps either delay or indicate that we would be interested in delaying a START agreement until we have made progress in the conventional talks, or in some other way link a START agreement to progress in the conventional talks.

Frankly, I am somebody who believes that if it would contribute to a better conventional agreement to delay START, or to link it, I would do it. Now, I have not favored that because I have not been persuaded that it would lead to a better conventional agreement.

But I must tell you that if I reached the conclusion that we would have a better conventional agreement by delaying the START agreement and saying, as part of the INF debate, for instance, that the administration should delay concluding a START agreement until there is progress in the conventional talks, or in some other way linking the two, I would do it.

Because I think the conventional talks on a relative basis are more important even than the START talks. Now, I am not trying to minimize the importance of the START talks, Lord knows not in front of this company, and not anywhere else, because I think that it is critical that we have some mutual and verified reductions in the nuclear area.

But it is more important that we address the conventional issues in conventional arms control. They have not proved very fruitful so far. So my question to you is really a twofold question, to each of you.

Should we not make some kind of a statement as part of the INF ratification process about the relative importance of START to the conventional talks, perhaps indicating that if there is some advantage to be gained by either delay or linkage, that we would urge the administration to use that advantage?

Should we do that as part of the INF ratification process?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Levin, I think everybody may want to address that question. But let me go first.

I would strongly recommend against any such language. And let me explain why. First, if the START agreement is in our interest, we should sign it and implement it, and as soon as possible.

If it is not, we should not sign it. We should not negotiate against a deadline nor should we artificially delay a treaty that we hope will be in our interest.

Now, having said that, and I mean that very emphatically, I think that the political signals would be misread and misunderstood. I think that the damage that could be done to great opportunities could be immense.

Now, let me say, though, that your basic point concerns the interrelationship of nuclear and conventional forces. Let me try to make a very strong statement of agreement with you. And in this answer address somewhat indirectly some of the points that Chairman Nunn and others have raised.

What is NATO's policy? It is a policy of flexible response. Militarily and politically, it is a very sound policy. We may wish to adjust it this way or that over time. But the basic validity of the approach is sound.

And what it says to the Soviet Union is this. Whatever military strategem or tactic you develop, we will have the forces to call into question its success.

Even if you start to achieve success, we are prepared to escalate as we choose up to and including the use of the central nuclear forces of the United States. We are not going to tell you how we are going to respond to any specific attack. What we are telling you is that even if it is militarily successful, the price is too high.

Now, this strategy means basically this. Our nuclear forces, including our short-range nuclear forces, help to deter conventional attack. They force conventional forces to disperse. It prevents them from bringing forward certain types of offensive systems for fear that they woud lose them. It therefore enhances our conventional deterrent.

But a strong conventional force enhances our nuclear deterrent. And the two together give us far greater safety and security.

So let us be very candid. When we are talking about no denuclearlization of Europe, what we are saying is that we recognize that nuclear weapons are part of our conventional deterrence, and they are a part of the overall deterrent that has prevented war in central Europe for over 40 years.

So they are related. START is related to INF. INF is related to the conventional. The conventional is related to human rights and to the political situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It is related to glasnost. It is related to many, many things.

And indeed, if we are going to make significant progress in the conventional area, I suspect it is going to require some very tough decisions in the Soviet Union about how they are going to relate to the West, and how they are going to relate to themselves internally.

But I think it would be very damaging to a rational approach to arms control to enhance our security to link everything to everything. Indeed, I think formal linkages will create conditions that eventually will stop the process.

Now, if on its merits you do not like the START agreement, then that is something to be considered. But I think we ought to look at it on its merits. And I am prepared to discuss that further. But I think that is another question.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Rowny, Ambassador Lehman, Secretary Ridgway, we are very pleased to have you with us.

I would like each of the witnesses to answer this question. Could you please tell this committee what you would consider to be a militarily significant violation of the INF Treaty?

Please be specific. For example, is the detection of one or two illegal SS-20's a militarily significant violation? Or would 100 to 200 covertly deployed SS-20's be a significant violation?

Could you also provide the committee with an example of a militarily significant circumvention of the treaty?

Any of you can start that wish to.

Ambassador ROWNY. I would like to start by saying that if one or two SS-20s were deployed that would be a significant violation. I say that because the Soviets have agreed to zero. That is the number against which we are working, and I would say that that would be a significant violation.

I would not say one or two is all right, or 50 or 100 is not all right.

As for your second question, it is my opinion if the Soviets were to take the step, which would be unwise in my opinion, but if in some way they decided to covertly keep a number of undeployed missiles and then tried to fire them from other launchers and we discovered that, I would say that they were circumventing the agreement and it would also be violation in that respect.

So that would be the way I would answer your question, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Lehman.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Thurmond, let me first be very emphatic. Any cheating ought not to be tolerated and there ought to be a response, either a programmatic response with hardware or a policy response, either with respect to the provisions of the treaty or with respect to some other aspects of policy.

Now, with respect to military significance, let me say any cheating is significant militarily. It tells you something. It tells you something about how the system is operating and what they may be up to.

I think the real question you are asking is, what are the risks. And as you look at the question of the risks, obviously you have to look at it on a case-by-case basis. Let me say if you find a couple of missiles out there, that is very disturbing.

Now, if you discover that the reason they are out there is inadvertently, that they did not know they had them there and it was just a mistake, well, that causes you concern and you ought to get it remedied quickly.

But if what you find out there is the beginning of a covert effort, even though the number is very small, that is very, very disturbing. The number is the same; it is just that the circumstances are different.

Well, what am I trying to say? I am saying that you look at it on a case-by-case basis. You look at what were they trying to do, where were they headed, what could they do with what they had, what are our responses, things of that nature.

So I think I would not want to say one or two is not militarily significant. To me it could be terribly militarily significant.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Ridgway.

Ms. RIDGWAY. I would agree, Senator, with the formulation as Ambassador Lehman just put it. It will not be the number. It could be 1 or 200. It will be the circumstances surrounding it and what they tell us of Soviet intentions, and that could be militarily significant with one or it could be militarily significant with another figure.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, intent rather than number, is that the idea you are making?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I would not choose. You would have to put them both together, as well as what it tells us about what is happening with the infrastructure and what it means.

Senator THURMOND. I would like each of the witnesses to address this question. It is clear that the administration is actively attempting to conclude a START agreement before the President's next summit with General Secretary Gorbachev in late spring.

If a treaty cannot be completed before the leaders meet, should an interim agreement or a Vladivostok type accord be considered? If so, in light of the impact of past interim agreements on U.S. force modernization, do you think this is a prudent approach?

Ambassador ROWNY. I would like to lead off, Senator. First, I would strongly urge against and advise against any type of Vladivostok or interim type agreement. The history of what happened after Vladivostok is enough to tell us that that is not the way to go.

The Soviets looked then on such an agreement as a framework for just simply filling in the blanks, and that is not the true case. What I would suggest is that, if we cannot conclude a START Treaty, that we report our progress and say where we did agree and where we did not agree and leave that for the next administration or for future negotiations to go ahead.

But again, I emphatically state that we not try to conclude a Vladivostok type agreement.

Senator THURMOND. Our time is limited. If you could make your answers as short as you can. Ambassador Lehman.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Thurmond, I do not think we should negotiate against a deadline, but I do believe that we have achieved a tremendous amount of progress in the strategic arms talks. And if we could conclude a treaty this year, I think that would be very much in our interests, if the treaty is in our interest.

If the Soviet Union is not prepared to negotiate a treaty that is in our interests, then I think that we should leave behind a legacy for the next administration of an essentially completed treaty that the next administration should finalize in a careful and cautious way.

I would like to say that we have been negotiating with the Soviet Union on strategic arms since 1969. That is a long time. We know the lingo, we know each other. It is like a game of chess, in which you can anticipate quite a number of moves ahead.

So I think it is possible to conclude a START Treaty. If we do not, so be it. I think that we do not need a so-called framework agreement or Vladivostok, because there you are talking about a page or two of summary.

But in fact our position is already embodied with extensive agreed language in a joint draft text of several hundred pages in Geneva, and that will be our legacy. Now, as you will note, in the Washington summit the President and General Secretary Gorbachev made great progress furthering our START negotiations and helping with that draft treaty. And I think that we should continue to try to make such progress.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Ridgway.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Senator, I will try to keep it short.

If we have a good treaty possible by the time of a Moscow summit, we will sign it. And if we do not, we will not have one. There is no deadline.

As to what we would report at the time, we have developed a practice new to this decade. It is not agreements in principle and statements and the things of the seventies, but a document for the eighties, the joint statement. Between the joint statements from Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington and the joint draft texts now on the table in Geneva, we have a solid record to hand on.

The problem--and others may make this decision. But the problem with Vladivostok type agreements is that they tend to become binding for the United States and not for anybody else.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

I believe next is Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me make a couple brief observations. First, on the Montebello decision, I think perhaps listening to the exchange here that we have got to reclarify what the Montebello decision said, how we are going about to see its implementation, where the consensus is.

I certainly understand the sensitivity of when we get into the modernization. But if in fact we begin to walk away from Montebello and if in fact we do not take any step forward to the implementation of Montebello at the Brussels meeting on March 2 and 3 and we can see that there is not going to be this commitment to modernization, there is no good time to do things that are politically difficult.

This is certainly a politically difficult objective that I think is in the Western interests. And I can only say, though the administration may not have any connection between our troops in Europe and the implementation of a Montebello decision. I, as one who has been a steadfast supporter of this alliance, who voted for every program and put forth a NATO defense initiative, voted against amendments to see any kind of reductions, that if there is not this commitment to the implementation of Montebello I guarantee you I will reconsider my past position of support of the troops in Western Europe.

For me there is a connection, and that connection should be known to the administration. Even though the administration does

not have one, I do not have one. And I think that others will also draw that similar conclusion.

That does not mean that we have got to at Brussels get into the specific program at a time certain of when we are going to modernize. But we had better take a step forward at Brussels.

Second, on the START agreement, I have heard a number of pronouncements that we do not have a deadline. I hope that is the case. The only thing I can tell you is that there is a perception that there is a created deadline out there called a summit that is coming up.

But be that as it may, if we have an agreement to sign we will sign it, and if we do not we will not.

I concur with what I believe I heard Senator Levin say, that I really wish and I think that our focus ought to be and our attention and energies ought to be on where the problem is today. The problem is not on strategic inequality. The problem is on conventional inequality, the conventional imbalance.

There are two ways to correct that: We can have a conventional defense initiative, we can improve our conventional forces; and we can enter into, with enthusiasm, conventional arms control.

But it seems to be where the priority should be. I concur with what he said in that, that that is where our focus ought to be.

I would hope that we might think about that. As far as I am concerned, having spent the last week in Europe, I think that is where the attention should be. I think that our European allies understand that. They certainly support our position on START, and we can go ahead with that.

But that is really where the priority ought to be, on the conventional forces. If in fact we do not get a START agreement, it is not going to be the end of the world. As a matter of fact, it might give us some time to see how the INF agreement is going to be implemented.

There are a lot of lessons we could learn from that; how we are going to go ahead with the exchange of the data base that we do not even get until 30 days after the treaty, how the onsite inspection is really going to work. And therefore, I, just as one, am supportive of the idea that we begin to focus our attention more on the conventional forces and the real problem that is confronting Europe and is confronting the United States and the Soviet Union. It is not the strategic problem.

Now, I would like to turn for my questions to the treaty itself. I do not want to be presumptuous, to get into the details of the treaty itself. But I would like to focus on that—I have a little model here.

It is a boost glide vehicle that I presume you are familiar with. And I would assume that a boost glide vehicle, this hypersonic boost glide vehicle, is neither a cruise missile nor a ballistic missile. Is that correct? Would that be a proper definition, that it would be neither a cruise missile nor a ballistic missile?

Secretary Ridgway.

Ms. RIDGWAY. I am just saying, Senator, one, I have come without the analysis of the document that I think this comes from; and two, I am also concerned, because I am aware that much of the argumentation that you are headed toward is highly classified, and I

do not know quite where I am and what I can discuss and what I cannot.

Senator QUAYLE. I do not know how classified it is. Maybe Ambassador Lehman can give—I mean, this is a public thing. I have got a little model here. I do not think this is classified.

This is something we are concerned about, and I am concerned about the future. I think that we have got to look at some of these future systems that we might have and determine whether they are covered or not covered by the treaty.

And it is my desire and my concern, particularly on article XIV, that some of these things may be precluded, and we need to get that in the open discussion because I think it is very important, particularly as the ratification record is taking on a new importance, that we ought to have an understanding.

Are we not prepared? I mean, I cannot go into the questions of whether this is a cruise missile or a ballistic missile and whether it would be covered by the treaty? It is my understanding if you have a new class of cruise missile that is unarmed or a new type of cruise missile that is unarmed, that that would be allowed by the treaty. Would that be correct?

Ambassador LEHMAN. To which treaty are you referring?

Senator QUAYLE. The INF Treaty.

Ambassador LEHMAN. If we have a new class of cruise missile?

Senator QUAYLE. A new type of cruise missile or ballistic missile that is unarmed, that that would be allowed by the treaty even if it was within the range, ground-based, between 500 kilometers and 5,500 kilometers. Is that correct?

Ambassador LEHMAN. No.

Senator QUAYLE. That is not? You might want to look at article VI.

Ambassador LEHMAN. I want to make sure I understand your question.

Senator QUAYLE. You better be careful because I think you are wrong. If we have a new type of cruise missile and it is not a cruise missile as defined by this treaty and it is unarmed, it is allowed by this INF Treaty. We have been told, I think, in past testimony——

Ambassador LEHMAN. If it is unarmed, it is permitted.

Senator QUAYLE. That is my question. It is permitted?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. So if this would be unarmed, we would use it as a drone or a reconnaissance vehicle. And if it was ground-based, and even though it was within a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, it would be allowed by this treaty, is that correct?

Ambassador LEHMAN. That is correct.

Senator QUAYLE. I do not think that is in violation of any classified information. I think it is very important information that we have gotten. It is something that goes to the heart of this whole noncircumvention issue, that if you have something like this, a boost glide vehicle, that it is not a cruise missile as defined by this treaty and it is not a ballistic missile, and if in fact it would be unarmed then in fact it would be covered.

And then we would have to get into the question—my time is up—in the second round, how do we verify the unarmed versus the

armed potential. But at least we have got on record something we can clearly use.

Chairman NUNN. You might want to ask the Ambassador if he is an authoritative witness when it gets into that degree of detail.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Whether I am authoritative or not, I just wanted to make one point.

Senator QUAYLE. Are not all witnesses authoritative now?

Chairman NUNN. Some more so and some less so.

Senator QUAYLE. Which category are you in?

Ambassador LEHMAN. I fall into the authoritative category, I hope.

Senator QUAYLE. What about the other two? Authoritative? Do we have—is this an authoritative response?

Ms. RIDGWAY. These are all authoritative responses, unless the committee is informed otherwise.

Chairman NUNN. Before the ratification, before the advice and consent vote.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Quayle and Chairman Nunn, I would like to make one point, and that is that we are here in open session and that does require that we be cautious about certain national security information. But either with you privately or in closed session, certainly there is a level of detail that we can go into that is beyond what we would say in open session.

And in particular, I would like to say with respect to some of the issues you are discussing, remember we have ongoing processes, including negotiations with the Soviet Union, as in the case of START. And so when you are talking about issues that are related to that, I would just ask your forebearance and let us deal with it in closed session.

Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. We would be glad to have a closed session. We are going to bear down on some of these important details next week. We plan to have a 2-day session with Ambassador Glitman, and we may stretch it longer than that if need be.

We have a number of questions, and I think most of them can be answered readily. But they are very important interpretive questions.

Thank you, Senator Quayle.

I believe Senator Wilson is next.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Ridgway, can you tell the committee exactly what article XIV means?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I am not here with a legal brief. I would be happy to take the question, Senator. But I came up to talk about the political view of the alliance, and I just do not have anything with me that would have me do anything more than skate all over the topic. The others who have come prepared on that subject might be able to help. I would be happy to take the question. I am not trying to avoid it. I just do not want to wing it.

Senator WILSON. All right. I have got the treaty right here and the language is a sentence long: "The parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions."

Does anybody want to tell me what that means?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Wilson, as part of our effort to be authoritative, let me try to give you an answer. Article XIV is not a noncircumvention article as in SALT II. Article XIV records the parties' undertaking to comply with the treaty and not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the provisions of the treaty. This provision thus reflects the duty of each party under customary international law to comply with the treaty. This provision does not impose any additional obligation on the parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the treaty. This provision refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future, and existing agreements are therefore unaffected. Article XIV will not affect existing patterns of defense collaboration or cooperation with our allies, nor will this provision preclude cooperation with our allies in modernization.

Senator WILSON. All right, let me pursue that then. What you are saying is that it will not relate to weapons systems that are not expressly proscribed by the treaty. Is it your interpretation—or is your interpretation that you have just given to me legally binding on the Soviet Union? That is to say, is it supported by the negotiating record as the agreed upon interpretation of article XIV?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Wilson, I believe the negotiating record is clear on this point.

Senator WILSON. I take it that is a yes?

Ambassador LEHMAN. That is a yes.

Senator WILSON. All right. Let me give you a hypothetical. In your opinion, if the Soviets were to test a new ground-launched ballistic missile at a range of 5,500 kilometers and then consistently thereafter test that same new GLCM at a range of 3,000 kilometers and deploy this new missile in a mobile launcher throughout Eastern Europe, would you believe them to have circumvented the INF Treaty?

Would this be a violation of article XIV?

Ambassador LEHMAN. I would like to take that for the record and take a look at the question in detail.

[Information not received in time to print.]

Senator WILSON. Do you have any response, Ambassador Rowny?

Ambassador ROWNY. Well, I will say on the first part of the question, Senator, that article XIV is under the international law concept of pacta sunt servanda. In other words, we will undertake no obligations that are not consistent with the treaty.

It would not impact on systems air or seabased, or even existing patterns of cooperation.

Senator WILSON. How about that hypothetical I gave you?

Ambassador ROWNY. I hesitate to get into hypotheticals. Also, let me say simply that I would certainly look at it very, very carefully, and it would give rise to a lot of speculation as to what they are about. And I would have to consider this very seriously.

I think you might want to wait for Ambassador Lehman's written response.

Senator WILSON. All right. Ambassador Lehman, while you are taking things for the record, take this one.

If it were the United States rather than the Soviet Union that were to build this new GLCM, test it once at 5,500 kilometers and thereafter at 3,000 and deploy it in a mobile launcher throughout

Western Europe, would the Soviets not be within their rights to claim that this was a violation of article 14?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Wilson, I believe you were asking me to answer this for the record? I would like to answer it for the record.

Senator WILSON. I would be happy to have you answer it now.

Ambassador LEHMAN. I would like to answer it for the record.

[Information not received in time to print.]

Senator WILSON. That is what I was afraid of.

Let me just put this to you, Ambassador Rowny. Suppose that the answer that I get back for the record is one that says that we are by that interpretation unilaterally bound, that the United States is bound and not the Soviet Union.

Would you then recommend to the President of the United States that he go back to the Soviets and try to gain a consistent understanding so that they would be bound as well as we?

Ambassador ROWNY. I think I would, Senator. I think, to answer the second part of your other question, if we wanted a ground-launched cruise missile of 5,500 kilometers, I would not recommend that we test it under 5,500, because this would certainly give rise to suspicion and would give rise to questions.

So I would see no reason if we want to have a system over 5,500 kilometers why we would necessarily have to test it at shorter ranges. I would advise testing it at longer ranges.

So I would say that if any practice by the Soviet Union would depart from that, I would certainly look at it with great suspicion, and I would also want to see that is clarified so that it is not a unilateral or one-way street which binds us and does not bind the Soviet Union.

Senator WILSON. So, in other words, you would look with suspicion upon a test at 5,500 if it were followed by a test at 3,000. What would make you suspicious is the test at 3,000?

Ambassador ROWNY. Yes.

Senator WILSON. Suppose the Soviet Union took the view that such tests were permitted; that they were in compliance and not in violation of article 14 on the basis of their having tested well beyond that of intermediate nuclear forces as proscribed in the INF Treaty.

If they took that view and if we had taken the unilateral view that we were proscribed from such a development and testing of a new GLCM, what would your advice to the President be then?

Ambassador ROWNY. I would like to try, if I can, to get away from the hypothetical but simply say, Senator, that if the Soviets seem to be violating the spirit or the letter of the agreement, I would certainly advise the President to take this very seriously and to see that the Soviets cease and desist.

Senator WILSON. What if he went back to them, per your advice, and attempted to get them to come to the same agreement and announce themselves as bound by the same interpretation as that which we had been bound by, authoritative representations during ratification? What if they did not?

Ambassador ROWNY. I think it would give rise to bringing the validity of the treaty into question. I would not keep it on the narrow

range of one particular system. It would give rise to the entire spectrum.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson, I do not want to interrupt that line of questioning, but I think your time has expired.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, that is all right. I will just make the observation that I think, although we are dealing in hypotheticals, the ultimate conclusion of Ambassador Rowny's statements is that it would almost compel a renegotiation, and I think that is true.

I would add this observation. We are dealing with hypotheticals in my question. On the other hand, they are hypotheticals that could arise under one interpretation or another of the treaty, and that is why we are compelled to ask them and to determine whether or not both we and the Soviets are bound under whatever series of possibilities is permitted to exist with respect to the treaty.

Chairman NUNN. I would agree with that. I think we have to ask these questions. I think this panel of witnesses was not told to be prepared on the details of the INF Treaty since they were addressing the broader questions this morning.

Of course, any question is in order, because all of them have a great deal of knowledge in this area. But the very detailed questions of this nature I think can appropriately be addressed to Ambassador Glitman and his team when they appear next week. I am sure we will have a number of those questions.

I might just add on that point you were making, Senator Wilson, and this will be a question I ask next week, the way I read the INF Treaty, if you test a missile over the 5,500 kilometer range you have thereby gotten yourself out from under the definition of an intermediate missile no matter how many other times you test under the 5,500 kilometer limit; therefore, neither side would be precluded by the very definitions of the treaty from making a test at 5,600 kilometers and then converting the system into an intermediate range missile.

That is something that we have to go into, because it seems to me it is a very large loophole. If there is a loophole that we go into knowing about it, that is one thing; but if it is going to be one we get blindsided on later on, it will be of a totally different nature.

Now, maybe there is an answer to that, but the definition sections and the proscription sections tie together. The way I read the definition section, if you test over 5,500 kilometers even one time you have excluded that system from the definitions that are covered and precluded by this treaty; but that remains to be seen.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, that is precisely why I asked the questions. It may be that the answer to your question and mine is to be found in the negotiating record.

I cannot say it is or is not because I have not yet had access to that portion of the record. I think that it is to be pursued because my reading is the same, that article 14 would not proscribe that.

If these witnesses this morning within the definition of authoritative are not authorized to state that, I think that we should be told by the administration which witnesses are authorized and to have a very clear answer to these questions.

Chairman NUNN. I agree. Senator Warner I have used up my second round so I am going to defer to you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to turn to the question of modernization of the tactical systems with ranges less than 500 kilometers as provided within the treaty and certainly within the spirit of Montebello. We have had a fairly thorough discussion on it this morning, but I just want to lay out a few facts as I understand them.

Prior decisions by the President and the Congress have now put into production a new 8-inch nuclear artillery projectile which is being manufactured, as we are here this morning, and is being deployed in Europe. That modernization is going ahead.

Likewise, in prior decisions by the President and the Congress we opened up a 155 artillery shell line that is in production. I am not certain just when deployment will take place for that system.

We have in research and development a number of options for the follow-on Lance system, but again, it is in research and development and we are looking at the options. There is some flexibility there that NATO and our allies can bring to bear as we move from R&D into a full-scale development program.

We have also, as I understand it, in the conceptual phase, the tactical air-to-surface type of system.

Am I correct in those statements, Ambassador Lehman? I think the record should reflect it.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Warner, that is basically correct. However, I should point out that production of the 8-inch round has ceased and production of the 155mm round has not yet begun.

As I said earlier in response to the question from Chairman Nunn, modernization is something that is ongoing for conventional and in nuclear across the spectrum.

Now, what I would like to caution against is the creation of a kind of chicken-and-egg problem that basically would say you cannot think about or study an approach to a problem until you get alliance commitment to the specific approach you are going to recommend when, in fact, in some cases these are U.S. programs and in other cases, they involve alliance-wide decisions or bilateral decisions

I think you have to recognize that modernization is an ongoing process, and as we and our allies——

Senator WARNER. I think we have covered it. I want to get another question in under the time.

My point is that we have a modernization program underway and coordinated with NATO. Future options are being coordinated with NATO. As my colleague here pointed out, that is important.

Senator Nunn, others, and I picked up in our trip to Europe certain sensitivities about the scheduling and the announcement and so forth. I believe all of this can be accommodated, at the same time maintaining the highest priority, that being the security interests of this country and our NATO allies.

Let me move, then, to Secretary Ridgway on the 23-nation talks on conventional weapons. My understanding is that the CSCE forum will hopefully be issuing a mandate which will be the charter by which the conventional talks can get under way.

Is that correct?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. What time frame do you anticipate?

Ms. RIDGWAY. The Vienna Conference still hopes to complete its work by Easter.

Senator WARNER. That is the CSCE?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That is the CSCE hoped-for date. We have said that we believe we should work to meet that deadline, push forward on achieving the mandate, but that we are not prepared to bring Vienna and all of its negotiations to a close without significant improvement in the human rights performance of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Senator WARNER. There is linkage, then, to the mandate portions relating to conventional arms with the human rights issue?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. When we were in Europe, we had a great deal of discussion about the third option, and I think without exception the leaders were strongly against any third option or even beginning to have talks relating to elimination of tactical nuclear systems with ranges less than 500 kilometers.

Is that your impression?

Ms. RIDGWAY. No, sir. I wish it were. I hear a Western European leadership without exception, government leadership, being opposed to the third zero.

Senator WARNER. I thought that is what I said, if I misspoke.

Ms. RIDGWAY. But there is still a feeling that somehow it should be possible to begin negotiations in the area of systems below 500 kilometers. So there is, I think, a range of view within the alliance. It does not have a lot of people on either side of the question. It tends to be an uneven vote.

Senator WARNER. Quickly recapping, we learned from the leadership that the third option is not in the interest of NATO?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes.

Senator WARNER. The precise question I have is the avoidance of the third option talks being linked in any way with talks for reducing conventional weapons and chemical weapons.

Do you share that view?

Ms. RIDGWAY. They are precisely related in just the opposite manner. In the NATO statement of June, which says in conjunction with the achievement of a conventional balance and the completion and the achievement of a chemical weapons ban on a global basis—and it was a sentence that did not have a verb in it. It went on to say reductions and tactical nuclear missile systems of the United States and the Soviet Union to equal limits at lower levels.

So the alliance itself has said that there is an in-conjunction type of relationship.

Senator WARNER. You think, therefore, at the time these talks will open up in the 23-nation conference that that would be an agenda item?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Absolutely not. That is not the relationship.

Senator WARNER. That is the point I was endeavoring to make. It would not be part of the mandate or in that forum.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Precisely not a part of the mandate.

Senator WARNER. If there were any discussion on the reduction of systems below 500 kilometers, it would be in a separate forum?

Ms. RIDGWAY. It would have to be. It would be a subject only between the United States and the Soviet Union. But it is always

good in raising this topic to know that there are several allies involved. There are eight countries of the alliance who have systems of this range.

Senator WARNER. It would be my hope that those talks could be forestalled as long as possible. We should see what evolves from any conventional talks before the issue of talks relating to nuclear weapons, tactical below 500 kilometers, are addressed.

Ms. RIDGWAY. That is also our view, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Ambassador ROWNY. Senator, may I add a point at this stage? I, too, was at Wehrkunde, and I heard some of this talk about reducing part of the weapons below 500. I would strongly urge this committee to dampen any such talk and to emphasize the need to keep our modernization program strong and reduce none of these at this time in any form.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Warner, if I could get your ear for just a minute, I think the distinction, as I understand what we were told, is that all of the governments of the NATO alliance are against a discussion that would have the third zero, going to zero nuclear weapons in the below 500 kilometer range.

The German Government in particular and the NATO communique which Secretary Ridgway has referred to both say that you would begin discussions in conjunction with the conventional and chemical talks. I do not think it says begin discussions but it says be considered.

What are the exact words of that?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I have it with me, and I think it is well worth——

Chairman NUNN. We were part of this NATO communique, were we not?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, we were.

In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range leading to equal ceilings.

So there is no such word as discussion or negotiation. Methodology is not a part of that.

Chairman NUNN. Really, that is a pretty vague counterpronouncement. I suppose that was to give everybody a chance to——

Ms. RIDGWAY. To sign off.

Chairman NUNN. To sign off.

So it seems to me that a follow-up of that plus the questions of the timeframe and the systems to be given the highest priority in the modernization process, all have to be addressed in the summit coming up in March. I would think that is necessary.

I certainly agree that we should not engage in any kind of arms control negotiation on those short-range systems until we see the light at the end of the tunnel at least in the conventional and the chemical area. I think it would be a very bad mistake.

I do think questions of which systems are modernized have to be addressed in the post-INF environment, and I think that has to be done as soon as possible at the highest possible level.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was talking to Ambassador Lehman before about the possibility of linking the START negotiations to the conventional negotiations during our ratification of the INF, some kind of a statement which would either urge a delay in the START completion or linking some other way START and the conventional talks.

I am wondering if the other two might comment on the desirability of that. I guess the bottom line of such linkage with START would be to give us additional leverage at the conventional arms discussion.

Ambassador Rowny.

Ambassador ROWNY. Senator, I would urge that the Senate, if it feels this way, and I think I would agree, should make a statement that conventional imbalances should be reduced and that we should do everything possible to move forward with CDI, Montebello, and the others to see that this conventional imbalance is reduced.

On the other side of the coin, it has been the Soviet term of art to use linkages. They originally linked coming back to the negotiations with our abandonment of GLCM and Pershings. Later they linked SDI progress to INF and START, I think that START is good as a freestanding agreement, good for us and them, and we should proceed with it.

I also recognize that the conventional imbalance could lead to the type of war that could invoke our strategic umbrella. So I think there is a connection there.

So I guess, in short, I would urge the committee to do everything possible to redress the conventional imbalance and to put these forces in perspective; but I would not urge or not recommend a formal linkage to the progress of START.

Senator LEVIN. Would a delay in START not put pressure on the Soviets to be more forthcoming in conventional arms talks?

Ambassador ROWNY. Yes. It would delay, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. The question is would it put pressure on the Soviets to be more forthcoming? Would it result in a better conventional arms control agreement?

Ambassador ROWNY. I am not sure that it would, Senator.

I look at the time element and the way the Soviets have already squandered 4 weeks of the 16 weeks of negotiations between now and the time we are supposed to meet on this.

So I think that any further efforts of this type could give them reason for saying that we are the ones that are delaying reaching agreement. I would not like to give them that kind of an excuse.

Senator LEVIN. If you thought that either delaying the conclusion of the START talks or linking a START conclusion to progress in the conventional talks would lead to a better conventional agreement, would you then be supporting either the delay or the linkage?

Ambassador ROWNY. Again, I would have to see what the terms were, and I would have to look at it very carefully.

Senator LEVIN. The terms of the START agreement?

Ambassador ROWNY. The terms and the type of conditions we are putting on.

I personally do not think that any pressures that we put on with that kind of formal linkage would cause the Soviets suddenly to come around and give us the conventional balance that we seek.

I think the Soviets, being very realistic people, want to see what we are going to do, what NATO is going to do to take care of its security. I think that is the major thing they are looking at.

I think when that is done, then we have the greatest pressure against the Soviets and not through a START agreement which is in both our interests and neither side is necessarily the demandeur.

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Ridgway.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Senator, I do not see the levers that go with the word "linkage" in the relationship between START and conventional. I do not believe the Soviet Union would have a different position on conventional if START were withheld, and I do not think it would have a different position if START were proceeded with.

I think that they do not relate, and, consequently, I would not see anything positive to be gained on either the START negotiations or the prospective conventional negotiations by linking the two in any sense of time or document.

Senator LEVIN. Let me ask you the same theoretical question that I asked Ambassador Rowny.

If you did believe that delaying START or linking it in some other way to the progress in the conventional talks would put additional pressure on and provide us some leverage for a better conventional agreement, would you then favor such linkage delay?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I am sure anybody who believes that you could get a better outcome by doing certain things would do those certain things. I just do not accept the proposition that there is either linkage or a payoff.

I would think it would be irresponsible, but if one believed that to do X would produce Y and you wanted Y produced that you would proceed with that.

Senator LEVIN. Not necessarily, because you might then believe that the outcome on X might be a little less good. In other words, you might get not as good a START agreement if you delayed it or if you linked it to conventional. So there is an unknown there.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, yes, if anybody can see any value in the linkage to start with. But just taking your very hypothetical question at face value, I would presume the people who believe these things would proceed on that belief.

I, on a substantive basis, do not see the internal levers of the relationship that you could work to the advantage of the United States that would be achieved by linking these two documents.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to be general. I do not want to get too specific here on the treaty and get into some of the details that I guess other witnesses will get. So I will try to get it in an elevated plane of generalities where we can exchange.

Let me turn to my understanding of why we were willing to ban the conventional ground-based cruise missile as well as the nuclear

cruise missile. It is my understanding that the reason we did that is because of the problems of verification, that you could not verify effectively between a nuclear cruise missile and a conventional cruise missile groundbased. That is the reason that we went along with that.

Am I correct on that?

Ms. RIDGEWAY. That was certainly one of the considerations, yes.

Senator QUAYLE. What were some of the other ones?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I understand people were looking for the nature of the intrusive verification that would go with it. There has been a cost benefit analysis, not just that you do not know what it is but, if you could find a system, how intrusive the verification would have to be, intelligence losses against numbers of people involved to verify missions and things of that sort.

Senator QUAYLE. You mean the intrusive verification was one of the reasons that we went along with banning the conventional cruise missile?

Ms. RIDGWAY. No, no. You asked me what several factors were involved, and I was talking in the verification sense of what are the kinds of factors that go under the word "verification". That was just one, the balance that people looked for.

Senator QUAYLE. Let me try to understand why we gave up the conventional cruise missile, the groundbased.

It is my understanding and the arguments have been made and other witnesses testified that it was very difficult to verify whether it was conventionally armed or it was a nuclear tip.

Ms. RIDGWAY. That is right.

Senator QUAYLE. That was the primary reason that we, in fact, were willing to concede this point. That is what I am trying to establish.

I am trying to get general terms here, and I am not making much headway. I am trying to get a general impression on why we gave up the conventional ground-based cruise missile.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Quayle, this was a negotiation. In the negotiation, you have to weigh many factors, as Ambassador Ridgway has said.

Among those factors were the questions of what do we get out of the package; what do we give in the package; what problems does one approach create for us versus what prices do we pay; what missions do we have; can those missions be accomplished by other means?

Take the specific example that you are using of the conventional ground-launched cruise missile. We have made it very clear in the negotiating record in both INF and in START that we have no intention of putting limits on our conventional air-launched cruise missiles and our conventional sea-launched cruise missiles.

Those systems can cover many, and perhaps all of the targets that one could envision for a conventional ground-launched cruise missile, a program we did not have.

So as we were negotiating these issues, we were taking into account verification difficulties, but that was not the sole factor.

Remember, our position was that we were protecting the option, but in the course of the negotiation a decision had to be made. The

President made that decision, that in this overall package we would give up the right to that particular category of conventional cruise missile but recognizing that we had protected ourselves absolutely on the air-launched cruise missile and sea-launched cruise missile. Let me say that that was recorded in the Washington summit statement.

Senator QUAYLE. I noticed that the Washington summit statement used the word "nuclear sea launch cruise missile". They put in the word "nuclear", and it was very specific.

But I am also mindful, and you have reconfirmed what other witnesses have said, that one of the most significant factors that led us to this decision to go along with the ground-based or to eliminate the conventional cruise missile was the basic problems of verification, that you simply have a very difficult time verifying whether it is nuclear or whether it is nonnuclear.

You also, Ambassador Lehman, said you have no intention right now of giving up the sea-launched or the air-launched conventional cruise missile. Great, and I hope that stays.

You say no intention now, but then in your discourse to me of how these things are arrived at, you said there are all sorts of factors and decisions have to be made.

I just want to know how firmly have we drawn a line in the sand in saying, look, we have a mission and we have a requirement for these conventional sea-launched cruise missiles, the TLAM-C specifically, where the Soviets are now of the position they want to limit us to, what, 400? Is that their position now? I think it is 400.

Ambassador LEHMAN. 600.

Senator QUAYLE. They want to limit us to 600 right now, and yet we have a military requirement, and it is already in the budget to buy 2,600 of these.

What I wanted to find out is how firm we are in this position, because it seems to me that as you have to make these decisions and even though you have no intention now of giving up the conventional sea launch cruise missile, in the scheme of things this may have the same fate as the conventional ground-based cruise missile that, well, Senator, these are just decisions we have to make toward the end of the process.

How firm are we on this, because I believe it is a very, very important thing. As a matter of fact, I think it was a mistake in the INF Treaty, and I have said that before. I think it is the same argument that you heard on the ground-based cruise missile, and you are starting to hear it on the sea launch cruise missile.

We backed down on the ground-based, and now we say we are not going to back down on the sea launch cruise missile, but how firm are we on this? If we are that firm, why do the Soviets keep raising it?

Most recently, in the very prominent article in the Sunday New York Times, the headlines said "a hardened stance on missiles", and it goes right to this very point.

I guess I just want to see what we can get, and perhaps we ought to adopt something here between now and when you conclude or when you continue your negotiation of START. We feel that there is a very prominent requirement for a conventional sea launch cruise missile as well as an air launch cruise missile.

But that might give you some fortification and some endurance that you may need during these negotiations with the Soviets, because I believe it is a very important requirement.

Ambassador ROWNY. Let me say, Senator, I agree with you. It is a very important part of our arsenal, and we should not under any circumstances enter into a treaty which limits conventionally armed sea launch cruise missiles.

I would recommend to the President that he not accept a treaty which did limit our conventionally armed sea launch cruise missiles.

Senator QUAYLE. Would you agree with that, Ambassador Lehman? You would not recommend signing a treaty that would ban the conventional sea-launched cruise missiles?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Quayle, I would agree with that. You have to understand that you are preaching to the choir on this issue.

We have emphasized to the Soviet union again and again and again at the highest levels that conventional sea-launched cruise missiles are the heart of the modern Navy. In START, we are not about to cut out part of a modern Navy.

I have said this to Marshal Akhromeyev. We have made this very, very clear. They keep trying to work around the problem, and even after the Washington summit they have now come back and tried to put a separate limit on conventional sea-launched cruise missiles.

Previously they said that, yes, we agreed that only nuclear-armed would be limited, but we do not know how to tell the difference so you have to limit them both.

In the end, I think we will be absolutely firm on this issue, but the Congress can help us by making this clear to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership follows the speech and actions of the Congress very, very closely, and there is no doubt about that.

When you are divided, it does not make my job easier. When you are united behind us, it makes my job very easy. When you are united against us, I have no hope.

Senator QUAYLE. Ambassador Ridgway, do you agree that we probably should not sign a treaty that would ban the conventional sea launch cruise missile?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, and I would say with respect to what the other two men have said, there is nothing to suggest that that is the direction in which we are going. With the Soviet propaganda campaign, at which they are increasingly good, it can appear here and there and make it seem the obstacle to agreement when, in fact, we have been firm from the outset.

Senator QUAYLE. No limits on the conventional.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Lehman, the treaty specifically prohibits further flight testing of short- and long-range intermediate systems. A primary purpose of this provision was to prevent each party from having confidence in the reliability of the system in the event a covert force were deployed.

Could you please tell the committee what is our best estimate of the degradation of the SS-20 missile over the next 10 years?

I have heard, for example, that assuming the Soviets do not flight test the missile, the reliability of the SS-20 will decrease to about 85 percent in 3 years, 80 percent in 6 years, and 60 to 70 percent in 10 years.

Does that agree with your understanding?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Thurmond, we have some classified figures. I am not sure what the unclassified figures are. I would like to provide that to you, but there is a considerable drop-off.

Senator THURMOND. Please provide that for the record if you prefer to do that.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Certainly.

[The information was not received in time to print.]

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Lehman and Secretary Ridgway, how do you view unilateral restrictions being placed on the United States and NATO, nuclear and chemical force modernization programs, particularly in view of unrestrained Soviet modernization programs?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I have never favored anything unilateral, either self-imposed of or agreed to, but we have in some areas found, as for example in the Montebello program, that the sound management of our nuclear deterrent by ourselves has, in fact, produced decisions which some may describe as unilateral and which I would call just good planning.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Lehman, while you noted in your prepared statement that the INF verification provision offers some useful precedent for a START agreement, you also cautioned that these provisions were not enough.

Could you please tell the committee what additional verification provisions are necessary to have an adequately verifiable and strategically stable START Treaty?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Thurmond, I would add that if you look at the Washington summit statement, it is clear that the Soviet Union has agreed not only to go beyond the provisions of SALT II but beyond the provisions of the INF Treaty.

That treaty referenced, in addition, bans on the encryption of telemetry and a broader inspection regime, including suspect site inspection. I would not want to limit it to that. There may be additional areas where we want to go beyond what is done in INF; but clearly, we are talking about going well beyond what has been achieved before.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Lehman, while you noted in your prepared statement that the INF verification provisions offer some useful precedent for a START agreement, you also caution that these provisions are not enough.

I believe I asked you that question a few moments ago. Excuse me.

Ambassador Lehman, it has been suggested in testimony before this committee that in a post-INF environment, the confidence of the alliance could be bolstered by, among other things, relying more heavily on the American central strategic forces for NATO deterrence and the covering of targets in the European theater.

Do you think that shifting more of the responsibility for nuclear deterrence to American central strategic systems weakens the credibility of the NATO triad and U.S.-extended deterrence?

Ambassador LEHMAN. I do not believe that we should simply transfer the burden from one leg of the NATO triad to another. I think that we need to have a balanced program of adjustments.

But we will continue to maintain the type of target coverage that we need and that we had planned on with the INF deployments.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Lehman, the INF Treaty allows each party to reuse a physics package from the missiles being destroyed.

Do you recommend that the United States reuse a package for future nuclear warhead requirements such as tactical nuclear modernization?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Where it is practicable and it would save money and be in our interest, we ought to look at how best to use these devices, either for military purposes or other purposes. I would not want to prejudge where or how. We may also want to dismantle them, but we should take a look at each case.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Lehman and Secretary Ridgway, during testimony by Secretary Carlucci, he expressed a willingness to work with the Congress to fashion legislation separate from the treaty that would establish a commitment to support specific actions in the event the Soviets are found to be in significant noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

What are both of your views on such a legislative measure? What would you like to see in such legislation?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I certainly was not aware of the undertaking and perhaps just missed something in the record; but I know that my own secretary, Secretary of State Shultz, in his testimony has said that we must be prepared as an administration and as a Congress to work together to find the appropriate response in the event of Soviet noncompliance.

So I think that there is a general broadly accepted view that at such time as something goes wrong, that there is a violation, that compliance is not what it should be, that the administration and the Congress will have to get together to decide the appropriate response.

It would not be inconsistent with that to commit oneself to work together, but I think it is very hard to know what the response would be until you saw what the nature of the violation might be.

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Thurmond, Secretary Carlucci did commit to work with the Members of Congress on the possibility of such action, legislation and documentation.

Clearly, our view has been as an administration that we have to have a powerful and effective response to Soviet noncompliance. If there is any lesson learned in the last 18 years, it has been that the executive branch and the legislative branch are going to have to work together.

I think the spirit in which Secretary Carlucci was making the commitment was that maybe if we could identify earlier on principles, steps, procedures and policies on which we are united, this would make it possible not only to react more effectively to noncompliance but to deter noncompliance.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Rowny, would you express yourself on that question? Do you understand the question?

Ambassador Rowny. Yes, sir, I understand it. I understand the question, and I agree that we should take noncompliance very seriously, and we should look for better mechanisms in order to bring this to the fore.

In my opinion, the fact that the Soviets are allowed to get away with continuing noncompliance of treaties, sheds a lot of doubt in many people's minds about why we should enter into new agreements.

I think, therefore, that this is a very serious problem. I am delighted that Secretary Carlucci has asked for Congress' help in this, because I think it is something that needs to be addressed, and it needs to be addressed in strong terms.

Senator THURMOND. I wish to thank all of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Senator WILSON. You are now the chairman, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question, sir.

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. I guess I am the temporary chairman, then.

Senator WILSON. Ambassador Lehman, in your prepared statement you stated that the United States should not give up SDI for a START agreement.

Specifically, at page 16 of your testimony you declared that, "Our position is clear. We will not jeopardize our long-term security or that of our allies by accepting any restrictions on the SDI beyond those actually agreed upon in the ABM Treaty."

Could you restate your understanding of the administration's interpretation of the ABM Treaty? Does it still adhere to the broad interpretation?

Ambassador LEHMAN. It is a long, complex, legal issue as to what the broad interpretation is, but the answer is yes. We adhere to what some people have called the broad interpretation. We think that it is a fully warranted interpretation.

That has been our interpretation, and we believe that it is the correct interpretation.

Senator WILSON. Thank you very much.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Wilson.

I believe the question of the remotely piloted vehicle has come up earlier today. I am not sure who raised it, but I believe one of my colleagues raised the issue.

Apparently both sides are allowed to develop and test an RPV, a drone, and my question is how would you verify that as being something other than a cruise missile which is prohibited by the treaty?

Ambassador LEHMAN. Senator Levin, I can give you a general answer in open session, and in closed session we can go into quite extensive detail as to the differences.

It is our belief that the operating characteristics of these systems are sufficiently different that one could have enough confidence that a system designed and operating as a drone is not an armed vehicle.

Having said that, let me say it is not simply an easy question. It is not without risk. There are risks.

On the other hand, one has to balance those risks against the reality that RPV's and drones play an important part in deterrence. So we made that decision, and that was where we came out.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Thurmond, do you have any other questions?

Senator THURMOND. That is all the questions I had, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied, follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN SAM NUNN

Senator NUNN. On page 5 of your statement you emphasize the need for the United States to "dispel concerns about the continued coupling of the United States to the defense of Europe." On page 13, you say that "the Alliance has under consideration additional adjustments to ensure that NATO retains a full spectrum of nuclear deterrent options at all ranges." Can you tell us what adjustments are being considered? What political difficulties are associated with each? Would such adjustments in long-range forces help the climate for implementing the Montebello Decision?

Ambassador LEHMAN. NATO has made no decisions concerning adjustments to its nuclear force posture. [Delete.]

The Soviet Union will probably attempt to portray adjustments as attempts to violate or circumvent the INF Treaty. All adjustments under consideration by the Alliance are perfectly consistent with, and indeed complementary to, the agreement. They would not undercut the real reductions in United States nuclear weapons stationed in Europe that will result from the INF Treaty.

[Deleted.]

EUROPEAN PESSIMISM

Senator NUNN. On page 10 of your testimony, you say, "In truth, most of the concern expressed about the INF Treaty is really driven by a certain pessimism about the future of the Alliance." Would you describe the sources of that pessimism and gauge its depth?

Ambassador LEHMAN. As I suggested in my testimony, the source of the pessimism to which I referred lies not in the terms of the INF Treaty but rather in the fear that this arms control success could give rise to an unwarranted euphoria bout East-West relations and thereby undermine our collective commitment to maintain a robust defense. Let me make clear that we do not share that pessimism, nor, I believe, is it shared by the governments of four Allies. We can avoid any post-INF euphoria if we face frankly the reality of the Soviet Union's continuing military buildup of non-INF forces and the serious remaining imbalances between NATO's forces and those of the Warsaw Pact. In this regard, we respect that the NATO Heads of Government meeting in Brussels on March 2 and 3 will, while welcoming the INF Treaty's signal contribution to Alliance security, reaffirm their determination to ensure defense preparedness as an essential means of achieving the lasting stability we seek. As I emphasized in my testimony, the continuing modernization of NATO's conventional and remaining nuclear forces in Europe will be key to realization of these goals.

Senator NUNN. At the bottom of page 19 of your statement, you note that the Soviets "clearly hope to reduce our remaining nuclear deterrent forces in Europe by negotiating limits on our dual-capable systems" in the coming conventional stability talks. Is this an argument for moving away from dual-capable systems in implementing Montebello?

Ambassador LEHMAN. All nuclear forces committed to NATO remaining in NATO after implementation of the INF Treaty (aircraft, LANCE, and artillery) will be dual-capable. Replacing these with nuclear-only systems will not prevent the Soviets from attempting to limit them through arms control negotiations. Moreover, NATO would lose the important economic, military, and political benefits associated with dual-capable systems.

For example, development of a follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) capable of launch from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) would likely entail less cost and manpower requirements than a new, nuclear-only FOTL, and it would be more acceptable to Allies, who already field or intend to purchase MLRS. A nuclear-only system would have a distinct signature and would likely be deployed with a smaller

number of launchers for the same number of missiles. This would reduce oveall system survivability and increase Soviet confidence in their ability to neutralize NATO's remaining theater ballistic missile capability through conventional means or nuclear pre-emption.

ASIAN VIEWS

Senator NUNN. Your statement indicates you logged 300,000 miles in consulting with our Asian friends on the INF negotiations. Were the Chinese and the Japanese as worried about the SS-20 as NATO was? In your opinion, was the U.S. demand for a global zero dictated more by concern for Asia, or more by the concern for verification and the possibility of "Asian" SS-20's being moved West in a crisis?

Mr. ROWNY. The Chinese and Japanese were concerned that we not lose sight of the threat the SS-20 force presented to them. Given the destructive potential, as well as the range, mobility and transportability of that force, they wanted the United States to avoid any final solution that did not eliminate the SS-20 threat to both Europe and Asia. In particular they did not want to solution that simply transferred an increased threat to Asia. In short, Japan and China were every bit as worried about the SS-20 force as NATO.

From the beginning of the INF negotiations, our objectives included both global limits, with no transfer of the Soviet threat between Asia and Europe, and effective verification. These two objectives are complementary and both important. Global zero served both to eliminate the threat of INF missiles and to maximize verifiability. Soviet acceptance of global zero allowed us to achieve both objectives.

FRG ATTITUDES ON THE MONTEBELLO DECISION

Senator NUNN. In testimony before this Committee on January 25th, Secretary Carlucci stated: "I have full confidence that the Germans will proceed with the Montebello and CDI decisions." He then said: "I have seen no signs whatsoever, no official statement out of Germany, that they are backing away in any way from the Montebello decision." However, at the Wehrkunde Conference last week, which many of us attended, Chancellor Kohl refused to commit the Federal Republic to any new nuclear doployments. During the Conference, Franz Josef Strauss said that a majority of the Bundestag would oppose replacement of the Lance missile. Furthermore, the Social Democratic Party is flatly opposed to any nuclear modernization in Germany. Can you explain these discrepancies? What approach do you believe NATO should be taking at this juncture in terms of dealing with these German sensitivities?

Ms. RIDGWAY. On February 9, following the Wehrkunde meeting, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany issued a formal statement on security questions clarifying the FRG position on this issue. Inter alia, this statement noted:

"In this situation, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany saw no need for an isolated decision on modernization or non-modernization of individual nuclear weapons systems at the present time. Such decisions could only be taken on the basis of the overall concept which still had to be worked out. In this context, the alliance would also have to define the whole future structure of its nuclear weapons potential including the nuclear systems below 500 kilometers."

The statement went on to say:

"Nuclear systems which are considered indispensable by the Alliance on the basis of such a comprehensive strategic and arms control assessment for the maintenance of the credibility of its strategy of deterrence would, of course, have to be kept in a state of constant effectiveness."

At his press conference at the conclusion of his visit to Washington on February 19, Chancellor Kohl specifically reaffirmed the FRG's strong support for Montebello. He has also expressed the view that the so-called debate over nuclear short-range modernization is irrelevant because in fact new short-range nuclear weapons are being deployed in Germany now. Modernization is an ongoing process and at the present time there us no need for a specific new decision on modernization. In his February 25 report to the Bundestag on his visit to Washington, the Chancellor stressed that there was no doubt left that speculation about possible transatlantic misunderstandings and conflicts on SNF is completely unfounded.

At the recent NATO Summit, the allies, including the FRG, reiterated the requirement for "adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary." NATO Defense Ministers have also recently reiterated their support for the ongoing Montebello modernization program, which includes development of a Follow-On to Lance. This program, and on-

going work in the Alliance on NATO's nuclear posture after the INF Treaty, do not treat modernization in isolation. Rather, they place individual programs into the context of NATO's overall security framework. Needless to say, the United States fully supports this program. We are determined to do our part to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrent.

As far as dealing with specific German concerns in this area, we will continue to consult closely with the FRG, bilaterally and within the alliance context. We will continue to utilize existing NATO mechanisms—such as NATO's High Level Group—to address such matters. But no new alliance decisions or national commitments for the ongoing implementation of the Montebello Decision are required in the next few years.

Senator NUNN. In your view, can Germany be expected to agree to any major nuclear modernization program without a parallel arms control negotiation track?

Ms. RIDGWAY. At the recent NATO Summit, the allies, including the FRG, reiterated the requirement for "adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary." NATO Defense Ministers have also recently reiterated their support for the ongoing Montebello modernization program, which includes development of a Follow-On to Lance. Deployment of the Follow-On to Lance is envisioned in the mid-1990's. There is no need for a specific decision on its deployment at the present time.

The FRG would prefer that such a decision be taken on the basis of a comprehensive concept of security and arms control to be worked out by the alliance. However, we would not view a concept of that sort to mean that the alliance should adopt or would benefit from adopting a dual-track approach to Lance modernization. The alliance has already reduced unilaterally its inventory of nuclear weapons in Europe to the lowest level in 20 years. This has included significant reductions in warheads for short-range nuclear forces. These reductions stemmed from the 1983 Montebello Decision, which was predicated on the replacement of aging systems like Lance.

Senator NUNN. Should the United States commit resources to specific nuclear programs until we have evidence that deployment will be possible?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes. The allies have endorsed the requirement for nuclear modernization based on the Montebello Decision. In fact, the United States and its allies have already undertaken important steps in implementing the Montebello program. The next steps do not require a new alliance decision or new national commitments at this time. Rather, the allies are looking to the U.S. now to begin development of specific systems.

Once the systems begin to take shape, with a clear indication on the part of the USG to deploy, the allies will be in a position to make specific decisions on deployments and basing. Of course, the Allies would be reluctant to make political commitments on specific systems until they have been fully studied and defined and to which the United States has not committed itself. Moreover, it would not be in our interests to ask them to make a commitment to a new system years before actual deployment; rather, we should view the continued implementation of the Montebello Decision as a long-term process requiring ongoing cooperation with our NATO partners. In the meantime, the Department of Defense will continue to consult with allied governments and NATO military authorities on the desired military and operational characteristics of these systems.

Senator NUNN. Bearing in mind Germany's consistent position on non-singularity in nuclear matters, if Germany were to agree to a Follow-on Lance program, will other European countries go along? Which ones?

Ms. RIDGWAY. It is envisioned that the Follow-On to Lance would replace Lance in the forces of the six countries (including the United States) which already own Lance. NATO Defense Ministers—including the six whose countires own Lance—have recently reiterated their support for the ongoing Montebello modernization program, which includes development of a Follow-On to Lance.

INTRA-EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

Senator NUNN. Within the last year there has been a marked increase in intra-European defense cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally. France and Germany have established a joint defense and security council and have created a joint French-German brigade. British and French defense cooperation is also on the rise. In the multilateral area, the member states of the Western European Union have promulgated what you referred to as a "tough-minded" platform on European security interests. From the administration's point of view, are all efforts to strengthen the European pillar promising? Why is this the case? Do all of our European allies agree?

Ms. RIDGWAY. The United States supports cooperative efforts by its allies as long as they are within the broad framework of the Alliance and contribute to overall NATO capabilities. Our European allies, in the W.E.U. and other fora, have stated clearly that their activities are designed to strengthen Western defenses. For example, during his recent visit to Washington, W.E.U. Secretary General Alfred Cahen assured us that the W.E.U.'s efforts are designed to support NATO.

As noted above, the W.E.U. produced a tough-minded "Platform on European Security Interests" in October 1987. The United States endorses the W.E.U.'s platform, and we would note the platform emphasizes the W.E.U.'s commitment to defense and political solidarity within the alliance, and makes special mention of the irreplaceable role played by U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe.

The United States applauds activities by various NATO countries, including naval deployments, in support of free navigation in the Persian Gulf. We also note recent French steps in the W.E.U. Declaration and on the ground through Franco-German exercises to commit France to a policy of forward defense. As long as they are in the broad framework of the Alliance, efforts which improve security cooperation among the various allies strengthen the Alliance as a whole.

We have said repeatedly that we would oppose emergence of a "European Bloc" within NATO. However, we see nothing in current European efforts which gives us concern in that regard. We would note that Prime Minister Thatcher has expressed the view that bilateral defense arrangements among European countries should be supportive of NATO's capabilities. We agree with her on this, as do the allies participating in these activities.

FRENCH INITIATIVES

Senator NUNN. Do you think recent French initiatives in security cooperation should be characterized as tactical adjustments, or are they at least the beginnings of something more substantial? Why do you think France is taking these steps now?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Recent efforts by France to increase bilateral defense cooperation with other allies have a political as well as strategic rationale. The GOF has pointed out, for example, that Franco-British or Franco-German defense cooperation is nothing new. President Mitterrand has emphasized that there is "no Franco-German axis" and that bilateral efforts are "at the service of the European cause." There is a sharp awareness of growing budgetary constraints regarding the U.S. contribution to the Western Alliance. French bilateral defense efforts are in part a response to these constraints, and an effort to stimulate greater European involvement in its own security.

Senator LEVIN. There being no other questions, let me express our gratitude and our appreciation to our witnesses this morning; we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR NATO DEFENSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Dixon, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Quayle, Symms and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III and T. Kirk McConnell, professional staff members; Barbara B. Brown, Lori Jackson, Cindy Pearson and Mickie Jan Wise, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The meeting will come to order.

The committee is extremely fortunate today to have Dr. Brzezinski with us to discuss not only the strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, but also the political issues and the possibilities that ultimately will shape the future of the alliance.

So we are here to receive his views on the INF Treaty and also his views on where the alliance needs to go in the future.

Dr. Brzezinski needs no introduction as a national security and foreign policy expert. I would, however, like to remind the committee of Dr. Brzezinski's brilliant career as a European historian as well as a political analyst. Last year during our strategy hearings, Dr. Brzezinski offered a diagnosis of problems he saw within the alliance. That diagnosis which Dr. Brzezinski presented in his recent book, "Game Plan" and in his previous article on the future of Yalta, is of particular interest to the committee's current inquiry, and I hope we will be able to fully explore his views during this session.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just join you in welcoming this witness, and indeed, our good friend. He has taken his knowledge from public life and continued to be a public servant in many respects on international matters, and we welcome you here today.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Brzezinski, we will welcome your opening statement and whatever you would like to share with us in terms of opening remarks, and then we will have questions. Both our Republican and Democratic caucuses have just broken up, and so people will be coming in here a little late, but I think we ought to go ahead and get started.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, the committee is very glad to have with us today Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Dr. Brzezinski is an acknowledged expert on NATO security issues and the allied relationship with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. I look forward to hearing his views on the military and political implications of the INF Treaty.

I share the concern expressed by the chairman and other members of this committee on the criticality of the conventional balance of forces in Europe. By all quantitative measures we lag significantly behind the Warsaw Pact. This unfavorable balance has caused NATO to rely quite heavily on strategic weapons to maintain a deterrent capability. As we move toward a reduction in nuclear weapons in the INF and follow-on agreements, we must maintain a credible conventional deterrent. The imbalance must be addressed in conventional arms reduction agreements, and the United States and its allies must maintain the readiness and sustainability of our forces at the highest possible level.

In an era of declining resources we must establish the correct priorities to ensure a strong national and international defense strategy. We must work with our allies to ensure that we have a coordinated and viable policy for support and maintenance of the alliance. At the same time we pursue a policy of cooperation, the United States must maintain its own economic base and ensure the continued strength of our critical industries.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner. It is good to be with you. I fully appreciate the importance of these hearings, and I am glad to take part.

I do not have a——

Chairman NUNN. If you could, pull those microphones up there, you have to talk right into the mikes.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I fully appreciate the importance of these hearings, and I am delighted to take part.

I do not have a formal statement to make at the opening, but I have a few, if you will, informal comments to make which are not part of any prepared text.

I know that you have conducted extensive hearings on the INF issue as such, and I doubt very much that I have a great deal of wisdom to impart over and beyond what you have already heard. Let me, however, say for the record, first of all, that I do support the INF Treaty, and I do favor its ratification. I believe that the treaty is in keeping with the policy of the United States that has been steadfastly pursued since 1978. It is consistent with our strategic and political objectives and deserves to be ratified.

Second, let me add that at the same time, it is important not to exaggerate the importance of the treaty. I do not view it as a historical breakthrough. I do not view it as a——

Senator WARNER. Excuse me. I missed that word. You do or do not think——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I do not, do not view it as a historical breakthrough or as some monumental achievement. I think it is a useful treaty, but its actual significance is limited, and I think it is important therefore to see it in a realistic perspective.

As far as I am concerned, on the basis of what I know of the treaty, I am satisfied that its verification is feasible within general limits, and I am even more impressed by the fact that Soviet violations of the INF Treaty, were they to occur, are not likely to have any decisive strategic or political import.

I say this because I think it is important to establish the principle that the verification arrangements for the INF Treaty would not be adequate, I repeat, would not be adequate for any START Treaty, that indeed, such verification arrangements would be vastly inadequate given the monumental strategic and political importance of the START agreement. And it is important to put down a marker here.

You have asked me, however, to address some of the more political aspects of the current arrangements, and I welcome the invitation because indeed the treaty does have major political implications, not only for NATO, but for post-INF Europe. I think we have to acknowledge the fact that it is extremely unlikely that over the next 10 to 15 years the arrangements that have existed in Europe since the late forties will endure. We are entering a phase of accelerated political change in Europe, and hence, our political assessment must take as its point of departure an effort to assess what are the likely ramifications of that change.

And I wish to speak to that very briefly.

In my judgment, it is unlikely that over the next 10 to 15 years either the United States or the Soviet Union is likely to have the kind of political preeminence in the two halves of Europe respectively that the two superpowers have had over the last several decades. Both our preeminence and Soviet preeminence are declining and will continue to decline politically.

In this context, moreover, I think it is important to recognize that it is in the Soviet half of Europe that we are likely to see in the foreseeable future more dramatic, more dynamic and perhaps even more dangerous changes than in the Westerns half of Europe. For much of the cold war, our security concerns over the future of Western Europe meshed with our political anxiety about the future of Western Europe. Is it likely to be subverted from within by strong communist parties? Is Western Europe likely to be seduced by Soviet blandishments, et cetera?

We are now entering, in my judgment, a phase in which in the East the Soviet type system is going to be faced with a protracted crisis, and particularly so in Eastern Europe, to some extent in the Soviet Union itself; and I would not even dismiss the possibility of some truly explosive events transpiring in Eastern Europe in the not too distant future.

Several of the East European countries are today in what might be called a classical prerevolutionary situation, that is to say, a situation in which you have a significant downturn economically combined with growing political turmoil, or in some cases, even political liberalization. And the combination of the two, if you will, political loosening and economic downturn, is particularly destabilizing.

From our point of view, it is my judgment not in our interest that there be explosions in the East, for explosions in the East could precipitate strong Soviet reactions, Soviet interventions with far-reaching consequences for change within the Soviet Union itself and for the East-West relationship. But gradual change is desirable, both in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and hence, our policies, both on the security level and on the political plane, ought to bear that distinction in mind and be designed to promote evolutionary change.

This is why in the wake of the INF Treaty I think we ought to focus particularly on those aspects of arms control which deal with conventional arms and have militarily the desirable stabilizing effect while politically are conducive to the promotion of peaceful change. If we do not do that, we not only run the risk of being passive in relationship to potentially dynamic change in the East, but we also invite Soviet initiatives, politically and otherwise, to try either to neutralize or denuclearize Western Europe, with special attention being focused on Germany.

So in a sense, what I am advocating is a form of political initiative which is in part preemptive, which is in part a logical followup to the INF, and which in part ought to be part of a larger, longer range political strategy. More specificially, I have something in mind which I know you, Mr. Chairman, have talked about, and others as well, namely, conventional arms control proposals which are simple and therefore politically appealing, which focus directly on a highly visible issue, and I have particularly in mind the question of Soviet main battlefield tanks.

I think that the best way to deal with the problems that I have outlined would be for the alliance to follow the INF agreement with initiatives aiming at some initial thin-outs and then perhaps, even some tank-free areas being designated by mutual agreement, with the effort focused on the main battlefield tank, a weapon system which is usable primarily in conventional aggression, a weapon system which for most Europeans has historic significance, a weapon system which it is relatively easier to verify and to track.

My last point, Mr. Chairman, is that if my prognosis is right, that we are entering a phase of accelerated political change in the East and in the West, then of course it raises the question of what ought to be the security posture of the West as a whole, and here deliberate efforts by us to stimulate greater European self-reliance are very much needed.

And I do not believe that that self-reliance will develop on its own. It will only be in response to conditions that we further. Therefore, in a cautious and prudent way we ought to begin the process of making it clear that in the course of the nineties and into the next century, given our global priorities in the world as a whole, given the need for us to assume on our own security obligations in the Persian Gulf, in Central America, and to carry forward

the ones we have in the Far East, some cautious, progressive reallocation of our resources will take place, but slowly, gradually, giving the Europeans time to fill the void.

But unless we begin the process ourselves, there will always be reasons for the Europeans not doing more on their own, for delaying the process of somewhat readjusting the security burden.

In my view, the assumption gradually by the Europeans of a greater responsibility would stimulate also the political emergence of Europe, and that should still be our objective. Therefore, it would advance not only our security interests, but our larger geopolitical objectives.

I spoke a little longer than I intended, Mr. Chairman. I did not realize I had so much on my mind. But these are some of the thoughts that I would like to put on the table as a point of departure.

Chairman NUNN. You summarized very well, and we are very grateful to you for those constructive suggestions about the future of NATO.

I have a couple of questions to fit into the framework of dynamic change which you see on the Eastern side, and the importance of encouraging additional European effort on the Western side.

What do you see as the future of German reunification? I know you have written on this subject. I believe you have described German reunification as being an issue which is very much alive. I am not trying to quote it directly.

Could you tell us how the German reunification question plays in this overall future that you have portrayed both in terms of the West and the East?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, clearly the fact that Germany is divided, and is divided artificially (there is no historical basis for that particular division), means that Germany is a potentially volatile element in the East-West constellation. By this I do not mean to suggest that the Germans are not committed to the West or are disloyal or are easily seducible. But the fact is they are bound to be preoccupied with their national condition and not be entirely immune to Soviet efforts to exploit that division in order to promote either neutralization of Germany or some reduction in the German connection with the West as a whole.

Having said that, I do think that some of the current anxieties in the West, particularly in such Western capitals as Paris and to a lesser extent London, over the future conduct of the Germans are exaggerated. For one thing, I do not believe that the Soviets have a truly German card to play in the sense of suddenly offering the Germans reunification, dismantling of the Berlin Wall, et cetera, in exchange for neutral status for Germany. The reason is that any such effort would mean the dismantling of the East German regime. That would be presumably the cost of reunification, and the dismantling of the East German regime would mean that the bastion that contains Eastern Europe under Soviet control would be gone. And even a neutral Germany would be a very seductive attraction for Czechoslovakia, for Hungary, for Poland, who would then want to acquire gradually an equally neutral status.

So I do not see the Soviets playing that card. I think more limited efforts, particularly to obtain West German assistance to Soviet modernization investment are likely.

At the same time, and finally, I think also we have to recognize that historically, in the long run, if there is some day a reunification of Germany, it will not take place in the traditional form of a single German state in a Europe of states. It is much more likely to be in the form of some confederation in a Europe in which individual states are becoming less important, maybe part of a larger European confederation. And hence, it really is something on the agenda for the next century, and probably for our children rather than for us.

Chairman NUNN. What would happen, in your view, right now if the Berlin Wall were to come down?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If the Berlin Wall were to come down, I think there would be an initially fairly significant flight of people from the East to the West. All those who would have liked to leave over the last number of years but who simply were not desperate enough to try to climb walls or cut their way through barbed wire or to wiggle their way through minefields, would then take advantage of the wall being down to leave. So you would have initially a very large-scale exodus.

Then I think it would taper off, and its scale would depend very much on the degree of economic vitality in the West, on the degree to which East Germans can be absorbed into the German economy and so forth.

But it would have, I think, a significantly destabilizing effect, particularly initially, on the East German regime.

Chairman NUNN. We have heard talk, a good bit of talk, about French-German cooperation, and there have been some formal steps taken in that regard—for instance, the joint brigade. We find in some capitals, let's say London, for example, there is a lot of nervousness about this.

How do you feel about the French-German cooperative pattern that is slowly beginning to emerge?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. British nervousness is quite traditional, but at the same time, the British do compensate for it by having an increasingly close nuclear connection with the French.

I personally view it as a desirable development, particularly politically. From what I know of it, I have the impression that militarily it is not now and probably not for quite some time to come, a truly viable military combat unit in the sense that there would be real problems of language, command and integration to be resolved. But as a symbol of growing political-military cooperation between France and Germany, thereby creating necessary movement toward greater European self-reliance on the conventional and also on the nuclear level, it is desirable.

The Franco-British cooperation provides that on the strategic level. The Franco-German cooperation can provide that on the conventional level, and therefore I welcome it. I have to say that I see it as a reaction to some of the things that over the years you or Henry Kissinger or I and others have been saying for which we were initially much criticized, namely, that some very cautious reassessment of the level of the American involvement directly in the

defense of Europe should be undertaken, and that the Europeans could do more.

The argument was always made that if we say that, or worse, if we begin to do something about it, the Europeans would be stampeded into neutralism. I have never believed that. I think some of these initiatives are a reaction to the growing European realization that for legitimate collective security reasons we will have to in the years ahead somewhat readjust the way we operate on the global security level and that in response they will have to do more. And they can do this better together than alone.

So I view it as a very positive development, and I think it should be encouraged.

Chairman Nunn. I agree with that assessment.

My time has expired Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, we are delighted to have Dr. Brzezinski here.

Doctor, Senator Nunn, Senator Byrd, Senator Pell, Senator Boren, and I had a rather extensive trip to five of the NATO capitals. We spent a good deal of time with Chancellor Kohl, about 2½ hours, as a matter of fact, and went over a very wide range of issues. It was clear to us, and that meeting made it ever more clear, that while there was strong unity in NATO to get on with the foundation to provide for the INF Treaty, that there is always a fragility politically, and the decisions that we make here in the United States impact very heavily on their political structures.

Let's go back to your testimony of a year ago when you recommended the withdrawal of a substantial number of American forces from the NATO arena, and look at that in the post-INF context.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Do you want me to do that?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. All right.

Well, first of all, do not consider me to be picayune, but I do want to say I have never recommended the withdrawal of American forces. I believe——

Senator WARNER. Let me read your testimony.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I know what you are talking about. I do not deny the substance.

Senator WARNER. Just for the benefit of others,

> Consequently, and again, I know this is controversial, the United States should undertake a gradual and certainly only partial reduction in the level of American forces in Europe. A total of perhaps 100,000 troops should be gradually withdrawn.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Right.

Senator WARNER. Now, that was what was said.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Right. But I am always trying to use such words as "reduction," "redeployment" and so forth to suggest that we are not engaging in something which is viewed as a withdrawal because that implies politics as well. And over the years, I am very much aware of the fact that American troop levels in Europe have oscillated. Sometimes they have been higher than they are today; sometimes they have been lower than they are today. And it is interesting to note that these oscillations have had very little relationship to the East-West situation.

For example, in the sixties, we took out 112,000 American soldiers at a time when the decade was initiated by the confrontation of American and Soviet tanks in Berlin. In the seventies, when we were talking about détente, we put in 70,000. Others have recommended even bigger cuts. Henry Kissinger has talked about 50 percent being taken out over some period of time. Senator Nunn at one point talked about 90,000. I talk about 100,000.

I think that gradual readjustment over a number of years, largely to be accomplished through rotation, asymmetrical rotation, is justified. I think that 40 years after World War II, it really is somewhat unbalanced for approximately—no one knows exactly—40 percent of our defense budget to be effectively dedicated to the defense of one theater at a time when we have to assume strategic and conventional responsibilities in other parts of the world.

So I would favor a gradual redressing of that imbalance.

The INF Treaty I do not think either makes that more propitious or less propitious. There is never a good moment to do something like this.

Senator WARNER. Well, let me take you a step further. Before going over, I felt that there was perhaps some ambivalence on the part of certain of the European leaders with respect to the third zero option. If you take their statements made to us at face value, they seem to me unanimously opposed to that third zero option. Yet we are all certain that the Soviet Union is going to work every opportunity it can to see that that idea is raised. Germany, of course, for strategic reasons, is particularly vulnerable to that problem because the use of the shorter-range weapons could well be confined to their land.

It appears to me that if we are to go on with the modernization and I say if—I think it is imperative in my view that we go on with that modernization—that at the same time, if there is any thought of modernizing tactical nuclear weapons, then there may be consideration of removing some other of our forces. I see this as a stressful situation being placed on the NATO alliance, and particularly Germany.

How do you feel, specifically about the question of the modernization of the tactical nuclear forces?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, first of all, I agree very much with your point about the third zero. I think there is a danger. We ought to try to obviate it. I think we would do well to obviate it by also putting on the East-West table a proposal for conventional arms reductions, focusing on tanks. I think that would have public support, and would make it easier to divert the efforts of the Soviets to focus public attention on the nuclear issue.

Beyond that, I do believe that some modernization of the short-range weapon system is necessary, especially since I do not believe that American troops should be in Europe without the capacity to employ early on nuclear weapons.

Senator WARNER. We have upward of a million people.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

Senator WARNER. If you look at the troops and dependents.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. So I agree with that. Where I think I part company with some people—not necessarily with you, for I do not know exactly where you stand—is that I do not think there is any-

thing particularly sacrosanct about the present troop level in Europe. As I said earlier, it has been higher, it has been lower. I do not think we should be precipitating anxiety by doing anything dramatic, but there is nothing sacrosanct about that particular figure.

Senator WARNER. Let me turn now to conventional arms control. You started out with this issue and suggested that the alliance take the initiative. It is our understanding that NATO is really working very hard on that, and possibly at the summit there may be some public announcement about it.

The question that has been put to me time and time again is if MBR failed over 14 years and you not have this 23-nation conference consisting of NATO, Warsaw Pact and France, with the mandate for that conference coming out of the CSCE conference which you are fully familiar with that may well be linked to human rights issues, which are important, why should we raise the expectations of our publics today, both in Europe and here? How can we have fruitful conventional arms control talks, given the complexity of the drafting of the mandate and given the background against 14 years of MBFR without any significant results?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree with you. I do not think we should be building up expectations that there will be an agreement, but I think we should be focusing public attention on the need for some adjustment in the conventional arms area. Even in the absence of an agreement, public attention to that issue I think will dramatize for the West European publics the existing asymmetries on the conventional level. If we do not step forward with a politically appealing and potentially a militarily stabilizing conventional arms agreement, then I think the Soviets will succeed in focusing public attention on continued negotiations designed to attain the third zero, which is exactly what we want to avoid.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. So that would be my first point.

My second point on the MBFR specifically is that you are absolutely right, these negotiations have been complicated, slow and so forth. But I think part of the problem in the MBFR is that in dealing with multinational armies and the question of the data base, it was easy to get bogged down in insoluble problems pertaining to troop levels and troop reductions. Focusing on a single system, particularly a very dramatic and important system, I think makes it somewhat easier. A variant of this could be tanks and artillery, and I think it is for experts to determine whether that is an improvement.

But essentially what I think we want to avoid is coming up with an arms control proposal which from a military point of view may be wonderful, but which is so detailed, so complicated, which involves so many different ratios that the public is neither able to understand it nor support it nor become interested in it. This is why I really do favor something relatively simple and highly focused. And I think the main battlefield tanks issue is a very obvious target for us.

If progress begins to be made on this subject, at least some of the MBFR issues I think would be easier to resolve. It will be easier to track the movement and the deployment of tanks in depots, or to

track their surreptitious reentry, than it is really with troops, regarding which there are uncertainties as to numbers and which can be more surreptitiously moved. It is simply more difficult to be very confident about one's data there.

Senator WARNER. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Dr. Brzezinski, thank you again for being with us today.

Clearly one of the issues that we are all groping with is what happens post-INF. In other words, as we look at this, what next step should we take? Most of the debate has focused either on START and the potential of reductions in strategic weapons or on conventional weaponry. I have tried to focus us a little bit on another area that I think may be useful, and that is follow-on to Stockholm.

Would you give us your perspective on what we have learned from the Stockholm Agreement, the observations and inspections established by that agreement, and if in fact it is useful for us to think of developing further regimes of confidence building techniques.

I would appreciate your reaction.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I think these are useful steps, and they do somewhat marginally enhance mutual confidence and mutual stability. I do think, however, that by themselves they are not as important as more focused East-West arrangements dealing with central weapons systems. This is why I would not like to diffuse our efforts in the arms control area too much by trying to do too much at the same time, but would rather see a concentrated proposal on a major weapon systems which in fact does create genuine instability in Europe, namely, main battlefield tanks. It is a system that people are automatically responsive to; they understand, they know what it means. I think that is politically important.

Senator WIRTH. I do not think the suggestion has ever been that a follow-on of the Stockholm Agreement would stand by itself or, as the chairman noted in a speech that he gave in Germany last week, that it is a panacea. But it seems to me that if one of the intents of American policy is to assure that we could defend against any kind of surprise attack by the Soviets—and that seems to be just about at the top of everybody's list—that it would be useful to be able to detect a buildup for surprise attacks. If, to go along with your proposal, one of the elements of surprise attack would certainly be a lot of armor and, if we could be in a situation where there was some arrangement to monitor Soviet depots where the armor was, there might be some way for us to be able to understand what was happening in terms of the supply of petroleum, where we would be able to look at various bottlenecks of transportation, then quite logically that provides us with better information, not only through national technical means but very real means on the ground as well, that alerts us to some kind of a change of behavior.

That in turn gives us a longer period of time, presumably, with our more awkward political mechanism, to figure out what the appropriate political response ought to be.

So I would think that there is some virtue in these, not standing by themselves, but maybe even thinking of allying some of what we have learned from Stockholm and next steps with perhaps the kind of a proposal that you are making focused on armor by itself.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, absolutely. I agree almost, in fact, with every word that you have said, and I think your description of the utility of such arrangements was first rate. I think it has to be seen therefore as supportive and reinforcing of something which I personally consider to be very central and therefore to have a higher priority, namely, a more direct East-West accommodation on weapons systems, which then is made more credible and more reassuring by all of the specific steps that you have outlined.

I see a real mesh here and a mutual benefit. But I would not want to see that as a substitute for the other.

Senator WIRTH. Absolutely, and no suggestion that it would stand by itself or be a substitute.

In the little time remaining to me, let me ask you to expand on your remarks about our policy toward Western Europe. Realignment, change, evolutionary, I think were all words that you used to characterize our policy toward Western Europe. Dr. Kissinger had suggested that, you had suggested that, this was difficult to do. But clearly, you know, the world is changing, Europe has a concentration of power there, the Japanese are a very real power in the Pacific, and our role in the world is changing, and we are trying to understand that.

As we try to understand that, it seems to me it is important to understand what it is that the Soviets want and what it is that Mr. Gorbachev might think that he as the General Secretary wants the Soviets to do.

Could you just give us the benefit of your thoughts as to what you think the Soviets want post-INF, what do you think that it is in their national interest to do as a next step after INF?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, that gets to the question of how one assesses both Soviet foreign policy today and its internal policy, and in the Soviet case, the two are really closely related.

I see Perestroika as having a domestic and a foreign dimension. To me, as of now, I think both efforts are essentially designed to obtain a breathing spell, to relieve the pressures and the costs of a very expensive and debilitating competition with the United States, the result of which has neither been the closing of the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States economically nor the acquisition by the Soviet Union of a decisive strategic edge, but rather a situation in which there is ambiguity strategically and in which the Soviet Union increasingly falls behind economically and socially.

I do not know whether the present Soviet leadership looks beyond 10 or 15 years. But I should think that the Perestroika that is being advocated for the next 10 to 15 years is a serious effort, a genuine effort to correct that situation and to correct it by a process in which the Soviet Union regains some vitality, enhances its appeal and thereby also eventually improves its foreign policy posture.

More specifically, I think it is meant to avoid a situation in which 10, 15, 20 years from now the Soviet Union, instead of being

the principal rival of the United States, could find itself dangerously behind other countries. I recently participated in the Commission on Discriminate Deterrence, and we looked ahead to the year 2010. There are real reasons for concluding that the global hierarchy in the year 2010 will not be the Soviet Union displacing the United States as number one, which is what Khrushchev predicted in the year 1970 already, but rather a situation in which the United States is still at the top, with Europe right next to it (if a united Europe existed politically), followed by China, then by Japan, and only then by the Soviet Union.

Now, from the Soviet point of view, that is a disastrous prognosis. The fact is that every one of these countries in different degrees is more likely to be friendly with the United States than with the Soviet Union.

So I think Perestroika domestically and internationally has as a strategic objective the avoidance of this situation. And it requires a protracted breathing spell in the competition with the United States.

Senator WIRTH. Well, again, Dr. Brzezinski, my time has expired. I thank you again for not only today but your great help for this committee and the Congress.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, welcome and thank you for your very insightful comments. You have certainly provided a great deal today, as in many other days.

Doctor, Senator Warner mentioned the concern that some have concerning the so-called triple zero option and also stated that every European leader opposed that as the next step.

The concern that I have is what my colleague Senator Cohen described as "Genscherizing", and that is the advocating of simultaneous negotiations, of the so-called triple option, START, and conventional arms reduction negotiations taking place all at the same time, with progress being made on the triple option and no progress in the other two.

Does that scenario concern you? It seems to me that it is somewhat attractive to a lot of Europeans.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. You mean negotiations on START and on battlefield nuclear weapons, and on conventional arms at the same time?

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I would think that——

Senator MCCAIN. Thereby leading to a scenario where you make progress on the short-range, but not on the others.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I would think that it would be in our interest to try to set the pace on the conventional arms reduction initiatives and to generate as much public support for them as is possible through some proposals, thereby avoiding that danger. But that means coming up with some initiative on conventional arms.

It is not sufficient to keep pointing out the asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I think what is needed is some initiative by us which involves a proposal which then sets in motion some form of negotiating process, however slow or rapid it then

subsequently may become. So the way to avoid that danger, in brief, is to step forward with some initiative.

Senator McCain. Do you believe there should be any linkage between conventional arms reductions and a successful negotiation of the START Treaty?

Dr. Brzezinski. No, no, I do not. It seems to me that the strategic issues are sufficiently complex, significant in their own right and, if you will, strategically autonomous that any formal linkage between the two at this stage at least is not necessary.

Given the levels envisaged provisionally for START, I think that they do not affect, as of now and for the foreseeable future, the capacity of either side of wage a central strategic war.

So until we begin to get down to numbers in which that capacity is significantly and adversely affected, I do not think a linkage would be desirable. But the absence of linkage does not mean that we simply sit and not do anything on the conventional arms level until START is concluded. I am not sure that we will have a START agreement by May. We certainly should not let some artificial deadline dictate that outcome.

But I do not think we should wait until a START agreement to set a conventional proposal in motion.

Senator McCain. What reason do you have for confidence that we could arrive or make progress on a conventional arms reduction treaty?

Dr. Brzezinski. I do not have any confidence that we would. I have a certain amount of confidence that taking the initiative on the subject would help us politically with the West European public opinion, would put the Soviets somewhat on the defensive by focusing international attention on weapons system in which they have an enormous advantage and which gives them an aggressive capacity. Those will be the more immediate benefits.

Whether the negotiations are successful or not, I really have no way of predicting. In fact, I am agnostic on that subject. I do not know.

Senator McCain. But in your view, there is an enormous conventional imbalance?

Dr. Brzezinski. In certain weapons categories. I am not of the view that if there was a conventional war on the central front in Europe, that a Soviet military victory is preordained. In fact, my exposure to the national security issue leads me to the view that as of now, no self-respecting decisionmaker on either side who genuinely examines the issue has the basis for reaching any confident conclusion as to who would win either a central war of a strategic type or a major conventional engagement on the central front. I think the situation is simply too complicated, too ambiguous.

This does not mean that there are not serious asymmetries in certain weapons categories; there are. But I do not think that one is justified in concluding that we would definitely lose a major conventional engagement.

Senator McCain. Given these asymmetries, as you mentioned, there is clearly a requirement for not only modernization but perhaps some changes in the structure itself, like pulling back—abandoning or reevaluating the so-called front line strategy and others.

Do you have confidence that our European allies are willing to make some of these changes to correct these asymmetries?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, up to a point. You know, we have to be, to some extent, forgiving and tolerant of some of their political concerns. If you were a German, given the limited depth of the country, you would naturally be preoccupied with forward defense and so forth. So we have to be sensitive to these concerns. These are not illegitimate.

But within these obvious political limits, I think the Europeans are moving today to a far greater extent than at any point since the fifties to a recognition that they need to do more for their defense. I think this is a healthy development. We should not adopt a posture that we will do it for them under all circumstances if they do not, because if we do that, then we encourage them to do less.

So I am rather, in fact, encouraged by the European reaction to even the relatively limited American discussion about the need for readjustments in our global strategic and conventional posture in terms of the nineties and beyond.

Senator McCAIN. My time has expired.

Thank you, doctor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Doctor, it is great to have you here.

I wanted to bring up a subject that I do not think has been talked about very much during the course of our hearings. We have looked at some perceived weakness on the northern flank of NATO, but we have not talked enough about the southern flank of NATO.

I wonder what your thoughts would be on the proposition that if we could get ourselves, our NATO allies in Western Europe, and the French to pool some resources and rearm Turkey, and modernize their forces so that they could, in fact, be a "dagger" on the southern flank to any attack into Central Europe, if that not be one of the most positive and wise expenditures of defense funds?

And then let it be known as a doctrine that they would start attacking north at the time that the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces attacked on the central European plains.

What would you say to that?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, first of all, I would say I am not sure the Turks necessarily would go for it in terms of adopting a responsive offensive posture. But militarily, it certainly has a great deal of sense, and there is no doubt from a military point of view that a continued cooperative relationship with Turkey is very, very desirable.

By and large over the years, the Turks have been a good ally and have in some respects deserved better than they got.

I realize the issue is complicated by a variety of other concerns, including the need for a good relationship with Greece. There is no doubt in my mind that Turkey is geopolitically and geostrategically vital, and it does represent a very major strategic asset, not only in terms that you spoke, but also in regards to any contingency involving a Soviet drive to the south.

Senator SYMMS. To the Persian Gulf region?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

On the question of pooling our resources together and doing more, let me make a general point here that does not apply to Turkey necessarily, but to NATO in general. I think that the time has come for the United States to state flatout that it will not pay anybody for the right to have bases on foreign soil.

I think we have allowed ourselves to get sucked into a posture in which we are inviting blackmail, financial blackmail. The reason for American bases in most places abroad is that the countries concerned have as much of a security need for our troops as we have for our troops to be there. There are also a lot of economic and technological benefits to these countries concerned. I would strongly favor a flatout doctrine that any country that wants to be paid for American bases is not going to have American bases. I think we will get rid of a lot of difficult problems which pertain not only to your question, but to a lot of other places in the world, if we took that position.

Senator SYMMS. Doctor, I appreciate that very much. I might just say that during the break over Christmas I had the opportunity to visit the Philippines, and one of our colleagues here in the Senate was there and had a press conference. He stated that he thought we should pay twice as much for the use of the bases in the Philippines as we are currently paying. And I can tell you that our Ambassador over there about died, because part of his job is to do the negotiating.

I think that your statement certainly is one that I respect you for saying, and we need to have you go around the world and repeat it. Because in the Philippines it is obvious, not that we are talking about the Philippines today, that the United States presence there is probably one of the most stabilizing influences in the islands.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I do not want to name countries, because it is invidious. But we know of some cases where we were invited into bases because the countries concerned for a variety of reasons wanted our bases. Then years later we end up paying huge sums of money for the right to have a base. I think we are being very misguided. I think if we took the position from now on no American base goes into a country unless there is a reciprocal interest, and if there is we do not pay for it——

Senator SYMMS. I know that my senior colleague would agree with you. He told the Turks when he was there recently and they brought this up. If you don't want us here, we will be glad to move out. And I think it is in our best interest, and certainly in their best interest, to have our presence there.

Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Symms.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, we are glad to see you again, glad to have you here.

Dr. Brzezinski, could you tell the committee what you would call a militarily significant violation of the treaty? For example, is the detection of one or two illegal SS–20s a militarily significant viola-

tion, or would 100 or 200 SS-20s that were convertly deployed be significant?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I do not want to be misunderstood about my answer, but I am going to be very direct about it. I do not think even the surreptitious and very disagreeable deployment of 100 SS-20s would have a very significant military effect.

I think the SS-20 in my judgment is not a terribly useful military weapon. I think it would have far-reaching political effects, and I would not want to absolve the Soviets or to give them a green light. I certainly would not want them to establish the precedent that they can get away with it, because then they would do it in START, where it might matter.

But almost any kind of violation of the INF agreement that I can think of is not likely to be very militarily significant.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brzezinski, what in your opinion would be a militarily significant circumvention of the INF Treaty?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, as I said, the INF Treaty really deals with a relatively minor percentage of the nuclear arsenals of both sides. It so happens that it deals with nuclear weapons on our side that are militarily very useful and with nuclear weapons on their side that are mostly politically useful.

So I really cannot answer that question beyond what I said in response to the previous one.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brzezinski, there seems to be growing sentiment in the Federal Republic of Germany to move toward the triple zero option and eliminate all the short range systems not covered by INF.

What are your thoughts concerning this?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it would be a mistake for us to get involved at this stage in any negotiations pointing toward a third zero. I think we should focus instead European attention on the need to negotiate a meaningful conventional arms control agreement, focus particularly on a weapons category in which the Soviets have the greatest advantage and which gives them the potential for a sudden conventional attack.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brzezinski, Richard Perle testified before this committee and he was concerned about the ban on ground-launched cruise missiles, because we would be prevented from deploying conventionally armed missiles with precision accuracy at a future date.

Do you share this view?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, doctor.

Thank you, Mr. chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

I would like to probe with you the public opinion battle, I suppose you could call it that, or whatever we are engaged in with the Soviet Union, and we appear to be on the wrong end of it in Europe. The European public opinion polls continue to show that they believe Gorbachev is taking the initiative and give him credit for things like the INF Treaty, when we were the ones who proposed it to begin with, and so forth.

What do you believe America and the West needs to do to get on top of the whole thrust of public opnion? Are we playing our cards

poorly, or is it just that we are facing a much more formidable adversary and we are not quite prepared for it?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I guess both of these things are true. We probably have not played our cards quite as well as we might have over the last several years. There is no doubt, second, that Gorbachev is much more skilled and attractive.

But there may also be a third reason, namely, we have become accustomed over the years to brutish, crude, inept Soviet leaders. And the very fact that there is on the scene an intelligent, attractive-looking Soviet leader is bound to have initially a major impact on Western public opinion.

Chairman NUNN. So you think there is likely to be a settling effect after people get more accustomed to a different kind of Soviet leader? It is the contrast that is making a lot of difference?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Exactly, the novelty of it. But I think it will wane.

I suspect that his domestic efforts of Perestroika will also confront growing difficulties, and that will I think also somewhat dilute his appeal. Last but not least, what we have been talking about this afternoon, namely, if we begin to take the initiative now on the conventional arms level, I think we might make some real progress in the area that you were raising, in public relations.

Chairman NUNN. So you are saying that conventional arms control has to play an educational role?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. And I think if we focus in Europe on a weapons system which is really threatening, then that in itself is educational, in addition to being a negotiating process.

Chairman NUNN. I completely agree with that. I think that has been one of the missing links in our arms control efforts for a number of years, and that is educating our own people about the relationship between conventional deficiencies, conventional imbalances, and nuclear weapons and the nuclear deterrent strategy.

Senator Quayle, I do not think you have had——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. May I just add?

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. On that point, and at the risk of repeating, I think we have to be careful to fashion our conventional arms control proposal in such a way that it really is a proposal with domestic political appeal. Without vulgarizing the proposal excessively, that does mean keeping it simple.

I know, for example, the French are coming up with a conventional arms control scheme which is very elegant and very sophisticated, and which deals with all sorts of ratios and tradeoffs. But it is so complex that I suspect nobody will understand it. And while it may be militarily desirable, it will not have the desired political impact. So keeping it simple, focusing it in one or at most two categories of systems, is I think very, very important here.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome back, Dr. Brzezinski.

Let me focus on the commission on long-range integrated strategy, the report on Discriminate Deterrence, which is a new doctrine that we will be hearing a lot about. I might just say, in my 7 or 8 days that I was in Europe, that there was a lot of publicity con-

cerning or having some anxieties about what the report did or did not say.

But when you really press a number of the people over there, I would say probably a bottom line figure is that 90 percent of the report they agree with, and that there is just 10 percent that they have some questions about. So I think the judgment overall has been much more favorable than perhaps the public reaction.

My question would be, in looking at a post-INF environment and looking at Discriminate Deterrence, what two or three things should we be focusing on that would begin to see the implementation of this type of a strategy?

Are there some specific programs that you might want to place on a priority basis or some things that we might want to do as the Senate Armed Services Committee to get a better handle on this, particularly as we look on initiatives that we should undertake with the post-INF situation?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would say three things, at least to me, are the most important in terms of tangible follow-up. The first is to provide for the United States an increasingly effective and genuine capacity for Discriminate Deterrence, which means flexible, highly precise, strategic delivery systems, armed both with nuclear and nonnuclear warheads for the performance of highly specified military missions. That would in my judgment greatly enhance deterrence, because it would avoid the choice between no reaction and apocalyptic war. In some cases that choice might make no reaction the more likely choice, and that would destroy deterrence.

So I would say more emphasis on highly flexible, selective, precise strategic systems, both nuclear and nonnuclear.

Senator QUAYLE. Would this be like cruise missiles?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. For example, like cruise missiles, exactly. But also ballistic missiles like the Pershing II, with that kind of accuracy, but perhaps of intercontinental type.

Second, some mix of offense and defense. I have long felt that a limited strategic defense makes sense for us and for them as well. For both of us, some deployment of limited strategic defenses to protect our central military assets would be desirable.

I think it would be stabilizing. Technology makes it feasible. I think strategy makes it desirable, and I think we have to move out of the era in which we are both dependent for deterrence and security on highly prompt offensive systems, which could under certain circumstances even precipitate a conflict by mistake.

Senator QUAYLE. I wonder if I could just interrupt there. Would you also apply that offensive-defense mix to Europe, and in particular I am thinking perhaps we ought to be looking more seriously at an extended air defense in Europe.

Would you go in that direction as well?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, of course there you have to make a tradeoff in terms of cost between air defense or some form of an ATM, and I am not sure which one at this stage would come out ahead. But certainly if we begin to move in that way, an extension of the process to Europe would follow in some area which is feasible, again not for population defense, but largely for stabilizing military purposes.

The third priority I would emphasize, again extracting from that report what I consider most central, is enhanced air- and sea-lift capability for flexible forces capable of rapid use anywhere in the world, making us less dependent on prepositioned forces, foreign bases, or cooperation from our allies, which in recent years in some crisis situations was denied to us.

Now, those are the three priorities that I would favor. The question arises, how do we pay for it? And there are three things of which I would do less:

First, I would put less emphasis on central strategic systems.

Second, I would put less emphasis on new large platforms for the three services, and stress instead force multipliers for existing platforms.

Third, I would urge some cautious, limited readjustment of our budgetary priorities away from the European theater. Neither strategic nor conventional war there is likely, than elsewhere, and conflicts are more likely elsewhere than there.

Senator QUAYLE. I would like to take this opportunity, as long as you are before the committee, to get to an issue that is not entirely related to INF, but focus on your understanding and what you think may happen in Afghanistan. It appears to me, looking at at least the published reports and what the common provincial wisdom is, is that the Soviets are prepared to leave Afghanistan, they are prepared evidently to do it this year.

My question is I guess two or threefold. One, do you think that they are prepared to leave Afghanistan? Under what types of circumstances do you think they will leave Afghanistan?

And then, finally, this will be happening in all probability right before the summit of our President and the General Secretary. What do you anticipate that the Soviets may ask us as far as help?

We have read a lot and heard discussion today, they sort of need help in leaving Afghanistan, that we ought to in fact respond in some way. I wonder if you would give us your viewpoint.

You have had vast experience in this particular area and I would be interested in any comments you might have.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, let me try to respond seriatim. Are they prepared to leave? I think that the Soviets are in a somewhat similar position in Afghanistan to where we were in Vietnam in the early seventies. That is to say, they would like to leave, but they would still like to leave behind something that they like.

It was not until 1974 that we were prepared to bite the bullet, irrespective of what happens in Saigon after we leave. I am not quite sure they are there yet. They would still like to have something in Kabul after they leave that does not collapse immediately, and it is this that they would like us to help them on.

But they are inching toward a departure, and I think we ought to do whatever we can to make certain that they leave. We should not try to rub their noses in dirt as they leave. But at the same time, we should be very prudent and not make commitments which make the resumption of resistance more difficult.

For example, if we cut off aid to the Mujahideen too prematurely or if we couple the cutting off of aid to the Mujahideen with the dismantling of training camps and base support facilities outside of Afghanistan, wherever they may be, we will be reducing our capac-

ity to resume the resistance in the event the Soviets stop their withdrawals or reverse them for some reason, which could happen.

I hope it does not happen. But I do not think we should create a situation in which our ability to respond to an unfavorable development is severely limited.

So my bottom line is, let us act as if they were talking in good faith. Let us see whether we can facilitate their departure, but not at the cost of arrangements which may then tempt them to reverse their departure.

Senator QUAYLE. And you think the critical element is the aid?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I think there are really several critical elements. I think that is one critical element, but the other one is whether we do strive to create a transitional regime for Afghanistan as they leave or not, or whether we leave that issue open. I think that is another very complicated issue.

But on all of these matters, I would be inclinded to try to precipitate the departure of a significant portion of the troops up front, in response for which we should be willing to make some concessions but not concessions which foreclose our option of reversing our action if the Soviets all of a sudden change course. We do not know how committed they are, we do not know how committed they will stay. We do not know whether some circumstances might not tempt them to change course, and therefore we have to be ready to respond.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Welcome to you, Dr. Brzezinski. We are always delighted to have you back in front of the committee because of your considerable expertise in the area.

I understand that you have indicated again today what I have heard you say on other occasions. I think that is particularly important in view of your long experience in dealing with the Soviets. That is that you truly believe that there is at least a new hope today, with the new leadership in the Soviet Union, that they are taking a more realistic attitude toward the future.

I suspect that might be, as much as anything else, the need of their own empire to improve the standard of living in the Soviet Union. But for whatever reasons, you firmly believe then that, under Mr. Gorbachev, we are dealing with a different group of Soviet leadership. While we cannot trust them, you are hopeful that the INF Treaty might be a significant beginning at least or chance to go on down the road further into even more meaningful reductions, both in the strategic and with regard to conventional forces.

Is that a fair assessment of your position?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, let me put it this way. I believe the Soviet leadership is serious about changes domestically because it recognizes that if it does not make them it will not be able to compete with us internationally. This may therefore not mean that their ultimate strategy has been altered, but it does mean a significant shift in priorities.

Second, let me say that my positive attitude toward the INF Treaty is not premised on what Mr. Gorbachev is doing domestically or externally. If we had negotiated the very same INF Treaty with Brezhnev, I would also be for it. In other words, my willingness to accept and give my support for its ratification is not connected with what Gorbachev is doing at home or abroad.

The fact that he is doing these things creates a somewhat better climate for the treaty and maybe makes us somewhat more hopeful over the possibility of negotiating other issues. But I think by and large the INF Treaty is deserving of support on its own merits.

It is essentially consistent with what we set out to accomplish in 1978 in response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. I was then responsible for the work of the National Security Council. I chaired the session at which we decided to go with the proposal or 572 counterweapons. I was the one who proposed to the NSC Committee in the course of a disagreement that we go with the 572 figure, for a variety of reasons, which was the figure only at that point favored by the JCS.

Everybody favored a lower figure. And I as the chairman was able to prevail on that committee to recommend to the President unanimously the higher figure, for a variety of reasons. We did that in order to achieve an outcome which I think the INF Treaty achieves.

So I am for the treaty on its own merits, irrespective of whether Gorbachev is there or not.

Senator EXON. Getting back to the Soviet Union, though, I am trying to establish what chances of future success you think we have. Obviously, with the INF Treaty we seem to have had a breakthrough. I suspect that you must feel that there has been a significant change in direction, at least in the uppermost leadership of the Soviet Union.

And yet, I keep hearing and I keep reading about the fact that Mr. Gorbachev and the new openness that he is fostering is under some very solid opposition within the highest realm of the Politburo.

How serious, is the risk in your opinion, that this could be all suddenly turned around, with the old guard taking back over again? Is that a serious threat?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Let me respond by telling you a story, which is true. It is slightly indiscrete, but it is responsive in part to your question, and I will elaborate on it.

During the state dinner for Gorbachev in the White House, to which I went, I had the opportunity to talk to several Soviet officials about Perestroika, and in the course of that conversation, once we sort of became a little more friendly and relaxed with each other, I said: You know, the word "Perestroika," which starts with "p" and means reconstruction, is now well familiar to most Americans. But I kind of harbor the feeling that before too long Americans may learn three other Russian words which begin with a "p", namely that Perestroika will ultimately be seen as a peredyshka, which is the Russian word for a breathing spell; and then that in turn will lead for a number of you to a posadka, which is Russian slang for sitting in jail; and it could even end up for a few of you as a perestreika, which is Russian slang for thinning out by shooting.

And the Russian to whom I was talking kind of looked at me. He did not laugh, of course. He did not think it was very funny. But he did not glare, either. He looked rather wistful, and then he very quietly said: You know, I do not think a perestreika is possible any more, meaning only the fourth is out, but the other two are not.

I think that has bearing on your question, namely, that there is a great deal of uncertainty how far Perestroika will go, how successful it will be.

I spend a great deal of my time now every day reading the Soviet press, because I do not believe we report fairly and adequately in this country what is happening. The turmoil is enormous. The amount of open discussion is extraordinary. But all of that is producing a great deal of uncertainty about the future. Unless the reform program really works well, there could be a gradual retrogression, turning away from the effort and eventually stopping it altogether.

So I think the future is very uncertain, and I am sure there must be a number of Soviet leaders who are uneasy at this stage. I do not think that there is a coalition in the Politburo which is adamantly opposed to the efforts, but I think there must be—in fact, there are some indications that there are—some Soviet leaders who feel that this is too uncontrolled, too extensive, too ambitious, too dangerous. In that sense, the future is very uncertain.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, I just have one more question. In your opinion, were there reasons for deploying Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles, other than as a counter to the SS-20s?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. There are some military reasons for deploying them. They do give us certain capabilities, especially because of their high accuracy. In the case of the Pershing II, the time urgency of the system makes their utility more than purely political.

But the predominant reason was to reinforce the sense of coupling with the West Europeans, the sense that their security and ours is inseparable, that Soviet nuclear weapons cannot be used against Western Europe without precipitating an American nuclear response from European soil.

So the main objective was political, but there are some military utilities, yes.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Exon, do you have any other questions?

Senator EXON. I have no further questions.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Brzezinski, as usual you have informed us in a very, very constructive way. You have been very helpful. We hope to stay in touch with you on this and many other matters. We are grateful to you for taking the time to come before our committee with your words of wisdom.

Thank you very much.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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